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Thesis Summary 
 
Following the failure of top-down centralised management approaches to natural 
resources, attention has shifted in the last two decades to participatory approaches. 
Unfortunately, participatory resource management projects have produced 
disappointing results. They have failed to meet the objectives of enhancing 
sustainable management of resources and of improving the well-being of local people.  
 
These efforts have recently been criticized by environmental conservationists, who 
continue to believe that participation by local people has resulted in increased 
degradation and loss of biodiversity. Proponents of participation however take the 
option of reverting back to top-down management approaches as ‘reinventing the 
square wheel’ since top-down approaches have an even worse record in resource 
management. The proponents of participation, therefore, call for alternative 
approaches that combine improvements of both human well-being and the status of 
natural resources.  
 
It is against this background - a conviction that community participation must be the 
way forward, despite a number of failed participatory initiatives - that the Center for 
International Forestry Research (CIFOR) initiated in 1999 a multi-country, multi-site 
Adaptive Collaborative Management (ACM) project. The starting point of the ACM 
approach is that sustainable resource management can only be achieved if local 
people participate in the utilisation and management of those resources. The approach 
makes use of various theories and concepts from several disciplines including 
complex systems theory, adaptive management, social learning, cooperation and 
competition, and theories of human interaction.  
 
The ACM project was implemented in Mafungautsi in Zimbabwe forest by a multi-
disciplinary team of researchers from 1999 to 2003, and aimed to strengthen an on-
going Resource Sharing Project that began in 1994. This thesis documents and 
critically analyses the interventions facilitated by the ACM team and their outcomes. 
It also traces these outcomes to check if they were sustained or not, and why. 
 
Evidence presented in Chapter 4 shows some of the complexities encountered in 
implementing the ACM approach. Several activities and processes were initiated 
simultaneously in the different sites.  ACM researchers facilitated stakeholders to go 
use Participatory Action Research (PAR) processes to deal with their problems and 
learn from the impacts of their actions, they, too, had to learn by doing.   
 
Through context studies the team realised a number of issues had to be addressed at 
the outset.  The context studies revealed a range of issues to be addressed if 
stakeholders were effectively to participate in the PAR process. These included 
numerous conflicts among stakeholders at various levels, unequal distribution of 
power, misunderstandings, passiveness of local community members in issues related 
to the management of the forest, the fact that not all stakeholders in local communities 
were interested in all resources in the forest, and finally weak leadership skills among 
stakeholders. 
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The ACM team therefore developed several interventions to resolve conflicts and 
build stakeholder capacities before the PAR process could progress. These 
interventions included empowerment training workshops, conflict resolution 
workshops, training on leadership skills and finally the formation of the resource user 
groups. Implementing these interventions took considerable amounts of time.  
 
PAR processes were later initiated with various resource user groups. Stakeholders at 
a range of scales, including resource user groups, resource management committees, 
and FC officers and researchers, were included in processes to develop visions and 
implement action plans. The process however was not so neat in all cases and some of 
the action plans were never implemented. Opportunities were created for stakeholders 
to share experiences, and learn together.  
 
The team also facilitated the development of a collaborative monitoring system to 
help stakeholders learn about the impact of their actions. The process for doing this 
was time consuming since several relevant stakeholders had to participate in the 
process. The CM system was initially not welcomed by all resource users. Follow up 
studies showed that stakeholders in various RMC areas did not implement all the 
aspects of the CM system but chose only certain aspects. The development of a plot 
system in Gababe to monitor the quality of the grass resource as well as resolve 
problems related to favouritism in allocation of resource harvesting areas was an 
interesting outcome. The CM system however in some cases (like in the Batanai area) 
collapsed due to political factors at play.  
 
The interventions by the ACM team resulted in some positive outcomes including the 
empowerment of local communities, some improvement in incomes obtained through 
value addition and seeking alternative markets, improvement in stakeholders’ 
knowledge about their forest resources through their monitoring activities and the use 
of sustainable harvesting methods. However, a follow-up study four years after the 
project ended showed that these positive developments were not sustained. 
  
The ACM team also aimed to influence resource management institutions and 
Chapter 5 traces how the Resource Management Committees (RMC) transformed 
over time. The chapter shows that the RMCs (especially the one in Gababe) over time, 
with capacity building on both the RMCs and local communities transformed into 
downwardly accountable and transparent organisations. The positive change was 
however short-lived, when the FC officer died. A follow up study four years later 
showed that, the RMCs were no longer accountable to their communities and several 
conflicts were now present among stakeholders. These were simply ignored.  
 
In trying to understand why things turned out this way, I address one central question 
– to what extent was failure a result of misconceptualization and misapplication of the 
participatory approach, as distinct from being a product of the general rapidly 
declining socio-economic conditions in the country? Although from a superficial 
analysis one can conclude that wider events in the country finished off a beautiful 
initiative in its infancy, I argue that the initiative would have failed anyway even if the 
environment had not changed. I identify key factors that would have led to the failure 
of the project.  
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First, the overestimation of what the ACM team could do given the limited period and 
the complexity of the situation in Mafungautsi. Second, the ACM team did not 
address issues of power and its unequal distribution. Third, the ACM team did not 
facilitate the development of clear rules and their means of enforcement to support 
management activities. Fourth, the ACM team paid insufficient attention to the 
conflicting needs of local resource users, and finally, the team left the future work 
with an underfunded and understaffed organisation.  
 
I conclude that if ACM and other learning-based participatory resource management 
initiatives are to succeed, they must empower the poor and marginalised and 
explicitly address issues of power and politics. Joint learning processes should not be 
taken as a panacea but must integrate elements from other disciplines such as political 
ecology. Such projects should also ensure that clear rules for management and use of 
resources are agreed upon as well as their means of enforcement. 
 
Samenvatting van de thesis 
 
Na het falen van de top-down en centraal georganiseerde benadering in het beheren 
van natuurlijke hulpbronnen verschoof de aandacht in de laatste twee decennia naar 
participatieve benaderingen. Ongelukkigerwijs hebben ook participatieve projecten 
ten aanzien van het beheer van hulpbronnen teleurstellende resultaten opgeleverd. Zij 
faalden in het halen van de doelstelling om duurzaam beheer van de hulpbronnen te 
versterken en het leven van de lokale bevolking te verbeteren.  
 
Deze pogingen zijn recentelijk bekritiseerd door natuurbeschermers die er nog steeds 
vanuit gaan dat participatie van de lokale bevolking heeft geresulteerd in toenemende 
degradatie en verlies van biodiversiteit. Voorstanders van participatie beschouwen de 
optie om terug te keren naar de top-down beheersbenadering als “het opnieuw 
uitvinden van het vierkante wiel” want de top-down benaderingen hebben een nog 
slechtere staat van dienst in het beheer van hulpbronnen. De voorstanders van 
participatie roepen daarom op tot alternatieve benaderingen die het verbeteren van het 
leven van de mensen en de status van de natuurlijke hulpbronnen combineren.  
 
Het is tegen deze achtergrond – de overtuiging dat gemeenschapsparticipatie de weg 
naar verbetering is, ondanks een aantal mislukte participatieve initiatieven – dat het 
Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) in 1999 een Adaptive 
Collaborative Management (ACM) project startte in verschillende landen en meerdere 
sites. Het startpunt in de ACM benadering is dat duurzaam beheer van hulpbronnen 
alleen bereikt kan worden als lokale bevolking participeert in het gebruik en beheer 
van die hulpbronnen. De benadering maakt gebruik van verschillende theorieën en 
concepten van verschillende disciplines zoals “complex systems theory”, “adaptive 
management”, “social learning”, “cooperation” en “competition”, en theorieën over 
menselijke interactie.  
 
Het ACM project werd geïmplementeerd in Mafungautsi Forest in Zimbabwe door 
een multidisciplinair team van onderzoekers van 1999 tot 2003, een streefde er naar 
om een lopend Resource Sharing Project dat in 1994 begon te versterken. Deze thesis 
documenteert en analyseert op kritische wijze de interventies die door het ACM team 
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werden gefaciliteerd, en de uitkomsten daarvan. Het traceert ook of de uitkomsten 
duurzaam waren of niet, en waarom.  
 
Bewijs dat gepresenteerd is in Hoofdstuk 4 laat een aantal van de moeilijkheden zien 
die werden ontmoet bij het implementeren van de ACM benadering. Verschillende 
activiteiten en processen werden tegelijkertijd gestart in drie verschillende “pilot” 
sites aan de rand van het beschermde bos: Batanai, Gababe en Ndarire. Terwijl de 
ACM onderzoekers de belanghebbenden faciliteerden in het gebruiken van 
Participatory Action Reserach (PAR) om hun problemen op te lossen en te leren van 
hun acties, moesten zij ook ‘leren-door-te-doen’.  
 
Door het uivoeren van “context studies” realiseerde het team zich dat een aantal 
kwesties vanaf het begin moesten worden aangepakt. De context studies toonden een 
reeks van kwesties die aangepakt zouden moeten worden om de belanghebbenden 
effectief te kunnen laten participeren in het Participatory Action Research (PAR) 
proces. Deze omvatten talrijke conflicten tussen belanghebbenden op verschillende 
niveaus, ongelijke verdeling van macht, misverstanden, passiviteit van leden van de 
lokale gemeenschap in kwesties van beheer van het bos, het feit dat niet alle 
belanghebbenden in de lokale gemeenschappen geïnteresseerd waren in alle 
hulpbronnen in het bos en tenslotte de zwakke leiderschapsvaardigheden bij de 
belanghebbenden.  
 
Het ACM team ontwikkelde daarom verschillende interventies om conflicten op te 
lossen en de capaciteit van de belanghebbende de vormen voordat het PAR proces 
zijn voortgang kon hebben. Deze interventies omvatten “empowerment training 
workshops”, “conflict resolution workshops”, training in leiderschapsvaardigheden en 
tenslotte de vorming van “resource user groups”. Daarnaast faciliteerden zij het 
functioneren van zogenaamde “Resource Management Committees” (RMCs), welke 
opgericht waren in het kader van het Resource Sharing Project. Het implementeren 
van deze interventies koste een aanzienlijke hoeveelheid tijd.  
 
PAR processen werden later gestart met verschillende resource-user groepen. 
Belanghebbenden van verschillende niveaus, zoals de resource-user groepen, de 
resource-management comités, en de Forest Commision (FC) functionarissen en de 
onderzoekers, werden in het proces betrokken om de visies te ontwikkelen en de 
actieplannen te implementeren. Het proces was echter niet in alle gevallen zo simpel 
en sommige actieplannen werden nooit geïmplementeerd. Er werden gelegenheden 
gecreëerd voor de belanghebbenden om hun ervaringen te delen, en om samen te 
leren.  
 
Het team faciliteerde ook de ontwikkeling van een “Collaborative Monitoring” (CM) 
systeem om de belanghebbenden te helpen in hun leren over de effecten van hun 
acties. Het proces om dit te doen was tijdsrovend omdat alle belanghebbenden in dit 
proces moesten participeren. Niet alle belanghebbenden verwelkomden het CM 
systeem. Vervolg studies toonden aan dat belanghebbenden in verschillende RMC 
gebieden areas niet alle aspecten van het CM system implementeerden maar er slechts 
bepaalde aspecten van selecteerden. De ontwikkeling van een “plot”-systeem in 
Gababe om de kwaliteit van het gras te monitoren en tegelijkertijd het probleem van 
voorkeursbehandeling in het toewijzen van oogstgebieden op te lossen, was een 
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interessante uitkomst. Het CM systeem stortte echter in sommige gevallen in elkaar 
(zoals in het Batanai gebied) door politieke factoren die in het spel waren.  
 
De interventies van het ACM team resulteerden in enkele positieve uitkomsten en 
omvatten de “empowerment” van de lokale gemeenschappen, enige verbetering in de 
inkomens door de toegevoeging van waarde en het zoeken van alternatieve markten, 
verbetering in de kennis van de belanghebbenden over hun hulpbronnen in het bos 
door hun monitoring activiteiten en het gebruik van duurzame oogstmethoden. Echter, 
een vervolg studie nadat het project was afgelopen toonde aan dat deze positieve 
ontwikkelingen niet stand hielden.  
 
Het ACM team ook probeerde de instituties die betrokken zijn in het beheren van 
hulpbronnen te beïnvloeden en hoofdstuk 5 zien hoe de “Resource Management 
Committees’ (RMC) zich over de tijd transformeerden. Het hoofdstuk toont aan dat 
de RMCs (speciaal degene in Gababe), met het vormen van hun capaciteit, 
veranderden in organisaties die transparant waren en naar beneden toe rekenschap 
aflegden. De positieve veranderingen waren echter van korte duur: totdat de FC 
functionaris stierf. De vervolgstudie vier jaar later toont aan dat de RMCs niet langer 
naar hun gemeenschappen rekenschap aflegden en dat er veschillende conflicten 
speelden tussen de belanghebbenden die simpelweg werden genegeerd.  
 
In een poging om te begrijpen waarom de zaken zo verkeerden stel ik één centrale 
vraag aan de orde – in welke mate was de mislukking een gevolg van een onjuiste 
conceptualisering en toepassing van de participatieve benadering, dit ter 
onderscheiding van mislukken als een gevolg van de algemene snelle neergang in 
sociaal-economische condities in het land. Alhoewel men van een oppervlakkige 
analyse zou kunnen concluderen dat de meer brede gebeurtenissen in het land een 
einde maakten aan een mooi initiatief dat zich in de kinderschoenen bevond, beweer 
ik dat het initiatief hoe dan ook mislukt zou zijn, zelfs als de omgeving niet zou zijn 
veranderd. Ik identificeer sleutelfactoren die tot het mislukken van het project hebben 
geleid. Ten eerste, de overschatting van wat het ACM team kon doen, gegeven de 
beperkte projectperiode en de moeilijkheid van de situatie in Mafungautsi. Ten 
tweede, het ACM team pakte de kwesties van macht en zijn ongelijke verdeling niet 
aan. Ten derde, het ACM team faciliteerde niet de ontwikkeling van duidelijke regels 
en de wijze van toepassing daarvan ter ondersteuning van de beheersactiviteiten. Ten 
vierde, het ACM team gaf onvoldoende aandacht aan de conflicterende noden van de 
lokale hulpbronnengebruikers, en tenslotte, het team liet het toekomstige werk over 
aan een ondergefinancierde en onderbezette organisatie.  
 
Ik concludeer dat als ACM en andere op leren gebaseerde participatieve initiatieven 
van beheer van hulpbronnen succesvol willen zijn, zij de armen en 
gemarginaliseerden moeten “empoweren” en expliciet kwesties van macht en politiek 
aan de orde moeten stellen. Gezamenlijke leerprocessen moeten niet als een panacee 
worden geschouwd maar moeten elementen integreren van andere disciplines zoals 
politieke ecologie. Dergelijke projecten zouden ook moeten waarborgen dat duidelijke 
regels voor beheer en gebruik van hulpbronnen worden overeengekomen als ook de 
wijze waarop deze worden nageleefd.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction  
Following the failure of top-down centralised management approaches to 
conservation of natural resources, attention has shifted in the last two decades to 
participatory approaches. Participatory resource management projects, however, have 
produced disappointing results. They have failed to meet the combined objectives of 
enhancing sustainable resource management whilst simultaneously benefiting the 
poor (Kiss, 1990; Wells et al., 1992; Franks and Worah, 2003; Emerton, 2001; Oates, 
1995; Gibson and Marks, 1995; Barrette and Arcese, 1995; Alpert 1996; Hannah 
1992). The efforts have therefore been criticized by conservationists, who consider 
participation by local people to result in increased degradation and biodiversity loss 
(Terborgh, 1999; Kramer and van Schaik, 1997, Oates, 1999). These critics call for 
stricter enforcement of protected area boundaries to safeguard biodiversity. 
 
Although proponents of participation agree that findings by conservationists regarding 
the shortcomings of participatory approaches are well grounded, they find the overall 
argument incomplete since it largely ignores key aspects of the social and political 
processes that shape and are shaped by conservation interventions in specific contexts 
(Brechin et al., 2002; Wilshusen et al., 2002). Research by political ecologists has 
pointed to the fact that efforts to preserve ‘nature’ that overlook local systems of 
livelihood and socio-political organisation lead to degradation of resources and 
exacerbate resource management conflicts (Robbins, 1994; Anderson and Grove 
1987; Richards, 1983). According to Wilshusen et al. (2002), reverting to top-down 
management approaches is like ‘reinventing the square wheel’ since top-down 
approaches have an even worse record in resource management situations. 
 
Proponents of participation, therefore, call for alternative approaches that will result 
in improvements in both human well-being and the status of natural resources. The 
Adaptive Collaborative Management (ACM) approach developed and implemented in 
several countries in Africa, Asia and South America by the Center for International 
Forestry Research (CIFOR) was meant to meet this challenge, and is the subject of 
close examination and critical analysis in this thesis. The ACM approach was 
grounded in the working assumption that resource management efforts excluding 
local people dependent on natural resources is a recipe for potential disaster. This 
thesis will examine the validity of this assumption and how well, in practice, the 
ACM approach worked.   
 
The ACM approach has its roots in ideas from several disciplines relating to complex 
system behaviour.  These include adaptive management, social learning theory, and 
ideas by sociologists and others about the roots of human cooperation and 
competition. Because of the complex nature of natural resource management, the 
ACM approach aimed to facilitate collaboration among stakeholders in consciously 
learning together about the impacts of their management actions and adapting their 
practices accordingly. The ACM approach sought to encourage groups of people 
involved in managing natural resources to undertake Participatory Action Research 
(PAR), as a means to systematically and deliberately plan, implement and evaluate 
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their actions (Fisher and Jackson, 1998), and thus to learn together about the impact of 
their actions. ‘Learning by doing’ is therefore an important principle underlying the 
ACM approach, and valid for both implementing agents (like research teams) and 
participating stakeholders. 
 
A growing body of literature, here dubbed the ACM series (Colfer, 2005a; Colfer, 
2005b; Mandondo et al., 2008, MacDougall et al., 2008; Diaw et al., 2009), tries to 
assess the outcomes in the various countries where the ACM approach was 
implemented. This thesis contributes to this literature by critically analysing the 
implementation and outcomes of the ACM approach in Mafungautsi State Forest, 
Gokwe South District, North-western Zimbabwe. However, the thesis also aims to 
take a step further, by following-up upon and assessing whether these outcomes were 
sustained or not after the project ended. The thesis is thus intended to contribute to 
wider critical debate on whether ACM or similar learning-based approaches are 
solutions for improving the status of natural resource management whilst 
simultaneously improving the lives of resource dependent communities. The track 
record of initiatives assumed to produce such ‘win-win’ outcomes has so far been 
patchy at best (Frost and Bond, 2006) and several commentators have begun to ask if 
such initiatives can at all produce lasting socio-economic development and/or 
conservation benefits (Logan and Moseley, 2002; Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Barrett and 
Arcese, 1995). These authors - and other sceptical scholars, often writing from the 
perspective of political ecology - claim that such programmes fail because of their 
lack of engagement with issues of power and politics in the communities where they 
are implemented. Logan and Moseley (2002) for instance, claim that the Communal 
Area Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE – see Section 1.2.4 for more 
details) implemented in Zimbabwe to alleviate rural poverty and enhance sustainable 
management of wildlife resources failed because the programme was flawed in 
structure, and implementation significantly deviated from the programme’s 
fundamental principles (see Box 1.1). 
 
The remainder of this chapter presents the background to natural resource 
management approaches in Zimbabwe. It outlines the factors that influenced the 
development of natural resource management policies in Africa, and in Zimbabwe in 
particular. The ACM project is positioned within this broader field. Research 
objectives, research questions, methodology and analytical framework are also 
discussed. The chapter ends with an outline of the thesis.  
 
1.2 Background  
 
1.2.1 Recent history of natural resource conservation in Africa  
Natural resource management history has been dominated by two discourses: 
conservation concerns and the global environmental crisis. These two issues have 
over time merged and become entangled. The environmental crisis in Africa has 
become a topical issue in recent years, especially in the developed world. Human 
lives, animal and plant species, natural habitats and soils are seen as being threatened 
in this continent to an extent never known before (Anderson and Grove, 1987). The 
African environmental crisis has become a common theme in both academic and 
popular culture in the Western world, and among the urbanised Africans, mainly (in 
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this last case) due to the important role played by Western media. In the past two 
decades environmentalism has flourished in most Western countries, resulting in 
increasingly loud calls for action over conservation. This has mainly been fed by new 
perceptions on the global ecological crisis and new convictions that society has 
become increasingly vulnerable to technological risks (Lowe, 1980). This essentially 
Western world perspective has resulted in global initiatives to save the planet. These 
include programmes to reduce human induced climate change, to halt tropical rain 
forest destruction and to limit the excessive use of fossil fuel. All are perceived as 
threatening global ecological sustainability. 
 
The interest of industrialised countries to conserve wildlife and habitat in Africa has a 
long history, mainly based on the Western view of African environments. To 
Westerners, Africa offers pristine wild and natural environments no longer available 
in industrial countries, and this wilderness should therefore be preserved. To 
ecological fundamentalists, natural resource conservation is an end in itself and the 
main (and perhaps only) reason why natural resources should be preserved (Richards, 
1992).  In this reckoning, African environments are pictured as a kind of ‘Eden’ 
(Curtin, 1964; Graham 1973; Marnham, 1980), rather than as complex and changing 
environments with a multiplicity of functions (Anderson and Grove, 1987). For many 
Westerners, Africa offers wilderness environments and thus opportunities to 
rediscover a lost harmony between humans and the natural environment (Marx, 1964; 
Olwig and Olwig, 1980). This Edenic image of Africa influenced most conservation 
policies in colonial states, and has lived on into the post-colonial era, influencing 
independent governments in Africa to the extent that its adoption is a prerequisite to 
access the substantial flow of available funds for environmental management.  
 
A reason for the dominance of external perspectives on the African environment 
relates to the complex infrastructures for information exchange developed under 
British and French colonial rule in Africa. These frameworks began to emerge in the 
immediate pre-colonial period, as the great European botanical gardens (such as Kew 
in England) began to develop global information networks (later linking scientists in 
the various colonies) through which environmental information could be 
systematically collected and collated on a global template (Grove, 1987a). Already, 
even in the colonial period, a link was made between the state of the environment in 
Africa and climate change (Grove, 1987a). Discussion and debate by a number of 
colonial scientists focused on information linking deforestation to rainfall reduction 
(Grove, 1987a).  The influence of the European botanic gardens (and Darwinian 
Theory) was felt on debates about species prevalence, rarity, and extinctions, helping 
to shape, as Grove (1987b) has argued, the early environmentalism of the African 
colonies. The fact that Africans successfully ensured their own survival, and thereby 
the survival of African soils, animals and plants, was largely ignored in the major 
debates (Worthington, 1958; Darling, 1960; Richards, 1985). Colonial ideas on 
conservation went hand-in-hand with the belief that Africa was somehow the 
“Westerner’s burden” and that the role of colonial conquest and subsequent rule was 
to save Africa from Africans. 
 
It was in African colonial states that environmental conservationists first lobbied for 
governments to inhibit environmental changes they did not like (Grove, 1987b). 
Prescriptions for environmental management were put forward by Western experts as 
conservation panacea (Harrisson, 1984), without critical insight into their potential 
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impact on rural populations (Mair, 1984; Hill 1986). Many conservation policies 
pursued by colonial governments (often continued by post-colonial governments, with 
subsidies from former colonial powers) reflected the perspectives of Western experts. 
In Zimbabwe for instance, the 1948 Forestry Act developed during the colonial era 
was highly influenced by debates from  conferences networking scientists and policy 
makers from throughout the Commonwealth (see Section 1.2.2), beginning with the 
idea that nature needed to be protected from burgeoning African populations. 
 
More recently it has been argued by critics that the failure of Western conservation 
experts fully to understand the social and the ecological contexts in which they 
worked led to the development of policies within colonial states that, in the event, 
proved hazardous to human survival, and even to the existence of the natural 
environment it was intended to preserve (Timberlake, 1985; Redclift, 1984). Under 
colonial rule, a “fortress” conservation approach dominated thinking about 
management of natural resources, as it was believed that conservation could only be 
achieved through fences, barriers and force, needed to keep people and nature 
separate. In short the concept of protected areas dominated thinking about 
conservation. 
 
Based on these policies, conservation projects were put in place that promoted 
protection (rather than management) of the natural environment, and incorporated 
harsh plans for the resettlement of communities living within areas identified as being 
under threat. Often this resulted in the formation of state-backed armed patrols – e.g. 
quasi-militia groups - to control (and prevent) local use of natural resources (Sharpe, 
1998). Large tracts of land in rural Africa were converted into protected areas in 
which all human activity was prohibited.  
 
Protected areas were managed by government forest or wildlife departments, on the 
basis of excluding human population. In official communications, local communities 
were blamed for the degradation of natural resources in protected areas, and in most 
cases they were forced to adopt conservation measures imposed from the top 
(Venema and van den Breemer, 1999). The exclusion of people from protected areas 
was the main aim of colonial conservation policies (Anderson and Grove, 1987). Such 
interventions had detrimental effects on the rural populations whose livelihoods 
directly depended on forest resources (Kaimowitz and Sheil, 2007). 
 
To a largely peasant rural populace in Africa, ownership of land for settlement, and as 
a means of production, is vital for survival, and is at the core of local political agenda 
(Richards, 1983). Colonial conservation policies negated those local concerns, and yet 
(surprisingly) have often continued in place in post-colonial African states. The 
colonial Forestry Act in Zimbabwe is a clear (and paradoxical) example. Where 
colonial reservation of farm land for whites was quickly reversed, at least in theory 
(even though minor changes were achieved in practice until radical changes 20 years 
later) as seen by the various changes to the legislation related to land acquisition by 
the government of independent Zimbabwe (See Box 2.2, Chapter 2), the same regime 
has made only minor changes in the colonial forest management laws (see Section 
1.2.2). This continuity helps explain the often highly negative attitudes towards 
conservation in many rural communities in Zimbabwe today. 
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The problem is in fact more general.  Colonial powers lost direct control in Africa at 
independence, but have continued to maintain strong indirect influence over 
conservation (Smith 1980; Mazrui, 1980). Post-colonial governments have a genuine 
interest at stake in, for example, preserving natural forests, protecting of water 
catchments and biodiversity.  So it is both a surprise and a puzzle to find that 
conservation efforts in Africa, today, are still driven to a large extent by a repudiated 
colonial “Edenic” model.  It will be shown that moving to a more effective framework 
is not, in fact, easy, due to certain unresolved tensions between national and 
community political interests. This thesis will explore how far the ACM approach was 
(and could be) effective in addressing this latent politics of conservation in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
1.2.2 Emergence of participatory forest management approaches 
Exclusionary conservation policies increasingly result in local hostilities and conflicts. 
Conservation objectives are undermined by the fact that indigenous people living 
around protected areas continue to make illegal use of resources they consider 
essential for survival (Dzingirai and Breen, 2005; Pimbert and Pretty, 1995; Prabhu, 
2003; Hasler, 1996; Duffy, 2000; Gibson, 1999). In many cases, indigenous groups 
have destroyed infrastructure put in place to protect natural resources (Murombedzi, 
1994). In trying to protect natural resources, some governments have sought help 
from international organisations such as the World Wide Fund for Nature, including 
equipment to track and shoot poachers of wildlife resources. Even with such measures 
in place, many African protected areas have continued to degrade, ‘leaving 
conscientious ecologists and practitioners… less doubtful that some other way of 
doing conservation was needed’ (Dzingirai and Breen, 2005, p.2). 
 
Several questions have been posed about the focus and disciplinary paradigms 
underlying conservation programmes, and conservationists have been forced to look 
beyond their own disciplines for solutions (Anderson and Grove, 1987; Sharpe, 1998). 
Debates have focused on possibilities to include social contexts within conservation 
project planning activities (Anderson and Grove, 1987). This has been the context 
within which participation by local communities as a way of enhancing effective 
conservation has surfaced in conservation debates. The arguments for participation 
have, in fact, become so commonly acknowledged that reference to participation is 
practically mandatory in environmental management project planning (Sharpe, 1998).  
 
Thus, the past two decades have been witness to an increased pressure for developing 
countries to implement decentralised,2 community-based natural resource 
management (CBNRM) approaches (Wilshusen et al., 2002; Borinni-Feyerabend, 
1996; Dzingirai and Breen, 2005; Leach, 2002). CBNRM projects have taken various 
forms, and a diversity of names has emerged, including joint forest management, co-
                                                 
2
  Decentralisation has been recommended as a way to reduce inefficiency (Ostrom et al., 
1993). It is a process by which entrustments (including regulatory and decision making powers, 
responsibility for planning and implementation and administrative capacity) are transferred to local 
groups (Nemarundwe, 2003; Ostrom et al. 1993; Mandondo, 2000a; Agrawal and Gibson, 1999). There 
are two forms of decentralization (a) devolution – when entrustments are completely transferred to 
local groups and (b) deconcentration – in which entrustments are transferred to local groups that remain 
accountable to the central government. 
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management, collaborative management, and shared forest management. This 
organizational shift fits well with calls by proponents of participation to incorporate 
the views of local communities, where livelihoods depend on the resources in 
question. In a neo-liberal age, it is often argued that this element of local self-interest 
probably is the single most effective incentive for sustainable resource management. 
Proponents of the approach then seek to make local self-interest compatible with 
defined conservation objectives. This shift towards participation by local communities 
was incorporated into the World Conservation Strategy (WCS)3 in 1980. In regard to 
Africa, this aimed to integrate rural development goals with conservation objectives, 
and to ensure the participation of local people (IUCN, 1980).  
 
Three elements stand central to the approach: 
 
• Participation as motivation. Beginning in the 1970s, several researchers (e.g. 
Chambers, 1974; Pitt, 1976) recommended use of participatory approaches to the 
management of resources  on the assumption that it is only when local actors are 
involved in decision making that they become willing to make substantial 
investments of time and effort to ensure resources are managed sustainably 
(Cernea, 1985).  
• Cost reduction. Proponents of participatory approaches believe that participation 
by local communities will result in economic and managerial efficiency. For 
example, administrative and managerial costs are reduced since communities stay 
in close proximity to resources. 
• Use of local knowledge. Local knowledge and values are deemed to be invaluable 
in designing, planning, implementing and monitoring complex and detail-specific 
resource management projects (Murphree, 1993; Mohammed Katerere, 2001). 
  
Many advocates for participatory approaches argue that taking local values and 
indigenous knowledge into account is the only way to achieve sustainable 
resource management. For those of this persuasion the following additional 
elements are considered important for enhancing sustainable resource 
management: 
 
• Empowering local community members to participate in resource management 
activities. It is essential to devolve authority to the local level, so that in effect 
rights and responsibilities related to the management of resources are transferred 
to local resource users. Traditional forms of organisation and management can 
(indeed, should) be used as entry points for sustainable resource management. 
This is because traditional organisations are seen as effective (though often 
without real evidence – see Section 1.6.1), and there are doubts about the 
usefulness or possibility to set up and sustain new natural resource management 
structures (Hesseling, 1996; Holmberg, 1992). 
• There is need to pay close attention to socio-economic variation among 
community members, and thus to take into account varying interests and 
                                                 
3
 The World Conservation Strategy (WCS) was commissioned by the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) which, together with the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) provided the 
financial support for its preparation and contributed to the evolution of its basic themes and structure. 
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motivations among members of groups often quite strongly differentiated 
according to gender or wealth. 
 
The approach has not been without its critics. First, even though the World 
Conservation Strategy (WCS) set the basis for participatory approaches, according to 
Anderson and Grove, (1987b), some of its underlying assumptions still remain 
disturbing. The strategy strongly emphasise that a conservation vision of society 
should predominate, and does not examine critically the social and political changes 
that might be necessary for conservation objectives to be achieved. The WCS 
advocates that entire societies ought to align with biosphere protection (Allen, 1980). 
Anderson and Grove (1987) see this as propaganda for global social manipulation 
towards environmental conservation that goes beyond even the most dramatic social 
engineering ambitions of colonial states in Africa after 1945. To these authors, this 
suggests that conservation initiatives are still driven by the need to meet objectives 
defined in the Western world, while only paying lip service to the social contexts 
within which the proposed management systems will operate (Anderson and Grove, 
1987). 
 
It is partly because of this unreconstructed ambition to impose a biologically-driven 
agenda that most participatory resource management initiatives are seen, by 
conservationists, as having failed to produce positive results. At issue is whether 
human welfare and development can be squared with conservation goals without 
redistribution of wealth on a global scale.  In the absence of any such international 
commitment (seen recently in the failure of the Copenhagen conference on climate 
change) it is unsurprising to find that there has been increasing criticism of 
participatory management approaches by conservationists (Terborgh, 1999; Kramer 
and van Schaik, 1997). 
 
Second a number of researchers have argued, for example, that proponents of 
participation ‘romanticize’ local cultures and ways of life, especially in assuming that 
a collective problem-solving culture exists. These critics point out that advocates of 
participation ‘neglect the complex character and evolving nature of local 
communities’ (Venema and van den Breemer, 1999:7), underestimate the presence of 
differences in local communities, pay little attention to understanding how collective 
action is organized to deal with resource management issues, and fail to appreciate 
how such action might be sustained (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004). 
 
Third, it is feared that cooperation with development agencies will create a 
dependency syndrome in local communities, resulting in the collapse of participatory 
initiatives when outsiders pull out (Newmark and Hough, 2000; Kozanayi, 2005). 
Critics also allege that indigenous knowledge is idealised while at the same time 
Western science is down-graded or even regarded as irrelevant (Baland and Platteau, 
1996; Matondi, 2001; Ribot, 1999; 1995). To some extent, this criticism is misplaced.  
Indigenous knowledge, apart from not being static, is also not complete.  Rural people 
learn continuously and take up new ideas from various sources that become part of a 
new, enlarged indigenous knowledge (Richards, 1985; Agrawal, 1995; Wolf, 1982; 
Schneider, 1977; Wallerstein, 1974; 1979a; Eckholm, 1980). 
 
A fourth major objection focuses concern on whether traditional institutions (see 
Section 1.6.1 for a definition of institutions) can act as entry points for initiating 
Chapter 1 
 8 
sustainable resource management.  Again, the charge is that proponents of 
participation tend to romanticise these institutions. In Africa, many traditional 
institutions were fatally weakened during the colonial era, and no longer command 
much respect from local communities (Richards, 1985; 1992; Baland and Platteau, 
1996; Matondi, 2001; Ribot, 1999). Some were based on the exercise of despotic 
power, and induced only fear. Suggestions to revive them are often met with disdain 
or protest by (say) women or younger people, who bore (in the past) the brunt of 
punishments meted out by often unaccountable authorities. Lastly, the concept of 
participation is also seen as problematic because it slides too easily along a discursive 
continuum from tokenism to interactive participation (Pretty, 1995). 
 
1.2.3 History of forestry policy making in Zimbabwe 
Consistent with the history of resource conservation policies in Africa mentioned 
above, early forestry policy-making in colonial Rhodesia was highly influenced and 
informed by policies endorsed by the British Empire (now the Commonwealth) 
Forestry Association. The association acted as a knowledge centre through which the 
forestry departments in the British colonies accessed conservation arguments that 
influenced the policy formulation process (Matose, 2002). These policies were mainly 
intended to command and control forests in the colonies. This early policy took no 
account of the needs of the majority population. Policy formulation during the 
colonial period was mainly influenced by a number of debates held during the various 
imperial forest conferences endorsing strict conservation of forests based on law 
enforcement (Brown, 2003). This resulted in the demarcation of state forests to be 
managed in a top-down fashion by the government forestry department, the Forestry 
Commission. These debates included discussion of watershed conservation centred 
around scientific arguments about the relationships between climate, deforestation and 
hydrology. 
 
Hydrology and climate were topical issues within the empire debates up to the 1940s, 
but their significance in the formulation of forestry policies diminished over time 
(Matose, 2002). However, ideas on the role of forests in watershed conservation 
continued to persist in forest policy formulation in Rhodesia and even in post-colonial 
Zimbabwe.  These debates were centred on the belief that indigenous forests lay 
mainly on fragile Kalahari sands, and were susceptible to erosion.  Later, sustainable 
timber yield came to greater prominence in colonial debates, due to the fact that some 
forests in commonwealth countries were rich in commercial timber species, and there 
was need to establish how best to sustain production from these commercially 
valuable assets.  A resolution was made at the Empire Forestry conference of 1923 
spelling out the need for sound management (Matose, 2002). All governments were 
urged to come up with management plans to ensure sustained yields of forest 
products. Forest and land policies during the colonial era, however, were deeply 
imbued with the desire to increase social and economic control of natural assets by 
colonial governments.  
 
The independence of Zimbabwe (1980) and a changing international conservation 
climate created a window of opportunity for more people-friendly policy frameworks 
(Adams and Hulme, 2001). Zimbabwe became, in fact, a fore-runner in experimenting 
with community-based conservation programmes, of which CAMPFIRE (Communal 
Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources) is the most notable. In 
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congruence with these trends, the Forestry Commission also communicated a desire 
for more community-based forestry policies in Zimbabwe in the early 1980s, and 
expressed a willingness to change the law accordingly. However, the Forest Act was 
merely amended and its original provisions not fundamentally changed.   
 
The Forestry Act gives authority to the Forestry Commission, to manage all state 
forests in the country. The first point under section 41 of the Forestry Act states that, 
unless authorised in terms of sub-sections (3) or (4) of section 44, no person shall cut, 
fell, injure or destroy any forest produce or remove any forest produce from any 
demarcated forest or protected private forest (Government of Zimbabwe, 1996). This 
led to the paradoxical situation that “whilst the FC advocates participation in forest 
resources management and benefit sharing by local people and communities, the 
legislative framework does not enable this to occur” (Nhira et al., 1998, p. 43). The 
laws allow local people in communal areas to use forestry products for own use only, 
while commercial use still remains limited to private owners of large scale 
commercial farms. In addition, the decentralisation of authority meant to empower 
communities never really reached them, as the Rural District Councils (RDCs, the 
lowest level of local government) remained the “appropriate authority” to decide on 
natural resources (Campbell et al., 2001). 
 
As the above discussion suggests, policies crafted in the early years of the century in 
Zimbabwe, and mainly influenced by Western environmental concerns, largely 
ignored the needs of local communities. This resulted in conflicts, and threatened the 
ultimate failure of centralised natural resource management approaches. This threat 
triggered international debate from which people-centred approaches to resource 
management emerged. 
 
1.2.4 Experiences with participatory forest management in 
Zimbabwe 
In Zimbabwe, the first attempt to implementing participatory approaches to resource 
management began in 1984 with the Communal Areas Management Programme for 
Indigenous Resources CAMPFIRE (Bonger, 1999). The Department of National 
Parks and Wildlife Management was given the authority under the Parks and Wildlife 
Management Act of 1975 to manage wildlife within and outside national parks. The 
1975 Act, however, mainly focused on commercial farming areas. It was amended in 
1982, enabling the Minister of Environment and Tourism to devolve authority to 
manage wildlife resources in areas under their jurisdiction to Rural District Councils4 
and local communities under the CAMPFIRE programme. The CAMPFIRE 
programme had its origins in a tsetse-eradication programme in the Sebungwe 
Region,5 in north-western Zimbabwe, comprising three districts namely Binga, 
                                                 
4
  The Rural District Council is the overall responsible authority and custodian of all natural 
resources in each district. It falls under the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban 
Development and has a Natural Resources Management Committee (NRMC) to coordinate all council 
activities on natural resources. The composition of the NRMC is determined by Section 36A of the 
District Councils Act.  This allows the Minister of Natural Resources to determine the members and 
terms and conditions under which the committee can appoint sub-committees (Bonger, 1999). The 
NRMC also formulates and implements all by-laws on forests and natural resources (see Section 2.3.2 
for more details) 
5
 The Sebungwe Region is an area of approximately 40 000 km2, constituting 10% of the 
country, in north western Zimbabwe, extending southward from Lake Kariba (Taylor, undated). 
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Northern Gokwe and Kariba. A major proportion of this region falls within agro-
ecological regions IV and V, considered unsuitable for agriculture.6 
 
The programme of tsetse eradication made the area habitable and resulted in 
thousands of people migrating into the area from the mid 1970s onwards 
(Murombedzi, 1994; Bonger, 1999). However, the settlers, who came from the 
densely populated Masvingo and Midlands provinces, were mostly looking for 
agricultural land. This raised fears that major changes to land use would threaten the 
protected areas, unless the settlers benefited in one way or another from the wildlife 
resources. To ensure that some of the benefits from wildlife resources devolved to the 
settlers a Wildlife Industries New Development for All (WINDFALL) Programme 
was formulated by the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, and implemented in 
1978. The programme involved the return of revenue from culled elephants in the 
Chirisa Game Park (in Sebungwe region) to surrounding communities. The basic 
assumption behind the WINDFALL programme was that the human/wildlife conflicts 
would be reduced and attitudes towards conservation would be improved in affected 
areas if wildlife proceeds were returned to their sources of origin. In the programme, 
revenues accrued to the central treasury were transferred to the Rural District 
Councils (RDCs) to fund approved projects. There were, however, huge delays in the 
transfer of funds (Murphree, 1988) and only a small portion of the proceeds from 
safari hunting were returned to relevant districts, let alone to the originating 
communities (Murphree, 1990). Under the programme, meat from culls in the national 
parks adjacent to communal areas was also supposed to be made available to the 
inhabitants of those areas. However, because of the bureaucracy involved, very little 
meat found its way back to the local communities. Overall, the programme failed to 
halt the decline of wildlife in the game park (Murombedzi, 1994; Bonger, 1999). 
 
Being aware of the deficiencies of the WINDFALL programme, and encouraged by 
the Zimbabwe Government’s ideological and policy commitments to localised 
planning and implementation of development processes, the Department of Wildlife 
Management produced a new programme entitled Communal Area Management 
Programme for Indigenous Resources CAMPFIRE, (Murphree, 1990). Details of the 
new programme are found in Martin (1986).  The programme’s main assumption was 
that conservation is only possible when undertaken by ‘relevant populations’7 as an 
investment in a sustained programme of resource exploitation. The programme also 
assumed that financial benefits from wildlife management and utilisation would act as 
an incentive for communities to develop institutional mechanisms to manage wildlife 
resources in their areas. The programme aimed: to enhance voluntary participation of 
local communities in the management of wildlife resources and their conservation, 
whilst simultaneously benefiting from this initiative; introduce a system of ownership 
                                                 
6
 Zimbabwe has been divided into five natural regions (NR)/ agro-ecological zones: NRI 
receives 1050mm+ rainfall per annum with some rain in all months of the year;  NRII receives 700-
1050mm rainfall per annum with rainfall only in summer; NRIII receives 800-700mm per annum 
rainfall and is characterised by high temperatures, infrequent heavy rains and seasonal droughts; NRIV 
receives 450-600mm rainfall per annum and is characterised by high temperatures and seasonal 
droughts, and NRV receives less than 500mm rainfall per annum and this rain is erratic (Vincent and 
Thomas, 1962). 
7
  ‘Relevant populations are those who live within the micro-environments which sustain the 
natural resources concerned, who pay the price for their sustained maintenance, who must reap the 
benefits of this investment and who at the smallest viable operational level, have the collective capacity 
to manage these resources’ (Murphree, 1990, p. 3) 
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and access rights to the wildlife resources in the game park (Nemarundwe, 2005); 
facilitate the setting up administrative and institutional structures for making the 
programme work (this involved granting of appropriate authority to rural district 
councils to allow them to take control over the management and utilisation of wildlife 
resources in their areas of jurisdiction); and provide assistance (both technical and 
financial) to communities to participate in the management and also realise economic 
benefits from their wildlife resources (Murombedzi, 1994). 
 
The financial benefits might be utilised for: a) the development of community 
infrastructure such as boreholes, schools and roads; b) the training of local community 
members in problems of animal control in order to protect themselves against wild 
animals and c) crop protection measures (Murombedzi, 1992; Nabane, 1997).  
 
In order to assist the RDC in their new responsibilities for management of wildlife 
resources, a CAMPFIRE collaborating group, consisting of seven organisations, was 
set up. This included the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management, 
responsible for policy guidance and ecological monitoring and advisory services, the 
Ministry of Local Government and National Housing with responsibility over the 
RDCs, the Zimbabwe Trust, to provide institutional development support and funding 
for RDCs, the Centre for Applied Social Sciences, responsible for policy research and 
socio-economic expertise and monitoring support, the Africa Resources Trust, to 
provide information and links to international networks on issues related to 
international policy and regulations, and the CAMPFIRE Association, whose role was 
to coordinate all RDCs with appropriate authority for managing wildlife resources, 
and to represent their interests in a policy advocacy role (Moyo, 2000). 
 
The system of ownership envisioned under the CAMPFIRE Programme involved the 
creation of natural resource co-operatives with rights and obligations similar to those 
of private ranch owners. The programme was considered impressive because of its 
bold response to problems produced by earlier policies and its sensitivity to socio-
economic and ecological factors (Murphree, 1990). Even though it took a long time 
before the programme was operational (mainly because of the complexities in setting 
up the programme), in 1988, two districts (Guruve and Nyaminyami) were given 
authority to control wildlife resources in their areas. The district councils later set up 
their enterprises and entered into contracts with private organisations, receiving all 
revenues directly and distributing them at their discretion. 
 
The RDCs were also responsible for ‘problem animal control’ (controlling animals 
that strayed out of the game park into the village to destroy crops or injure people), 
and for law enforcement and protection of wildlife resources in their areas of 
jurisdiction. The financial benefits, and increased meat consumption from culled 
animals increased the interest of local stakeholders in the programme. This resulted in 
the creation of numerous community wildlife management committees. At the peak of 
the CAMPFIRE programme, 37 districts had received appropriate authority to 
manage wildlife in their constituencies. However, only 23 districts functioned as 
intended and only 12 of these received regular income from hunting and ecotourism, 
amounting to USD20.3 Million accumulated between 1989 and 2001 (Frost and 
Bond, 2006). Of this amount, 49% was channelled back to the communities, 
representing 121.500 households (Khumalo, 2003). Because of these positive 
developments the CAMPFIRE programme was hailed as a success and received 
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international recognition as a good example of Community-Based Natural Resource 
management.  
 
However, as time passed it became obvious that the programme had failed to live up 
to its expectations to conserve wildlife resources and improve lives of local people 
living on the margins of national parks (Murphree, 2000; Mandondo, 2001; Ribot, 
1999; Matondi, 2001; Nemarundwe, 2003). A number of factors were identified as 
having led to this failure: a free-rider problem, as a result of unclear definition of 
beneficiary groups, lack of transparency by RDCs over the generated financial 
benefits and their use, and reluctance to devolve power to local communities by the 
RDCs. Reasons for the reluctance of the district level local government structures, the 
RDC, to devolve authority included continued bureaucracy in government 
departments  (Murphree, 1993), the supply-led nature of the decentralisation process 
(Mandondo, 2001; Ribot, 1999; Matondi, 2001), and the existence of too many 
organisational structures in the communities (such as the CAMPFIRE Wildlife 
Management Committees, the Traditional Leadership Authorities, and the Village 
Development Committees), which made it difficult to identify the entity to which 
authority was to be devolved (Nemarundwe, 2005; 2003). 
 
Following the implementation of CAMPFIRE which focused on big game in national 
parks, interest developed to see if the framework could be applied to other natural 
resources, such as forests. The Forestry Commission (FC), a government department 
under the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, decided to embark on co-
management initiatives around reserved state forests8 to deal with conflicts between 
local communities and the FC. A pilot Resource Sharing Project (RSP) was initiated 
in Mafungautsi State Forest, in Gokwe South District of Midlands Province, in 1994. 
The pilot project aimed to test joint management of the forest by the FC and local 
residents, as an alternative to complete state control. The experiences were meant to 
inform policy on the importance and feasibility of participatory approaches to the 
management of state forests. 
 
The FC initiated the formation of fourteen Resource Management Committee (RMC)9 
areas in communities surrounding the forest. The RMCs were created to align with 
communities, and to act as entry points for the FC in the community. An RMC area 
covered between 3 and 10 villages. Each RMC consisted of 7 members: a chair, vice 
chair, secretary, vice secretary, treasurer and 2 ordinary committee members. These 
members were representatives of local communities in the different areas. The RMCs 
were supposed to help control resource-harvesting in the forest through issuing 
harvesting permits to community members, thereby at the same time generating 
income for local rural development. The joint management project went beyond the 
provisions of the current Forestry Act by allowing communities to harvest minor 
forest products.  These included thatch grass (Hyparrhenia femitina), broom grass 
(Aristida junciformis), dead wood, mushrooms, fruits, mopane worms (edible 
caterpillars of the moth Imbresia belina) and use of pasture lands within the forest 
                                                 
8
  State forests in Zimbabwe have over the years been solely managed by the Forestry 
Commission since they serve national interests – including commercial timber and wildlife protection, 
preservation of biodiversity, and protection of ecosystems and water catchments (Piearce and Gumbo, 
1993)  
9
  The 14 RMC areas and their locations around Mafungautsi State Forest are shown in Chapter 
2 (Figure 2.5) 
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reserve. Major forest resources, such as timber and poles, remained outside the 
resource sharing agreement.  
 
Through the Resource Sharing Project (RSP), the FC aimed to encourage local 
participation in forest resource management and benefit sharing, while devolving 
limited authority to the local level. In a study to assess the prospects for co-
management of the Mafungautsi State Forest, Matose (2002) concluded that even 
after many years of participatory management in Mafungautsi, villagers and forestry 
staff still maintained fixed ideas about the forest. On one hand, due to entrenched 
discourses around watershed conservation and fragile ecosystems, the FC continued 
to deny local people access to forest land for cultivation and settlement. Local 
community members, on the other hand - particularly original settlers - viewed the 
forest symbolically as their homeland, to which they had rights to return to settle and 
farm (Matose, 2002). Community members also continued to access resources like 
timber that fell outside the RSP, and this resulted in continued degradation of the 
forest resource.  
 
The background to the kind of initiative attempted in Mafungautsi is found in Indian 
forestry which in many ways acted as a model for the Mafungautsi Resource Sharing 
Project. In India, 95% of forest land is owned by the government (Matose, 2002) as a 
result of laws that converted private and communal lands to state lands, and resulted 
in the rights of local communities over land being eroded (Campbell, 1992; Nhira and 
Matose, 1996; Matose, 2002). The Indian government forest department’s main 
objective in managing the forests was to maximize revenue while protecting the 
environment. Because of their exclusion from the management and utilisation of 
forests resources, communities living in the forest margins began to treat these forests 
as open-access resources,10 leading to over-exploitation and degradation. 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Indian forest departments realised that they would never 
succeed to manage forests sustainably without participation of local communities. 
Officials from three states, Bengal, Gujarat and Huryana, therefore decided to involve 
local community members in management by creating Forest Protection Committees. 
These committees were supposed to represent local communities and were 
responsible for protecting degraded lands from illegal tree cutting, fires, overgrazing 
and encroachment (Matose, 2002). In return, local communities were supposed to 
benefit from accessing a wide range of non-timber forest products. 
 
Because of success in these three pilot states, the Indian government enacted an order 
in 1990 asking all states to involve local communities in the management of forests 
lands, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were asked to become facilitators 
of the process. By 1992, nine states had passed regulations encouraging partnerships 
between local communities and forestry departments in management of forestry 
resources (Campbell, 1992). By 1998, 21 states had involved local people in the 
management of forestry resources (Sharma, 1998). Results from these joint 
management initiatives were uneven, however, and in some cases distinctly 
disappointing, for a number of reasons: inter/intra community disputes, unchanged 
attitudes and culture among forest department officials, the socio-economic and 
                                                 
10
  Under the open access regime, the resource in question is not taken as property and its use is 
open to all on a first come first served basis. Open access resources are subject to resource depletion 
(Moyo, 2000). 
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cultural values of the local communities, lack of statutory authority within local 
institutions, coverage of degraded forests only, and the donor-driven nature of some 
initiatives (Sharma, 1998). 
 
As mentioned in the introductory section, because of some of the disappointing results 
from participatory resource management initiatives (such as those experiences in 
India and Zimbabwe), it is not surprising that there has been increasing criticism by 
conservationism who blame participation as leading to resource degradation. 
However, proponents of participation take reverting back to parks as re-inventing a 
square wheel that will never work (Wilshusen et al., 2002). They still see participation 
as a promising alternative and therefore call for more participatory approaches that 
produce positive outcomes. 
 
It is against this background  - a conviction that participatory resource management 
must be the way forward, but experience of a number of failed participatory initiatives 
- that the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) initiated (in 1999) a 
multi-country, multi-site Adaptive Collaborative Management (ACM) research 
project. The ACM concept  counts  complex systems analysis, adaptive management 
and social learning theory, and theories  relating to cooperation, competition, equity, 
development, human interaction and facilitation of change among its intellectual 
heritage  (Diaw, et al. 2009). At the heart of the ACM approach are issues concerning 
what is needed to bring about cooperation among stakeholders in joint resource 
management situations, in the face of multiple interests and conflict. The ACM 
approach makes use of a literature on common property that has grown over the years 
to demonstrate alternatives to Hardin’s tragedy of the commons thesis [i.e. that 
resources held in common are subject to degradation, since it is in no individual's 
interest to conserve an open-access assets, and free-riders cannot be excluded - 
(Hardin, 1968)]. As in this common property literature (Kayambazinthu et al., 2003; 
Ostrom, 1986; 1990; Bromley and Cernea, 1989; Cleaver, 2000), ACM considers that 
when communities have regulatory systems 11 to check on individual interests, free 
riders can be controlled and common pool resources can be maintained. 
 
The ACM approach acknowledges that natural resource management is complex and 
characterised by uncertainty and surprise. This is a consequence of multiple, non-
linear interactions among the various components in eco-systems making predictions 
of precise outcomes impossible. Simple localised events can lead to the emergence of 
complex phenomena at macro levels not easily predicted from knowledge of lower 
level components and their interactions (Jiggins and Roling, 2000). The complexity is 
further increased by a multiplicity of stakeholders with different aims and interests. 
This makes planning and decision making processes difficult especially when 
resource users do not have complete knowledge about the impacts of the actions.  
Nevertheless, waiting and not doing anything is not an option; decisions must still be 
made and actions must be taken. 
 
The ACM approach advises resource managers to prepare themselves to expect and 
deal with surprises, and to treat management activities as experiments. For the ACM 
approach, management of natural resources should always be experimental, with 
managers consciously learning from their implemented activities and their outcomes. 
                                                 
11
  Norms, rules and regulations that govern behaviour 
Introduction 
 15 
This, according to the ACM approach, calls for resource managers to engage in 
Participatory Action Research (PAR) - a reflective process of progressive problem 
solving. In this process, resource managers identify their problem, list alternative 
solutions, select and implement solutions, monitor outcomes, reflect upon them and 
draw lessons from the outcomes of these actions (Selener, 1997). PAR is generally 
applied within social learning contexts, where multiple actors collectively arrive at 
joint problem definition and objectives, and then work collectively toward an agreed 
solution (Maarleveld and Dangbégnon, 1999; Pretty and Buck, 2002). 
 
In Zimbabwe, the ACM project was implemented from 1999 to early 2003 in 
Mafungautsi State forest. This forest acted as a pilot joint management project 
between the FC with and local communities in 1994. The joint forest management 
programme was named the Resource Sharing Project (RSP). ACM was meant to 
strengthen the RSP project, which so far had been ineffective (Section 2.6, Chapter 2). 
Key partners in the implementation of the ACM project were CIFOR, the FC and 
local communities. The main aims of the ACM project were to add value to the RSP 
as well as gain more understanding on the usefulness of the ACM approach in joint 
forest management situations. Because of a belief in ‘learning by doing’ as a way to 
solve natural resource management problems, the ACM project was introduced as a 
PAR project.  
 
The project aimed to facilitate a shift away from top-down prescriptions to encourage 
use of PAR for problem solving. However, participatory resource management 
approaches have recently been criticised for not living up to their expectations and 
producing patchy successes only. Critics point out that such programmes do not 
address issues of power and politics in the communities and the underlying their 
assumptions are still disturbing as they still promote Western conservation ideas 
whilst paying lip service to needs of local communities (Anderson and Grove, 1987). 
The approach (it is claimed) romanticises traditional institutions, assuming such 
institutions are suitable entry points for initiating sustainable resource management. 
This assumption underestimates the presence of socio-economic differences within 
communities and the degree to which traditional structures may serve the interests of 
an elite. In addition, dependency syndrome is sometimes fostered, and the initiative 
collapses when the facilitators pull out.  Finally, it sometimes suggested that 
supporters of participatory approaches in conservation do not always fully appreciate 
the complexity of the natural resource management problems to be addressed. 
Assuming that ecosystem responses to human use are linear, predictable and 
controllable has been identified as a fundamental error in past resource management 
efforts (Folke, et al., 2002). Empirical evidence has however shown that human and 
natural systems behave in non-linear ways that makes prediction of management 
outcomes using probability based approaches difficult and impossible (Folke, et al., 
2002). Uncertainty and surprise therefore requires a new way of doing things based on 
learning by doing approaches to problem solving (Jiggins and Roling, 2000). The aim 
of this thesis is to examine and resolve doubts of this kind, focusing in particular on 
the adequacy of learning-based approaches to the kind of situation encountered 
around the Mafungautsi forest. 
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1.3 Research Objectives 
The main objective of this thesis is to make a critical assessment of the contribution of 
the ACM approach to the conservation of forests in Zimbabwe, and the improvement 
of lives of villagers living in communities on the forest margins.  
1.3.1 Specific objectives 
There are 3 specific objectives: 
• To understand linkages between changing social and environmental conditions 
and power relations among stakeholders attempting joint resource 
management. 
• To contribute to the understanding of implementation and outcomes of 
learning-based approaches in natural resource management and factors that 
influence the sustainability of outcomes of learning-based approaches.  
• To understand the influence of institutions in outcomes of learning based 
resource management initiatives 
1.4 The Research Questions 
This thesis addresses the following questions and sub-questions: 
 
1. How was the learning-based approach implemented in Mafungautsi Forest and 
what were its outcomes? 
• What steps were taken in implementing the ACM approach? 
• Who was involved in doing what? 
• What challenges were faced in implementing the ACM approach? 
• What were the outcomes of the ACM approach and how did these come 
about?  
 
2. What conflicts or tensions emerged during and after the ACM project and how 
were they dealt with? 
 
3. Which institutional structures were put in place in the ACM project and how 
did these influence resource management activities and outcomes? 
 
4. Is the ACM approach an answer to the recent criticisms of participatory 
resource management? 
• Did the ACM approach lead to improvements in the well-being of local 
community members and the status of the forest?  
• If improvements were observed, were these sustained and what factors 
influenced the sustainability or lack of sustainability of outcomes of the ACM 
approach? 
 
5. What lessons can we learn from the Mafungautsi experiences in relation to 
learning based approaches?  
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1.5 Methodology   
In this research, I revisit the action research project through a kind of reflexive 
technographic study, buttressed by concepts of political ecology and new 
institutionalism. There are several definitions of reflexivity in literature (Aamodt, 
1991; Guillemin and Gillam, 2004; Mason, 1996; Hertz, 1997; Côté & Levine, 2002; 
Huberman and Miles, 1994), but they come all down to the same critical reflection of 
the researchers own position and views, and how this influences his/her interpretation 
of the research findings (Burr, 1995). Some definitions go further and relate 
reflexivity to the influence of the researcher on the researched situation and the 
participation of others, non-researchers in knowledge generation (Giddens, 1990; 
Bourdieu, 1992). Reflexivity consists of two processes: self reflection and 
identification of the researcher’s feelings and pre-conceptions; and the ability to put 
aside these feelings and pre-conditions (Ahern, 1999). Huberman and Miles (1994) 
argue that sharing experiences and insights fully makes researchers accountable to 
readers. Reflexivity therefore helps to make qualitative research findings credible and 
objective by accounting for researcher’s values, beliefs, knowledge and biases 
(Cutcliffe, 2003; Bourdieu, 1992).  
 
The following two techniques can be used in reflexivity and account for oneself in the 
research. First, use of a reflexive journal to capture the researcher’s mind process and 
philosophical position and the bases upon which decisions were made in the research 
process. This requires the researcher to spend time reflecting on his/ her thoughts and 
feelings about the issues being investigated (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The researcher 
however, needs to note changes made to these thoughts and feelings during 
implementation of planned activities. A reflexive journal should include: daily plans 
for research activities; a dairy with personal reflections and methodologies chosen for 
implementing the research and reasons associated with the choice made. Second, 
making the researchers pre-suppositions explicit before starting the research work. 
Andrews et al. (1996), argue that researchers studying a certain phenomenon bring 
with them pre-suppositions and these need to be made explicit and should be tested 
out with empirical evidence from the study. This however requires one to be fully 
aware of him/ herself. However, as the ‘Jo-Hari’ window shows (Chapter 4, Part I), 
one can never fully know one’s self and there is always a blind spot. This means that 
only a portion of our assumptions can be made explicit whilst the other potion 
remains outside of the researchers’ consciousness (Cutcliffe, 2003).  
 
I use reflexivity as a methodology to help me attain objectivity when looking back at 
the experiences of the ACM project in Mafungautsi Forest from 1999 up to 2007. In 
this research, I play two key roles, one of retelling the ACM project story as I was 
part of the implementing team in Zimbabwe and the second of being a PhD researcher 
critically reflecting on the ACM project and its outcomes. I therefore start by making 
explicit the assumptions that the researchers had before initiating the ACM research 
project (Chapter 3) as these influenced their methodologies in implementing the ACM 
approach in Mafungautsi. In this research, I also put my initial assumptions aside by 
adopting a new analytical framework (consisting of New Institutionalism and political 
ecology) to critically analyse the project and its outcomes. 
 
In trying to distance myself from a project in which I was an actor, I take the step of 
trying to look at the ACM approach as a technology (i.e. as a way of making 
something), and specifically as a technology used to make changes in a resource 
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sharing process. It was believed that with the ACM approach, local stakeholders 
would collaborate, jointly learn together to solve their natural resource management 
problems. In the thesis I trace the steps involved in this process of joint learning, and 
then assess the outcomes of this technology, asking whether they were positive or 
negative and whether they were sustained or not. I critically analyse why these 
outcomes were sustained or not. The first step in gaining a reflexive standpoint is to 
say something about my background as a project worker.    
 
I joined the CIFOR’s ACM project as a PAR researcher in January 2001 and worked 
for the project until 2003 when it ended. My terms of reference as an ACM team 
member included facilitating the implementation the ACM approach in the RSP, 
contributing to the further development of the ACM concept, conducting field work 
related to participatory resource management using PAR as the main methodology, 
writing field reports, analysing findings from the field work and preparing written 
output (such as scientific papers and manuals) for different audiences, and finally 
acting as a resource person in training workshops to equip forest extension officers 
with the ACM approach.  
 
After the project ended in 2003, I became involved in another project to upscale the 
ACM approach. My terms of reference changed and my work now focused on 
capacity building for forestry officers in the selected districts with regard to the ACM 
approach, and monitoring progress in all the sites. I also acted as a chief editor for an 
ACMZim news newsletter that was put in place to act as a learning platform for the 
various officers in ACM up-scaling project. During this period (from 2004-6) I also 
conducted post-project fieldwork in Mafungautsi as part of my PhD studies. I did my 
final field work in 2007 when I was no longer working for CIFOR and was a full time 
PhD student. 
 
Some of the data used in this thesis were generated during the action research process 
that I participated in, as a member of the Zimbabwe ACM team. This included 
information on how the ACM approach was implemented in Mafungautsi State 
Forest, the various processes facilitated, and their immediate outcomes. Besides using 
my own experiences in facilitating this process from 2001 to 2003, I also undertook 
complementary ethnographic research in the period 2004 - 2007. This ethnographic 
research partly served as triangulation for the action research findings, but also 
yielded additional information on what had happened in the area subsequently. I also 
examined the field reports that were produced during the ACM research period, and 
subjected them to a critical appraisal. I collected the bulk of the data in 2004 - 7 using 
a mix of methods including participant observation, secondary data analysis, focus 
group discussions, and questionnaire surveys.  
 
To generate information on the profiles of the Resource Management Committees 
(RMCs) in Mafungautsi (including the ACM sites, at Gababe, Ndarire and Batanai), I 
conducted interviews in September 2004, guided by a checklist, with key informants. 
These key informants included RMC chairpersons, secretaries, and treasurers, and 
other people knowledgeable about RMC operations in Mafungautsi. I also 
interviewed the Forestry Commission (FC) programme officer for the Mafungautsi 
Resource Sharing Project, who gave a historical overview of all the RMCs around the 
state forest. I also attended to a number of important details, such as measuring 
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distances, in cases where the respondents did not know the distances from one place 
to the other.   
 
For identifying the outcomes of the ACM approach, I analysed field notes taken in the 
period 1999 to 2005, and conducted focus group discussions and key informant 
interviews with villagers and the FC project staff in 2006 - 2007. Because of the 
deteriorating socio-economic-political environment in Zimbabwe, it was not practical 
to attempt a thorough ecological and socio-economic impact assessment of the study 
area. So much had changed in the general context, so fast, that it would be hard to 
quantitatively identify project impacts. An additional disturbing factor was the loss of 
a key figure, the FC officer, who unfortunately passed away in October 2005. The 
officer who took over in 2006 received limited training in the ACM approach and 
faced serious constraints in accessing basic resources as the situation in the country 
continued to worsen.  Up to October 2007, when the new officer also sadly passed 
away, he had concentrated his efforts on a new drive to evict new settlers in the forest. 
With this background of flux, a thorough ecological survey to assess the status of the 
forest resource at the end of the project would have been a waste of time, as several 
parts of the forest had already been converted to agricultural fields by new settlers, 
who moved in and settled in forested land after the introduction of the Zimbabwe Fast 
Track Land Reform Programme in 2000. The number of settlers in the forest has 
continued to increase (Chapter 2). While no attempt is made to assess quantitatively 
the ecological impact of the ACM intervention after the project ended, I do attempt to 
assess and interpret provisional outcomes realised during the project period before the 
general situation became more unstable, as noted at the time and documented in 
project records. 
1.6 Conceptual Orientation  
Mafungautsi State forest, like other common property resources, faces a potential 
tragedy of the commons. However, a huge body of common property literature has 
demonstrated that this problem can be avoided if effective institutions (rules, norms 
and regulations) are put in place to regulate and control individual behaviour. The 
Mafungautsi forest resource continued to be degraded even after the introduction of 
the RSP, and up to the time when the ACM project was introduced in 1999, the RSP 
had produced disappointing results. In this thesis, it is imperative to analyse how the 
ACM project facilitated the setting up of institutional elements considered crucial for 
overcoming the tragedy of the commons problem. Several approaches to institutional 
analysis can be found in literature, and this study makes its own selection from among 
available new institutionalist options, to throw light upon the outcomes of the ACM 
project in Mafungautsi. New Institutionalism, however, has recently been criticised 
for failing to address issues of social difference and failing to incorporate political and 
contextual factors into its analysis. Because of this shortcoming, the present study will 
also make use of an analytical framework reflecting some ideas developed by 
geographers, anthropologists and others working under the banner of “political 
ecology”, to try and probe some of the conflicted power relations involved in 
participation. These two elements in my analytical framework will now be discussed 
in more detail.  
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1.6.1 New institutionalism  
There are different definitions of institutions in literature. Some researchers (Harriss, 
1982; North 1990; Pretty and Ward, 2001) clearly differentiate institutions from 
organisations. Organisations in this case are taken as players or institutional structures 
with authority to ensure that agreed upon rules are adhered to (Pretty and Ward, 2001; 
North, 1990). Institutions are then defined as regulatory systems of formal rules, 
regulations, informal agreements and norms of behaviour and organisations (Harriss, 
1982; North, 1990; Bromley, 1989; Cleaver, 2000). Other scholars however, see 
organizations as products of institutions and thus in some sense synonymous (Uphoff, 
1986; Mukamuri, 2000). Uphoff (1986), for example, considers institutions (whether 
organisations or rules governing use) as complexes of norms and behaviour that 
persist over time by serving collectively valued purposes. For Douglas (1986), by 
contrast, the form of organization (e.g. hierarchy, markets, egalitarian-collective, etc) 
generates norms and ‘collectively valued purposes’. In Douglas' approach, clash of 
institutional values is one of the problems to be explained and resolved by 
institutional analysis. Institutions have been seen as crucial in defining the context 
within resource management takes place (North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990; Murphree, 
1993). In discussions of institutions in the literature, terms like ‘traditional’, 
'customary’ and ‘indigenous’ are frequently used to specify the type of institution or 
management system in place. 
 
However, not all scholars using these terms attempt to qualify their meaning. When 
the term ‘traditional’ is used in connection with ‘management’ for instance, it is often 
taken to mean systems characterised by sustainable and equitable use of resources 
(Knudsen, 1995). In this case, the term ‘traditional’ has a connotation of being old, 
legitimate, equitable and well adapted to the resources and resource users in question. 
The terms ‘customary’ and ‘indigenous’ are also often not defined and used 
interchangeably. Indigenous institutions for instance, are taken to be old, local in 
origin and conducive to equity. There are dangers, however, in using such terms in an 
unqualified manner since they give a stamp of authenticity or legitimacy to local 
resource management arrangements that have actually changed a great deal over time, 
and which may be far from being equitable. 
 
To understand natural resource use, an institutional analysis is an important step 
(Mukamuri et al., 2000).  One example is the rational co-operation approach that 
argues resource users can economise on transaction costs. Proponents of his approach 
are inspired by work of rational choice New Institutionalists such as Ostrom (1990), 
and Bromley (1989). A second approach draws from Durkheimian tradition focuses 
on moral codes.  There is often a focus on culturally-specific traditions and value 
systems. This approach emphasises the power of moral constraint in generating and 
maintaining collective resource management (Mukamuri et al., 2000), and views 
actors as being largely driven by social norms (Skott, 1986). The rational choice 
framework adopted by the (so called) New Institutionalism is adopted here, since I 
consider it useful to be able to apply a universal template to the task of assessing 
informal and customary norms.  This is simply a heuristic move, to avoid becoming 
entrapped in arguments about culture, and cultural relativism. Rightly or wrongly, this 
was also the approach of the ACM, in that it supposed that the principles of social 
learning were shared across cultures.  I apply a New Institutionalist orientation in 
seeking to understand the outcomes of resource use and management in Mafungautsi.  
Further details about this approach are given below. 
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The New Institutionalism argues that credible commitment combined with mutual 
monitoring, under the protection of certain institutional arrangements, can motivate 
individuals to become more engaged in the realisation of shared goals and visions 
(Ostrom, 1990). Under this approach, individual decision making is not only 
influenced by individual preferences and the optimisation of behaviour (as argued by 
many economists) but by institutional (i.e. group) preferences as well (Bates, 1995; 
Ostrom, 1990). Douglas (1986) goes so far as to suggest that when an institution is 
functioning well it takes over much of the thinking and decision making from 
individuals. According to the new institutionalism, credible commitments can be 
made when individuals are presented with rules meeting key criteria (Nemarundwe, 
2003).  These include clearly defined boundaries, congruence between allocation and 
access rules and local conditions, users able to modify rules, monitoring by 
accountable individuals, and graduated sanctions for non-compliance.  Commitment 
by individuals is to follow the rules, so long as others adopt the same commitments 
and long term benefits to individuals and groups are greater than costs. The main 
argument of new institutionalism is that institutions provide mechanisms to enable 
individuals bound in groups to overcome “free-rider” problems (Ostrom, 1990; 
Acheson, 1989; Bates, 1995).  
 
Unlike the neo-classical economists, who view the individual decision-maker as 
acting according to a calculated rationality, new institutionalism assumes that 
individuals acts according to a bounded rationality (not all preferences can be ranked). 
In situations where an individual decides to go against set rules, institutions play an 
important role in sanctioning such actions. A large number of empirical studies of 
common property resource management have been informed by New Institutionalist 
thinking (Bromley, 1992; McCay and Acheson, 1987; Ostrom, 1990). This body of 
literature has been termed “common property resource theory” (Steins, 1999). The 
theory suggests that individuals will collectively manage common property resources 
when benefits from the institutional set up (rules and means of enforcement) are 
limited to a small and stable community (McCay and Acheson, 1987; Ostrom, 1990). 
Ostrom goes further to explain that boundaries define the terms of exclusion, and 
these are monitored and enforced by institutional structures established to monitor 
resource use.  
 
A common theme that can be distilled from the common property resource theory 
literature is the concern with the design principles underlying successful collective 
resource management, though there is debate about what ‘successful’ and ‘not 
successful’ means, and whose perceptions of success count (Ostrom, 1990; 
Nemarundwe, 2003). Design principles are elements or conditions that influence 
institutions in sustaining the common pool resources by gaining compliance of users 
to rules, across generations (Ostrom, 1990). Several design principles have been 
identified by Ostrom (1990).  These include:  
 
• Rules that clearly define who has rights to use a resource 
• Congruence between the rules that assign benefits and costs 
• Possibility to modify rules 
• Monitoring and conformance 
• Graduated sanctions 
• Conflict resolution mechanisms using clearly defined rules 
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• Recognition of rules by external authorities 
• Application of rules, both horizontally (across groups) and vertically (up and 
down hierarchical levels).  
 
Ostrom (1990) suggests that long-term stable institutions have most or all of these 
features, but that fragile or failed institutions have fewer, or none.  
 
In the common property literature (North, 1990; Harriss, 1982; Bromley, 1999) 
regulatory systems designed to coordinate individual and collective action in natural 
resource management are sometimes classified under three broad categories, namely 
formal laws, informal conventions and norms designed to coordinate and manage 
individual and collective actions. Common property theory and the design principles 
have influenced institutional reforms aimed at community-based natural resource 
management. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that an approach based on these 
design principles results in treating communities as homogenous entities, where there 
is, in fact, much diversity in both communities and environments (Moore, 1996; 
Campbell et al., 2001), so that something more differentiated and flexible is needed. 
 
The design principles have been recently critiqued by a number of development 
practitioners and researchers (Campbell et al., 2001; Mandondo, 1997; Steins; 1999) 
in that they assume a single resource use, use a static rationality model, and assume 
that collective management outcomes are determined by pre-defined principles. 
Natural resources, such as woodlands, produce a range of products, and often require 
different rules and norms for their management. Attempts to apply design principles 
in an inflexible manner in such complex resource management situations seem bound 
to fail (Murphree, 1991). Also, even if the management of common property 
resources revolves around a single product, this is often a source of conflict, due to 
multiple uses and management systems in place. Design principles, as mentioned 
above, are also criticised for romanticising indigenous knowledge systems and 
“traditional” organizational capacity, whereas in fact both local knowledge and 
“traditional” governance have been shaped and modified by colonial governments, 
and are often now only shadows of their original form (Baland and Platteau, 1996; 
Matondi, 2001; Ribot, 1999; Richards, 1985; 1992). These criticisms amount to a 
substantial critique of the new institutional approach, in particular for its failure fully 
to incorporate political and contextual issues in analysis. It is for this reason that the 
present study will integrate a second element in the analytical framework for local 
resource use and management, the political ecology approach. 
 
1.6.2 Political Ecology 
Political ecology describes empirical research-based explorations to explain linkages 
in the condition and changes in social and environmental systems with explicit 
consideration of relations of power. The research is directed at finding causes, rather 
than describing symptoms of problems. Political ecological research reveals winners, 
losers, hidden costs and differential power that produce social and environmental 
outcomes (Robbins, 1994). Political ecology research focuses on key questions such 
as: 
• What causes resource degradation? 
• Who benefits and who loses from resource conservation efforts? 
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• What political movements have emerged in response to resource conservation 
efforts? 
 
Political ecology is an emerging area of enquiry that cuts across disciplines and 
methodological approaches. There is a large body of literature tracing its roots 
(Paulson et al., 2003; Peet and Watts, 1996; Neuman, 2005) which I only summarise 
briefly.  
 
Political ecology scholars come from various academic disciplines including 
anthropology, biology, geography and political science. Though political ecology has 
a strong interdisciplinary emphasis, it ‘grew’ from two major theoretical disciplines, 
namely political economy12 and ecology13 (Greenberg and Park, 1994; Blaikie and 
Brookfield, 1987). The field of political ecology began as a reaction to human 
ecology as it was practiced in the 60s and early 70s (Vayda and Walters, 1999). The 
reaction was mainly due to the neglect of the political dimensions of the human-
nature interactions.  A largely functionalist human ecology treated human 
communities as homogenous and autonomous units. Political ecologists share the 
following assumptions that: a) environmental change and ecological conditions are a 
product of political processes; and b) costs and benefits associated with environmental 
change are distributed among actors unequally and this influences existing socio-
economic inequalities, thereby influencing the power of actors in relation to each 
other (Robbins, 1994). 
 
Political ecologists argue that human-nature relationships are influenced by politics to 
a large extent (Bryant and Bailey, 1997), and that politics is essentially about 
competition and conflict over scarce resources. Political ecology views relationships 
between the environment and society as mediated by a variety of cultural and social 
practices, systems and structures (Department of Geography, Lancaster University, 
2005). By focusing on factors that shape relations of power among human groups, and 
enquiring into how these influence diverse aspects of environment, political ecology 
has challenged dominant interpretations of the causes of environmental degradation 
and contested prevalent prescriptions for solving such problems based on functionalist 
thinking, including systems modelling approaches (Paulson et al., 2003). Political 
ecologists argue that programs for addressing natural resource conservation problems 
that do not address the contested, political underlying causes of resource management 
problems will not succeed. For political ecologists, environmental problems are a 
product of political interests and struggles and this understanding is essential for 
solving problems. 
 
                                                 
12
  Political economy originated from the work of the following 17th-19th century thinkers – 
Hobbes, Adam Smith, Malthus, David Ricardo and Karl Marx (Greenberg and Park, 1994). Originally, 
political economy was the study of conditions under which production was organised in the new 
capitalist states. Contemporary definitions of political economy refer to approaches for studying 
economic and political behaviours ranging from a combination of economics with other fields, to other 
studies that challenge the orthodox economic assumptions. 
13
  Ecology is the study of the interactions between organisms and their environment. The term 
ecology was coined by a German biologist Ernst Haeckel in 1986 (Greenberg and Park, 1994). Haeckel 
defined ecology as the comprehensive science of the relationship of the organisms to the environment 
(Worster, 1985). Haeckel’s writings (and also those by another German writer, Humboldt) influenced 
people like Charles Darwin (Worster, 1985). Several key theoretical ideas in ecology today owe their 
formulation to Darwin’s book entitled, ‘The Origins of Species’.  
Chapter 1 
 24 
The CAMPFIRE programme, already mentioned,  implemented in Zimbabwe in 1984 
to alleviate poverty and conserve wild life, is a good instance of this failure to grapple 
with political issues. In their assessment, Logan and Moseley (2002) concluded that 
the programme had made limited progress towards its goal of poverty alleviation 
mainly because it avoided in both design and implementation the historical and 
political realities surrounding resource ownership in the Zimbabwe. They further 
identify three critical dimensions of this problem: the design criteria for community 
ownership of resources, the legal structure of resource ownership, i.e. the framework 
within which the programme sought to transfer state owned resources to communities 
and the administrative allocation of the resources (see Box 1.1). 
 
Political ecologists reject the view that environmental degradation can be understood 
as a problem of system failure to be solved by scientific and technical fixes. Rather, 
they argue that environmental problems - especially those in developing countries - 
are a product of broader global political and economic forces (Bryant and Bailey, 
1997). This requires radical change in local, regional and global political processes if 
environmental problems in the developing countries are to be dealt with (Bryant and 
Bailey, 1997). Political ecology argues that there is an ecology of politics14 and a 
politics of ecology. 
 
Ecology of politics refers to the role that natural resources play in shaping the nature 
of political and social institutions. This view takes ecosystems as active agents 
shaping human action. Ecological services and resources available at a given time and 
place, determine alternatives available to people. These alternatives then shape 
politics, economics and management strategies of the ecosystems (Peterson, 2000). 
The constraints that the ecosystems pose are, however, dynamic and variable due to a 
number of factors such as climate change, species migration, population fluctuation 
and the evolution of diseases. These ecological changes, whether independent of or 
influenced by human actions, alter the conflicts over the ecological resources and 
services as well as the management approaches that can be applied to model and 
manage ecosystems. 
 
Politics of ecology refers to the role that hierarchies, privileges, status and power play 
in shaping natural resource-use patterns and define the fundamentals of what 
constitutes an environmental problem, who causes it and how it can be solved. This 
view takes as important: political forces that influence what and how people learn, 
and political processes through which certain problems (and not others) are 
designated as crises requiring concerted action and resolution (Peterson, 2000).   
 
In this thesis, I make use of the political ecology framework to reflect upon my 
experience as an ACM practitioner in Mafungautsi. In particular, I use it to uncover 
issues of power and its distribution in Mafungautsi and how these influenced resource 
use and management outcomes and their sustainability.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
  Politics – the practices and processes through which power, in its multiple forms is exerted 
and negotiated (Paulson et al., 2003) 
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Box 1.1: Why the CAMPFIRE Programme failed to achieve its objective of 
poverty alleviation, according to Logan and Moseley (2002) 
 
Design criteria for community ownership of resources: In Zimbabwe, the process 
of community empowerment is seen as a process of decentralisation. In the context of 
CAMPFIRE, community empowerment takes a narrow meaning of local communities 
taking full control over resources in terms of use rights, whilst the government takes 
the role of a facilitator and not decision maker.  There are however significant 
questions surrounding the practicalities of implementing CAMPFIRE in a context 
where the definition of community has a variety of meanings. Rural communities are 
characterised by different ethnic groups, who have different rights to different types 
of resources under different situations. The notion of community is also time 
dependent and resource specific and it is therefore crucial for community to be self 
defined instead of imposing the definition from outside.  
 
Legal structure of resource ownership: The CAMPFIRE poverty alleviation potential was 
handicapped by its avoidance of tenure issues. The programme’s land tenure guidelines 
specify that resource ownership should be established on the basis of a ‘communal property 
regime with strong tenurial rights (Murphree, 1997, p.7) in order to transfer decision making 
from the state to the community. This aims to redress decades of policies under which rural 
land was transferred to state ownership. However, despite the programme's initial 
acknowledgement of tenure as an important part of resource management, the government 
failed to implement significant land redistribution policies and to date the colonial resource 
ownership structure still remains in place, and land reform remains a highly contentious issue 
in the CAMPFIRE areas as well as the larger economy. 
 
The administrative allocation of resources: The administrative structure of the CAMPFIRE 
programme is directly influenced by the legal structure upon which it was founded. The 
government has maintained legal authority over land, and this gives the state authority to act 
as the manager and overseer of community resources. Government control operates through a 
hierarchical administrative system comprising of Village Development Committees 
(VIDCOs)15, Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) and District Development 
Committees consisting of elected chairpersons of WADCOS (the councillors) and district 
administrators appointed by the government (see Section 2.3.2, Chapter, 2 for more details). 
This administrative structure poses two key challenges for the CAMPFIRE programme’s 
potential in empowering local communities: a) the flow of authority from the district to the 
villages gives the RDC control over ward and village decisions b) the final decision on 
whether a community can join the programme or not rests with the RDC and this deprives 
communities of their authority to decide whether or not to join the programme. In cases when 
a community is approved (communities do not decide to join but are approved by the RDC) to 
join the programme, all decisions concerning the wild life resource and safari companies are 
made by the RDCs. Overall, the CAMPFIRE’s role in community empowerment is limited.  
 
 
                                                 
15
  VIDCOs were created by the 1984 Prime Ministerial Directive to give a democratic 
orientation to the process of planning for local development.  The VIDCO is the lowest unit of 
government administration, whose role is to identify needs of people in their villages and articulate 
them in the form of village development plans. These plans are presented to the WADCO. The 
WADCO draws its memberships from the chairpersons of the VIDCOs in the ward and is chaired by an 
elected councillor. It is responsible for consolidating the various VIDCO plans into a WARD 
development plan to be  presented to the Rural District Development Committee  
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1.7 Organisation of the thesis  
The current chapter has established the context for the research. The research 
problem, objectives, questions, methods and the analytical framework have been 
outlined. An outline of the following chapters and their main arguments now follows. 
 
Chapter 2 situates the study in the broader Zimbabwean and then local context. The 
chapter is divided into two major sections. The first part presents the changing 
national socio-economic and political climate and the related challenges that the 
Zimbabwe ACM team faced in implementing the ACM approach in an unstable 
environment. The second part presents the local historical context and settlement 
history in Gokwe and around Mafungautsi State Forest, as well as the biophysical 
contexts, e.g. the vegetation and soils in the forest.  
 
Chapter 3 outlines the details and assumptions of the ACM approach.  These 
assumptions were important in shaping activities implemented by the ACM 
researchers in Mafungautsi. The chapter highlights how the ACM approach was 
conceived by CIFOR researchers in Bogor, Indonesia, and conceptualised by the 
ACM researchers in Zimbabwe. It summarises the questions that the research team in 
Zimbabwe aimed to address and the impacts they hoped to achieve by using the ACM 
approach. 
  
Chapter 4 describes and analyses how the Zimbabwe CIFOR team, using a 
participatory action and learning framework, implemented the ACM approach in the 
complex Mafungautsi environment. The chapter shows that using the ACM approach 
was easier on paper than in practice. Various interventions were needed to resolve 
conflicts and build stakeholder capacities even before the PAR process could be 
started. Setting the stage for PAR, and doing PAR in practice was complicated by 
issues of power. Some initial positive outcomes were realised, but these were gone 
four years later.  
 
Chapter 5 focuses on the operations of the RMC in the two study sites, Gababe and 
Batanai. In addition to facilitating the PAR processes, the ACM team also aimed to 
influence the local level resource management institutional structures. The chapter 
shows how the functioning of the RMCs in two areas, Batanai and Gababe, were 
complicated by issues of power and its unequal distribution. The RMCs at the initial 
stage of the project evolved into transparent and downwardly accountable 
organisations, resulting in improvements in resource management at the local level. 
More improvements in the functioning of the RMCs were noticed in Gababe than in 
Batanai, a politically volatile area; operations of the Batanai RMC were in many ways 
hampered by politics in the area.  However, even the improvements noted in Gababe, 
had disappeared in a follow up study four years later.   
 
Chapter 6 synthesises the ACM experiences and findings. The chapter makes use of 
arguments from both new institutionalism and political ecology to probe the outcomes 
of the ACM approach. This leads to a discussion of possible reasons why outcomes of 
the ACM project were not sustained, and might not have been sustained, even if there 
had not been a more general crisis in Zimbabwe. I point to some issues that can be 
considered to be outcomes of design flaws in the project’s ACM approach. I also 
discuss issues that I think should be addressed if learning-based approaches to natural 
resource management are to be re-organised to bring about lasting positive change. 
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Chapter 2: The Zimbabwe and Mafungautsi 
contexts 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The Adaptive Collaborative Research (ACM) project and its outcomes in Mafungautsi 
State Forest can best be approached by situating it in a broader national context, as 
well as within its specific local context. This comprises the socio-economic and 
political climate in the country and in Mafungautsi, as well as the forest's ecological 
status and environmental functions. Understanding context helps us uncover the 
underlying causes of natural resources problems so that they can be addressed. 
Resource management efforts that fail to address underlying causes are from a 
perspective of political ecology unlikely to succeed (Anderson and Grove, 1987; 
Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Chauveau and Richards 2008; Richards, 1983; 1996; 
Sharpe, 1998). Adequate contextualization requires international, regional and local 
issues to be inter-related. For instance, problems encountered at the local level may be 
a result of national policies, in turn, highly influenced by global economic and 
political forces. The context presented in this chapter helps prepare the ground for 
later analysis of how these issues were dealt with in the ACM project and how 
strategies chosen influenced the outcomes of the project.  
 
2.2 Situating the study in the broader national context 
 
Forest resources in Zimbabwe fall under categories linked to a land tenure system16 
put in place during the colonial era in Zimbabwe. These include state owned land, 
state owned land with customary control by traditional leaders and privately owned 
land (Table 2.1). During the colonial era, Native Reserves (today, Communal Areas) 
were set aside for native Zimbabweans who were forced to move from areas with high 
agricultural potential as these were re-assigned to white settlers. 
 
The communal areas are typically remote, characterised by poor soil fertility and 
erratic rainfall, and considered unsuitable for colonial settlement. Land in communal 
areas is owned by the state. The Communal Lands Act of 1981 vests control over land 
in communal areas to the President, but devolves its administration to the Rural 
District Councils (RDCs). Traditional leaders, however, are responsible for ensuring 
that land in communal areas is used in line with existing national legislation (see 
section 2.2.1). 
 
Land in agricultural high potential areas taken over from natives by the colonial 
government was at first given freely to whites working under the British South Africa 
Company (BSAC). Land for commercial farms was later sold cheap to encourage 
                                                 
16
  The land tenure categories however changed drastically after the Fast Track Land Reform 
Programme that was introduced in the year 2000 as land was taken over from the white commercial 
farmers and redistributed to landless Zimbabweans. The size of land under the  new land tenure 
categories in the country are not yet known as studies to quantify the changes are still yet to be done 
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more white settlers to come to the colony. Legislation was also put in place to prevent 
natives from purchasing land in the areas designated for commercial farms. 
 
Forests are found on both communal land, owned by the state, and on private land. 
Four categories can be distinguished (McNamara, 1993): 
 
• Forests and trees in communal areas. These cover about 10 million hectares 
and provide households with construction timber and fuel wood. The quality 
of such forests, in terms of number of trees, varies from place to place, but 
mostly consists of a scattering of trees in cleared terrain. These forests are 
important sources of wild fruits and provide pasture for cattle in communal 
areas 
• Forests and trees in privately owned large-scale commercial farming areas. 
These cover an area of about 7 million hectares, and function as an important 
habitat for wildlife 
• Forests on state land in protected areas. These cover an area of about 6 
million hectares. These forests consist of parks and protected areas vital for 
the country’s tourism industry and make up about 5 million hectares. The 
remaining 1 million hectares consist of badly overexploited, but still 
commercially productive, forests. These forests are jointly operated by two 
organisations, the Department of National Parks and Wildlife and the Forestry 
Commission (McNamara, 1993).  
• Privately owned industrial forest plantations. These cover a total of 110 000 
ha and are of great commercial value, producing timber based products for the 
domestic market and export. 
 
The focus of this thesis is on forests on state land, and these comprise 2.4 % of the 
total land area of Zimbabwe (Table 2.1). The state forests were created to protect 
them from destruction. The total of 21 forests in this category range in size from about 
500 hectares (Ungwe Forest has a total of 567 hectares) to more than 144 000 hectares 
(the Gwaai Forest Reserve has a total of 144 230 hectares), (Mapedza, 2007). Most of 
these reserved forests are found in Matebeleland North and Midlands provinces and in 
predominantly drier areas. They are managed for various ends, including protection of 
watersheds, biodiversity conservation, and extraction of timber and other forest 
products. The management of state forests in Zimbabwe has been vested in the 
Forestry Commission (henceforth FC), a parastatal body under the Ministry of 
Environment and Tourism. The organogram for the FC is presented in Annex 2.1. 
 
The FC was formed in 1954 (during the colonial period) subsequent to the passing of 
a Forestry Act in 1948 (Mapedza, 2007). Its main mandate remains to implement 
government strategy on forestry. This strategy sought to reserve rights to private land 
owners so ensure commercial utilization of forestry resources. The FC research 
branch was formed (also in 1954) to conduct silvicultural research geared to support 
management and exploitation of forest resources by the private land owners. Other 
roles of the FC included controlling and managing all state forests in the country, 
protecting private forests, controlling the cutting of timber resources in all areas, 
promoting forestation programmes in the country, regulating trade in forest produce, 
and finally creating an institutional framework to ensure these tasks were effectively 
carried out. 
 
The context 
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Current roles of the FC (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2002) include: 
 
• considering all questions and matters arising out of or relating to forestry 
policy and making reports and recommendations thereon to the Minister 
• controlling, managing and exploiting State Forests and such other lands as 
may be acquired by the State for forestry purposes 
• establishing, maintaining, improving and renewing exploitation of plantations 
and nurseries 
• surveying forestry resources of the country 
• advising and promoting forestry issues in the country 
• conducting research and investigations into all matters pertaining to forests 
and forest products 
• investigating matters relating to the use or occupation of the forest estate and 
making recommendations thereon to the president where it considers such use 
or occupation to be inconsistent with the Act 
• carrying out activities as the Minister may specify as a service to the public on 
behalf of the State. 
 
The mission statement of the current FC clearly states the role of the commission in 
supporting sustainable development, through conducting research and training 
programmes that promote forestry and forestry issues, promoting tree planting in the 
country, and investing in forest based industry and commerce (Forestry Comission, 
1998). The FC is also responsible for formulating forestry policies in Zimbabwe. 
 
The FC comprises not less than 3 and not more than 8 commissioners appointed by 
the Minister of Environment and Tourism after consultation with and directions from 
the state President (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2002). Commissioners are appointed for 
periods not exceeding 3 years, and one of the commissioners is appointed chair of the 
Commission. In consultation with the Minister, a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and 
a deputy are appointed. The CEO is responsible for supervising and managing the 
FC’s staff activities, funds and property. The Commission is required to submit 
annual reports to the Minister of Environment and Tourism. 
 
As regards policy, the FC top management presents any issue it  wants addressed to 
the Minister of Environment and Tourism. To come up with a law, the Minister 
follows the procedure for law making in Zimbabwe. He/ she starts by presenting to 
cabinet a proposal to make a new law or to amend an existing law. Once the cabinet is 
satisfied that the proposal is in line with government policy, it gives the Minister a 
directive to prepare a draft bill to be presented and approved by the cabinet 
Committee in Legislation. Once the bill has been approved by the Cabinet, it is then 
published in the government Gazette for 14 days for the relevant stakeholders to see it 
before its introduction to Parliament. The bill then goes through several stages (Annex 
2.2) in Parliament until it finally becomes a law (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2006). 
 
Since independence many laws have been enacted or amended to take account of the 
new political situation in the country. What is of current relevance is to note that, only 
cosmetic amendments were made to oppressive natural resource management 
legislations and this contradicts the spirit espoused during the liberation struggle to 
end systems of oppression (Mandondo, 2000). Although there is provision for new 
forestry laws to be developed, forestry policies in Zimbabwe were inherited from the 
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colonial period have more or less remained in place. This is surprising, given the 
strong link between forestry law and land law in Zimbabwe.  Land laws favouring 
white settlers have been replaced (Box 2.1), but the forestry law remains in essence a 
colonial law. This has major consequences for conservation and participatory 
management of forest resources, as will be explored later. According to the Forestry 
Act, state forests are solely managed by the government forestry department and 
communities are excluded. This has been a source of many conflicts between 
communities living on the margins of state forests and the Forestry Commission. 
 
2.2.1 Background to natural resource management in Zimbabwe 
Governance of natural resources in Zimbabwe, of which the forests are part, falls 
under two separate and partly parallel regimes. These are traditional leadership 
authority structures and the local government structures. Local chiefs are the link, 
since they belong to the traditional leadership structures but are also members of 
Rural District Councils (in the local governance structure). This section presents two 
key aspects of this governance structure, and discusses how they came about, and 
their roles in the management of natural resources. 
 
As mentioned above, Native Reserves were created in areas considered unsuitable for 
white settlement, and these were thus mainly in the drier and remoter areas of the 
country. In creating the reserves, the colonial regime (see next section) ignored the 
provisions of the British Order in Council to ensure that natives had enough land for 
crop production, watering and grazing. The new focus by the settlement company was 
geared towards attracting more Europeans to high potential areas (Rukuni, 2006), 
while the natives were forced on to marginal lands of much lower agricultural 
productivity due to poor natural soil fertility and erratic rainfall (Mehretu, 1994; 
Masiiwa and Chigejo, 2003). However, although racially-motivated land policies 
were in place, it took a long time before the natives were evicted from the white areas, 
mainly because of lack of space in the densely populated reserves (Rukuni, 2006). 
Because of high human and animal population densities on marginal lands, as well as 
their conversion from land suitable for extensive ranching to intensive cropping, there 
was rapid ecological degradation, characterized by soil erosion, degradation of forests 
and increased siltation of rivers (Whitlow, 1987).  
 
Concerns over the management of natural resources in native reserves were first 
raised by a colonial government in the 1920s (Cliffe, 1988a;  Ranger, 1985) that  saw 
overpopulation, poor farming methods and overstocking as the major cause of 
problems (Beinart, 1984; Cliffe, 1988a; 1988b; Moyo and Skalness, 1990). Settlers 
had begun to experience environmental side effects from an unjust land division on 
the ecologically fragile lands to which the native population was being relegated 
(Murombedzi, 1994). To respond to these concerns, the colonial government started 
by enacting a Native Reserve Forest Produce Act of 1928 that restricted use of forest 
products to own use. This was followed by the passing of a Natural Resources Act of 
1941, resulting in the formation of a Natural Resources Board with powers to compel 
farmers in native reserves to carry out conservation work. Such measures included the 
adoption of recommended methods of cultivation, limiting stock numbers, increasing 
cattle off-take, and imposing range-land management programmes. The 
implementation of the Act in the reserves was undertaken by the government 
extension services, which started servicing the reserves in the 1950s. 
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Several other items of legislations were also passed by the colonial government to try 
and address environmental concerns in the country, including the Forestry Act of 
1948, the Parks and Wildlife Act of 1949, and finally the Parks and Wild Life Act of 
1975. A summary of all the environmental management legislation passed during the 
colonial period is presented in Box 2.1 below: 
 
Box 2.1: Legislation passed for the management of natural resources during 
the colonial era. 
 
1920s: First environmental concerns raised over natural resources in the native reserves. 
 
1928: Native Reserves Forest Produce Act. This limited the use of forest products in the 
Native Reserves to ‘own use’. The Act was replaced by the Communal Land Forest Produce 
Act of 1987. The new law only remeoved the racial reference but its provisions remained the 
same. 
 
1930: The Land Apportionment Act. This made more land to be taken away from the natives. 
 
1941: The Natural Resources Act was passed and led to the creation of the Natural Resource 
Board. 
 
1948: The Forest Act was passed and led to the creation of the Forestry Commission. The Act 
was amended in 1982 and 1996. Despite these amendments, the Forest Act has remained 
more or less the same. 
 
1950s: Extension workers were introduced to implement conservation measures. Natives 
were forced to implement conservation measures 
 
1952: Native Land Husbandry Act. Introduced to improve conservation and agricultural 
productivity through enforcing conservation measures in the native reserves. This was later 
replaced by the Communal Lands Act of 1981. 
 
1969: Tribal Trust Lands Act. This gave traditional leaders supervisory role in conservation. 
 
1975: National Parks and Wildlife Act. Gave authority to private land owners to 
commercially utilise and benefit from their wild life resources. The Act was later amended in 
1982 and became the legal basis for the Communal Areas Management Programme for 
Indigenous Resources programme. 
 
Despite passing so many laws, environmental degradation continued, mainly because 
of the command and control approach used. This ignored local concerns, and 
culturally respected values and priorities were not taken into consideration in 
influencing policy formulation on reducing degradation (Chigwenya and Manatsa, 
2007). The resultant resource management during the colonial era was characterised 
by lack of common vision, no community involvement in resource management, and 
conflict between the government and local communities (Katerere, 1999). 
 
For example, the Natural Resources Act was implemented through coercion rather 
than persuasion. Being forced to implement conservation works, in addition to  loss of 
land, was among reasons some peasants and young landless people felt impelled to 
join the second liberation struggle (the 2nd Chimurenga) that eventually led to the 
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collapse of the Rhodesian regime and dawn of an independent Zimbabwe (Sadomba, 
2008). Management of resources during the colonial era was, therefore, characterised 
by skewed power relations, with communities being forced to implement conservation 
measures but with little or no power over these resources (Katerere, 1999). At 
independence in 1980, the government inherited the colonial government structures 
for natural resource management and rather surprisingly made only a minimum of 
changes, despite being swept to power by cadres anxious to restore African control 
over the land and natural resources of the country for which they had fought 
(Chingwenya and Manatsa, 2007; Sadomba, 2008). 
 
Two key organisations play an important role in the management of natural resources 
in communal areas of Zimbabwe - namely local government structures and traditional 
authority structures (Figure 2.1). Local government structures are represented at the 
national level by the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development., 
Rural District Councils operate at District level, and councillors, WADCOs and 
VIDCOs are found at the local community level. Traditional Authority structures are 
represented at the national level by the Chief's Council, while chiefs, headmen and 
village heads are the resident authorities in local communities. These two governance 
structures exist side-by-side in the communal areas of Zimbabwe. The background to 
these organisations and their roles in natural resource management are discussed 
separately below. 
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Fig 2.1: Organograms of natural resource governance structures in communal areas of Zimbabwe 
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Local government structures  
 
Rural District Councils 
At independence in 1980, the new Zimbabwe government inherited a dual local 
government system. This was a result of racial colonial policies, in which the Rural 
and District councils existed next to each other as local government structures at the 
district level. The Rural Councils served the interests of Africans in communal areas, 
while District Councils served white settlers in commercial farming areas. The two 
councils were later amalgamated in 1995 to form the Rural District Councils (RDCs) 
(Manyena, 2006). RDCs are chaired by Council Chairpersons. RDCs have Rural 
District Development Committees chaired by appointed District Administrators (who 
are representatives of the Ministry of Local Government Rural and Urban 
Development). The members of the RDCs are elected councillors representing rural 
communities in constituent wards, district heads of line ministries, the Rural District 
Council sub-committees, heads of national security agencies (army, police, national 
intelligence), council executives, chiefs and co-opted NGOs (Makumbe, 1998). The 
elected councillors chair the Ward Development Committees (WADCOs). 
 
Effective decentralisation in terms of the formal governance framework in Zimbabwe 
ends at the level of the RDCs. For natural resource management, the Communal 
Lands Act of 1981 currently vests control over land in the President, but devolves 
administration to RDCs. The Rural District Councils Act of 1988 gives the RDCs 
authority to enact conservation and land-use planning by-laws. The legislative 
authority of Rural District Councils, however, is subsidiary to national statutes, and 
has to be consistent with such statutes. The Rural District Councils Act includes a 
schedule that clearly specifies the areas in which the Rural District Councils enjoy 
privileges to enact legally binding by-laws. The RDCs have an option of formulating 
their own new by-laws with the participation of local communities or to adopt model 
Communal Lands by-laws already developed (Mandondo, undated). Model by-laws 
provide for the preparation of land use plans in council areas, similar to those 
promoted by the state in the 1930s. Model by-laws are generally prescriptive, and 
community members did not participate in their formulation.  
 
By-law formulation in Zimbabwe has a preparatory stage during which the need is 
identified, ideally by communities, who notify the Council through their 
representatives. A relevant standing committee of the council, e.g. the Natural 
Resources Committee, in the case of natural resource management - then examines 
the need for such by-laws by consulting experts. The Committee then makes 
recommendations to Council. By-law formulation takes a long time as higher-level 
provincial officials and the relevant cabinet Ministers should be involved in 
scrutinizing drafts before endorsing them. Local communities are later given time 
(about thirty days) to inspect the draft by-laws and, if necessary, lodge their 
complaints and objections. RDCs are therefore obliged to display the by-laws at 
Council offices for a specified period and also to publish them in newspapers so that 
communities can inspect them. After this, the RDC submits the proposed set of by-
laws, proof of consultation in the form of a notice in the press, a list of objections 
received, minutes of council meetings where the by-laws were discussed, and the final 
council resolution. The Minister has powers to modify or amend the by-laws or 
recommend the Council to adopt model by-laws if those submitted are not 
substantially different from the model bye-laws (Mandondo, undated).  The reason 
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this information is important in this thesis is that by-laws are one way of providing a 
set of rules and sanctions for community-based management of natural resources.  As 
will be seen, it was an approach neglected by the project to be described later.  
Arguably participatory conservation needs sanctions as well as incentives, and lack of 
sanctions was a factor in the failures to be described.  
 
VIDCOs and WADCOs 
Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) and Ward Development Committees 
(WADCOs) were created by the 1984 Prime Ministerial directive, with an aim to 
make the local development planning process democratic. The VIDCO is the lowest 
unit of government administration, whose role is to identify needs of people in their 
villages and articulate them in the form of village development plans. These plans are 
presented to the WADCO. The WADCO draws its membership from the chairs of the 
VIDCOS in the ward, and is itself chaired by an elected councillor. It is responsible 
for consolidating the various VIDCO plans into a ward development plan. The ward 
development plans are forwarded to the Rural District Development Committee 
(RDDC), the planning body of the RDC, by councillors. Membership of the RDDC is 
highly restricted to bureaucrats and technocrats. 
 
VIDCOs consist of a total of 100 households and a WADCO consist of six or more 
VIDCOs. The two institutions do not have clearly defined mandates and no 
communication strategies were put in place, to allow coordination, and to avoid 
conflict (Mandondo, 2000). The formation of the VIDCOs and WADCOs was seen by 
political commentators as being part of a process to disempower traditional authority 
and punish it for its role in supporting the colonial government (Makumbe, 1998; 
Dore, not dated).  
 
Over time, the development structures in the communities have been infiltrated by 
national politics (Mandondo, 2000). For example, currently, it is generally the case 
that two positions in the VIDCOs and WADCOs, are reserved for ZANU-PF political 
party representatives. Also election of councillors is usually conducted along party 
lines, with elected councillors accountable to local party officials (Mandondo, 2000) 
 
Traditional leadership authority 
Traditional leaders are appointed, not elected, and normally hold office for life. Top 
of the hierarchy is a Chiefs’ Council, whose functions include making 
recommendations to the Minister concerning the needs of the people in various areas 
in the country. The chiefs are responsible for various districts, followed by local 
headmen, and at the lowest level by village heads (Figure 2.1). During the colonial 
period, chiefs and headmen were identified as playing a key role in the native reserves 
and native commissioners were asked to monitor and advise them in the use of their 
(traditional) authority, in order to extend the control of the colonial government. 
Although the position of chiefs was hereditary, native commissioners were given 
authority to select and legitimise chiefs who advanced colonial interests (McGregor, 
1991). Chiefs were thus (as in other parts of British colonial Africa) important 
elements in a system of colonial indirect rule, and this distanced them from their 
communities, local values and priorities. The colonial chiefs played various roles 
including collecting taxes on behalf of the colonial administration, controlling the 
allocation of land in the reserves, and presiding over land disputes (Mutizwa-
Mangiza, 1985; McGregor 1991). During the colonial period, chiefs, headmen and 
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village heads played a prominent role in the governance of native areas (Mandondo, 
2000), including governance of resources.  
 
Control over natural resources during the colonial era was an important aspect of the 
political and economic subjugation of the natives (Mohamed-Katerere, undated).  A 
racially inequitable natural resource management system emerged. Customary law17 
was used by the colonial regime to assert local control, and this resulted in the re-
empowerment of traditional leadership structures, as they now served the interests of 
the colonial overlords. However, the presence of chiefs in the judiciary and 
administrative structures did not result in accurate recognition and implementation of 
local customs and practice. Instead, local customs became the means through which a 
traditional leadership bargained with the colonial state for power in their areas of 
jurisdiction, resulting in new or distorted customs. This resulted in two forms of 
customary law – the law recognised by formal State structures and custom as the 
“living law” of actual communities. Since communities change according to 
circumstances the two are not necessarily the same thing. A key caveat is that the state 
did not recognise custom as a source of law governing natural resource use 
(Mohamed-Katerere, undated).  
 
Independence saw the disempowerment of traditional leadership because of their role 
in helping to perpetrate white rule.  The new development structures - the Village 
Development Committees (VIDCOs) and Ward Development Committees 
(WADCOs) - were put in place by the new government as an intended substitute. The 
Communal Area Land Act passed in 1981 effectively took away the powers of chiefs 
in land allocation. The Act vested the land allocation powers in the president, and 
devolved administration of land allocation to the RDCs and the DA. Even though on 
paper, the RDC has the authority over the allocation of land in the communal areas, in 
practice, the traditional authorities continued to perform this role, deriving their 
powers from customary and territorial claims to their land (Mandondo, 2000). 
 
Over time, however, there has been a re-empowerment of the traditional authority.  A 
key step was the 1998 Traditional Leaders Act [Chapter 29:17]. Current chiefs in 
Zimbabwe are appointed by the president and are tasked to supervise headmen in their 
areas. Their other roles include promoting and upholding cultural values, overseeing 
collection of taxes by village heads on behalf of the RDC, ensuring land and natural 
resources use and allocation is line with the national legislation (Mandondo, 2000). 
This is in effect a return to the role of the chief during the colonial period. 
 
The job has its benefits.  In addition to earning a salary equivalent to that of a 
university graduate, chiefs also enjoy houses electrified under the rural electrification 
programme and access to a free government vehicle. Overall, the 1998 Traditional 
Leaders Act, ‘effectively disenfranchised grassroots communities in its attempt to re-
empower traditional leaders. It created a huge flow of top-down appointments serving 
only the interests of upward accountability: the president appoint the Minister of 
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 The customary law of Zimbabwe refers to the customs and practices of native Zimbabweans (Saki 
and Chiware, 2007). These customs are definite, and where considered reasonable, are recognised by 
the state. For example, incestuous associations condemned by customary law are criminalised under the 
Sexual Offenses Act (Saki and Chiware, 2007); offenders are arrested and sentenced by the formal 
courts. 
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Local Government and National Housing and the chiefs; the chiefs in turn nominate 
the village headmen, whom the minister appoints; and the headmen nominate the 
village heads whom the chief appoints’ (Mandondo, 2000, p.13).  
 
However, even after independence, the management of natural resources is still the 
responsibility of state technical and managerial agencies, local government 
authorities, parliament and centralised ministries. Chiefs are, however, responsible for 
ensuring that natural resources are utilised in terms of the national natural resource 
management legislation in the country. Their specific roles include preventing over-
grazing, indiscriminate cutting down of trees, illegal settlements and abuse of natural 
resources (Mohamed-Katerere, undated). The chiefs still do not have authority to 
make legally enforceable resource management rules. Natural resource management 
disputes at the formal legal level may, however, be determined according to 
customary law, only when the dispute is civil, both parties are African, and when it is 
consistent with national natural resource management laws (Mohamed-Katerere, 
undated).  
 
Despite the lack of legal recognition of customary laws in the management of natural 
resources, several customary rules for governing common pool resource can be found 
in communal areas of Zimbabwe (Campbell et al., 1998). Many of these rules are 
ineffective (Campbell et al., 1998). There are, however, a few cases where cultural 
values and local knowledge systems still play an important role in the management of 
natural resources. In these cases, sanctions and complimentary monitoring and 
enforcement regimes still persist. The responsibility for ensuring that people abide by 
a set of rules lies with the Chief. But there is scepticism about whether such a system 
really works in practice, given the fact that the sanctions implemented have no legal 
basis (Mohamed-Katerere, undated). 
 
As mentioned above, communal areas where these governance structures are located 
came about due to the colonial policies. The next section presents background on the 
colonial era and the creation of communal areas.  
2.2.2 The land question and forests in Zimbabwe 
 
Forest management in Zimbabwe takes place within a broader context of highly 
unequal distribution of better land, a major issue in the history of the country. As 
mentioned above, state forest reserves make up 2.4% of total land area in Zimbabwe 
and these are mostly within densely populated communal areas (Matose, 2002). The 
other land categories are the resettlement areas, the large scale commercial farming 
areas (LSCFA), the small scale commercial farming areas (SSCFA), the national 
parks and finally urban and state land. Table 2.1 shows the various land categories in 
the country (up to c. 1999.) and associated population densities. The picture changed 
after the introduction of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme in 2000. Land was 
forcefully taken away from white commercial farmers and redistributed among the 
landless people. This resulted in an increase in resettlement areas and a reduction in 
the large-scale commercial farms. Statistics on these changes are not yet available. 
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Table 2.1: Land categories in Zimbabwe and population figures (Source: 
Matose, 2002) 
 
Ownership Land 
Category 
Area 
(km2) 
% of 
total 
area 
Population Density 
(people/ 
km2) 
% of total 
population 
State with 
control of 
traditional 
leaders 
Communal 
area 
163,500 41.4 6,269,464 38.35 53.2 
State with 
control of 
Traditional 
leaders 
Resettlement 
land 
36,000 8.0 295,152 8.20 2.5 
Private Large Scale 
Commercial 
Farming 
Areas 
121,000 30.6 1,108,894 9.16 9.4 
Private Small Scale 
Commercial 
Farming 
Areas 
14 000 3.5 289,184 20.66 2.5 
State National 
Parks Estate 
47,000 12.1 - - - 
State State-forest 
land 
9,400 2.4 - - - 
State Urban and 
state land 
13,000 3.1 3,826,580 294.35 32.5 
 Totals 390,070 100 11,789,274 - 100 
 
The skewed distribution of population across the various categories is rooted in the 
colonial era (1890-1980). When the British South Africa Company (BSAC) was 
established in 1889, its main aim was mining. However, after failing to find major 
gold deposits, the company turned its focus to agriculture (Eicher et al., 2006). In 
1890, the BSCA was given authority to occupy land in the colony by the British 
government. The first decade of colonization was therefore characterized by the 
appropriation of land by the white settlers, and this triggered the first uprising by 
natives (the 1st Chimurenga war) in 1896. In 1898, the British government enacted an 
Order in Council facilitating legal acquisition of land and requiring the creation of 
native reserves by the BSAC.  This created a long-lasting dual agrarian structure 
(Rukuni, 2006). Worse was to follow with the passing of the Land Apportionment Act 
in 1930 that gave legal powers to the BSAC to acquire more land from native 
Zimbabweans. The laws passed during the colonial period to enable land acquisition 
by the settlers are summarized in Box 2.2. 
 
This loss of land by the native Zimbabweans was among other factors motivating the 
liberation struggle from the late 1960s. In 1979, the British government became a 
broker in negotiations between the white settlers and the political representatives of an 
anti-settler liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. The negotiations resulted in the 
Lancaster House Agreement and a general election in 1980, won by Robert Mugabe, 
the leader of the Zimbabwe African National Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF).  
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In terms of seeking solutions to the land crisis in Zimbabwe, experiences from Kenya 
were influential. Just like Zimbabwe, Kenya also underwent a liberation struggle that 
was fuelled by land grievances (Lerbert, undated). In Kenya, the British government 
decided to redress the situation by buying out the white farmers. Britain made 
available 500 million British pounds for the Kenyan government to acquire land for 
resettlement. During the Lancaster House negations it was hoped that a similar 
solution could be found for the Zimbabwean case. Britain therefore agreed to 
contribute 75 million British pounds for the government to buy out the white farmers. 
At this same time, the United States of America also promised to contribute 500 
million United States Dollars towards the land acquisition programme. There was 
however no formally binding procedure that supported these promises (Moyo, 2000). 
Because of the lack of legally binding procedures, the Zimbabwean government had 
only received a small part of the promised funding by the year 2000 (Moyo, 2000). 
The government was instead required to compensate the acquired land at market value 
and in foreign currency. This way of compensation based on full market value for 
land acquired had never happened anywhere else in the world where land reform had 
been successfully done (Moyo, 2000). 
 
At independence in 1980, one of the promises by the new government was to give 
back land to the people, through resettlement. The independent government made 
several changes over time to the legislative environment to facilitate the acquisition of 
land for resettlement purposes. These changes are summarised in Box 2.2. 
 
The first phase of its resettlement programme was launched in September 1980 with 
British financial assistance. Resettlement was seen as key to peace and stability. The 
programme also aimed to address issues of equity in the redistribution of land, with 
the long-term effect of ameliorating poverty among the rural populace (Masiiwa and 
Chigejo, 2003). The new government, however, was bound by ‘sunset clauses’ in the 
Lancaster House Agreement, which gave protection to white Zimbabweans during the 
first ten years of independence. These included the provisions that the new 
government would not compulsorily acquire land and that when required the 
government would pay adequate compensation for property on a ‘willing buyer, 
willing seller’ basis (Human Rights Watch, 2002). 
 
During the first decade of independence (1980-1990), 40% of a target of eight million 
hectares was acquired, and 50,000 families were resettled on more than three million 
hectares of land (Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions, 2001). The government 
failed to meet its own target largely because it failed to get enough funding for farm 
purchases from the international community (United Nations, 2005). For instance, by 
1996, 44 million British Pounds out of the total promised funds was given to the 
Zimbabwean government by the British government to fund resettlement (McGreal, 
2002; Holman, 2000). 
 
In 1990, the constraints in the Lancaster House agreement lapsed, and the Mugabe 
government took the opportunity to amend the provisions of the constitution relating 
to property rights.  In 1992, a Land Acquisition Act was passed. This allowed 
compulsory acquisition of land for resettlement, subject to payment of fair 
compensation approved by a committee, using set guidelines. In 1994, a land tenure 
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commission18 recommended that a land tax be introduced as the best way to achieve 
redistribution. However, this tax was never put in place. Even though new laws were 
passed to aid the redistribution process, the resettlement programme continued to slow 
down during the 1990s. At the end of the second decade after independence, less than 
one million hectares had been acquired for distribution and less than 20,000 families 
resettled (Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions, 2001). 
 
At the end of Phase I of the resettlement programme in 1997, a total of 71,000 
households had been resettled on about 3.5 million hectares of acquired land, and this 
failed to match the target set to resettle 162,000 people (Technical Committee of the 
Inter-Ministerial Committee on Resettlement and Rural Development and the 
National Economic Consultative Forum Land Reform Task Force, 1998). Of the total 
land acquired, 19% was classified as prime land while the rest was marginal land 
unsuitable for cultivation and agricultural production (Chitiyo, 2000). Despite this 
first phase of the resettlement program, population density in the communal areas 
continued to increase (Moyo, 2000) due to population growth. More than one million 
black Zimbabweans were still crowded on a total of 16 million hectares of poor land 
in the communal areas, while only 4500 commercial farmers (mostly white) 
controlled 11 million hectares of prime land. 
 
As overcrowding intensified, due to pressure of population growth in communal 
areas, some people began to occupy land illegally during the 1980s and 1990s, but 
were removed by government security forces. However, around 1999, occupation of 
commercial farms began to take place on a much larger scale (Moyo, 2001; Chitiyo, 
2000; Sadomba 2008), and this gave birth to the Fast Track Land Reform Programme 
(FTLRP), which was a departure from earlier attempts at systematic land reform 
(Masiiwa and Chigejo, 2003). A summary of legislation related to land acquisition in 
the post colonial period is presented in Box 2.2. 
 
2.2.3 The Zimbabwe economic meltdown 
In 1980, the new Zimbabwean government adopted a state-socialist approach to the 
economy that aimed to eradicate poverty. Because of government-driven 
improvements in health and education, there were remarkable improvements in the 
social welfare indicators in the first decade. Immunization programmes were 
expanded to cover most children less than five years of age and primary education 
was made free. However, the key macro-economic indicators remained stagnant 
during the 1980s. This was mainly because the new government inherited a 
Rhodesian economy ‘suffer[ing] from a large fiscal deficit, low economic 
performance, high unemployment, price controls and a lack of foreign currency’ 
(United Nations, 2005, p. 16). 
 
The government of Ian Smith had made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
from Britain on the 11th of November 1965. Economic sanctions were imposed on the 
Rhodesian minority rule government (UDI) by the international community (Britain 
and the United Nations) during the 1970s, forcing the government to adopt a policy of 
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  Known as the Rukuni Commission (named after its chair, Prof. Mandivamba Rukuni from the 
Agriculture Economics Department at the University of Zimbabwe). 
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Box 2.2: Legislation related to land acquisition passed during the colonial 
and the post colonial periods (Sources: Moyo, 2000; Lerbert, 
Undated)  
 
Colonial Land Acquisition Laws 
1889: The British south Africa Company (BSAC) established 
 
1890: The BSCA given permission to colonise the country 
 
1896: First uprising by the natives – the 1st Chimurenga war 
 
1898: A law passed to allow the BSAC to create native reserves for the natives 
 
1930: The Land Apportionment Act passed. This gave the BSCA more power to acquire land 
from the natives. 
 
1965: Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the Smith Government and sanctions 
were imposed against the country by the international community. 
 
End of 1960s: Beginning of the second liberation war – 2nd Chimurenga war 
 
 
Post Colonial Land Acquisition Laws 
1979: The Constitution of Zimbabwe (this was developed during the Lancaster House 
negotiations). Under this legislation, compulsory acquisition of land was forbidden. Land was 
to be acquired on a willing seller- willing buyer principle in the coming 10 years, with 
funding from Britain. 
 
1981: The Communal Lands Act shifted authority over land in native reserves from 
traditional rulers to local authorities and changed the designation from Tribal Trust Lands into 
communal areas 
 
1981-1984: Land Acquisition Act (No. 21). This legislation enforced constitutional provision 
to land acquisition and stressed the need for payment of adequate compensation for acquired 
land 
 
1985: Land Acquisition Act. This legislation was still in the spirit of the Lancaster House 
Agreement for acquiring land under the willing seller, willing buyer principle. This gave the 
government right to purchase excess land for redistribution the landless. The legislation 
introduced the offering of Certificate of ‘No Present Interest’ or ‘Right of First of Refusal’ by 
the government for any land being sold by commercial farmers. The government however 
faced problems due to lack of funding to purchase the targeted size of land for resettling the 
landless. 
 
1990-1993: Constitutional Amendment (No. 11) Act No. 30 of 1990 and Constitution of 
Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 12) Act 4 of 1993. These legislations denied power of the court 
to declare unconstitutional, compensation decisions and allowed for compulsory land 
acquisition. 
 
1992: Land Acquisition Act (Amendment to Section 10 of Chapter 20) was enacted to speed 
up the land reform process by removing the willing seller – willing buyer principle. The Act 
gave the government power to buy land compulsorily for redistribution and a fair 
compensation was to be paid for the land acquired. The land owners could challenge in court 
the price set by the acquiring authority and opposition by land owners increased during the 
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period 1992 – 1997. However, most of the acquired farms ended up in the hands of cabinet 
ministers, senior government officials and business men. Fewer landless people than planned 
were resettled during the 1990s. During this period, the government also listed a total of 1471 
farms that it intended to buy compulsorily for redistribution. Land owners were given 30 days 
to submit written objections. The legislation also abolished the Rights of First Refusal to 
enable the compulsory acquisition of land 
 
1998: The government published its policy framework that envisioned compulsory purchase 
of land owned by commercial farmers (both black and white), public corporations, churches, 
NGOs and multinational companies. In September 2008, the government called for a donor’s 
conference to inform them of the new land reform programme and seek their assistance. 48 
countries and international organizations that attended the conference unanimously endorsed 
the programme. 
 
1999: The Commercial Farmers’ Union offered to sell land for redistribution – but the 
landowners dragged their feet. In response, the National Constitutional Assembly together 
with other stakeholders drafted a new constitution that allowed for land to be compulsorily 
acquired from the landowners without any compensation. At this time, the opposition political 
party (MDC) was formed and campaigned for a 'No' vote for a new constitution that allowed 
land to be acquired by force from the white farmers. When the majority of people voted 'no' 
for the constitutional change, the ZANU-PF party used its majority vote in parliament to 
make an amendments to the constitution that allowed land to be acquired by force.  
  
2000: Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No 16) Act. This amendment freed the 
Zimbabwe government from paying compensation for land acquired for resettlement if it 
established a fund into which the former colonial power could deposit money to compensate 
for land acquired for resettlement. Under this amendment, the government is only required to 
pay compensation for improvements on the land. It also stipulates a number of factors to be 
used in determining compensation. 
 
2000: Amendment to the Land Acquisition Act. This legislation freed the government from 
any obligation to pay for compensation for unimproved land. It also changed the procedures 
for compulsory acquisition of land and also removed the legal and administrative obstacles 
that led to successful litigation against compulsory acquisition of land in the past. This gave 
birth to the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) that was put in place in the same 
year. 
 
import substitution. Also, in trying to create a pool of labour for the manufacturing 
and industrial sectors, the colonial government pursued policies that prevented black 
workers from owning land and becoming self-employed (van der Hoven et al., 1993; 
Marquette, 1997). This is a major reason why the manufacturing and industrial sectors 
in Zimbabwe accounted for the majority of formal employment in the country. 
 
Production came to be dominated by domestic rather than foreign market concerns 
and the minority government imposed strict protection. This protection continued 
after independence, up to the late 1980s, and limited investment and export-led 
growth, in the manufacturing and other sectors (Kadenge et al. 1992; Davis and 
Rattso, 1996; World Bank, 1995; Marquette, 1997). A shift in focus by the new 
government then saw massive investment in the smallholder sector. The commercial 
agriculture sector, a major economic activity for the country, was by-passed (World 
Bank, 1995). During the 1980s, the new government borrowed heavily from the 
World Bank.  Payments on debt consumed 37% of total export earnings by 1987. To 
compound the situation, smallholder farmers, having borrowed money from the 
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government, often defaulted on repayment, thereby worsening the government’s 
financial situation (Human Rights Watch, 2002). 
 
During the 1990s, under pressure from the World Bank and the IMF, the government 
launched the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) intended to jump-
start a stalled economy by relaxing trade restrictions and also by reducing the public 
deficit (Marquette, 1997). In 1995, the then minister of finance promised that by the 
end of the year there would be a 25% cut in the civil service as well as abolition of 
labour restrictions, investment regulation, import restrictions and government 
subsidies (Bond and Manyanya, 2003; Andersson, 2002). The mid-1990s saw rapid 
privatization of parastatals providing telecommunications, electricity, water and 
transport, in order to meet World Bank demands. 
 
Unfortunately, overall evaluation of the economic reform programme in Zimbabwe 
shows disappointing results, and its effectiveness as a macro-economic strategy still 
continues to be debated (Riddell, 1992; Mosley and Weeks, 1993; van der Hoven et 
al., 1993; Mosley et al., 1996; Addison, 1996; Davis and Rattso, 1996; Harvey, 1996; 
Husain and Feruqee, 1996; Lensink, 1996; Marquette, 1997; Bond and Manyanya, 
2003; Andersson, 2002). 
 
External factors may have influenced the outcome of the programme, such as the 
1991-1992 drought.  However, analysis of previous periods in the history of country 
suggests that weather is not the primary determinant of economic activity in 
Zimbabwe (Bond and Manyanya, 2003). The 1975-1978 period had very good rains, 
and yet this was a period of sustained economic crisis, while the late 1960s and 1970s 
was a period of severe drought and yet was a period of booming economic growth 
(Bond and Manyanya, 2003). After the economic structural adjustment programme, 
several companies in the manufacturing and industrial sector had to reduce activity 
and lay off workers. The decline in the formal sector contributed to the emergence of 
a large informal sector, as laid off workers struggled to survive. By 1997, the country 
was in a serious economic and political crisis.19 Increased food and fuel prices led to 
urban strikes and political unrest.  
 
In 1999, disgruntled by the declining economic conditions in the country, 
representatives of various interest groups (including labour, employers, capital and the 
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions) formed an opposition political party, the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).  This posed a serious threat to the 
government, and perhaps its biggest challenge since its taking power in 1980.  To 
disarm the threat the government then proposed a draft constitution that included 
provision for compulsory acquisition of land without compensation.  This was 
rejected in a referendum in 2000 (United Nations, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 2002) 
as a result of the opposition party campaigning for a ‘No’ vote. 
                                                 
19
  Three other factors worsened the economic crisis in the country in the 1990s:  a)  increased 
tensions between the war veterans and the government over corrupt administration of compensation 
made necessary by the War Victims Compensation Act of 1993; this caused the  President to offer a 
one-off package payment and a monthly pension to the war veterans but it was not clear where this 
money was to come from; b) damage to government finances caused by the sending of Zimbabwean 
soldiers to the Democratic Republic of Congo to fight in support of the government of Laurent Kabila,  
c)  negative impact on commercial agriculture, the backbone of the economy, caused by spontaneous 
land invasions from 1999  (United Nations, 2005).  
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Now facing increased threat from the opposition MDC, the government revived its 
call for radical land redistribution to fulfil promises made at independence, and 
offering some degree of official sanction for the commercial farm occupations led by 
war veterans in 1999 (Sadomba, 2008).  In July 2000 the government officially 
announced it was to embark on a new resettlement initiative, the Fast Track Land 
Reform Programme (FTLRP) aimed at acquiring 3,000 farms for resettlement 
purposes. 
 
Even though the government claimed that the initiation of the FTLRP aimed to 
redress historical imbalances, hidden objectives were suspected (Human Rights 
Watch, 2002; United Nations, 2005). For example, the FTLRP helped to protect the 
interests of the ruling party in the face of increased competition from the opposition 
by providing a means to compensate regime loyalists. In February 2001, 2,706 farms 
were gazetted for compulsory acquisition by the government, covering a total of six 
million hectares (Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement, 2001a). In April, the 
programme aimed to acquire 8.3 million hectares from the large scale commercial 
farming sector for redistribution (Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement, 2001b). 
In October, the government announced that it would list 4558 farms for redistribution, 
covering a total of 8.3 million hectares. In February 2002, a total of 4874 farms 
covering 9.23 million hectares were listed for acquisition (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2002). 
 
As already outlined, a process of economic decline had set in during the late 1990s. 
The government’s economic policy framework from 1995 to 2000 was a reaction to 
the failed ESAP. The government made a proposal called the Zimbabwe Programme 
for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) (Matondi and Munyuki-
Hungwe, 2006). This failed to engage bilateral and multilateral agencies, however, 
and was not a success. 
 
The Zimbabwe economy declined by a further 40% between 1998 - 2006. The 
unemployment rate rose to 80% (Hawkins, 2006). The national gross domestic 
product (GDP) fell by 5.1% in the year 2006. Zimbabwe had also become a world 
leader in inflation, with an annual rate of 1593% in 2006 (Hawkins, 2006; 
International Crisis Group, 2006). In April 2007, annual inflation had risen to 3700% 
and the prediction for May 2007 was 5300% (Makoshori, 2007). Production levels in 
all sectors fell drastically, resulting in thriving cross-border trade. Retailers began to 
receive the bulk of their goods from the cross-border traders following the collapse of 
most manufacturing industry in the country. The lack of basic commodities - 
particularly food - and the collapse of social services had adverse effects, especially 
on the poorest groups. Zimbabwe now had the lowest life expectancy rate in the world 
(37 years for males, and less than 34 years for females)20.  It also had the third highest 
unemployment rate and the eighth highest death rate (International Crisis Group, 
2007). Major causes of these deaths included malnutrition and HIV/AIDS 
(International Crisis Group, 2006; 2007). 
 
To add to these problems, law and order slowly broke down from the 1990s, with the 
judiciary becoming politicized, and farm invasions and political violence going 
                                                 
20
  Life expectancy at birth for males in Zimbabwe was 60 years in 1990  
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unchecked. For instance, in March 2003, the opposition party, the MDC, organized a 
mass stay-away by workers in protest at declining economic and political conditions 
in the country. This stay-away was a success, and angered ruling party officials, 
resulting in violent attacks and the arrest of several MDC activists (Human Rights 
Watch, 2003). State sponsored violence has since continued to increase, with the 
uniformed police and army playing major parts in many attacks (Human Rights 
Watch, 2003). Also, increasing involvement by Zimbabwe National African Union 
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) militia contributed to a breakdown of law and order. 
These militia consisted of graduates from the National Training Centres (dubbed the 
Border Gezi National Training Centres, named after a late government minister and 
close ally of Robert Mugabe). In the 2000 parliamentary elections, Border Gezi21 was 
in charge of recruiting and organizing groups of ZANU-PF young supporters into a 
militia. Gezi was two years later appointed Secretary for the Commissariat 
responsible for organizing the re-election of Robert Mugabe. 
 
Many youths were forced to enroll at these centers after the government announced 
this as a prerequisite for getting an eventual job in the military, police or public 
universities. After graduation, these youth were deployed to different areas of the 
country where some became involved in violent acts. In some cases, they set up 
informal roadblocks, and monitored and violently harassed those suspected of being 
MDC supporters.  They also ensured compliance with government gazetted price 
controls, which drove trade underground. These youth militia were also implicated in 
several acts of violence, torture, and property destruction in rural areas. (Human 
Rights Watch, 2003). 
 
Because of a breakdown of law and order in the country, many NGOs and 
international organizations found it increasingly difficult to work in politically volatile 
localities, especially the rural areas. The situation in rural areas was made worse by 
the passing of restrictive legislation such as the Public Order and Security Act 
(POSA) put in place before the 2002 presidential elections to limit rights to freedom 
of expression. The POSA, for instance, prohibits speech acts that are likely to bring 
feelings of hostility towards state institutions and the president (Human Rights Watch, 
2003). Under POSA, anyone organizing a public meeting is supposed to report to the 
police four days before the meeting to obtain clearance.  POSA had a direct impact on 
activities to be later described in Batanai, one of the ACM research sites in Gokwe 
South District, since resource users were not allowed to hold public meetings 
(Chapter 4). These meetings were an essential part of the ACM strategy to create 
opportunities for resource users jointly to identify their problems, come up with 
agreed solutions, and implement them collectively.  
 
Partly because of the breakdown of law and order and increasing poverty and 
suffering, many NGOs and international agencies changed their focus. Environmental 
management issues took second place as humanitarian aid took centre stage. Some 
organizations focusing on environmental management issues scaled down their 
operations.  A pertinent instance is the CIFOR regional Office for Eastern and 
                                                 
21
  Border Gezi was identified as a close ally of Robert Mugabe.  But he was involved in a car 
accident and died in April 2001. Gezi was one of the few people who did not participate in the 
liberation war to be buried at the national heroes’ acre. The ZANU-PF party justified his hero status by 
saying that he was the hero of the third ‘Chimurenga’ that spearheaded the farm invasions towards the 
late 1990s. 
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Southern Africa in Harare, which was responsible for implementing the ACM 
approach in Mafungautsi. In fact, CIFOR stopped all activities after failing to secure 
donor funds to carry out further environmental research in Zimbabwe. The office is 
currently manned by one person for administrative purposes, and all research 
activities were shifted to other countries. 
 
In the course of these developments, Zimbabwe has become a pariah state. Carrying 
out field research on forest management and benefit sharing in these deteriorating 
economic conditions was not easy. Gokwe South District (where the research sites are 
located) is a stronghold of the Ruling ZANU-PF party, and ACM researchers had to 
visit the ZANU-PF offices and also the office of the president every time they went to 
the field to explain about their work. The team did this to assure the two parties that 
they were only doing research and were not involved in politics. When organizing 
workshops in the research areas, the team had to invite representatives from these 
organizations to come to workshops to remove any suspicion concerning their 
activities. Failure to do this would have put both the project and personnel in danger.  
This probably also explains why the team failed fully to take account of local political 
dynamics in thinking about the range of participants to engage in action concerning 
participatory resource management (see subsequent chapters).  
 
Because of inflation, and a ‘parallel market’ for foreign currency, it was difficult to 
quantify benefits, in US-Dollar terms, obtained by resources users from their 
activities.  Numerous exchange rates exist for the US dollar (USD) against the 
Zimbabwe Dollar (ZWD): official figures (which up to the end of 2007 grossly 
overvalued the ZWD), various parallel market rates, the UN Rate, and those 
prevailing on the internet. For the sake of consistency and comparison, I have used 
average monthly rates from the following website:  
http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory as these seem realistic estimates (Annex, 
2.3). The different yearly average ZWD amounts equivalent to one USD (generated 
from the average monthly figures – see Annex 2.3) are presented in Table 2.2. The 
major issues from the socio-economic climate in the post colonial period are 
summarised in Box 2.3 below. 
 
Table 2.2: Yearly average figures: amount of Zimbabwe Dollar (ZWD) 
equivalent to 1 United States Dollar from 2001-2007 (Generated 
from monthly average figures in Annex 2.2) 
 
Year Amount of ZWD equivalent to I USD  
2001 55.99 
2002 57.21 
2003 575.49 
2004 4 489.57 
2005 21 531.19 
2006 144 912.52 
2007 9 467 500.35 
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Box 2.3: Major socio-economic and political issues in the post colonial 
period 
 
1980: Zimbabwe became independent from British colonial rule. The new government 
inherited a crippled economy that had suffered from international sanctions imposed during 
the UDI period. 
 
1990: The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme implemented by the government. 
This resulted in the privatisation of parastatals providing services such as electricity and water 
around the mid 1990s. The ESAP however brought several negative changes with several 
companies having downsized and laid off their workers. 
 
1997: Beginning of the country’s present economic and political crisis 
 
1999: The formation of the Movement for Democratic Change opposition political party. 
During this period there was increased illegal occupation of large scale commercial farms led 
by war veterans. 
 
2001- 2007: The manufacturing industry collapsed in the country, and unemployment rate and 
inflation rates have continued to increase with Zimbabwe being a world leader. Production in 
all sectors fell and there was a collapse of social services. There was lack of basic 
commodities in the country. There was political unrest and a general breakdown of law and 
order. Zimbabwe became a pariah state and environmental issues took a back stake as 
humanitarian issues took centre stage. 
 
2.3 Mafungautsi reserve – forest and people 
2.3.1 The Mafungautsi Forest 
Mafungautsi State Forest lies in Gokwe South District, Midlands Province, north-
western Zimbabwe (Figure 2.2). The greater part of the district lies in the agro-
ecological region III22, receiving 600-800mm rainfall per annum mainly concentrated 
in the season from November to March. This is higher than rainfall received by the 
rest of Gokwe District mainly in agro-ecological regions IV and V. Gokwe South 
District therefore has a higher potential for agriculture, and most people in this area 
look at forest land as a reservoir for future arable land, as their livelihoods are mainly 
based on agriculture. The forest derives its name from the Mafungautsi23 Plateau on 
which it stands.  This plateau lies at an attitude of 1100 - 1390m (Matose, 2002) and 
is flat, except where dissected by four rivers - Sengwa, Ngondoma, Mbumbusi and 
Lutope. The rivers drain into the Zambezi. The dam on the Zambezi, Lake Kariba 
(Fig. 2.2) is an important source of hydroelectric power for Zimbabwe. 
 
Except for the small area occupied by small scale commercial farms on the southern-
eastern edge (The Chemagora SSCFA, see Figure 2.5) the forest is entirely 
surrounded by densely24 populated communal areas. When it was first demarcated as 
a state forest in 1953, it was 101,000 ha in size (Vermeulen, 1997). In 1972, the 
                                                 
22
  An explanation of the different agro-ecological regions in Zimbabwe is given in Chapter 1 
23
  Mafungautsi means ‘a place that smokes’ referring to the clouds that hang over the plateau 
due to its altitude in relation to the surrounding areas (Matose, 2002). 
24
  The population Density in Gokwe communal area ranges from 25 people per square 
kilometre to 50 people per square kilometre (Central Statistics Office, 1992). 
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northern part of the forest was reclassified as a communal area, and some parts of the 
southern part were degazetted when the forestry department failed to contain 
problems of squatters in the forest (Matose, 1997), leaving the area of the forest today 
at 82,100 ha. The forest makes up 17% of the district. The balance comprises 73% of 
communal farm land and 10% of land occupied by national parks and small-scale 
commercial farms. 
 
The dominant soils in the forest are derived from Kalahari sands25 up to 75m deep. 
These sandy soils have low clay and silt fractions (3% clay, 2% silt) and therefore 
cannot stabilise organic matter significantly (Zingore et al., 2005). They are therefore 
low in organic matter content, a crucial element for sustainable crop production by 
farmers oriented towards household food self-sufficiency, who sell little and have 
limited cash to buy fertilisers, and so mostly rely on nutrients mineralised from 
organic matter (Zingore et al., 2005). Zingore et al. (2005) found that soil organic 
matter in the Kalahari sands declines rapidly after cultivation and no meaningful crop 
production can be achieved after five to ten years of crop production without inputs of 
manure or fertilizer. The river valleys in Mafungautsi cut through the Kalahari Sands 
into Karoo Sandstones, thereby giving rise to varied soils. For example, soils found in 
valleys include colluvial deposits from the upper slopes; these tend to be deep, 
moderately well-drained loamy soils, and are highly favoured for agricultural 
purposes (Mudekwe, 2003). 
 
Mafungautsi is the third largest indigenous26 state forest after Gwaai (144 265 ha) and 
Ngamo Forests (102 900 ha), comprising dry miombo27 forests. The forest is 
dominated by Brachystegia spiciformis, and Julbernadia globiflora. The forest also 
has a high proportion (about 25 % of all stems) of the Zimbabwe teak (Baikiaea 
plurijuga), a leguminous tree valuable for timber (Vermeulen, 1994). Baikiaea 
plurijuga is well adapted to the very deep, nutrient-poor Kalahari sands due to its very 
deep rooting system. Most of the large specimens of Baikiaea plurijuga were 
removed by selective logging between 1989-1992. A few other commercial timber 
species, such as Pterocarpus angolensis, are also found in the forest.  
 
Grasslands in the forest occur only in river valleys where high water tables during the 
rains exclude the trees that are generally sensitive to water logging (Figure 2.3). Grass 
cover is low in the forests on the plateau where the deep-rooted trees out-compete 
grasses in accessing soil water.  In general, human intervention and other disturbances 
have tended to change the structure and diversity of the forest (Childes and Walker, 
1987; Vermeulen, 1994). These changes might be considered undesirable, but some 
can be manipulated to maintain the forest in a state most suited to fulfilling 
stakeholders’ various needs. The forest is a source for several resources, including 
timber, thatch grass (Hyparrhenia femitina), broom grass (Aristida junciformis), 
honey, mushrooms, poles, herbs, tea leaves and firewood. Only a few wild animals 
                                                 
25
  ‘This is the most northerly extension of the Kalahari Sands geological surface in Zimbabwe 
(Vermeulen, 1994). 
26
  The Indigenous forests of Zimbabwe fall under three tenurial categories: forests in communal 
areas; forests in protected areas and state land and forests in large scale commercial farming areas 
(McNamara, 1993) 
27
  Miombo forest is the most extensive tropical seasonal forest and dry forest formation, 
covering substantial regions of south and central Africa (Campbell et al., 1996; Frost 1996). The 
regions where Miombo forest is found receive more than 700mm of rainfall and are often characterised 
by nutrient poor soils. 
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Figure 2.2: Location of Mafungautsi Forest Reserve, and the case study sites 
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are found in the forest, however.  These include: zebra, kudu, bush pig, warthog, 
reedbuck, bushbuck, buffalo, hare, hyena and duiker (Maturure et al., 1994)], Timber, 
poles and wild animals are not part of the resource sharing agreement.  
 
Mafungautsi forest has over time been a landscape of contested values and meanings. 
To the government forestry department and other agencies involved in environmental 
management issues, it is a remnant of an original vegetation type associated with the 
Mafungautsi Plateau, and therefore needs to be preserved. The forest is also seen, by 
the forestry officers, as a water catchment area for the important rivers in the country, 
and this is one of the key reasons the forest was gazetted as a state forest. For the local 
community members, both the Shangwe indigenes (the early settlers) and immigrants, 
the forest represents a reservoir of future arable land, especially because of its 
numerous wetlands. For others, notably the early, the forest is an ancestral home, a 
place where they used to stay before it was claimed by the state. 
 
2.3.2 The stakeholders in Mafungautsi 
Stakeholders in the management of Mafungautsi State forest can be grouped in two - 
district level and local level stakeholders. District level stakeholders include the FC, 
Rural District Council (RDC), The District Administrator (DA), the Ministry of 
Youth Gender and Employment Creation (MYDGEC), the Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR), the Department of Agricultural Research and Extension Services 
(AREX), and district level political party structures. Except for AREX and the FC, 
none of the other district level stakeholders is actively involved in facilitating 
processes in communities. 
 
Local level stakeholders include local leaders (chiefs, headmen, and village heads), 
members of local government structures [Village Development Committees 
(VIDCOs), Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) local councillors,  political 
party structures28, Resource Management Committees (RMC) (see Chapter 5) and 
agricultural extension agents. The roles of these stakeholders are presented in Table 
2.3.  
 
Comparable with other communal areas in Zimbabwe, several of the organisations 
listed above are found in communities surrounding Mafungautsi State Forest. These 
organisations play various roles in the management of natural resources (see Section, 
2.2). Because many structures exist at village level, one has to make a decision on 
which structure to approach first, on entering a community. As we shall see later on, 
organising meetings though the traditional leadership structures in Batanai (one of the 
study sites), was not a good strategy as community members would not come. Batanai 
was a politically volatile area and a stronghold for the ruling ZANU-PF political party 
(next sections, and Chapter 4), and for any meeting to be a success, one had to 
organise it via the political structures.  
                                                 
28
  In Zimbabwe there are two major political parties, the ruling ZANU PF party and the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) opposition party. These two parties have similar structures 
at district and communal levels. In communal areas, members of political parties hold the following 
positions both at the ward and village: ward/village chair; vice chair; ward secretary; vice secretary; 
treasurer; and committee members.  
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Figure 2.3: Mafungautsi land cover types29 
 
2.3.3 The People 
Prior to the 1940s, Gokwe District in north-western Zimbabwe, (where this research 
was carried out was) was sparsely populated by ‘Shangwe’30 indigenes (Nyambara, 
2001a, 2001b; Nyambara 2002; Worby, 1992; 1994; Alexander and McGregor, 1997; 
Alexander et al. 2000). The low population densities were mainly due to the presence 
of tsetse fly (a cause of both cattle disease and human sleeping sickness) and to the 
semi-arid condition of the area. Immigrants later came to the area once the tsetse fly 
problem was eradicated in 1940 and can roughly be classified into six categories. 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
  Grassland areas in Mafungautsi Forest are a result of seasonal flooding that prevents the 
establishment of trees. 
30
  Shangwe is derogatory, and the indigenous people do not like to be called by it as it denotes 
primitivism and backwardness. The indigenous people claim Rozvi origins and speak a Korekore 
dialect of Shona (Nyambara, 2002). They insist that the term ‘Shangwe’ refers to their area rather than 
who they are (Nyambara, 2002; Worby, 1994): most of Gokwe district is classified under Natural 
Regions III, (mostly suitable for semi-intensive farming) and IV (mostly suitable for semi-extensive 
farming) and the areas are relatively dry and prone to periodic droughts and severe drought spells. The 
word Shangwe seems to have some of the same connotations as the Shona word for drought and 
famine, Shangwa. Shangwa can also be used to describe a place that has harsh weather, making human 
settlement difficult (Nyambara, 2002). The early settlers, depending on where they came from before 
they settled in Gokwe, classify themselves as Ndebele, Shona or Korekore. 
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Table 2.3: Stakeholders and their roles in Mafungautsi (Adapted from 
Matose, 2002). 
 
Level Stakeholder/ 
Organisation 
Role in the management of the forest 
Forestry 
Commission 
 
A state body specifically mandated to provide advice on, and 
control, management and exploitation of forest resources. 
The FC has regulatory roles as well as extension roles. 
Department of 
Agricultural 
Research and 
Extension 
(AREX) 
Government department that carries out agricultural 
extension in communal areas. It is responsible for providing 
technical extension services to forest users and training e.g. 
on beekeeping. 
Department of 
Natural 
Resources 
 
Secretariat to the Natural Resources Board, nationally their 
role is advisory, regulatory, and supervisory in relation to all 
natural resources. 
The Ministry of 
Youth, Gender 
and 
Employment 
Creation 
Ministry that coordinates government activities on rural 
development activities. It is responsible for providing 
training to communities and RMCs on various issues 
including proposal writing. It is also responsible for 
monitoring community participation in development projects 
 Rural District 
Council (RDC) 
This is the local government authority. The RDC has a Rural 
District Development Committee (RDDC) that coordinates 
all council activities. It is responsible for formulating and 
implementing by-laws, and consolidating ward development 
plans into the district five-year plan.  
District 
level 
stakehol
ders 
The District 
Administrator 
(DA) 
The DA chairs the RDC RDDC and is an employee and 
representative of the Ministry of Local Government, Rural 
and Urban Development 
Traditional 
leaders (Chiefs, 
Headmen and 
village heads)  
They play a supportive role to the RMCs and also help in 
policing issues.  
The District 
Administrator’s 
Office 
Represents the Minister responsible local government at the 
district level 
Councillors These are elected people who chair the WADCOs and are 
responsible for forwarding the ward development plans to 
the Rural District Council. 
Village 
Development 
Committees 
(VIDCOS) and 
Ward 
Development 
Committees 
(WADCOs) 
VIDCOS were created by the 1984 Prime Ministerial 
Directive to give a democratic orientation to the process of 
planning for local development.  The VIDCO is the lowest 
unit of government administration, whose role is to identify 
needs of people in their villages and articulate them in the 
form of village development plans. These plans are presented 
to the WADCO. 
 
The WADCO draws its memberships from the chairpersons 
of the VIDCOS in the ward and is chaired by an elected 
councillor. It is responsible for consolidating the various 
VIDCO plans into a WARD development plan to be  
presented to the Rural District Development Committee  
Local 
level 
stakehol
ders 
Resource RMCs were formed on FC initiative to represent their 
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Management 
Committees 
(RMC) 
communities and act as a link between the communities and 
the FC. Their main roles include issuing permits to resource 
harvesters, controlling and monitoring resource harvesting 
and keeping the community bank account 
The resource 
users 
These are local people who utilise forest resources as well as 
help in the management of the forest. Their participation is 
mainly through the RMC. 
 
The first group consisted of families evicted from Rhodesdale farm31 in 1953, 
together with their traditional leaders.  This group was resettled in Gokwe by the 
colonial government (Nyambara 2001a; Worby 1994)32 and consisted mainly of 
Shona speakers called Madheruka by the indigenes.33 The second group of 
immigrants consisted of people from the southern parts of the country (Masvingo and 
Mberengwa) characterised by extreme land pressure and who migrated during the 
time of the guerrilla war of independence and  settled in Gokwe where land was still 
available and cotton had become one of the major established crops. This second 
group migrated to Gokwe during the period 1960s to 1970s. Unlike the first group of 
immigrants, when people were forcibly settled in Gokwe, these immigrants settled 
voluntarily. 
 
A third group of immigrants consisted mainly of labour migrants from neighbouring 
countries such as Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique who worked in mines and on 
commercial farms and wanted to establish rural homes. A fourth group was 
heterogeneous and included civil servants (teachers, tsetse control personnel, road 
workers, etc)  posted to Gokwe and who then decided they wanted to settle 
permanently and petty traders attracted by prospects of acquiring land as an 
investment for commercial farming. 
 
A fifth group came to Gokwe after the introduction of the Fast Track Land Reform in 
2000. These immigrants came from a variety of places, and sought to settle especially 
in the forest areas, where they joined local people moving into the forest reserve to 
                                                 
31
  Rhodesdale farm was owned by a British multinational corporation, Lonrho, but was later 
bought by the state, (after the Second World War). It was later divided into a number of separate farms 
and ranches to be allocated to European ex-servicemen (Nyambara, 2002). 
32
 Their settlement in Gokwe coincided with the introduction of cotton to the area by the colonial 
government. The immigrants were quick to adopt the new crop while the indigenous people were 
reluctant. The immigrants, because of their connections elsewhere, looked down upon the indigenous 
people and labelled them backwards and primitive, as summed up the following statement. 
 Stereotypes of the primitiveness of the indigenous people pervaded almost every aspect of 
their lives: house styles, clothing, hygiene and gender relations. The stereotypes also touched on rituals, 
religion, belief, agricultural practices, cattle ownership, involvement in the market, accumulation, use 
of technology and consumption of manufactured commodities (Nyambara 2002, p. 291) 
 Perception of Shangwe as backward can be traced to the historical circumstances that placed 
their area on the margins of colonial world, because of remoteness (Worby, 1992; Nyambara, 2002). 
The Gokwe area was less accessible to colonial administration, and it was only around the 1950s - just 
before the immigrants were brought to Gokwe - that schools, boreholes and other facilities were 
introduced. Because of the late introduction of school, Shangwe people are not well educated are 
usually labelled as illiterate (Nyangani, 1971) 
33
  According to Nyambara (2002), Madheruka is an onomatopoeic word intended to evoke the 
sound of the engines of lorries that brought the immigrants to Gokwe. Because the immigrants were 
from diverse backgrounds and lacked a shared history, the term Madheruka is not appropriate as an 
ethnic label. However, what the immigrants shared in common was their self-conscious progressive 
status, compared to the indigenes, and this became part of their self-identity. 
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reclaim ancestral lands. The ‘Shangwe’ indigenes once lived in the forest and were 
forced  out in 1986, sometime after the forest was gazetted  (see section entitled 
‘Settlement history in Mafungautsi’  below). A sixth group arrived after an operation 
dubbed ‘Operation Murambatsvina34’ (Murambatsvina is a Shona word that can be 
broken into two words, Muramba that means ‘who refuses’ and tsvina that means 
filth/ dirt. Murambatsvina therefore literally means ‘one who refuses dirt’) in 2005 
(International Crisis Group, 2005).  This displaced many urban settlers with no title to 
the land on which their shanty housing stood.  Many were hostile to the regime, which 
helps explain their displacement. Now homeless, they sought refuge in places like 
Gokwe. Table 2.4 summarizes the categories of immigrants settled in Gokwe and the 
period at which they came. 
 
Table 2.4: Types of immigrants who settled in Gokwe (adapted from 
Nyambara 2002) 
 
Type of Immigrant Voluntary/ 
forced 
settlement 
Year of 
settlement in 
Gokwe 
• Those evicted from Rhodesdale farm by colonial 
government 
Forced 1953 
• People coming from the southern parts of the country 
characterised by extreme land pressure and who 
migrated during the guerrilla war and settled in Gokwe  
Voluntary 1960s-1970s 
• Labour immigrants from neighbouring countries who  
worked in mines and commercial farms and wanted to 
settle permanently 
Voluntary On-going 
• A more heterogeneous group comprising civil servants 
and petty capitalists 
Voluntary On-going 
• Those who decided to settle in Gokwe after the 
introduction of the Fast Track Land Reform 
programme, especially in the forest area 
Voluntary 2000-2008 
• Those who decided to come and settle after  Operation 
Murambatsvina resulted in  many homeless urban 
settlers 
Voluntary 2005-2006 
 
Because of continued immigration into Gokwe, the area soon became overcrowded, 
and as in all communal areas in the country, there has been very little progress in 
tackling this problem. This was mainly because the government faced major 
challenges to fully to embark on the resettlement programme to reduce pressure in 
                                                 
34
 The Zimbabwe government decided to embark on this operation with an aim to ‘clean up cities’ in 
the country. During the operation, bulldozers were used to flatten out structures that were identified as 
illegal jointly by the Zimbabwe army and the police forces. In some cases, residents were instructed to 
bring down their own structures and those who refused were beaten by the police (International Crisis 
Group, 2005; United Nations, 2005). By the 7th July 2005, 92,460 housing structures in 52 sites were 
destroyed and 133534 households were affected. A total of 700,000 people in cities in the country lost 
their homes whilst about 500,000 children were forced out of school or had their schooling programme 
interrupted. At least six people (four children and two adults) died due to prolonged exposure to cold as 
no alternative shelter was provided for the victims of the operation. In total, 18% of the Zimbabwean 
population (2.4 million people) was directly and indirectly affected by the operation. The speed at 
which the operation accelerated and worsened the economic crisis in Zimbabwe was described by the 
UN Special Envoy as ‘not just a crisis, but a meltdown’ (United Nations, 2005).  
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communal areas, and by 1985, although a scheme was devised for Gokwe, only 45 
families from the entire district were resettled at the Model A35 Copper Queen 
resettlement scheme in the north (Nyambara, 2001a). In 1997, 60,000 people out of a 
total population of 400,000 were on the waiting list for resettlement in Gokwe. 
 
Over time, local conflicts over land have become increasingly common in Gokwe, 
involving different social fractions - immigrants and indigenes,36 individual land 
claimants, young men and elders, squatters37 and established villagers, villages versus 
village, and within families. Landlessness has increased, especially for young 
household heads and single women (widowed, separated, unmarried and divorced) 
(Nyambara, 2001a). A survey conducted by Nyambara (2001b) found that about 40 
percent of young men in the sample were completely landless. This has been one of 
the major drivers of unauthorized land occupations in Gokwe, and in Mafungautsi 
forest in particular. But a big historical change needs to be noted. Before 1999, 
unauthorized occupation of land was not tolerated by the Zimbabwean government, 
and it often responded by using the police to evict squatters by force or through court 
prosecutions.  If found guilty, squatters were fined or imprisoned and were asked to 
leave the land they occupied (Nyambara 2001a; 2001b). However, after the 
introduction of the FTLRP in 2000, scores of people in surrounding communities took 
this as an opportunity to move into and settle in the forest. Even now, people continue 
to move into the forest (further details on settlements after the FTLRP are presented in 
Chapter 4).  
 
2.4 Settlement history in the forest 
 
People living on the northern and southern edges of Mafungautsi forest have different 
histories, and have been affected differently by forest management policies in 
Mafungautsi. These distinct histories are presented in the following two sections. 
2.4.1 Mafungautsi North 
This is where Batanai, one of the study sites is located. Before the 1940s, some of the 
early settlers (the Shangwe indigenes) lived at Raji (now the Chemagora Small Scale 
Commercial Farming area, see Figure 2.5), located on the south eastern edge of 
Mafungautsi State forest. Around the 1940s, the residents at Raji were forced to move 
by the colonial government when the area was converted into a commercial farm, and 
they settled into what is now Mafungautsi Forest land. The displaced families joined 
                                                 
35
  This was a dominant resettlement model in the country. Settlers in the model A scheme were 
allocated individual 5-hectare-plots of arable land and there was provision of grazing areas in the 
scheme ranging from 20 hectares in NR I and II to 150-200 hectares in NR V (Alexander, 1994). 
Selection of the land reform beneficiaries under this model was based on a criteria that emphasised 
need and gave priority to refugees,  displaced people and those with no or inadequate land for 
subsistence. Beneficiaries under the scheme were also supposed to be married or widowed, aged 
between 25-50 and not in formal employment (Kinsey, 2004). The government policy was to move 
individuals and their immediate families and not entire communities (Dekker, 2004) 
36
  Disputes between indigenes and immigrants were exacerbated by the complicated history of 
immigration into Gokwe since the 1950s. 
37
  Squatting by outsiders on grazing land is common in communal areas of Zimbabwe (Scoones 
and Wilson, 1989). The squatters usually seek local permission and make illegal payments. In the 
Gokwe area, squatters are usually brought in and allocated land illegally in grazing areas by village 
heads and are sustained for political reasons (Nyambara, 2001b). 
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others and settled at Bandakamwe area around the head waters of Lutope River in the 
eastern part of the forest (Figure 2.5). In 1954, the forest was gazetted as a state forest. 
However, up to 1963, the takeover of the forest by the FC had little effect on the lives 
of the forest dwellers, who continued to perform religious rituals and ceremonies in 
the forest, to ensure plentiful harvests as well as continued flow of water in rivers. 
 
In 1963, the inhabitants of Bandakamwe were asked to move to the western part of 
the forest, to an area that became known as the Zanda Plateau. The FC recommended 
this area as suitable for settlement. The relationship between the FC and the forest 
residents was cordial, and residents helped the FC to put out forest fires without any 
payment. However, in the 1970s the FC began to issue rules and regulations to be 
followed by the residents.  For example, large game hunting was prohibited. The FC 
officials also began to issue permits for people to harvest forest products. During the 
late 1970s, at the peak of the liberation war struggle, the FC employees stopped their 
forest service. Some families took this opportunity to move back to Bandakamwe, 
while others moved into the forest to settle. Movement into the forest and reclaiming 
of land by local people was based on the assumption that the war was being fought to 
regain access to land lost to the colonial government (Matose, 2002). 
 
At independence, FC employees returned to work, and their first assignment was to 
evict settlers who had moved into the forest in 1981, and those who had moved back 
to Bandakamwe.  The relationship between the FC and the forest residents remained 
cordial, even after the evictions and the reintroduction of the FC permit system for 
harvesting resources. However, things changed by 1983, due to the rise of dissident 
activities in the forest. These can be considered a by-product of inadequate or 
incomplete demobilization activities at the end of the war38 (cf. Sadomba, 2007). 
 
In 1985, dissidents in the forest set the FC camp and its equipment on fire (Matose, 
2002). The burning of the FC camp, and rumours that forest residents were 
harbouring the dissidents, provoked the government to issue a three-month eviction 
                                                 
38
  From the 1960s, many ordinary Zimbabwean people became engaged in the liberation war to 
get rid of the colonial government. The Rhodesian army was opposed by two insurgent groups, 
ZANLA and ZIPRA. ZANLA was the armed wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) 
party, and ZIPRA was the armed wing of the Zimbabwe African People Union (ZAPU) party (Catholic 
Commission for Justice and Peace and Legal Resources Foundation, 1999). The two parties (ZANU 
and ZAPU) competed with each other for territory and support during the war, and sometimes fought. 
Even though memberships were not initially based on ethnic affiliation, over time the two parties 
became somewhat ethnicised, since by-and-large they fought in different areas, and recruited from 
different ethnic groups. ZAPU recruited from among Ndebele speaking populations in Matebeleland, in 
the western part of the country, and ZANU recruited from among Shona speakers in the eastern part of 
the country. At Independence, the two parties were suspicious of each other, and this made it difficult 
to incorporate the armed wings into a single nationalist party. It was partly because of this that some 
people became disgruntled after independence.  But the problems also came about because the new 
government failed to address issues of land equity after independence.  There was a widespread 
impression among ordinary rural people that the war was waged to regain their land.  The leaderships 
of the two movements, however, were more interested in wresting state power from the colonial 
regime.  When the new government failed to act to redistribute as much land as was expected (largely 
because of constraints built into the Lancaster House agreements that ended the war) some rural 
elements turned against the government and became dissidents. In the present case, the dissidents were 
a small group of armed men, loyal to ZIPRA ideas.  They were leaderless, and had no clear policy apart 
from staying alive and causing as much damage as possible (Catholic Commission for Justice and 
Peace and Legal Resources Foundation, 1999). The dissidents were mainly based in Matebeleland and 
Midlands provinces, and some of them found cover in Mafungautsi State Forest. 
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notice to the residents of the Zanda area in 1986. But before the eviction notice period 
had elapsed, the army came and set fire to structures belonging to forest residents. 
These residents then moved out of the forest to be accommodated in villages on the 
forest margins.  When hostilities between the FC and local communities ended in 
1987 most displaced residents were anxious to return to Zanda, but they were never 
invited back. The residents were now afraid to use their own initiative, as some of 
them had been evicted several times before. As a result, they continued to live on the 
fringes of their forest homeland, hoping that the FC would one day allow them access 
to forest land for cultivation and settlement (Matose, 2002).  The introduction of the 
FTLRP in 2000 was, therefore, seen as an opportunity by some local people to 
reclaim land in Mafungautsi forest (more details about settlements in the forest after 
the FTLRP are provided in Chapter 4). This settlement history in Mafungautsi and 
forest management activities (including those presented in the next section) are 
summarised in Box 2.4. 
 
Box 2.4: Settlement history in Mafungautsi State Forest and Forest 
management practices from colonial to the post colonial period. 
 
Before 1940: sparsely populated because of the tsetse fly problem.  
 
1940: Tsetse fly eradicated. People who were settled on the south eastern edge of the forest 
were forced to move away as this area was converted into a commercial farm. These people 
join residents at Bandakamwe, around the head waters of Lutope River in the eastern part of 
the forest. 
 
1954: the forest area was demarcated and converted into a state forest to be managed by the 
forestry commission. 
 
1963: Residents at Bandakamwe were forced to move to an area (Zanda Plateau) considered 
suitable for settlement in the western part of the forest. 
 
1970s: Rules were issued by the Forestry Commission (FC) to be followed by forest residents. 
In the late 1970s, the FC stopped its services in the forest area because of the liberation war. 
New families moved in and settled in the forest during this period. 
 
1981: The FC resumed its services and evicted those who had moved into the forest. 
 
1985: Dissident activities in the forest. The dissidents set fire to the FC camp in the forest. 
 
1986: All forest residents were forced to move out of the forest by the Zimbabwe army. 
 
1994: The FC decided to initiate the Resource Sharing Project (RSP). 
 
1999: Some families moved into the forest to settle following the wave of illegal settlements 
by war veterans on commercial farms. 
 
2000: More families moved into the forest to settle after the formalisation of the Fast Track 
Land Reform Programme and these settlements continue to increase up to the present day. 
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2.4.2 Mafungautsi South 
This is the where Gababe and Ndarire sites are located. This is the area where most of 
the Shona speaking immigrants evicted in 1953 from Rhodesdale were forced to 
settle. People from this area have a shorter history of interaction with forestry officers 
compared to those from the north. Before the immigrants came to settle, the area was 
surveyed by a group of technical officers including agriculturalists, health officers and 
economists. The group identified the best area for settlement, around Kana. After 
agreeing on the area suitable for the resettlement programme, infrastructure such as 
boreholes, dip tanks and roads were provided. The new immigrants were used to 
uncontrolled cultivation, rearing large herds of cattle and a relatively higher standard 
of living, when compared to the Shangwe indigenes. 
 
It was only around 1970s that people in Mafungautsi South started experiencing the 
impact of the takeover of the forest by the FC. The FC officials started moving to the 
villages, announcing that it was now illegal to harvest certain resources, notably 
timber. The forest boundary was also demarcated. However, at the end of the 
liberation war, some people from this area, and others from outside the district, took 
the opportunity to settle the forest close to the Zanda area. The new settlers in the 
forest preferred growing crops along river valleys, as these were seen as fertile, and 
had reliable water supplies. For a few years from the late 70s until the FC finally 
started its work, the villagers from Mafungautsi South, and those squatting in the 
forest, had uncontrolled access to all forest resources. The new settlers at Zanda were 
evicted by the army in 1986, after the FC camp was burnt, an event that fostered 
suspicions forest residents were harbouring dissidents.  
 
In 1989, some families with fields adjacent to the forest lost them when the FC re-
drew the forest boundary, and illegal settlers in the forest were forced to move out. 
Some of the immigrants who were asked to move out of the forest actually had 
wonderful memories of the area where they came from, and when they were asked to 
move out of the forest, they preferred to be taken back to their original homelands – 
this was however no longer possible. In 1992, the relations of people in Mafungautsi 
South and the Forestry Commission worsened when the FC granted a logging 
company a concession to cut commercial timber. None of the benefits were shared 
with local communities, even though people with fields adjacent to the forest suffered 
crop losses due to damage during the logging sessions. When cutting down trees, the 
logging company drove their vehicles through people’s fields, especially those that 
were adjacent to the forest, and some of the trees fell in the fields, damaging crops. 
Also around the 1990s, the FC introduced its Forest Protection Unit (FPU) 
responsible for patrolling the forest and arresting trespassers. People caught cutting 
down trees, or harvesting any other forest resource (e.g. firewood) were arrested and 
made to pay fines by the FPU members. 
  
2.5 The study sites  
Anticipating budgetary constraints, and reflecting on the likely intensive nature of the 
research, the ACM team focused on three out of fourteen RMC areas around the 
forest.  These were Ndarire, Gababe and Batanai (see figure 2.2 for location). Not 
much information was available specifically focusing on the three study sites, and to 
get details about these and other RMC areas around Mafungautsi, I interviewed key 
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informants. These were mostly the RMC chairpersons, secretaries and treasurers 
knowledgeable about RMC operations in Mafungautsi. I also interviewed the Forestry 
Commission (FC) programme officer for the Mafungautsi Resource Sharing Program, 
and he gave me a historical overview of all the RMCs around the state forest. I also 
took measurements of distances between settlements and sites in cases where 
respondents did not accurately know distances. I also made use of participant 
observation to collect data. The key characteristics of the study sites are presented 
separately below and later summarised in Table 2.5. 
 
Location and accessibility of the sites 
Ndarire is located on the south-western margin of the forest, Gababe on the south-
eastern margin and Batanai on the north-eastern margin (Figure 2.2). The Batanai area 
is about 15 km from the Gokwe South Business Centre and is easily accessible due to 
availability of transport in and out of the area. The Gababe area is located about 50 
km from the Gokwe South Business Centre, and is poorly accessible. Gababe 
villagers walk about 30 km to the main road to get transport.  The bus service in the 
area ceased at the beginning of the ACM research programme, due to poor road 
conditions. Consequently, Gababe has been neglected by development agencies.  The 
Batanai area, by contrast, was frequently visited by numerous organisations, 
especially government departments. The Ndarire area is located furthest away (75 km) 
from the Gokwe Business Centre. The road connections to Ndarire, though a bit better 
than those of the Gababe area, were also in a poor state, making the area inaccessible 
during the rainy season. Because of the poor roads and long distance to Ndarire, the 
area was not frequently visited by development agents.  
 
Composition by ethnicity and origin. 
The dominant ethnic groups in Batanai and Gababe are the Ndebele (51% and 57% of 
the population respectively).  The dominant group in Ndarire is the Shona, accounting 
for 77% of the total population (Table 2.5). Batanai has the greatest concentration of 
Shangwe indigenes (30% of the total population). Other groups (Tonga and people 
from neighbouring countries) constitute 1%, except in Gababe, where they account 
for 11% (Table 2.5).  
 
Forest products and key challenges 
Resource users in the study sites accessed a wide range of resources in the part of the 
forest they were responsible for managing. These included medicinal plants such as  
intolwane (Elephantorriza goetzei), umvagazi (Pterocarpus angolensis), and 
ikhalimela (Dicoma anomala), collected from various locations in the forest, wild 
fruits such as matohwe (Azanza garckeana), mazhumwi (Strychnos cocculoides), 
matamba (Strychnos spinosa) and chakata (Parinari curatellifolia),  wild vegetables, 
construction and roofing materials, firewood, natural honey collected from trees or 
holes in the ground, bush meat; thatch grass (Hyparrhenia femitina), broom grass, 
(Aristida junciformis), mushrooms, pasture, mopane worms (a source of protein and 
are considered a delicacy by many Zimbabweans) and wild tea leaves (common name 
in Eastern Highlands of Zimbabwe - Makoni tea from leaves of Fadogia ancylantha) 
(Matose, 2002). 
 
However, unlike in Gababe and Batanai, resource users in Ndarire did not have 
grasses (thatch and broom) in the part of the forest they were managing. The closest 
area  they could get the grasses was about 50 km away, managed by the FC, close to 
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the FC Camp (Figure 2.5), distant. Because of long distances and lack of transport, 
resource users in Ndarire utilised the grasses found in the wetlands in their 
communities. The resource users however, made illegal use of timber resources in the 
forest, since timber was not part of the resource sharing agreement. 
 
In Batanai and Gababe, ACM activities mainly focused on enhancing sustainable 
management of key resources - grasses and honey - and on how to improve the lives 
of the forest-dependent people. In Ndarire, because it lacked grasses (a major resource 
under the resource sharing project) ACM activities mainly centred on lobbying for 
timber to be added to the RSP. Timber was an issue even in Batanai and Gababe, but 
the ACM team was reluctant to initiate processes that included resources outside the 
RSP; the team started by working with resource user groups on honey and grasses in 
the early stages, and it was only later, towards the end of the project, that they began 
to initiate lobbying processes in Ndarire for timber. 
 
Political orientation 
Politics is volatile issue in Batanai and Ndarire areas. Most people in these two sites 
support the ruling ZANU-PF party. In Gababe the majority support the government 
opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), probably because 
they have not benefited much from the ZANU-PF government, and were left out of 
development processes. Politicians were more active in Batanai, which complicated 
participatory forest work in the area. For instance, during the initial stages of the 
project research process, meetings were delayed by people having first to introduce 
themselves by chanting political slogans, and then by stating their positions in the 
ZANU-PF party. 
 
Livelihood strategies 
As already mentioned, parts of Gokwe District lie in agro-ecological regions III, IV 
and V and suffer from mid-season dry spells and high temperatures. The most viable 
agricultural activity for the district is animal production (Katerere et al., 1993). 
Despite this, local communities still practice mixed farming (Vermeulen, 2000). 
People in Gokwe rely mainly on agriculture to make a living, and they grow both 
subsistence and cash crops, including maize, cotton, groundnuts, and raise cattle 
(Vermeulen et al., 1996). The communities around Mafungautsi forest are dependent 
in part on the forest for subsistence.  The forest provides a wide range of goods and 
services, as indicated above. A substantial number of community members benefit 
economically from the sale of forest products such as honey, thatch grass, broom 
grass and wild fruits. But a ranking exercise I undertook with key informants 
suggested that the forest was a less important source of income than agriculture. This 
is mainly because of the low commercial value of resources such as grasses.  The 
specific livelihood strategies in the study sites and a summary of their characteristics 
are presented in Table 2.5.  
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Table 2.5: Study sites – main features 
 
Profile Batanai Gababe Ndarire 
When was the 
first RMC put 
in place? 
1996 1994 2002 
Ethnic groups  Ndebele 51%, Shona 
20%, Shangwe 28%, 
Other39 1% 
Ndebele 57%, Shona 
27%, Shangwe 5%, Other 
11% 
Ndebele 22%, 
Shona 77%, Other 
1% 
Distances from 
Gokwe South 
Business 
Centre by road 
15km 50km 75km 
Forest 
products 
accessed under 
the resource 
sharing 
project.  
Thatch grass, broom 
grass, herbs, 
mushrooms, pasture, 
firewood, fruits, 
mopane worms and 
tea leaves 
Thatch grass, broom 
grass, herbs, mushrooms, 
pastures, firewood, fruits, 
mopane worms and tea 
leaves 
The portion of the 
forest that the 
people in this RMC 
manage does not 
have grass 
resources. The only 
available resources - 
timber and poles - 
were outside the 
resource sharing 
agreement.  
Livelihood 
Strategies in 
their order of 
importance. 
This 
information 
was obtained 
through a 
ranking 
exercise with 
key informants 
1. Cotton production 
2. Gardening 
3. Selling broom 
grass  
4.  Maize production 
5. Selling of both 
wild and domestic 
fruits (like bananas 
and oranges) 
6.  Raising and 
selling livestock 
 
1. Cotton and maize 
production [these two 
were ranked as equal in 
terms of income 
generation] 
2. Gardening and selling 
reed mats 
3. Selling broom, thatch 
grass and marijuana 
(Cannabis sativa)   
4. Remittances from 
those working in towns 
5. Selling both wild and 
domestic fruits (like 
bananas and oranges) 
6. Raising and selling 
livestock 
1. Cotton 
production 
2. Gardening 
3. Maize production 
4. Beer Brewing 
5. Selling gum tree 
products 
6. Selling timber 
and carpentry 
Key 
challenges that 
the ACM 
project aimed 
to address 
How to enhance 
sustainable 
management of the 
forest, starting with 
management of key 
resources (thatch, 
broom and honey) 
and how to improve 
the lives of the forest 
dependent people. 
How to enhance 
sustainable management 
of the forest, starting with 
management of key 
resources (thatch, broom 
and honey) and how to 
improve the lives of the 
forest dependent people? 
Activities focused on 
ensuring sustainable 
How to enhance the 
sustainable 
management of the 
forest in situations 
where people are 
not allowed to 
harvest the main 
available resources? 
Activities were 
mainly centred on 
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
 This includes the Tonga and immigrants from other countries (e.g. Malawi and Zambia) 
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Activities focused on 
ensuring sustainable 
harvesting of 
resources, value 
addition and 
improved marketing 
strategies 
harvesting of resources, 
value addition and 
improved marketing 
strategies 
lobbying processes 
to ensure that the 
timber resources 
were also added to 
the Resource 
Sharing Project. 
 
2.6 Resource management approaches in the history of 
Mafungautsi Forest 
Like all the other state forests in Zimbabwe, Mafungautsi forest was managed by the 
government forest department, the Forestry Commission (FC) from 1954 (when it 
was gazetted as a state forest). Due to the continued increase in the communal area 
population, state forests have increasingly become contested resources (Matose, 2002; 
Bradley and McNamara, 1993), with communities living on the forest margins 
demanding recognition of their traditional rights to forest land and other resources 
(Matose, 2002). While the state saw gazetted forests as production reserves, sources 
of revenue, areas of recreation and repositories for genetic material, local 
communities viewed the forests as their land, by custom, and as sources for 
subsistence, including tradable products, land for agriculture, and as places for 
cultural and spiritual fulfilment (Matose, 2002). 
 
These differences in the perceived value of state forests – with government valuing 
timber and environmental services, but rural forest dwellers emphasising agrarian 
uses and heritage values, has been a major cause of conflict among the stakeholders 
responsible for managing the forests. But this stakeholder conflict is unavoidable.  
Excluding the surrounding communities from the forest management process actually 
provoked many conflicts between the FC and local users, and the condition of the 
forest continued to deteriorate as poaching of resources intensified. An issue 
addressed by the project was how to live with this conflict, and make it manageable 
 
Because of the problems experienced in top-down management of  state forests, the 
FC, with some funding from the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA), decided to embark on a pilot resource-sharing experiment in Mafungautsi 
forest in 1994. The CIDA proposal envisioned a diversified joint resource 
management initiative including eco-tourism, wildlife management activities and also 
forestry. Investments were made in building accommodation facilities in the forest, at  
a site known as FC Camp ( Figure 2.4 shows one of the three accommodation 
facilities at the FC Camp; Figure 2.5 shows the location of the FC camp in the forest). 
However, these structures have yet to be used for eco-tourism. Instead, the FC Camp 
has been used for community functions and as venue for the annual pre-grass cutting 
workshops organised by the FC (Chapter 4, Part 111). 
 
Although the wildlife proposal received support from Gokwe South Rural District 
Council (the body with authority to manage wildlife under the Communal Area 
Management Programme for Indigenous Resources) the proposal was opposed by 
lobby groups like including the Department of Agricultural Research and Extension. 
This was mainly because the area was considered highly suitable for animal 
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production and introducing wildlife into the forest would result in the spread of foot 
and mouth diseases (Mapedza and Mandondo, 2002) 
 
The RSP aimed to invite communities to participate in the management of the forest 
as they were not involved.  In return, the members of these communities would be 
allowed to benefit from forest resources. The pilot project went beyond the provisions 
of the existing Forestry Act by allowing communities to harvest minor products such 
as broom and thatch grass, mushrooms and firewood. The main aim of this resource-
sharing activity was to enable the two major competing stakeholders jointly to 
manage the forest in a sustainable way, while at the same time benefiting from this 
joint management. 
 
Figure 2.4: A photo of one of the accommodation facilities at the FC Camp 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to enhance community participation, the FC initiated the formation of 
Resource Management Committees (RMCs) to assist in managing resources by 
controlling their utilization though issuance of harvesting permits to community 
members. The RMCs formed included Chemwiro Masawi, Gababe, Gwehava, Rugare 
Tasununguka, Batanai, Sokwela, Kupfuma Ishungu-Chemusonde, Hlangano, 
Masichiri, Ndarire, Nyaje, Mateme, Tachi and Mapiwa. The locations of all RMC 
areas are shown on a map drawn by local community members in Mafungautsi during 
a participatory rural appraisal (PRA) exercise (Figure 2.5). The areas where each 
RMC area harvested its grass resources and the sizes of these areas are shown in a 
map generated using GIS in Figure 2.6. 
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Figure 2.5: Map showing location of Mafungautsi RMC areas 
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Figure 2.6: Map showing exact location of the grass harvesting areas and their sizes 
developed using GIS. 
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2.7 Summary  
 
This chapter has presented the context under which the ACM project was 
implemented in Zimbabwe. The following key issue has been identified.  Forest 
management in Zimbabwe takes place against a background of forestry policy that 
largely reflects colonial ideas and does not allow the participation of local 
communities in management, and unequal land distribution inherited from the 
colonial era. State forests in Zimbabwe are surrounded by densely populated 
communal areas and have come under increasing pressure as local people move in 
and claim ancestral lands. Mafungautsi State Forest has a history of struggles over 
land, and like most state forests, has come increasingly under pressure from 
intensified resource use. Early settlers used to live in the forest before they were 
forced to move out in 1986. They then settled at the edges, hoping one day they would 
be allowed back to their ancestral lands. This however never happened. 
 
Opportunity presented itself later, after the introduction of the FTLRP in 2000, and 
several people moved to settle in the forest. The capacity of the FC to respond 
declined due to the economic deterioration in the country. This decline in socio-
economic conditions affected resource management activities both during and after 
the ACM project, as will be explored more fully in Chapter 4.  
 
The present chapter has also brought to attention the two main institutions involved in 
the management of natural resources in communal areas in Zimbabwe, the Rural 
District Councils and the traditional leadership authority, and has highlighted the role 
that Mafungautsi State Forest plays in providing forest products to local communities, 
and in supplying vital environmental services, such as acting as a water catchment and 
protecting the fragile Kalahari sands from erosion. The Kalahari sands are susceptible 
to erosion when cultivated and are of inherently low soil fertility.  
 
The chapter also noted the fact that Mafungautsi forest has been solely managed by 
the Forestry Commission since it was gazetted as a state forest in 1954. Because of 
the many problems resulting from the exclusion of local communities in the 
management of the forest resource and utilisation of the forest products the forestry 
department introduced a Resource Sharing Project in 1994. This project was funded 
by the Canadian International Development Agency. The project proposal aimed to 
involve local communities in wildlife management, eco-tourism and forest 
management. In practice, even though structures to support eco-tourism were put in 
place, the eco-tourism aspect was never implemented. The proposal for wildlife 
management in the forest was opposed by many stakeholders in an area considered 
suitable for livestock production, for fear that wildlife would bring diseases like foot 
and mouth. The project went beyond the provisions of the Forest Act in allowing local 
communities to benefit from some resources in the forest and participate in 
management. However, the forest continued to be degraded. This led to the 
introduction of the ACM project in 1999.  The details of this project form the topic to 
be presented in the next chapter. 
The context 
69 
 
 
 
  70 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thatch grass harvesters at the FC camp 
in the forest, before ferrying the grass to 
their homes 
Thatch grass harvesters on their way home 
Harvested broom grass in a wetland in the 
forest before being ferried to the community 
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Chapter 3: The Adaptive Collaborative 
Management Approach  
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents and discusses the Adaptive Collaborative Management (ACM) 
approach implemented in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2003. It starts by tracing how the 
global ACM programme came about and how the ACM approach was conceptualised. 
This is important to understand the theoretical considerations guiding the ACM team 
and why they used an action research mode based on self learning and learning-by-
doing to implement the project in Mafungautsi. The last part of the chapter describes 
the formation of the ACM Zimbabwe team, the roles of the team members, and their 
own capacity building processes.  
3.2 Background of the ACM Research Project 
In 1998, researchers at the head office for the Center for International Forestry 
Research (CIFOR) in Bogor, Indonesia, realised that two of their projects were 
heading in the same direction (Colfer, 2005a and Colfer, 2005b). The first group of 
researchers working on a ‘Criteria and Indicators’ (C&I) project realised, after a four-
year research period, that the developed C&Is were insufficient to address problems 
faced by forest managers. They concluded that it was important not only to identify, 
but also to create, conditions for sustainable management. The second group of 
researchers, working on a ‘Devolution and Livelihoods’ project focused on naturally 
occurring adaptiveness of forest managers, also came to similar conclusions. They 
realised that both forest conditions and communities were continuously changing, 
thereby requiring communities to adapt continuously (Colfer, 2005a). 
 
Based on research in Asian humid tropical forests, and comparative experience in 
Africa and South America, CIFOR researchers were convinced of the urgency to 
solve environmental and human problems related to sustainability. Influenced by the 
work of Terborgh (1999) and Wirkramasinghe (1994) they recognised a need to act 
quickly to halt environmental degradation and address increasing rural poverty and 
suffering. Researchers realised that there was scope for convergence of these two 
projects, and later formulated a new programme - Local People, Devolution and 
Adaptive Collaborative Management of Forests. It was under this new project that the 
ACM approach was conceptualised to address environmental and human problems 
while contributing to researchers’ understanding of processes involved (Colfer, 
2005a; and Colfer, 2005b). 
 
ACM research was initiated through projects in 11 countries (Cameroon, Ghana, 
Zimbabwe, Malawi, Indonesia, Philippines, Nepal, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Brazil 
and Bolivia). By 2002, research had expanded to thirty field work settings (Colfer 
2005a). An ACM coordinating team with Research Programme Coordinator 
coordinated global research and synthesised main findings. In various countries ACM 
teams typically comprised a mix of ecologists, sociologists and economists. For each 
team, a leader was appointed and made responsible for coordinating and guiding the 
research in his/her own country.  
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To facilitate learning among the different ACM teams, the ACM Research 
Programme Coordinator organised meetings to share experiences. An ACM 
newsletter was started for the same purpose. 
 
3.2.1 Conceptualising the ACM approach 
From the CIFOR researchers ACM was seen as  drawing on a number of bodies of 
theory, including complex systems theory, adaptive management theory, social 
learning theory, ideas about equity in development, notions of cooperation and 
competition, models of human interaction and pragmatic processes of facilitating 
change (CIFOR, 2000; Diaw et al. 2009). The approach was also seen as embodying 
two main orientations: 
• collaborative management, as applied in various fields of natural resource 
management. The collaborative management approach has made headway as a 
result of a growing consensus that without some basic agreements among 
affected parties about resource use sustainability would never be achieved, and 
degradation would continue 
• adaptive management, seen as a way to address the complexity and 
uncertainty inherent in natural resource situations. The adaptive management 
approach is an iterative process providing regular analysis of progress towards 
established objectives and adjustment to changing circumstances. ACM also 
recognised traditional approaches.  These are often informal, adaptive and 
collaborative ways of approaching management of forest resources, and have 
been in use for centuries.  ACM aims to integrate these approaches where 
appropriate.  
 
The CIFOR researchers initially defined ACM as a concept of natural resource 
management (NRM) and as a research program. ACM research in practice was 
supposed to help define the ACM approach more clearly. CIFOR researchers’ initial 
definitions were as follows:  
 
ACM as a vision and a concept of management 
In our vision, adaptive collaborative management is a means, or a combination of 
means, that can help achieve sustainable forest management. In this vision, the 
stakeholders confidently seek to anticipate the future based on improved abilities to 
learn, as a group and from their shared experiences. Their disposition to treat 
management as a series of experiments to be consciously observed, evaluated and acted 
upon to catalyze their ability to learn, to adjust and to improve the information, 
technical options, organizational forms, incentives and social institutions upon which 
successful management depends. Communication is strong across stakeholders and 
different interests are balanced through negotiation. There is a collective awareness of 
the impacts - actual or potential - of different management and resource use 
interventions, and a considerable ability to deal with surprise and conflicts and to strike 
a dynamic balance between the economic, ecological and social needs of the present 
with those of the future. Seen in that light, ACM is a concept or an ideal management 
system, which has built-in institutional mechanisms for accommodating multiple 
interests and for dealing with complexity and surprise through systematic experiential 
learning.  (CIFOR, 2000 p. 9) 
 
ACM as a family of research programs 
While of interest to forest stakeholders, managers and policy-makers, ACM is based on 
a scientific paradigm that sees local governance, participation or collaboration as the 
centrepiece of sustainable forest management, and hypothesizes that these will be better 
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realized through iterative processes of social learning among and between local 
stakeholders, policy-makers and other interest groups in society. ACM is thus part of 
an evolving family of research programs emphasizing various aspects of this 
complexity and relying on a broad range of approaches and methodologies. These 
include thematic research on community-based, collaborative management, devolution 
policies, local institutions and environmental governance, as well as methodological 
and philosophical inroads related to conflict management, pluralism, adaptive 
management, patrimonial mediation, criteria and indicators of SFM [Sustainable forest 
management], participatory rural appraisal or participatory action research. Within 
CIFOR itself, the “Adaptive Collaborative Management Program” is a broad umbrella 
for a dozen related research projects, which all contribute to the advancement of our 
knowledge of ACM systems, through various angles (devolution, C&I, institutional 
arrangements, landscape development, future scenarios, participatory action research) 
and using different methods (CIFOR, 2000, p. 9). 
 
The definition of ACM was refined over time as research progressed in the different 
countries. Recently, ACM has been defined as a quality-adding approach whereby 
stakeholders interact, negotiate a vision for their resource, and consciously undergo 
shared-learning in developing and implementing their plans (Prabhu et al., 2007; 
Prabhu and Matose, 2008; Colfer, 2005a; Colfer, 2005b; Hartanto et al., 2003; and 
Kusumanto et al., 2005). Implementation is jointly monitored, and outcomes are 
observed and reflected upon to generate lessons for next activities. Within ACM, 
management processes are influenced by conscious and deliberate lessons generated 
by stakeholders involved in joint learning processes (Prabhu et al., 2007). ACM is 
characterised by conscious efforts among stakeholders to communicate, collaborate 
and seek opportunities for joint learning about the impacts of their actions (Colfer, 
2005a). 
 
It is believed that ACM leads to self improving systems of resource management 
based on improved flows of information, decision making following from 
experimentation, communication and negotiation among stakeholders, and learning 
among resource users that result in changes in management systems (Prabhu and 
Matose, 2008). ACM aims to ‘strengthen and enhance processes of adaptation so that 
groups concerned have the capacity to adapt quickly and more appropriately to 
changes that confront them than through ad hoc trial and error’ (Prabhu, 2003:12). In 
order to improve the adaptive capacity of groups in resource management, ACM 
focused on three main elements: (i) strengthening social and human assets of groups, 
(ii) enhancing shared/ social learning and adaptation by stakeholder groups through 
the creation of opportunities for them to share their knowledge and experiences, and 
to learn together and adapt, and (iii) broadening the knowledge base upon which 
decisions can be made by improving collaboration beyond immediate actors to 
include other key stakeholders by helping to identify who they are (Prabhu, 2003).  
 
The overall ACM research programme formulated key questions, outcomes, key 
steps, hypothesis and assumptions (CIFOR, 2000; Colfer 2005b). The formulated key 
questions were: 
• Can collaboration among stakeholders in forest management, enhanced by 
processes of conscious and deliberate social learning that results in conscious 
adaptation of management lead both to improved human well being and the 
maintenance of forest cover and diversity? If so, under what conditions? 
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• What approaches, centred on social learning and collaborative action among 
diverse stakeholders, can be used to encourage sustainable use and 
management of forest resources?  
• In what ways do the processes and outcomes of ACM affect social, economic, 
political and ecological functioning and how does this feedback reinforce or 
weaken forest management?  
 
It was envisioned that ACM would have the following outcomes: 
Immediate Impacts 
• Improvements in policy making processes: Strengthening of mechanisms and 
incentives for policy makers would make them to be more responsive to local 
community strengths and needs as managers; there would be improvements in 
avenues for information flow from local level to the policy process level. 
• Improvements in local governance: e.g., improved transparency in how 
information is collected, communicated and used locally, development would 
be more flexible, (responsive), representative and resilient in local institutions. 
• Improved collaborative and negotiation capacity: stakeholders can recognize 
and choose to act on opportunities to increase human well being (HWB) and 
forest condition via negotiation and collaborative action.  
• Improved adaptive capacity: stakeholders are better able to develop 
management strategies that take into account both biophysical and social 
systems, they are better able to anticipate system responses to their 
management actions, and they are better and more rapidly able to interpret the 
impacts of their actions and adjust management in response. 
End Impacts 
• Empowerment & decision making:  marginalised forest actors have a greater 
ability to act on their interests; forest stakeholders are enabled to think more 
critically and longer term regarding forest management 
• Linking forest and human well-being: Better managed forests for both local 
people's well-being and conservation interests; livelihoods and livelihood 
strategies improve. 
 
It was envisioned that the ACM programme would follow 3 key steps, each of them 
composed of different activities (Table 3.1). In that process, the research would test 
the following hypothesis (Cifor, 2000; Colfer, 2005b):  
• Under conditions of uncertainty and multiple interests in common natural 
resources, collaborative processes of social learning lead to improvements in 
adaptive capacity, resulting in improvements in resource management and 
human well-being.  
• Processes of social negotiation that enable collective planning and adaptation 
lead to more meaningful representation of strategic stakeholders, 
empowerment of local stakeholders and a more equitable sharing of the 
benefits of resource management. 
• Collaborative monitoring arrangements strengthen processes of social learning 
and lead to improvements in forest management and human well being. 
• Feedback loops between the local and higher levels of forest management and 
forest policy lead to improvements in forest management and human well 
being.  
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A number of assumptions formed the basis of ACM research (Cifor, 2000; Colfer, 
2005b). These included: 
• Forest dependent people are part of a complex and dynamic forest-human 
ecosystem that is constantly changing, making predictions impossible and 
surprises inevitable.  
• Forest dependent people have the capacity to act, have agency and invaluable 
knowledge about their systems. It is therefore important for them to participate 
in the management of their natural resources.  
• Resource management efforts that ignore the issue of equity are doomed to fail 
as inequity results in conflicts and violence. Most community based projects 
are high-jacked by the elite, with marginalised people ignored or playing a 
peripheral role in the project. Efforts therefore need to be put in empowering 
the marginalised groups so that they also play an active role in resource 
management. Social capital is an important precursor to collective action, and 
should therefore be enhanced. 
 
3.2.2 Objectives and proposed steps of the ACM project in Zimbabwe 
Using a handbook developed for ACM research highlighting issues discussed above, 
(CIFOR, 2000) the ACM researchers in Zimbabwe later developed their own 
understanding of the project they implemented. The objectives defined for the ACM 
research project in Zimbabwe were to facilitate the improvement of current 
management systems by forest managers at both local and national levels, and to 
facilitate the development of locally appropriate collaborative monitoring 
arrangements. The ACM team in Zimbabwe also formulated simplified steps for 
implementing the ACM project in the field: researcher identification, context study, 
stakeholder analysis and roles definition, site selection, context studies at local level, 
learning and training workshops with key partners at local level, development of 
strategic plans with identified community groups, implementation of actions and 
monitoring, reflection on actions and monitoring, and adjustment of actions. All these 
activities were supposed to be implemented during the three-year project plan from 
1999 to early 2003. During the stakeholder analysis phase, it was hoped that the ACM 
researchers would try to identify different resource users in the communities and 
beyond, their interests, levels of power, their rights and responsibilities and nature of 
communication and information flow among them. After identifying the poor and 
marginalised, the team was supposed to encourage them to participate in the project 
activities. In trying to empower the poor and marginalised groups to participate in 
resource management activities, so as to avoid problems of elite  
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Table 3.1: Envisioned Steps in the ACM programme (Adapted from CIFOR, 
2000) 
 
Step Main Activities Specific Activities Who? 
1 Research Design • Defining research questions 
• Defining research methods and other 
operational elements 
ACM team at the 
head office at Bogor, 
Indonesia 
Partnership 
Identification 
• Build ownership of research by  
negotiating 
• and jointly developing research 
agendas 
• Build agreements on potential sites 
ACM team at the 
head office at Bogor, 
Indonesia 
2 
Joint Site 
Selection 
• Establish and agree on site selection 
criteria 
• Formation of site selection team 
• Site visits 
ACM team at the 
head office at Bogor, 
Indonesia 
Regional and 
Global Research 
Development 
with key partners 
and personnel 
• Research plan development  
• Methods development 
• Networking 
ACM team at the 
head office at Bogor, 
Indonesia and ACM 
field based 
researchers (site-
level) 
Start up activities • Community immersion 
• Create interests and motivation on 
• community and other key 
stakeholders 
• Negotiate research agendas  
ACM field based 
researchers (site-
level) 
Background 
information 
gathering 
• Stakeholder analysis 
• Histories of interventions in the area 
• Level of adaptiveness and 
collaborativeness 
• Forest conditions and socio-economic 
conditions of the people 
ACM field based 
researchers (site-
level) 
Learning cycle 
implementation 
• Define actions and monitoring system 
• Conduct action and monitoring 
• Evaluation and reflection 
ACM field team and 
separate groups/ 
stakeholders in the 
community 
Communication 
and sharing 
among different 
groups 
• Share lessons learnt and strengthen 
feedbacks to wider groups 
ACM field team and 
separate groups/ 
stakeholders in the 
community 
3 
Observation 
Documentation 
and reporting 
• Document and analyse the ACM 
process 
• Report to head office on regular basis 
(fortnightly, monthly, quarterly basis) 
ACM field based 
researchers (site 
level) 
 Continuous 
reflection and 
evaluation on the 
ACM processes 
following the 
PAR learning 
cycles 
 ACM field based 
researchers (site 
level) and ACM team 
at the head office in 
Bogor 
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 Comparative 
analysis of ACM 
processes across 
countries and 
regions 
 ACM team at the 
head office in Bogor  
 
capture, the ACM team, as we shall see in Chapter 4 organised an empowerment 
training workshop and marginalised groups were especially encourage to participate. 
 
In addition to field activities, the ACM team had discovered from several research 
carried out in on forestry policy in the country (Bradley and McNamara, 1993; 
Thomas, 1993; Nhira et al., 1998) that the existing forestry policy did not support 
community management of forests. The team also aimed to influence forestry policies 
so as to enhance the participation of local communities in the management of State 
Forests. The team developed several interventions to realise this objective, as we shall 
see in Chapter 4.  
 
3.3 The Zimbabwe ACM team and its capacity building 
 
3.3.1 The selection of Zimbabwe ACM team members 
As noted, the multidisciplinary ACM-Zimbabwe team, included ecologists, 
sociologists and economists. The composition of the team changed over time, partly 
as a result of the changing socio-economic climate in the country, and partly in order 
to improve the gender balance of the team. The ACM coordinating team from Bogor 
started by recruiting one consultant, an ecologist, and then a sociologist (who was on 
secondment from the FC, and was appointed team leader). Later, a forester, an 
ecologist, a social scientist and an agriculturalist joined the team. Other team 
members were hired as consultants for shorter periods – e.g. an agricultural economist 
who moved in and out of the project. A student intern - a social forester - also joined 
the project, and finally a replacement sociologist joined when the ACM team leader 
left. 
 
When the ecologist left consultants were hired to do some ecological work, but this 
was soon more or less abandoned as ecological variables proved to be much less 
sensitive to changes (given the nature of forest products harvested by the 
communities) than social variables. In early 2003, the ACM project ended and the 
ACM team stopped actively facilitating the ACM processes in the field. The team 
however, continued to offer backstopping support to the FC officer (who was now the 
main facilitator of the processes in the communities around the Mafungautsi forest), 
as well as monitoring developments in Mafungautsi.  Throughout the research period 
(1999 - 2003) the team leader was responsible for steering the research process. The 
CIFOR global ACM Project Coordinator, one of the scientists who developed the 
ACM concept, was also based at the CIFOR Harare office and played an important   
role in the research process.  
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3.3.2 Roles of team members 
The team members were offered contracts that specified their roles in the team, and 
they had to develop specific outputs from their work as described in their yearly 
performance contracts. These outputs had to address ACM research questions. Each 
team member had to take lead in writing one or more specific papers but (s) he could 
also co-author articles with the rest of the team. In preparing papers, lead authors were 
expected to develop concepts notes on the topics they were dealing with and present 
these to the rest of the team and then get feedback. In most cases, however, 
presentation of concepts notes generated little critical response, even though they 
helped to make the rest of the team aware of various issues and topics being covered, 
and what data needed to be collected. 
 
Asking team members to choose topics they had an interest in made ACM work more 
exciting to team members. However, this also risked some crucial topics not being 
covered because they were not chosen by one of the team members. To encourage 
team members to finalise their papers, the team leader organised annual retreats in 
remote areas of the country with conducive environments for them to concentrate, 
give each other feedback, contribute critique, and finalise submissions. Over time, the 
ACM team members achieved several publications, including book chapters, journal 
articles, videos, policy briefs, and newsletters to share their experiences with the 
wider public. A sample of publications produced is presented in Box 3.1 below. 
 
Before and after each field trip, team members met with the team-leader and the ACM 
project coordinator to discuss progress and reflect on findings. The team used the 
lessons learned to influence the next research steps, as well as to adjust their 
strategies.  In other words the research team used reflective action learning cycles just 
as local community members involved in the research were expected to do. The ACM 
team members also organised in-house seminars for which they invited key people in 
topics to be discussed. During seminars, ACM team members presented findings and 
received comments and feedback. 
 
Because of the different backgrounds of the team members, it was not easy to work 
together, especially during the field trips. This relates not only to the different 
disciplinary backgrounds, but also personal principles influenced individual decision 
making processes. For instance, an incident that happened at Batanai area illustrates 
this point (Box 3.2). 
 
3.3.3 Capacity building for the ACM team members 
To build their capacities in ACM, team members were given an ACM research 
handbook that described the conceptual underpinnings of the ACM approach, with 
guidelines on the various steps in implementing the approach, a suite of tools, and 
brief discussions on the various concepts (e.g. social learning, collaborative 
monitoring and participatory action research) related to the ACM approach. The guide 
was, however, presented as a ‘work in progress’- a living document to be 
continuously updated. Team members were also encouraged to learn more about the 
various concepts through literature. On appointment, each member was asked to 
select his/her key area of interest, depending on background (e.g. PAR and social 
learning), take the lead on the topic and come up with concept notes  
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Box 3.1: A list of publications produced by the Zimbabwe ACM team 
members 
 
Journal Articles 
Büscher B. E., and Mutimukuru T., 2007.‘Buzzing too far? The ideological echo of the global 
governance agenda on the local level: the case of the Mafungautsi Forest in 
Zimbabwe.’ Development Southern Africa 24: 649-664. 
Haggith M, Prabhu R., Colfer C, Ritchie B., Thomson A and Mudavanhu H., 2003. Infectious 
Ideas: Modelling the Diffusion of Ideas across Social Networks. Small-scale Forest 
Economics, Management and Policy 2: 225-239. 
Haggith, M. Prabhu, R. Mudavanhu, H. Matose, F. Mutimukuru, T. Nyirenda, R & Standa-
Gunda, W., 2003.  The challenges of effective model scoping: A FLORES case study 
from the Mafungautsi Forest Margins, Zimbabwe. Journal of Small-Scale Forest 
Economics, Management and Policy 2: No 2, special issue. 
Mendoza, G.A. Prabhu, R. Nyirenda, R. Standa-Gunda, W. Mutimukuru, T., 2003. A 
Community-driven Multi-criteria Approach to Developing Indicators of Sustainable 
Resource Management. Journal of Forest Policy 10: 1-21. 
Prabhu R., Haggith M., Mudavanhu H., Muetzelfeldt R., Standa-Gunda W., and Vanclay J. 
K., 2003. ZimFlores: A Model to Advise Co-management of the Mafungautsi Forest 
in Zimbabwe. Small-scale Forest Economics, Management and Policy 2: 185-210. 
Standa-Gunda, W., Mutimukuru, T., R. Nyirenda, and Haggith, M., 2003. Participatory 
modelling to enhance social learning, collective action and mobilization among users 
of the Mafungautsi forest, Zimbabwe. Journal of Small-Scale Forest Economics, 
Management and Policy, 2: No 2, special issue. 
Mutimukuru T., Kozanayi W. and Nyirenda R, 2006. Catalysing collaborative monitoring 
processes in joint forest management situations. The Mafungautsi Forest Case, 
Zimbabwe. Journal of Society and Natural Resources, 9:  209 – 224. 
 
Book Chapters 
Mutimukuru T., Kozanayi W., and Nyirenda R., 2007. Initiating a Dynamic Process for 
Monitoring in Mafungautsi State Forest, Zimbabwe. In Guijt I., (2007), Negotiated 
Learning: Collaborative Monitoring in Resource Management. Resources for the 
Future (RFF), Washington DC, USA. 
Mutimukuru, T., Nyirenda, R and Matose F., 2005. Learning amongst ourselves. Towards 
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Box 3.2: An example of problems encountered when working as a team 
 
ACM team members usually started their field trips by visiting the community partners40 in 
each of the research sites to get an overview of processes, developments, challenges and key 
activities taking place.  One day during their visit at Batanai, they discovered that the 
community partner for Batanai, Mr Lizwe Sibanda, was very ill and suffering from malaria. 
Mr Sibanda was no longer able to speak and had spent the past few days in bed. As they were 
seated in Mr Sibanda’s hut talking to his wife, the ecologists suddenly asked the social 
scientists what CIFOR’s policy was concerning sick employees. He went on to say that there 
was no option but for the ACM team to take the community partner to hospital so that he 
could get treatment. The two social scientists were shocked by this proposition and they 
excused themselves from the hut so as to deliberate on this issue on their own. When outside, 
one of the social scientists told the ecologist that from their point of view this was not the 
right way to handle this issue – they argued that it was wrong to impose their decision on the 
family by telling them what to do. They however agreed that if the wife had asked for the 
teams’ help to take her husband to the hospital, then they were willing to help. The ecologist 
was angry and accused the social scientists of not being sympathetic to the person who was 
helping them to do their work. He went on to say that even if there was no policy from 
CIFOR to pay for a community partner who was ill, he would pay the bills from his own 
pocket. The social scientists later convinced the ecologist that at least they should ask for the 
opinion of Mr Sibanda’s wife on what she wanted to do about her husband’s illness. When 
they went back into the hut, Mrs Sibanda told the team that her husband was already receiving 
treatment from a local traditional healer and that if after this treatment, he did not get well, 
then she would probably ask them to take him to hospital. When the team members came to 
visit the community partner a few days later to check how he was doing, they found him up 
and about, and he was back to his normal self. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40
  These were local community representatives, who helped the CIFOR researchers with data 
collection and lived in the research sites. The ACM team visited them, and the local community 
members for two week periods every one-two months. 
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addressing the following points: definition of the concept, how to operationalise the 
concept in practice, possible challenges that could be faced in implementing the 
concept and how outcomes from processes facilitated could be sustained. The concept 
notes were shared among the team members to get feedback and gain their support in 
the field. An example of a concept note on social learning developed by one of the 
ACM team members (the author of this thesis) is presented in Annex 3.1. It is, 
however, important to highlight that no concept note was developed for the concept of 
social capital, though it was taken by the ACM team members as an important pre-
curser for collective action. This was because no team member took an initiative to do 
so. 
 
With regard to capacity building, team members were also advised to identify relevant 
training courses for developing their capacities, and CIFOR paid for them to attend. 
Such training included a scientific writing workshop for CIFOR ACM team members 
from all countries, held in Bogor, Indonesia in November 2001, a presentation skills 
workshop attended by ACM team members in Harare in March 2002, the 
participatory monitoring and evaluation workshop that two ACM team members 
(including the author of this thesis) attended in Uganda in June 2001, and a modelling 
workshop attended by the economist and ecologists in Johannesburg in December 
2000.  
 
3.4 Reflection and Discussion 
This section comments on key issues arising from the ACM background, and their 
implications for the ACM team and for the implementation of the project in 
Mafungautsi State Forest. 
 
The ACM approach was not clearly defined when the project started. Although 
the ACM researchers did not have a clear understanding of the approach-in-
development (and the various concepts identified as crucial under the ACM approach, 
such as social learning and social capital), they still went ahead and implemented 
activity in Mafungautsi. Study of the concept notes developed by the ACM team in 
Zimbabwe shows limited understanding by the team members. An example is the 
social learning concept note in Annex 3.1. Although the term social learning has 
become popular in the natural resource management literature, there are various 
definitions for the term, and what it means differs from one researcher to the other. 
Concepts like social learning, as laid out in the concept notes, were embraced by the 
team as solid, good and valuable, and their interpretation was not questioned.  
 
In relation to social learning, for example, there is no common theoretical perspective 
and definition of learning (Parson and Clack, 1995) and different definitions of social 
learning are found in literature (see Box 3.3). Social learning scholars focus on 
individuals (Bandura, 1977) and groups, formal organisations and entire societies 
(Argyris and Schon, 1978; 1996; Senge, 1990, and Wenger, 1998, Woodhill and 
Roling, 1998), but views on what it means for learning to be ‘social’ differ. The 
biggest difference is that for some, social learning means learning by individuals in a 
social setting (e.g. copying others), while for others, it means learning by social 
aggregates (collective learning) (Parson and Clark, 1995; Wals, 2007).  
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Box 3.3: An example of the different definitions of social learning in 
literature 
 
• Individual learning that is based on observation of others and their social interactions 
in a group (Bandura, 1977) 
• An iterative and ongoing process that comprises several loops and enhances 
flexibility of socio-ecological systems and its ability to change. For social learning to 
take place there is need for capacity building among actors; awareness of 
stakeholders’ different goals and perspectives, shared problem identification, 
understanding of stakeholders’ interdependence, learning to work jointly, trust and 
the creation of formal and informal relationships (Parl-Wostl and Hare, 2004) 
• Shared learning by interdependent stakeholders which acts as key for them to arrive 
at more desirable futures (Leeuwis and Pyburn 2002b). 
• An approach and philosophy that focuses on participatory processes of social change. 
It involves critical self-reflection, development of multi-layered democratic 
processes, reflective capabilities of individuals and societies and the capacity for 
social movements to change political and economic frameworks for the better 
(Woodhill and Röling, 1998).  
• a dynamic process that involves continuous sense-making of the world through 
perspectives based on concrete, experience-modified knowledge, beliefs and values, 
and a dynamic process of reflection and action by stakeholders through the 
experiences encountered by involvement with other people and the physical 
environment (Maarlveld and Dangbegnon, 1998). 
 
Scholars who use the concept of social learning are thus at variance,  but the ACM 
team did not further dig into these various conceptualisations. As we shall see later, 
the ACM team mostly focused on learning by groups (see chapter 4) and hence 
organised several learning platforms, such as meetings and workshops where resource 
users learned jointly. This strategy, although it was effective in solving problems 
faced by users of some resources (e.g. broom grass and thatch), was not so effective 
when it came to other resources like honey. Beekeeping projects were individual in 
nature and the beekeepers were not keen to share knowledge on beekeeping as this 
would bring more completion for honey production. An example is the Batanai 
beekeeper - an innovator who was not willing to share his knowledge with other 
beekeepers (Chapter 4). Although the ACM team took social learning as the condition 
necessary for enhancing sustainable management of resources and the improvement 
of lives of forest dependent people, no thorough investigation was done to find 
practical examples in which this model was successfully used. In some cases, 
however, the learning model has been found to have some shortcomings (Leeuwis, 
2000). Leeuwis (2000) even suggests that for the learning models to be effective, they 
need to be embedded in well managed negotiation processes. Having a more critical 
analysis of the social learning concept would have helped the ACM team to realise 
that it had some weaknesses, and hence not take the usefulness of the concept for 
granted.  
 
Looking at the social capital concept, it is interesting that although this was 
considered a crucial precondition for collective action by the ACM team (and many 
other researchers - Putnam et al., 1993; Ostrom 1994, 2000; Dasgupta and Serageldin, 
2000; Narayan and Pritchett, 1997), not much effort was put in trying to understand 
the concept. No concept note was developed by the ACM team members on social 
capital, mainly because no one decided to take the lead on the issue. 
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Although the concept of social capital has become increasingly popular in research 
and development work, especially in less developed countries, the term again has 
several definitions (See Box 3.4). From these various definitions we can see that a 
number of different notions are lumped up as social capital including mechanisms for 
generating social capital, outcomes of having social capital, and the type of social 
organisation through which social capital emerges (Portes, 1998). Some scholars 
believe that social capital is not embodied in individuals but in social relations, with 
benefits realised by individuals (Loury, 1977; Bourdieu, 1985; and Coleman 1988), 
while others view social capital as something that cannot be realised by individuals 
but is something intrinsic to individuals or groups (Putnam, 1993a; 1993b; 1995; 
1996; and 2000). Even though so many definitions of social capital exist, it is 
important to note that all these definitions emphasize relations among people in a 
community. Some of the forms of social capital as proposed in the literature are 
instanced in Box 3.5.  
 
Box 3.4: Definitions of social capital 
 
• sets of actions, outcomes and relationships – whatever allows people to act. Social 
capital is seen as having several entities with two common elements; (a) consists of 
some aspects of social structures and (b) they facilitate certain actions of actors within 
the society (Coleman, 1988; 1990). 
• a set of norms, networks and organization through which people gain access to power 
and resources (Grootaert, 1998). 
• the social structure that facilitates coordination and cooperation among people 
(Putnam et al., 1993). 
• something that is central to economic development.  There is prosperity where trust 
and social networks flourish (Putnam, 2000). This view rapidly influenced the 
incorporation of social capital in development work especially in the underdeveloped 
world (DeFilippis, 2001).  
• the ‘intra-community connections among individuals which form a catalytic network 
by which individual, group and community wide efforts are made more effective’ 
(Dudley, 2004. p. 1) 
• the internal social and cultural coherence of society, the norms and values that govern 
interactions among people and institutions in which they are embedded. It is the glue 
that holds societies together and is essential for economic growth and human well 
being (Serageldin, 1998). 
• the measurable variables that create trust and cooperation in communities (Torsvik, 
2000). 
• the norms and networks that facilitate collective action in a community (Woolcock, 
2001). 
• goodwill, fellowship and sympathy among individuals and families that make up a 
social unit (Hanifan, 1916). 
• features of local organisation that enable people to act collectively through the 
formulation and reinforcement of norms, common rules and sanctions (Pretty, 2003; 
Uphoff and Mijayaratna, 2000). 
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Box 3.5: Forms of social capital 
 
(a) civic and governmental (institutional) social capital. Civic social capital refers to 
interconnections among individuals at community level whilst governmental social 
capital refers to connections among people at different levels in a hierarchy (Collier, 
1998; and Torsvik, 2000). 
(b) structural and cognitive social capital. Structural social capital refers to the 
organization of the society, particularly the rules, roles, procedures and networks that 
make cooperation possible. Cognitive social capital refers to mental processes and 
resulting ideas (reinforced by culture and ideology) and specifically to norms, values, 
attitudes and beliefs that make people cooperate (Krishna and Uphoff, 1999; Uphoff, 
2000). 
(c) bonding and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital refers to cohesion 
applicable to acquainted individuals within circles of reciprocal trust. Bridging social 
capital refers to the cohesion applicable to unacquainted strangers in a broader group 
and is important for building civil society (Daubon and Sanders, 2002). 
 
Obtaining knowledge on these various forms or competing definitions of social 
capital, as we shall see in Chapter 6, would have been helpful to the ACM team later 
on. Because the ACM team did not put much thought in the social capital concept, 
most of their efforts focused on enhancing the cognitive form of social capital, whilst 
little was done to enhance the structural form of social capital. The cognitive forms of 
social capital include norms (e.g. trust and reciprocity), values (e.g. truthfulness), 
attitudes (e.g. solidarity) and beliefs (e.g. fairness) that influence people to cooperate 
and achieve joint solutions. The cognitive forms are ‘individual in origin but usually 
reflect broader, shared symbols and meanings within the culture or sub-culture’ 
(Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000, pp 1876). The structural forms of social capital 
include roles (for decision making, resource mobilization, communication and 
conflict resolution), rules, procedures and social networks that establish on-going 
patterns of social interactions (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000). With the existence of 
these structural forms it is assumed to make it easier for people to engage in collective 
action, since they are presumed to lower transaction costs.   
 
Nor is it to be assumed that all forms of social capital are good or useful. It is 
important to acknowledge situations when social capital is the fabric that underpins 
bad activities. Examples are Mafia-like organizations whose benefits are only for a 
small group. There are some cases where social capital was used to benefit specific 
ethnic groups whilst others suffered (Bates, 1999; Daubon and Saunders 2002; 
Pantoja, 1999). And there are cases where extreme levels of social capital are 
undesirable, as for instance, when ‘excessive government intervention can destroy 
social capital, sometimes replacing it with governmental/ institutional social capital’ 
(Dudley, 2004. p.4). The social capital concept has therefore been increasingly 
criticised (Edwards and Foley, 1997; Fine, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002; Foley and 
Edwards, 1997; 1998; Galston, 1996; Portes, 1998; Portes and Landolt, 1996; 
Scudson 1996; Skocpol, 1996; and Harriss, 2001).  Critics also include commentators 
in the media (Lemann, 1996; Pollitt, 1996) and activists (Bowles, 1999; Durlauf, 
1999). The most comprehensive criticisms are to be found in two books by Fine 
(2001) and Harriss (2001). Key issues raised include the following: 
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• In defining social capital, various scholars lumped up a wide range of assets 
together as social capital, making the analysis of the concept difficult and 
helped ‘generate a body of social capital research that, regardless of its quality 
(some of which was very high) …is unable to convey a coherent message 
about this thing called social capital’ (Bebbington. 2002a, p.3).  
• The term is used differently by different authors, 
• The quantification of social capital has remained elusive.  
• Some use the term not because of its conceptual logic but rather in the hope 
that this will make their work visible, especially among economists and 
organizations like the World Bank 
• The term is taken as a panacea for all social problems 
• Social capital is mostly viewed as good and the dark side of social capital is 
ignored. 
 
If the ACM team had developed a better understanding of the downside of social 
capital they might have given more thought on how to intervene in situations replete 
with excessive governmental social capital, like the situation encountered in the 
Batanai area. As we shall see in Chapter 4, in Batanai, in cases where resource 
management activities contradicted the will of the local politicians, resource users 
preferred to serve their political masters instead. An example is a case in which the 
monitoring sub-committee chair burnt the Batanai grass area when the RMC members 
refused to hand over their money to local politicians (Chapter 4). Governmental social 
capital in this case acted against collective efforts to manage resources sustainably. 
 
Also, because the ACM researchers decided to each work on their own issues of 
interest, no one chose to focus on issues of power and politics, and how the project 
was going to deal with these. It was therefore not surprising that the team in effect 
largely ignored these issues, as no clear strategy to challenge existing power relations 
that continued to marginalise the poor had been developed (see Chapter 4). 
 
In retrospect, there are three assumptions embodied in the ACM approach at 
conceptualisation and these influenced both the implementation of the approach and 
its outcomes. First is the assumption that resource management efforts that ignore the 
issue of equity are doomed to fail. This was an assumption defined in the 
conceptualisation phase of the programme shaping ACM interventions, as we shall 
see in Chapter 4. The ACM team made efforts to empower marginalised groups to 
enable them actively to participate in resource management, in order to ensure that 
their views were taken into account in decision making processes. However, even 
though ACM researchers realised during the early stages of the project that there were 
struggles over the forest land ownership and use - see the section on context studies in 
Chapter 4 - they nevertheless decided to work with only those who supported the 
conservation initiative, and ignored those who wanted to claim their land from the 
forest. This posed problems that disturbed resource management activities later on, 
when those who wanted land got an opportunity to seize it after the formalisation of 
the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (Chapter 4).  
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Second was the assumption that all the planned project activities would be 
implemented in the given time-frame. At conceptualisation, it was assumed that by 
the time the ACM team was ready to leave the communities at the end of the project, 
all planned activities would have been conducted. This would have created a solid 
base upon which the remaining stakeholders would easily continue afterwards. 
However, implementation of the ACM processes took a huge amount of time, as we 
shall see later on in Chapter 4. Third, was the assumed superiority of the learning by 
doing approach in implementing PAR. For the ACM team, even though they had 
theoretical knowledge on PAR, they lacked practical experience. Capacity building on 
the various concepts was focused on using a self learning approach, not dissimilar to 
the development of theoretical understanding about the ACM approach (for example, 
learning through writing concept notes, i.e. on social learning). As we have seen from 
the above discussion on social learning and social capital, this way of learning on its 
own was not sufficient to generate full understanding of concepts. It would have been 
more useful if (in addition to the self learning approach) team members had been 
given formal training on these key ACM concepts. 
 
3.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has tried to show how the ACM approach was conceptualised at the 
global level and then at the national Zimbabwean level. This is the base on which the 
Zimbabwe ACM team implemented the project in Mafungautsi. As we shall see later 
in Chapter 4, because of the belief that natural resource management problems are 
complex and no solutions exist, the ACM project was implemented in a learning-by-
doing mode – with both stakeholders in the study sites and ACM team members both 
learning as they implemented activities. The chapter has shown that at 
conceptualisation, the ACM concept was only loosely defined – and the approach was 
overloaded with various concepts from several research fields and approaches. The 
terms social learning and social capital were central and had serious implications for 
operationalizing the approach in practice. By paying all their attention to these 
concepts during implementation, there was  a risk that of some crucial elements in 
joint resource management  might be overlooked by the ACM team, especially given 
the limited project time frame (see  Chapter 6);  Efforts to operationalize the social 
learning approach (something that was popular and seemed relevant) took too much 
time, for example. The intensive focus on social learning by ACM team members 
distracted them from paying attention to other elements, such as the issue of power 
and the setting up of institutions to support resource management efforts (Chapter 6). 
Also, at conceptualisation, it was assumed that the three-year project time frame 
would be sufficient for the ACM team to implement its activities and set a solid base 
for those who would take over. Actual events in the field, however (as we shall see in 
Chapter 4) revealed that the time frame was too short, and the project ended before 
the Participatory Action Research process had fully taken root. 
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his certificate after attending the ACM training 
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Chapter 4: Implementing Adaptive Collaborative 
Management in Mafungautsi State 
Forest 41  
 
Scope 
This chapter describes and analyses the implementation of the Adaptive Collaborative 
Management (ACM) project in Mafungautsi State Forest and its immediate outcomes. 
The operationalization of the ACM approach was shaped by the ACM team’s 
understanding of the approach and its assumptions. Interventions by the ACM team in 
Mafungautsi aimed to address issues of inequality by deliberately targeting to work 
with marginalised groups, such as women and people from minority ethnic groups. 
Although the steps in implementing the ACM project largely followed those planned 
by the ACM Zimbabwe team at conceptualisation (Chapter 3), some additional 
activities were added when the ACM team encountered challenges unique to the 
Mafungautsi case. 
 
Although the steps in implementation are presented separately in this chapter for 
analytical purposes, in practice, they did not take place in sequence; most took place 
simultaneously and were intertwined. The ACM project had a budget of about 
USD$400 000.  Costs were about USD$100 000 for each of the first two years, and 
about USD$50 000 in subsequent years, including support of activities by the Forest 
Commission (FC) officer after the project ended. These mainly covered personnel, 
transportation and funding for workshops and other activities in three of fourteen 
Resource Management Committee (RMC) areas in the forest. 
 
The present chapter is divided into three main parts. Part I presents the site selection 
process: the process of entry into the community, the selection of community partners 
and their capacity building process, contextual studies, ACM interventions (and their 
outcomes), and dealing with issues that came up during the contextual studies. Part II 
zooms in on the participatory action research process facilitated by ACM researchers 
with different resource users, the initiation and implementation of the collaborative 
monitoring process crucial for joint learning by resource users, and the ACM capacity 
building process for the FC, the agency that took over when the ACM project ended. 
Part III covers post-project developments: the joint learning processes facilitated by 
the FC officer, what happened after the FC officer died in 2005, and the developments 
in the forest after the introductions of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme 
(FTLRP). The chapter ends with a discussion and conclusion.  
                                                 
41
  Some information in this chapter has been published in: Mutimukuru-Maravanyika T., Prabhu 
R., Matose F., Nyirenda R., and Kozanayi W., 2008. In Mandondo A., Prabhu R., and Matose F. (eds.). 
Copying Amidst Chaos. Studies on adaptive collaborative management from Zimbabwe. Resources for 
the Future (RFF), Washington DC, USA. 
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PART I: Preparing the ground 
 
4.1 Selection of study area and specific study sites 
Mafungautsi State Forest was selected for the ACM pilot project by officers from the 
Forestry Commission (FC) on the basis that it would provide incremental learning of 
value for joint forest management in Zimbabwe. The forest was a site of a pilot 
Resource Sharing Project (RSP) supported by the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) from 1994. This was initiated after lessons were 
learned from the Communal Area Management Programme for Indigenous Resources 
(CAMPFIRE). 
 
The RSP had aimed to help two former adversaries, the State (as represented by the 
FC) and community members living in areas around the forest, manage the forest 
jointly. The FC had over the years managed the forest for water catchment purposes, 
bio-diversity conservation and protection of the high value timber species. The local 
communities, on the other hand, viewed the forest as land with arable and settlement 
potential and as source of a number of useful resources (Forestry Commission, 1997). 
 
Although the aspirations of community members were gathered prior to 
implementation, some resources were excluded from the RSP and continued to be 
sources of conflict with forest authorities. Conflict management systems to reduce 
tensions between the two main stakeholders in Mafungautsi Forest were lacking. 
Instead, the project forged ahead with user communities for the least controversial or 
conflicted resources. Under the RSP, communities around the forest were divided into 
14 Resource Management Committee (RMC) areas with each area given a certain 
portion of the forest to manage and a RMC to control the resource harvesting process. 
However, up to 1999, there was little progress in terms of collaboration between the 
FC and communities living around the forest. This situation offered the opportunity 
for the ACM project to generate relevant experiences and knowledge.  
 
For entry into the study site ACM researchers began by promoting the development of 
mutual respect and trust among the various local stakeholders. The stakeholders 
included the local community members and district level officials with interests and 
mandates for forest management. The FC at Gokwe District Business Centre, as the 
mandated authority, became the first entry point through which a variety of other 
district level stakeholders involved in the Mafungautsi RSP were identified and 
contacted. The ACM team organised a meeting with about 15 people representing 
different district level institutions in late 2000 to identify communities to take part in 
the ACM research project. Participants included the officers from the Rural District 
Council (Chair of the Natural Resource Committee, the CAMPFIRE coordinator, the 
vice chair for the council), local councillors, an officer from the Department of 
Natural Resources, officers from the District Administrator’s office, three traditional 
Chiefs and the FC officers (the Provincial Manager for the Midlands Province and the 
FC RSP Coordinator), an officer from the Ministry of Youth Development, Gender 
and Employment Creation and an officer from the Department of Agricultural 
Extension Services (Agritex). 
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Given the numerous communities around the forest, a selection of sites had to be 
made for the ACM research project. A site was described as a community working 
with a Resource Management Committee (RMC). An RMC could consist of one or 
several villages, depending on the size of the area. The ACM team initially proposed 
two sites, but participants proposed three sites, arguing that, judging by the number of 
RMCs already in operation, fourteen in total, two sites would not be representative 
enough. It was also reasoned that since all the RMCs were under three traditional 
chiefs42 (i.e. Chiefs Njelele, Headman Ndhlalambi and Chief Chirima) it would be fair 
and appropriate to select a site in each of their respective areas. The RMC areas were 
selected by lottery. The District Administrator43 was asked to select one RMC area 
from each of three boxes. 
 
The selected sites were Gababe under Chief Njelele, Batanai under Headman 
Ndhlalambi, and Ndarire under Chief Chirima (Fig. 2.2). The Gababe area was one of 
the older, more remote sites, and participants seemed to agree that, as a result of its 
remoteness, the area was not doing well. The Batanai area was also one of the older 
RMC areas, accessible, and apparently prospering. Ndarire was an area where an 
RMC was still to be put in place.  
 
After site selection, it was agreed that the councillors44 and chiefs would notify the 
RMCs selected and also help introduce the ACM team to the respective communities. 
It was also agreed that the ACM team would be accompanied by the Rural District 
Council’s (RDC) Wildlife Coordinator and the FC officer on the introductory trip. 
Unfortunately, immediately after the workshop, the FC officer excused herself from 
these planned site visits as she went on leave for the rest of the week. This was 
awkward for the ACM team, and seemed to fit a pattern, as later would show;  the 
officer failed to turn up for scheduled meetings and presented excuses on many 
previous occasions. 
  
4.2 Introducing the research to the study sites and selection 
of community partners 
At the end of 2000, a small team, comprising of a CIFOR researcher, the FC officer, a 
RDC officer and the councillors responsible for the study sites, went to visit all 
selected communities, to consult with local leaders about introducing the project and 
identifying local level stakeholders. Consultations with the local leadership were 
followed by a series of meetings with community members in the three RMC areas to 
introduce the project. The process of introducing the ACM research project to the 
three sites and selecting community partners to work as research assistants for the 
researchers differed from place to place. Details of what happened during visits are 
provided below. 
 
                                                 
42
  The chiefs were considered in the selection criteria probably because they were present 
during this meeting 
43
  The DA represents the Minister responsible for local governance at the district level 
44
  Councillors are elected representatives chairing Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) 
and responsible for forwarding ward development plans to the Rural District Council (Chapter 2). They 
receive monthly allowances from the RDCs. 
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4.2.1 Introducing the ACM project to Batanai area and selection of 
the community partner 
The first site to be visited was Batanai, during late 2000. The first port of call was the 
homestead of one of the village heads, Mr. Maf. The village head and his family were 
active participants of the RMC and his wife was a former treasurer of the Batanai 
RMC. The village-based forest promoter45 had advised the ACM team to visit the 
village head’s homestead first, as he thought they could help to inform the Batanai 
RMC of the team’s presence as well as call for a general community meeting on their 
behalf. It was hoped that the RMC members would then inform the community about 
the ACM team’s proposed meeting. However, the meeting that was arranged with the 
RMC through the village head did not take place, as the ACM team failed to turn up 
due to unforeseen circumstances, when one of the team members fell sick. A second 
meeting had to be organised.  
 
The postponement of the first meeting was fortuitous, since the ACM team later learnt 
there was a low turnout. According to some community members, the village head’s 
wife (Mrs Maf) had told them the meeting was mainly intended to select people to be 
employed by the project. Mrs Maf had begun to campaign for her daughter to be 
selected. The ACM team members also discovered that the meeting they had 
proposed implied attendance from all three villages in Batanai area. However, neither 
the village head (Maf) nor the RMC members had the authority to call such a big 
meeting. This authority lay with the headman (next in line after the chief). This was 
the main reason (according to some informants) there was low turnout at the first 
meeting. Also, it turned out that the local political leadership (See section 2.3.2, 
Chapter 2), including the councillor, were not informed, and others informed therefore 
decided not to attend. Meetings with outsiders on forest issues were always treated 
with suspicion and caution. If the local political leadership did not sanction the 
meetings, people would not attend, fearing to be labelled as sell-outs. 
 
After becoming aware of these issues around the first meeting, the ACM team 
organised the second meeting through the local councillor and the headman. 
However, when the ACM team went to see Mr Mat, the councillor of the area (and 
also the ward chair for the ruling ZANU PF party), to ask him to take them to the 
headman, he told them that he was the new headman now. He claimed a government 
directive had been issued recently announcing him the new headman since the 
incumbent, Mr Ndhlalambi, was to be moved to another ward. This seemed to the 
ACM team to be strange, as headmen were part of the traditional leadership structure. 
Mr Mat claimed he had already assumed the duties of a headman, but was still waiting 
to be officially sworn in. This was a surprise to the team, as none of the people they 
consulted, including some village heads, had mentioned this development. The ACM 
team then asked the councillor to call for the meeting. 
 
At the meeting, the ACM team explained the following things: how Batanai RMC 
was selected as an ACM research site, what the ACM project was, the research plan 
and related activities, and all other relevant information. Approximately 40 people 
attended this meeting, 35 men and 5 women. At least half of the men were youths.46 
                                                 
45
  These were selected members from each RMC who received allowances from the FC to 
promote forestry issues in the communities. 
46
  Also Mrs. Maf’s daughter was present. She worked at that time in another research project 
that was undertaken by University of Zimbabwe’s Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS). 
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Two of the five women were young. In addition, an official from the RDC, the village 
based forestry promoter, the FC’s Mafungautsi RSP Coordinator and the local 
councillor were present. Headman Ndhlalambi, presumably soon to leave the area, 
was not invited and when some community members suggested that a vehicle be sent 
to collect him, the councillor quickly overruled the idea. 
 
After introducing the aims of the research project, and the part that various 
stakeholders were supposed to play, community members asked several questions: 
   
Who will drive the research? Will the research be carried out by everyone in the 
community, as a group, or will there be an agent who moves around the households, 
asking questions to community members? If CIFOR is going to work with someone, as 
a representative of the community, will that person receive payment from CIFOR? Is 
there a possibility of CIFOR selecting one representative for each of the three villages? 
The research that CIFOR wants to undertake is not clear to us; it looks as if CIFOR is 
hiding something!  
 
These questions were understandable in the context of the experiences of the Batanai 
community with previous research work on Mafungautsi. The people of Batanai had 
so far taken part in a number of research activities carried out by other institutions, 
including the FC’s Forest Research Centre and two departments of the University of 
Zimbabwe (the Centre for Applied Social Sciences and the Institute of Environmental 
Studies). Most of these studies recruited one or two young persons from the 
community to work as research assistants. This explains why Mrs Maf and the 
Batanai people saw only an opportunity for employment when the CIFOR team came 
into their area.  
 
Community partner selection 
The ACM team left the process of selecting a community partner to the Batanai 
community members who came to the introductory meeting and helped them by 
giving them a list of the qualities required. These were someone who is honest, 
reliable, able to read and write, resident in the community for at least two years, 
trustworthy and either male or female.  
 
Two weeks later the community had still not reached a consensus on the person to 
select. They told the ACM team there were several reasons. Firstly, the community 
failed to agree on someone to lead the selection process. The RMC left it to the 
village heads, whilst the village heads thought it was an RMC issue. Some community 
members mentioned that they felt it was CIFOR’s responsibility to select a partner. 
The real reason, however, turned out to be the sensitivity of selecting someone for a 
job. In discussions with community members, the ACM team found out that there 
were several people who could potentially be selected as partners, and neither the 
RMC nor the village heads wanted fingers pointed at them for favouritism. Hence 
they were more comfortable with the CIFOR researchers doing the selection 
themselves. 
 
This view was strengthened by the fact that previous researchers in the area had also 
selected local assistants on their own, using their own criteria. The ACM team then 
sought for a transparent selection method. Eventually the community members and 
the ACM researchers agreed to select the person randomly. All those who wanted to 
become the local partner had their names written down on a piece of paper thrown 
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into a hat. The first person selected by the ACM researcher, a Mr Lizwelabo Sibanda, 
became the local partner.  
 
4.2.2 Introducing the ACM project to Gababe area and selection of 
the community partner 
In the company of an official from the RDC and the local councillor, the ACM team 
met with Gababe RMC’s vice chair, who was acting RMC chair for the area. The 
team asked him to call a meeting to introduce the ACM project to the community 
members and seek their consent to undertake the research.  
 
The meeting at Gababe was well attended: eight of the ten village heads in the area 
were present, - 60 community members in all. Twenty participants were women, 
mostly elderly, but their participation in the meeting was very low. They sat silently 
throughout the meeting, and efforts to encourage them talk yielded nothing.  Men 
always jumped in to speak on women’s behalf. In addition to the ACM team, the local 
councillor and the village based forestry promoter were present. 
 
Introducing the aim of the research project to the people of Gababe was not an easy 
task. Informal discussions with some local community members after the meeting 
showed that most people were suspicious that the ACM team members were actually 
staff of the FC, coming undercover, with a motive to shift the forest boundary closer 
to the villages, or to impose further restrictions on the resources that people could 
access from the forest.  
 
Explanation of the ACM project generated more questions and suspicions among 
community members. They particularly wondered about the idea that they would have 
to undertake their own research, and would be equal partners with the ACM team, and 
the FC. Some were quick to point out that they could not undertake their own 
research, since they lacked knowledge to do so. Others asked how it would be 
possible for them to be equal partners with the FC when they had so little power over 
the forest, relative to the FC. The other questions or statements included:  
 
We don’t understand what the CIFOR research wants to achieve? Why is it that 
members of the RMC are quiet, yet they are our leaders and they know our problems? 
We have problems of transport, to ferry thatch grass from the forest to our homes. 
CIFOR should come out into the open and be clear on its intentions 
 
The area councillor tried to plead with the communities to accept what was being 
said, warning they might miss the good things that come with research. One middle-
aged man asked for examples of where CIFOR had used the ACM approach in their 
work, and resulted in tangible benefits accruing to the people. That particular question 
caught the ACM researchers by surprise; ACM was still a relatively new concept and 
there were still no examples to refer to. Of the three research sites at Mafungautsi, the 
Gababe community was the most suspicious of CIFOR’s intentions, probably due to 
its remote location and lack of outside contact. The FC’s village based promoter was 
also present in the meeting and some of the community members directed their 
grievances directly at the FC. 
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Community partner selection 
The process of selecting a local partner at Gababe was done entirely by the 
community itself. After the ACM team pointed out the desired qualities for the local 
partner, the community assigned the task to village heads and elders. Because of 
earlier experiences with the FC - few of its promises had been fulfilled – villagers 
were now cautious when anyone came to talk to them about the forest. They therefore 
put the selection of a local partner in the hands of trusted elders. The person they 
selected (Mr Jevas Sithuta), was a 46-year old man who had been very vocal in 
expressing the community’s fears and expectations towards the ACM project. They 
chose someone who they knew would be more loyal and accountable to them than to 
the ACM team and CIFOR. 
 
4.2.3 Introducing the ACM project to Ndarire area and selection of 
the community partner 
The researchers' entry in the Ndarire community was different from the other two 
sites because there was no RMC at Ndarire. The ACM team organised the first 
meeting through a grinding mill operator (Mr Mandayaya) at Ndarire Business 
Centre. This meeting did not take place because of the ACM team’s failure to show 
up, also because the team had to attend to some urgent matters that arose. Subsequent 
efforts to book a second meeting through the same person were futile; he felt betrayed 
by the researchers’ failure to turn up without notification. He complained that this 
ruined his reputation and that community members had lost faith in him. The team 
later organised the second meeting through the local councillor who was based at 
Kana Mission, about two kilometres away. The councillor was happy that the ACM 
team had come to see him and to request him to organise the meeting. He told the 
team that he had heard about the first meeting, and several villagers had contacted 
him, asking if he knew anything about the meeting. When he told them that he did 
not, few people went to the first meeting. The ACM team later learnt that in Ndarire, 
people were afraid to attend meetings that were not called by the councillor for 
political reasons. The councillor agreed to organise the meeting and sent letters to all 
the village heads notifying them, and urging them to invite members of their villagers 
to attend. 
 
Despite the assurance from the councillor, attendance at Ndarire was low, compared 
to the other two sites. This was attributed to lack of interest in forestry related issues. 
The FC officer explained she had previously postponed several meetings to elect a 
RMC because so few people showed up. But despite low attendance the meeting 
turned out to be fruitful. Community members were open about their concerns and 
were eager to see an RMC in place. They interpreted the coming of ACM to signify 
that more was to come, as far as formalising their relationship with the FC was 
concerned. The following questions of community members are illustrative of their 
fears and concerns:  
 
How do we know that you are not the FC that has come under cover? Our relationship 
with the FC has no free play, the environment is not conducive enough for us and FC to 
discuss and meet both our needs. We and the FC are always running away from each 
other; when we saw your vehicle, some of us ran away. We held a meeting sometime 
ago with the FC, and nothing came out of it, how is this meeting different from the one 
we had? Are benefits from Mafungautsi forest going to accrue to us, or people from 
elsewhere? Is your organisation related to the FC? Is the CIFOR research focused on 
the people only, or the people and FC? 
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Community partner selection 
Unlike the other two sites, the process of community partner selection at Ndarire was 
straightforward. After the ACM researchers presented the required qualities for the 
individual they were looking for, the participants debated and agreed also to consider 
those who were not at the meeting. Three candidates were nominated, all three of 
them men, and the participants voted by a show of hands which candidate they 
preferred. Michael Thomas Chivanga, a young man, was selected. It is important to 
note that the ACM researchers had asked for a volunteer to assist as a rapporteur at 
the meeting, and this same young man had volunteered.  
 
Some reflections 
The entry experiences of the ACM team clearly show the complexity of local 
structure and dynamics. Proper procedures had to be followed and the right authorities 
had to call for meetings. In each of the sites, different issues played in the 
background, unknown to the ACM team. Suspicion towards FC officials, personal 
relations and power issues at the community level, and previous experiences with 
other projects played a role in these first encounters. In general, the ACM team 
learned that community members were often suspicious. In Ndarire and Batanai, 
politically volatile areas, political party personnel were the best option to call for the 
meeting. In Gababe lack of confidence in the FC was evident as a result of earlier 
unfulfilled promises. The community members in Gababe however, seemed quite 
united, but had less exposure to outside development agents. As a consequence, the 
ACM team had to react on the responses of the authority and adapt their action to the 
specific context. These experiences show that there is no blue print on how to enter 
communities. The outside group needs to be as well informed as possible about 
existing community structures to be flexible in implementation.   
 
4.3 Training of the Community Partners 
The three selected community partners became contact persons in the respective sites. 
They were also the facilitators of the ACM process, and served as process 
documenters when the ACM team was absent. The community partners had to sign 
contracts with CIFOR, and their contract form and terms of reference (TOR) are 
presented in Annex 4.1. The team trained the three community partners in skills and 
techniques for research work.47 This included, for example, interviewing and listening 
skills, use of participatory rural appraisal techniques in data collection, facilitation 
skills, record keeping and use of reporting formats.  
 
Choosing community representatives instead of working with the already established 
structures like the RMC, however, posed serious challenges to the institutionalization 
of processes. The team provided the community partners with a small monthly 
allowance. When the project and thus allowances ended these community partners 
stopped acting as facilitators. In regard to institutionalising learning processes, 
building on established structures such as the RMC might have offered better results. 
                                                 
47
  The community partners and some community members from the research sites were 
sufficiently empowered to also take part in participatory modelling as a way of exploring their 
visions/ideas and that this is reported more fully in Vanclay et al., 2006. 
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If RMC members had been trained, they might have continued to use their improved 
skills even when the research process had ended. 
 
Culturally, in the study sites, women were not supposed to take active roles in public 
meetings, as this was seen as lack of morals. This explains why even though the 
researchers had encouraged communities in the study sites also to select women, the 
three chosen community partners were all men. This became problematic later since 
some user groups were all female. It became difficult for male community partners to 
work with women's groups because spouses were not comfortable with the 
arrangement. However, later, after empowerment training, and other interventions 
challenging these local norms and values, there was opportunity (when more women 
started to attend resource user group meetings – (see Table 4.2) for the ACM team to 
create a gender-balanced community partner team in each area. There would have 
been a chance to set up teams of one man and one woman. The ACM team members, 
at that time, having too much work to do, did not make use of this opportunity. 
 
4.4 The context studies 
Having introduced the ACM project, and in parallel with training the community 
partners, the ACM team carried out contextual studies. These studies aimed to 
understand key aspects of the local level situation. They were also an important 
opportunity for both researchers and communities to share information, and develop 
their views on current resource issues. The contextual studies had both ecological and 
socio-economic components. The ecological survey aimed to make an inventory of 
the resources and the quantities present in the forest (both of grass and trees). The 
survey also assessed the rate of tree cutting for either timber or harvesting of honey. 
The socio-economic survey identified organisations working in the study sites, the 
type and location of resource extraction activity, and the problems faced by 
communities in collecting and utilizing forest resources. The socio-economic survey 
was carried out using participatory rural appraisal (PRA) techniques. At least one 
PRA meeting was held at each of the three sites. The PRA techniques used are 
presented in Box 4.1. Except for the key informant interviews, these tools were used 
with groups. 
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Box 4.1: The PRA techniques used during the contextual studies  
 
• Social/resource mapping – to visualize existing social infrastructure, land use 
patterns, location of forest resources.  
• Linkage diagrams – to find out the different sources of income that people were 
engaged in, and show their relative importance. 
• Ranking and scoring – to find out people's preferences among forest products, and 
sources of income. 
• Seasonal calendars – to show how income sources and extraction of forest products 
varied from month to month. 
• Wealth ranking – to find out the community’s perception of and criteria for wealth. 
• Institutional mapping – to identify and analyze the different stakeholders, 
organizations and groups of forest users in the community. 
• Historical trends – to find out the community’s perceptions on issues such as changes 
in resources availability, status of the forest, and their relationship with the FC. This 
tool was also used to understand the developments in Mafungautsi and what had 
happened in history. 
• Focus group discussions – to discuss and analyze existing resource sharing 
arrangements. 
• Key informant interviews – to discuss and analyze the composition in terms of 
gender, ethnicity, age, skills and history of the various social groupings in the 
community, including wealth ranking. 
 
4.4.1 Key findings 
An important finding from the context studies was the realisation that communities in 
Mafungautsi were not composed of homogenous groups of people, but contained 
several stakeholder groups with different interests, perceptions and views concerning 
the role and use of Mafungautsi Forest resources. Remarkable was the view of some 
community members who saw the forest as land for cultivation and settlement. The 
FC however viewed the forest as a fragile water catchment area that needed to be 
protected from human activity. It also emerged from the context study that several 
conflicts existed among stakeholders, especially between the local communities and 
the FC. It also came out clearly that local community members were passive when it 
came to resource management activities, and they felt they were poorly represented in 
the RSP. Some of the key findings are discussed separately below. 
 
The different stakeholders in the communities around the forest. The ACM 
researchers found out that within the communities around Mafungautsi different 
stakeholder groups could be distinguished: the traditional leaders, the RMCs, the 
councillors, village development committees, the ward development committees, and 
various ethnic groups (Shangwe, Ndebele and Shona). While Shangwe were identified 
as a group distinct from Shona and Ndebele (the predominant ethnic groups in the 
area), the context studies showed that this was not a grouping based on ethnicity. 
Rather, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the term Shangwe referred to early settlers around 
Mafungautsi, and included Ndebele, Shona and people of Malawian/Mozambican and 
Zambian Origin. The word ‘Shangwe’ is a derogatory word in the Korekore dialect of 
Shona meaning “very poor people”, and few people want to be called by that name. 
The earlier settlers were looked down upon by later settlers, and the term Shangwe 
may have been derived from the original settlers’ basic lifestyle based on hunting and 
gathering. Getting this information at the beginning of the research was helpful to the 
Implementing ACM 
 
 
99 
ACM researchers as this made them devise strategies to encourage the early settlers 
and the other marginalized groups to participate in the research process. 
 
Passiveness by local communities with regard to the management of the forest 
resource. During initial discussions, community members in all three research sites 
highlighted the problems they faced in the RSP. This included numerous conflicts and 
the exclusion of some resources like timber from the project. It was apparent that they 
hoped that the ACM team would provide answers to these problems. The team felt 
that this evidenced a dependency syndrome: expecting and waiting until outsiders 
came to solve their problems. The team also found that women rarely participated in 
resource management meetings mainly for cultural reasons. Since the ACM project 
philosophy was based on action research, and required local communities to 
participate actively throughout the whole process, team members decided to come up 
with techniques to break through passiveness. These included a Training for 
Transformation (T-for-T) workshop, more details of which are provided in section 4.5 
below. 
 
Interest in different resources by community. The ACM researchers found out that 
some people had interests in one particular resource while others had interests in 
another. For instance, people interested in beekeeping might not be interested in 
harvesting thatch or broom grass. This information was important to the ACM team in 
planning interventions to facilitate adaptive management. Based on this information, 
the team decided not to work with the whole community, but to focus on ‘resource 
user groups’, which would be small and focused, thus (it was hoped) easier to work 
with. 
 
Conflicts among stakeholders.  
After the launch of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 
supported RSP in 1994, the FC created RMCs in the communities around the forest. 
The RMCs were supposed to act as a link between the FC and the communities. Their 
roles involved the administration of permits for resource users to harvest the minor 
forest products, monitoring the harvesting process, opening and keeping a community 
bank account to keep the money raised through the permit system, and finally 
advising the community on how the funds could be spent. The creation of these new 
committees, however, generated conflicts at the community level. RMCs were created 
in a top-down way through the FC’s initiative, without consulting the communities 
(Mapedza and Mandondo, 2002) (see Section 5.1, Chapter 5). It was also not clear 
how these new committees would fit in the already existing institutional landscape. 
Communities were not clear on what the role of the RMC members was and hence 
most communities saw these committees as extended arms of the FC. This later was 
the cause of much tension. The RMCs themselves were made accountable to the FC 
only, and this ignored the already existing traditional leadership structures. This 
resulted in the conflicts between traditional authority and RMC members. For 
instance, when RMCs organised meetings, some heads and community members from 
some villages never attended.  
 
Ecological findings  
Detailed ecological reports (Mudavanhu, undated; Vermeulen, 2000) document the 
findings of the ecological surveys conducted by the ACM team members. The reports 
presents criteria and indicators for monitoring changes in the forest as well as baseline 
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data for the various resources found in the forest. The reports also list vegetation 
species in areas managed by the research sites, their location and abundance. Table 
4.1 below itemizes forest cover types and the areas covered in the forest.  
 
Table 4.1: Results from the ecological surveys 
 
Cover Type Area in Ha % Area 
Plantation 41 0.05 
Woodland 67698 82.19 
Bush land 5487 6.66 
Wooded Grassland 1617 1.96 
Grassland 5919 7.19 
Cultivation 1603 1.95 
Total Forest Area 82364 100 
 
The ecological surveys also showed that a large number of trees were being cut for 
honey harvesting and other purposes, and that the incidence of fires in the forest was 
also high (Mudavanhu, undated). 
 
Reflection 
The context studies helped ACM researchers to understand the existing resource 
exploitation situation so as to devise strategy on entry points and interventions. They 
also helped researchers to understand stakeholder differences, and dynamics in the 
communities and this was useful in selecting the groups to work with. The context 
studies, however, did not generate specific information for measuring both socio-
economic and ecological changes in the ACM project. It would have been helpful, 
after the stakeholders came up with their ideas (Part III below) on indicators for 
change, if a baseline survey had been conducted on these specific socio-economic and 
ecological indicators. This would have made it easier to assess changes during and 
after the project.   
 
4.4.2 Report back on context studies 
Following on from the context studies, report-back sessions were organised with 
community members in the research sites. The main objectives of these sessions were 
to provide opportunities for (a) the researchers to present their findings, get feedback 
from the communities and validate their findings and (b) discuss the implications of 
the findings. In particular this last part would help the community members to reflect, 
learn and rethink their management options. The results of the survey were grouped 
under two broad categories. The first comprised biophysical findings, including the 
quantities of resources available in the forest, the rate of tree cutting for either timber 
or harvesting honey. The second consisted of socio-economic data, including 
organisations working with resource users, the type of resources extracted in the 
forest, and where they were found, as well as the problems faced by communities in 
collecting and utilizing forest resources. 
 
Not only did the reflection sessions help the ACM team clear up some 
misinterpretations of findings, but it also benefited local resource users. For example, 
in the Batanai site (I will focus mostly on the Batanai feedback sessions, as interesting 
issues were raised after the session) the ACM team learnt that forest stumps were not 
only a result of tree cutting by timber poachers, but reflected past logging by timber 
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concessionaires. The presentation of data on the huge number of hollow trees 
(colonised by bees) cut for honey harvesting stirred up interesting discussions. 
Community members who attended the meeting were surprised to hear that they were 
losing so many trees from the forest due to honey harvesting.  In the discussions that 
followed, people talked about how many years it took an indigenous tree to grow to 
maturity and what a loss it was if such a tree was cut just for the sake of harvesting 
honey. Some of these honey harvesters were said to use smoke from burning rubber 
tyres and this not only chased bees away but also killed them. As honey harvesting in 
the forest was illegal, harvesters were said to work in a hurry, and in some cases failed 
to completely put out their fires, resulting in several forest fires. After the feedback 
session, community members agreed to embark on beekeeping projects to try to 
reduce damage from honey harvesting in the forest.  
 
When reporting the findings from the context studies the researchers avoided the land 
issue because of its high sensitivity. To their surprise however, people at Batanai 
RMC area brought it into the dialogue themselves, as they felt that this was a priority 
issue.  The point was vehemently championed by members of the ruling political 
party who passionately chronicled the history of Mafungautsi, highlighting how 
people were forcibly evicted from Zanda Plateau48 and other portions of Mafungautsi 
forest in 1986 (see Chapter 2). The group also stressed that some people had already 
moved back into the forest,49 and they wanted the researchers to help them by 
facilitating processes to formalize their occupations. This notion seemed not to have 
the blessing of the majority of the community members, who after the meeting openly 
expressed their disagreement with the idea of formalising settlement in the forest. The 
ACM researchers, however, responded by saying that they felt that the land issue was 
beyond the scope of their research. They later decided to work with community 
members who were interested in managing resources in the forest. Working with this 
group, against the forest occupiers, contributed to negative perceptions of the ACM 
project by those supporting the land occupations.  
 
4.5 Preparing the stage for PAR 
Several training interventions were organised by the ACM team to prepare the stage 
for the PAR process, an essential component of the ACM approach. These trainings’ 
were mainly geared towards key issues that arose from the context studies. They 
included the issue of passiveness by local communities, the conflicts that existed 
among stakeholders that would hinder collaboration, and the issue of poor leadership 
and representation by the RMC. The trainings were organised as workshops. When 
organising the empowerment training workshops, the conflict resolution workshops 
and leadership skills training for the local stakeholders, the ACM researchers ensured 
that all stakeholders in the RSP were represented. These were the district level 
partners such as the FC, the traditional leadership authority, the RMC members, 
representatives of various resource users (e.g. thatch grass, broom grass and honey), 
                                                 
48
  The Zanda plateau is one of the areas were people used to live in the forest before they were 
forced to move out of the forest. 
49
  At the time of the report back meeting, people constituting 7 villages had moved back into 
Zanda plateau, the FC and other government agencies also acknowledged this, but they had all done 
nothing about it due to the political nature of the issue. 
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women, representative from minority ethnic groups, the poor and the less poor. The 
training interventions are discussed separately below.  
 
4.5.1 Empowerment training 
The manner in which local communities had been involved in forest management in 
the past could explain passiveness, lack of confidence and the pessimistic view of the 
RSP. During the initial discussions, resource users in all the research sites could easily 
enumerate and elaborate on a multiplicity of problems faced in the RSP. They 
appeared, however, to lack the ability to think of solutions to these problems, either 
because they believed that solutions were beyond their scope or because they 
expected outsiders to solve their problems. Marginalised groups (notably women) 
were also passive participants in resource management meetings. In the ACM 
approach this was an undesirable situation and to stimulate their active participation, 
the ACM researchers organised an empowerment training workshop which they 
labelled Training for Transformation (T-for-T). 
 
Background to Training for Transformation 
The ACM team got the idea of the T-for-T workshop from its use by the Intermediate 
Technology Group (ITDG) in Chivi Ward 21 in Zimbabwe. In Chivi, ITDG 
discovered that T-for-T resulted in farmers demanding changes in the approach and 
attitudes of extension workers. It also stimulated farmers to carry out their own 
experiments as a means to solve their own problems. It also led to greater 
democratization of leadership and more transparent decision-making (ITDG, 1997).  
T-for-T was first developed in Kenya in 1974, and was later adapted to Zimbabwean 
conditions by Hope and Timmel (1995). T-for-T draws to some extent on Paulo 
Freire’s pedagogy of the oppressed. Freire (1970) advocates that change should be 
driven by the people themselves rather than by outsiders. This idea provided the 
motivation to stimulate and build confidence among marginalized groups, and to 
encourage them to initiate a process of change (Freire, 1970). T-for-T emphasizes 
experiential learning, empowerment of local people to control their own destiny 
through active participation in their development, and the sharing of ideas and 
knowledge. It strengthens people’s confidence through mottos such as “nobody knows 
everything and nobody knows nothing”. The ACM team saw T-for-T as a suitable 
intervention approach to overcome inertia among forest users. 
 
Objectives of the workshop 
The ACM team took T-for-T as a forerunner of Participatory Action Research (PAR), 
and the team hoped that the workshop would enhance stakeholders’ abilities to 
address their problems, as well as raise awareness on the importance of cooperation, 
especially in solving natural resource management problems. In the initial interactions 
with forest users, the ACM team had found that many of them had no capacity or 
confidence to deal with the problems they faced. For example the treasurer of Gababe 
RMC said: ‘people need education and to be made aware of their capacities in 
managing resources if the RSP can proceed and succeed’. The team also hoped that 
after the training, resource users would begin actively to participate in the RSP to 
improve their lives. The specific objectives of the workshop included the following: 
 
• To challenge local stakeholders to realise that they had potential to solve their 
own problems instead of just waiting for outside help which in most cases 
never came. 
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• To assist stakeholders in exploring their views on resource sharing and 
development  
• To make stakeholders analyse the root causes of the problems they faced in 
the RSP 
• To assist participants in self organization  
• To impart skills in improving leadership, openness, criticism, sharing 
information and reflection 
• To impart skills in documentation and record keeping 
 
Participants of the workshop 
The ACM team organised a one-week T-for-T workshop facilitated by hired outside 
T-for-T experts. The workshop took place at Shingai Training Centre, at Gokwe 
Centre. A total of 43 participants attended the workshop: 7 people from Ndarire (all 
men), 15 people from Batanai area (11 men and 4 women), 14 people from Gababe (9 
men and 5 women), the 2 workshop facilitators (the T-for-T Experts), 3 CIFOR 
researchers (1 woman and 2 men), the RSP Coordinator and the District 
Administrator for Gokwe South District (Table 4.2). Even though invitations were 
particularly extended to women (the team invited 5 men and 5 women from each site), 
only 9 out of the 15 attended the workshop. When invitations were sent out, women 
said they would participate. However, when the ACM team members went to pick up 
the participants they discovered that most of the women were no longer planning to 
come to the workshop. Reasons they gave were varied and included new 
commitments and the failure to find someone to take care of children. A lesson from 
this is that it is important to identify appropriate venues for both men and women to 
avoid disadvantaging a particular group. For instance, by holding the meeting in the 
village, more women would have been able to participate as they could have brought 
their children to the meeting in cases where they did not have anyone to take charge 
while they were away. 
 
Workshop methodology and key issues addressed 
The workshop facilitators developed a programme to challenge community members 
to be critical about their situation. They aimed to make the community members think 
of possibilities they had for improving their situation, instead of not doing anything 
about it. In the workshop facilitators made extensive use of visualisation techniques, 
games, stories and short plays (sketches) to help participants reflect on and challenge 
their ‘mental models’ of their contexts and behaviours. 
 
Table 4.2: Participants in the T-for-T workshop 
 
Men Women Total Area/ Organisation 
No % No %  
Batanai Area 11 73.3 4 26.7 15 
Gababe Area 9 64.3 5 35.7 14 
Ndarire Area 7 100.0 0 0.0 7 
CIFOR 2 66.7 1 33.3 3 
District Administrator 1 100.0 0 0.0 1 
Forestry Commission 0 0.0 1 100.0 1 
The T for T experts 2 100.0 0 0.0 2 
Total 32 73.2 11 26.8 43 
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The workshop started with an exercise in which stakeholders produced a vision for 
development in Mafungautsi. After this they critically analysed what hindered them to 
move towards the vision they had elaborated. The hindrances that participants 
identified were mostly related to ‘others’ and what they were not doing to enable their 
area to develop. They did not mention what they themselves could do in order to bring 
development to their area. This, according to the ACM team, showed that the 
communities had a ‘dependency syndrome’. The facilitators then decided to address a 
number of key issues using ‘codes’: symbolic narratives that were supposed to have 
parallels with the participant's situation. These ‘codes’ were intended to bring out 
issues in a form that all could relate to, and which would trigger some discussion. The 
key issues the facilitators brought forward included: 
 
• The importance of self-reliance illustrated by a sketch on the River Code (Box 
4.2).  
• The importance of effective communication among people, illustrated by the 
Story of Chief Jahana (see in Box 4.3). 
• The importance of being critical about values and norms through the sharing 
of a story that demonstrates that education can either domesticate or liberate 
(Box 4.4). 
• The importance of communication, feedback and cooperation among people if 
development is to take place (Box 4.5; Figure 4.1). 
 
In the next part of the workshop program, the workshop facilitator introduced the 
participants to what is called ‘Jo-Hari’s Window’. This model aims to help people 
understand that they can grow in self-knowledge and that they can actively develop 
deeper trust in people they work with though sharing and giving feedback. Facilitators 
emphasised that feedback and communication were crucial, especially when multiple 
stakeholders are involved in collective action to achieve a common goal.  
 
In the last part of the workshop participants were encouraged not to dismiss other 
people’s views just because they were different from their own views. Rather, the 
facilitator stimulated them to try to understand why others had different views. They 
emphasised that people have different views depending on the angle from which they 
are looking at an issue. Two examples were used to symbolise this situation: a letter 
‘m’ and a picture. Depending on the side one was seated people saw different things 
(see Figures 4.2 and 4.3). 
 
At the beginning of the workshop, community members lacked confidence to discuss 
issues that concerned them. For example, when one participant was asked to give his 
views on what could be done to improve the lives of local people in the RSP he said, 
‘it's you who should tell us; you know everything. We do not know anything 
ourselves.’ However, as the workshop progressed, they opened up and began to 
discuss important issues with the FC officer on an equal footing. 
 
Community report back meetings after the empowerment-training workshop 
At the end of the workshop, participants came up with things to do after the 
workshop, as part of their action plans. They decided to give a report of the workshop 
to the rest of their community members. Participants from the three areas later 
organised community meetings where they presented their experiences in the 
workshop. These presentations generated discussions among the local community 
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members. In Batanai, women who never used to speak during meetings also presented 
their report of the workshop. An example was Mrs Nti who surprised many people by 
her articulate speech when narrating what happened during the workshop and what 
she had learned. Most of the workshop participants brought the workshop proceedings 
prepared by the ACM researchers to the report-back meeting and they shared these 
with those who had not attended the workshop. The photos and the illustrations 
(boxes 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 and figures 4.2 and 4.3 are extracts from the proceedings) 
raised interest as many people wanted to see them during feedback meeting in which 
ACM team members participated.  
 
Outcomes of the empowerment training  
The first thing that all the T-for-T workshop participants had done when they arrived 
at Shingai Training Centre in Gokwe50 was to ask the ACM researchers how much 
they were going to be paid for attending the workshop since they had left behind other 
important things on their agenda. When the researchers heard this, they were surprised 
as they had not thought about this issue before. For them, this training meant to build 
community members’ capacities and the researchers considered this an opportunity 
for capacity building for community members. The researchers decided to negotiate 
with their office in Harare to obtain money for paying the workshop participants. On 
the last day of the workshop when they were giving out the payments for attending 
the workshop, all community members from Batanai refused to be paid. They said 
that after they had gone through the workshop, they realised they had learnt so many 
things. These things  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50
  Except for some members from Batanai who opted to walk to the training venue as they said 
they were nearer, we ferried all the workshop participants using the CIFOR vehicle 
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Box 4.2: The River Code: A sketch to show the importance of being self-
reliant  
 
This narrative has become very well known and much used throughout southern Africa. After 
telling this story, the narrator uses it to draw parallels with the situation of the listeners, 
usually community members participating in a change process. The story goes as follows: 
 
In one communal area, there was an overflowing river in which only five rocks were still not 
completely covered. One man came to the river and looking at it he, realised that crossing 
without drowning was going to be difficult. He sat down thinking of ways to cross the river 
but he could think of none. Realising that he did not know how to cross the river, he just sat 
down and waited. While he was seated, a second man came along and he too failed to come 
up with an idea on how to cross the river, and he too sat down and waited. Whilst the two 
men were waiting, a third man came along. He looked at the river and he told the two men 
that he was able to help them cross the river. The first man, in disbelief, asked the third man 
how he was going to do this. The third man told him that he was very strong and he could 
carry him on his back. The first man agreed to this help. The third man indeed carried the first 
man who was scared to death. When the two were now in the middle of the river, the third 
man began to feel so tired he decided to leave the first man on a rock. However he decided to 
go back and get the second man. When he offered his help, he again told this second man that 
he would carry him on his back. The second man refused to be helped this way; instead, he 
asked the third man to teach him how he was crossing this furious river. The third man agreed 
to teach him how to cross the river. By the time they reached the second rock, the second man 
was now able to cross on his own and he continued on his own until he crossed the river. 
When the second and third men had crossed the river, they said good bye to the first man who 
was still stuck on the third rock still waiting for the third man to come and help him cross the 
river – unfortunately the third man was now too tired to help him. The water level however 
continued to rise and the first man drowned, as he could not help himself. 
 
Discussion: What the three man represented in real life 
During discussions, after the drama, workshop participants identified the kind of people the 
three men represented in real life: 
1st Man: People who always relied on other people for everything, people who always live in 
fear as they feel they cannot help themselves, people who are lazy and do not want to try out 
things on their own and people who always want others to think on their behalf. 
2nd Man: People who are willing to learn, people who put actions into practice and those who 
understand their problems and when they get help, learn how to solve them so that they can 
continue on their own when the helpers had left. 
3rd Man: Donors, service providers or neighbours willing to help us. 
 
Key lessons learned from the drama 
The workshop participants identified the following as the lessons they had learnt from the 
drama: 
-The best way for us to develop is to be taught to be self-reliant rather than being carried on 
the backs of others. 
-Most people who want to help us by carrying us on their backs normally leave us before our 
problems are solved. It is therefore important to ask those who want to help us to teach us 
how to solve our problems by ourselves instead of carrying us on their backs. 
-If people offer us help, we should be careful that when their help stops, we do not drown in 
water. 
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Box 4.3: The Milk Code: a story to illustrate the importance of effective 
communication among people 
 
This narrative goes as follows: 
 
Chief Njelele told all his people to bring one litre of milk and pour it into a big container. 
Each one of them thought, ‘Suppose I pour in one litre of water instead, what will happen?  
No one will notice!’ So they all brought their ‘milk’ and poured it into the big container. Now 
the Chief later organised a big function and asked all the people to bring plates for the 
function. The chief thanked all the people and told them that he had organised this function so 
that they could all share food and eat together. He therefore encouraged each person to get 
his/her portion of sadza (the staple food in Zimbabwe – a thick porridge made from maize 
flour and water). After getting their maize porridge, people were supposed to go to the big 
container and get their portion of milk (this was the relish). When people took their portion of 
milk, they discovered that it was in actual fact water and not milk.  
 
Discussion 
During the discussions following the story, participants tried to analyse who was wrong in 
this case. Some said that the chief was wrong because of the following reasons: 
- He did not tell the people why he needed the milk 
- He did not monitor to check if people really brought milk and not something else 
- He did not tell them what the milk was going to be used for 
 
Others identified the people as being wrong because: 
- They did not ask the chief why he needed the milk 
- They cheated their chief by bringing water instead of milk 
- They were not trustworthy 
 
Key lessons from the story 
The participants identified the following as the key lessons learned: 
- People and their leaders need to be clear on objectives of their actions 
- It is important for leaders and their people to communicate – in most cases, people are afraid 
to ask certain things to their leaders 
- It is important to monitor implementation of actions. Without monitoring, people can bring 
water. 
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Box 4.4: The Chicken Code: a story to illustrate the importance of being 
critical about our norms and values 
 
This last of three narratives used in the workshop to make people reflect goes as follows: 
 
“Once upon a time there was a mother who used to remove thighs of a chicken before 
cooking it. She would later cook the thighs separately from the rest of the chicken. Her 
daughter grew up seeing this and after she got married, she also cooked chickens her mother’s 
way. One day, her daughter asked why she was cooking chicken that way. The only answer 
the mother could give was: ‘I saw my mother cooking chicken that way, but I have no idea 
why she did that.’ When they visited their grandmother in the rural areas, the granddaughter 
asked her why she cooked chicken that way. The grandmother said, ‘I just saw my mother 
doing it but I have no idea why she cooked it that way.’ This continued for quite some 
generations and luckily, great grandmother was still alive and she explained that she used to 
cook chicken that way because her pots were so small that the whole chicken could not fit. 
She therefore devised a plan to cook the thighs separately from the whole chicken.” 
 
Lessons learned: 
You must always ask the question ‘why’ and not just do as you are told without 
understanding why you are doing certain things. 
 
 
Box 4.5: The square game code: a game to illustrate the importance of 
cooperation among people 
 
The game of squares 
  
Workshop participants were divided into groups of five. Each member was given an envelope 
with assorted pieces of paper. The facilitator explained that each member of the group was to 
make a square from the assorted pieces that he/she got. The facilitator explained that because 
the pieces were mixed up before giving them out to group members, there was a chance that 
pieces for completing one’s square were given to others and vice versa. However, each group 
member was supposed to come up with squares of equal size but they were not supposed to 
speak to each other or ask for certain pieces from group members. However, if a group 
member wanted to assist others he was allowed to silently pass the pieces that he/she did not 
need to them. Members were allowed to only give out and receive pieces but not talk to each 
other. The success of the game depended on all members completing their tasks. 
 
After a signal from the facilitator, the groups started the game. When the task was finished, 
the facilitator and the groups discussed the following questions: 
- What helped or hindered the group in completing the task? 
- How did you feel when you saw someone holding a piece of paper that could have helped 
you to complete your task? 
-How did your members feel about the person who could not see the solution as quickly as 
others? 
 
Lessons drawn from the game 
Participants identified the following lessons: 
- Sharing of knowledge is essential for development.  
- Lack of communication hinders development 
- Cooperation by community members is essential for development 
- We should be open with one another if we want our community to be developed 
- We all have different ideas and knowledge, and if we combine it, we will all be developed 
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Figure 4.1: The Jo-Hari’s Window 
 
 Known to self Unknown to self 
Known to others What I know 
What others know 
(Public person) 
   What I don’t know 
   What others know 
(Blind Spot) 
Unknown to Others What I know 
What I do not know 
(Private person) 
What I don’t know  
What others don’t know  
(Mysterious person) 
 
Figure 4.2: Participants discussing their perception on the letter “m”: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Picture to illustrate that people can have different perceptions on 
the same issue 
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would change their lives and it was not necessary to be paid. The ACM researchers 
were again surprised, and even after negotiating with the Batanai members to take the 
payments, the latter all still flatly refused. 
 
For the researchers, this was a humbling experience, also considering that some 
people from Batanai area had walked about 15 km to the workshop since they were 
nearer to Gokwe than the people from other areas. For the ACM team this 
demonstrated an immediate outcome of the T-for-T workshop: it had changed existing 
attitudes, norms and beliefs for the Batanai community members. However, a 
question that can be asked about this incident is: was the initial demand by the 
Batanai community members simply a lack of awareness/ knowledge on what the 
workshop was about? Probably yes, because the ACM team members did not give a 
thorough explanation of what the workshop was about when inviting the participants. 
Unlike community members from Gababe and Ndarire, the Batanai community 
members had over the years participated in many meetings and workshops organised 
by different research institutions in their area and most of this research was  extractive 
in nature, according to community members. It was not, therefore, surprising Batanai 
community members came up with the idea of asking for payment. However, after 
attending the workshop, my own feeling was that the community members could tell 
the difference between this workshop and other workshops they had attended and they 
felt that indeed they had benefited in a new way from it. For the other sites, Gababe 
and Ndarire, they happily accepted the allowances. This might have been their first 
exposure to outside agencies and they were keen to get some payment to take home 
after attending the week-long workshop. 
 
Following the T-for-T workshop women dominated meetings organised for thatch and 
broom grass resources in both Batanai and Gababe (Table 4.3). The percentage of 
women who attended workshops organised outside of their communities also 
increased. For example, 49% of workshop participants in the Criteria and Indicators 
workshop that was organised by the CIFOR researchers on the 30-31st of July 2001 at 
Shingai Training Centre at Gokwe South Business Centre (the same venue for the T-
for-T workshop) were women. 
 
Mrs Nti, a poor reserved and withdrawn woman in 2003 was elected a chair of two 
groups – a seed group and a recently formed garden group. With the garden group 
they got some books from the Swedish Cooperative and they met twice a week to read 
and share ideas on crop production. She also visited Shurugwi district to learn how 
they used the books for learning purposes. These visits did not influence resource 
management activities but show that some woman gained the power or confidence to 
aspire to resource management positions. When talking to Mrs Nti on why she 
suddenly held so many positions, she just said ‘ndimi makandiita kuti ndidero. 
Zvakatanga nemi veCIFOR makandichenjedza’ – ‘it started with you CIFOR people. 
Your workshops were an eye opener that made me to change and I am now clever’. 
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Table 4.3: No. of women who attended resource management meetings and 
workshops. 
 
Date Meeting/ workshop Where  No of 
women 
Total 
number 
people 
who 
attended 
Percentag
e of 
women 
16/07/01 Thatch visioning and 
action planning meeting 
Batanai 16 27 59 
30/07/01 The Criteria and 
Indicators workshop 
Gokwe 
Business Centre 
16 29 55 
18/09/01 Thatch visioning and 
action planning meeting  
Batanai 24 33 73 
16/09/01 Broom grass action 
planning meeting 
Batanai 21 23 91 
28/08/02 Community general 
meeting 
Batanai 10 27 37 
 
Looking at the increase of women’s’ participation in meetings and workshops, it can 
be concluded that the T-for-T training had been effective in boosting women’s 
empowerment. During the workshop, women participants obtained opportunities to 
speak without any disruption from men. There were unintended outcomes as well, 
however. Unknown to the CIFOR team, most of the workshop participants from 
Batanai became active supporters of the opposition political party. Some participants 
even became poling agents for the opposition during the 2002 presidential elections. 
When the researchers came to Batanai the next time, they first visited the people who 
had attended the T-for-T workshop. Local politicians, following these developments, 
began to view the T–for-T workshop participants as a threat and started regarding the 
researchers as advocates for the opposition party. This was dangerous, and to continue 
with their work, the researchers had to seek help from officials in the ZANU PF 
Gokwe South district. These officials explained to the local politicians that the 
researchers only did research and were not involved in politics. It was not easy for the 
local community members who became activists for the opposition party because they 
suffered at the hands of the ruling party members. For instance, the ACM community 
partner for Batanai at one time discovered that ruling party members were planning to 
beat him up for his new role in the opposition party and he had to run for his life. He 
called on the ACM team members when he arrived at Gokwe South Business Centre, 
but the team members, who were in Harare, could not help him. He later went back 
home when things had settled down. The fact that local politicians did not approve of 
the Batanai community partner made it difficult for the ACM team to work with him.  
  
At Batanai, the political context made it increasingly difficult for the ACM team to 
conduct meetings, especially during the early stages of the research process. Each 
time they organised a meeting they were supposed to notify the local councillor and 
the ruling party political leaders in advance. Failure to do so would result in trouble. 
One day when the ACM team was organizing a meeting in Batanai with resource 
users, they had forgotten to notify some of the ZANU PF local leaders. One of the 
people they forgot to notify stopped the team’s vehicle on the way to the venue of the 
meeting and explained that he was angry because he had heard a rumour that they 
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were organizing a meeting in the village and they had not informed him about it. The 
team had to apologise. 
 
At meetings they organized in Batanai, it took considerable time to really get started 
because of elaborate introductions by some of the invited party people.  They 
introduced themselves with their political titles, like ruling party chair, vice-chair, 
secretary, vice-secretary, and so on. During the meetings, anyone who wanted to 
speak had to chant the party slogan before and after saying something. This went on 
for several meetings. Later, the same people who used to chant the political slogans 
stopped doing so when they came to meetings and concentrated more on how to 
manage their forest resources more sustainably. In the view of the ACM team, these 
positive developments could at least partly be attributed to the T for T workshop. 
 
Organising resource user group meetings became difficult in Batanai after meetings 
were banned (as everywhere else in the country) following the passage of the Public 
Order and Security Act51 just before the 2002 presidential elections. One had to seek 
permission from the ruling party political leaders and the police to hold meetings. 
During this time, the ACM team had to invite officers from the central intelligence 
organisation (CIO) to attend and bless the meetings and workshops that they 
organised in communities and at Gokwe Business Centre. Failure to do so would have 
put the researchers in danger as meetings could easily be mistaken for political 
gatherings. The situation improved some time after the elections and meetings could 
again be organised. The ACM team, however, still continued to invite members of the 
CIO, especially to district level workshops just to be on the safe side. 
 
4.5.2 Conflict Resolution Processes 
After the T-for-T training, the ACM team organised several workshops and took 
advantage of other organised meetings (by the traditional leadership, the FC, or the 
RMCs in the research sites) to build the capacity of stakeholders for conflict 
resolution. In terms of process, the conflict resolution workshops (for instance the one 
organised in August 2002 at Lutope Camp, with participation of representatives from 
Gababe, Batanai, Ndarire and Nyaje RMC areas) started with presentations from 
resource persons, mostly hired conflict resolution experts. They made presentations 
on the importance of conflict resolution and the various methods that could be used to 
resolve conflicts. Participants were later asked to recall conflicts they had faced in the 
past, individually or in the RSP, and critically look at what mechanism they had used 
to deal with the conflicts and how effective they were. Later on, participants identified 
their current conflicts. Then, in the workshop, they tried to resolve these conflicts 
through facilitated negotiation: participants first had to agree on the status of the 
conflict, and the available alternatives, and then come up with jointly agreed 
solutions.  
 
During the various workshops, several conflicts were identified among stakeholders 
in Mafungautsi and these can be classified as internal and external conflicts. Internal 
                                                 
51
  POSA limits peoples’ rights to freedom of expression. The Act prohibits speech acts that are 
likely to bring feelings of hostility towards the state institutions and the president (Human Rights 
Watch, 2003). Under POSA, anyone organizing a public meeting is supposed to report to the police 
four days before the meeting for clearance on whether the meetings should take place. 
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conflicts were those among local-level stakeholders.  Examples were (see also 
Chapter 5):  
 
• Resource boundaries: Each resource management committee was allocated an 
area by the Forestry Commission where they could harvest resources such as 
broom and thatch grass. In most cases, however, the boundaries were not clear and 
this was a big problem in all RMC areas. 
• Resource theft within and between RMCs: Some community members were said 
to steal resources from the forest to avoid paying the permit prices. It was also 
alleged that those who stole the resources used poor harvesting practices resulting 
in depletion of the valuable resource. For instance, thieves were blamed for 
digging instead of cutting broom grass, and this was regarded as a poor practice. 
In addition, it was alleged that members from other RMCs came and stole 
resources in areas outside their RMCs, and this resulted conflicts.  
• Fire management: Some community members were accused of starting forest 
fires, especially those involved in honey harvesting. It was also alleged that 
community members without livestock (especially cattle), were responsible for 
starting fires, probably during hunting expeditions since they lost nothing when 
pastures burnt.  
• Lack of transparency by RMCs: In various RMCs there were tensions in regard to 
the leadership. Community members accused the RMCs of lack of transparency. 
In some cases RMCs were said to issue permits, especially to outsiders, before the 
grass was ripe. In other cases, RMCs were said to misuse money raised in their 
areas and communities missed out. 
• RMC members and traditional leadership: There were conflicts between 
traditional leaders and RMC members. It was said that traditional leaders were not 
supportive of RMC activities. For instance, in Batanai area, some village heads 
did not notify community members of meetings organised by their RMCs. The 
village members would, therefore, not come to meetings organized by the RMC. 
In such situations, it became very difficult for the RMC to operate without support 
of traditional leaders. 
• Incentives for the RMC members: RMC members wanted to be paid for their work 
in controlling resource harvesting and raising money for the communities. 
However, most communities did not want to pay them and referred them to the FC 
since they said that the RMC was working for the FC, not the community. The 
FC, however, had made it clear that the RMCs were working for their respective 
communities, which were therefore responsible for rewarding them for their work. 
This resulted in tensions between people and their RMCs. In one case, the 
chairperson of one of the RMCs, Chemwiro Masawi, said that when his RMC 
appealed for people to pay them for their work, the people said kana zvakukona 
rega, tinotsvaka vamwe’ ( if you are fed up you can leave, we can always find 
someone to replace you’).  
 
External conflicts were those between the communities and the FC. Under these, 
different issues were identified. Already during the initial stages of the ACM project, 
the ACM team discovered conflicts between the FC (FC) and local communities. The 
ACM researchers could not go to the field in a FC vehicle, as they realised that any 
association with the FC resulted in non-cooperation from the communities. At first, 
the researchers had to meet separately with the FC and with the communities in order 
to find out about the existing conflicts and problems. It took about a year for the 
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relations among these stakeholders to improve. Later on, when relations were better, 
especially after application of the conflict resolution process, communities did not 
mind researchers arriving in a FC vehicle. External conflicts in Mafungautsi included: 
 
• Boundaries: There were serious conflicts around the boundary of the forest, ever 
since the establishment of the forest as a conservation area. At one time, for 
instance in Nyaje RMC area, the FC, using their map, came and evicted some 
people they said were living in the forest. The people of Nyaje were very bitter 
about this because some lost their fields whilst others were forced to move out 
completely to areas far outside Mafungautsi. According to the people, the FC had 
encroached on their village in an attempt to increase the forest area. Similar stories 
were also narrated by community members in Gababe. 
• Fire management: The FC accused communities of causing forest fires. 
Community members believed, however, that the FC started these fires to punish 
them by destroying pastures for their animals. 
• Resources communities were allowed to harvest: The FC allowed the villagers to 
harvest only minor forest products such as grasses, mushrooms and herbs and not 
major products such as timber. This made villagers bitter: they also wanted to 
harvest the high value commercial timber found in the area. However, according 
to the FC, there were only a few ripe trees to harvest. According to the community 
members, however, the last time the FC harvested the commercial timber was in 
1992, and ten years later there was now enough mature trees to permit harvesting 
again. Some RMC areas like Ndarire had no grasses in their area and, for them, 
harvesting timber was the only possible income generating activity from the forest 
• Perceptions on the role of the forest: According to the FC, Mafungautsi forest was 
a water catchment area for four of the major rivers in Zimbabwe that drain into the 
Zambezi river, the major source of hydroelectricity in Zimbabwe. According to 
the FC, the forest was predominantly growing on very fragile sandy soil and hence 
needed to be protected in order to prevent siltation of the major rivers. For some 
community members, the forest was arable land, and they wanted to settle there.  
 
Lessons learning during the conflict resolution processes 
The conflict resolution processes were facilitated by the researchers and experts 
during the various types of workshops and meetings organised by FC, RMC and 
traditional leaders. In all cases, facilitation was crucial to cope with suspicions and 
help stakeholders open-up to others, to bring their conflicts out into the open, and to 
discuss, negotiate and resolve them. These discussions between stakeholders provided 
great learning opportunities.  Some of the lessons from the conflict resolution 
workshop in August 2002 included: 
 
Learning about causes of the forest fires by both sets of stakeholders 
Through discussions in the various types of meetings, both stakeholders realized that 
they had some common concerns, such as wanting to protect the forest from fires. The 
FC blamed the communities for starting fires and not putting any mechanisms in place 
to make sure that those who started fires were punished. On the other hand, 
community members blamed the FC for starting these forest fires and burning 
valuable pastures for their animals. The community members said there was rumour 
that sometimes the FC started fires deliberately to open up fire breaks. The FC officer 
explained that the FC was at times involved in starting small fires, as part of their 
management strategy to prevent major fires from happening at a later date. According 
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to the FC officer, these fires were carefully controlled by FC duty officers. When the 
community members heard this explanation, they realized they had a wrong 
perception and had misunderstood the involvement of the FC in some of the forest 
fires. The FC, on its part, learnt from the dialogue why community members were not 
helping to control the fire outbreaks in the forest. In the end, both parties agreed on 
strategies to stop or control forest fires. The FC asked the RMC members to come up 
with plans to open up the fire breaks and organize awareness raising meetings on 
forest fires. At the end of the conflict resolution workshop in August 2002, the FC 
also promised to help the four RMCs at the conflict resolution workshops to organize 
such meetings and to conduct demonstrations in the village on fire fighting. The FC 
also offered to train people in bee-keeping and construction of beehives because this 
would reduce forest fires due to honey harvesting. 
 
Communities learning about the status of timber 
With regard to resources community members were allowed to harvest, villagers 
clearly expressed the desire to harvest timber and poles, and they wanted to know if 
the FC would allow them. The FC official said that they were not allowed to do so at 
present, but that some provisions might be made for the future. The FC official 
admitted that from their side they had not made an effort to really find out from the 
communities what everybody was interested in. This was a learning point on the part 
of the FC, as well the realization that different communities were interested in 
different type of resources. In some RMCs, people were more interested in grasses, 
while in other RMCs people were more interested in poles and timber. The position of 
the FC on this issue came as a great relief to the community members, and acted as a 
motivational factor. 
 
In other discussions, community members indicated they also wanted to benefit from 
timber concessions offered by the FC to logging companies. This raised a lot of 
discussion and the FC said that the last time they gave licenses to logging companies 
was ten years ago. Recently no surveys had been carried out and it was therefore not 
clear how many trees were ready for harvesting. Community members said, however, 
that timber was available in the forest, and they needed to have access to it for making 
various furniture products like beds, cupboards and doors. After long discussions, the 
two stakeholders agreed to conduct jointly a timber assessment survey.  
 
Communities learning about the areas for harvesting their resources 
Community members from Nyaje were not clear on the areas where they could 
harvest grass. In the area allocated to them there was no grass. Hearing about this 
from community members, the FC then offered to divide the FC grass harvesting area 
and give a portion to Nyaje RMC. This came as a great relief to these villagers.  
 
Lessons concerning ownership of the forest 
Another conflictive issue concerned the ownership of the forest. The FC said that the 
forest belonged to the communities. This raised a lot of discussions. Community 
members alleged that the FC only said this because they needed help from the 
community. They said that when it came to timber harvesting, the FC normally said 
the forest belonged to the government. The FC officer had to do a lot of explaining in 
regard to this allegation. He said ‘Isu ve Forestry takapiwa sango nehurumende kuti 
tirichengetedze kuti rigorambe riripo, asi harisi reduba. Asizve, hurumemde 
ndeyaani, hatisisu here vakaisarudza kuti itimirire. Saka, kana sango riri 
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rehurumende, nderenyuwo zvakare’ - 'The FC was given a mandate to protect the 
forest by our government. However, since the government was put in place by people, 
it means the forest belongs to the government as well as the people who elected that 
government’. With more explanation and clarification, there was learning among 
community members, who later confessed that this knowledge needed to be passed on 
to everyone, for all along they thought that the forest belonged to the FC and hence 
they did not really care about what happened to it. Now that they understood that it 
belonged to them, they saw it would be to their benefit to help manage it.  
 
Learning by the FC on the feelings of local people on the evictions 
In trying to discuss and resolve the conflict concerning eviction of community 
members from the forest by the FC, the official learnt that this touched on a very 
deep-rooted conflict. The community members clearly expressed their anger to the 
FC. Evictions had resulted in some people losing their fields completely, while others 
had had to move out of the area completely and resettle elsewhere. The community 
members who were present in the meeting admitted that they were not the right 
people to negotiate on this conflict; this was an issue that required discussions with 
the traditional leadership. The FC official also explained that the FC had been given a 
directive by the current government to evict people, and it was highly unlikely the 
government would change its policies. Both stakeholders ended up by agreeing that, 
even though this was a very crucial conflict, this was not the right platform to try and 
resolve it. Both parties now better understood each other's position. The community 
members realized why the FC had acted so cruelly, and the FC officer realised that 
this was a serious conflict that needed to be pursued by FC managers. 
 
4.5.3 Training on Leadership Skills 
The ACM team also organised trainings that especially focused on competencies for 
leadership. One of these workshops was organised immediately after the T-for-T and 
conflict resolution workshops. Others were organised when the ACM researchers felt 
the need. In addition to these trainings, ACM researchers made use of other 
community meetings and organised platforms such as the annual pre-grass cutting 
season workshops organised by the FC.  The ACM team felt that leadership capacities 
were important for effective functioning of key institutions, namely, the RMC and the 
traditional leadership authority. Leadership training was based on the assumption that 
the sustainability of projects depends on the quality of both leaders and their 
followers. During the leadership training sessions, participants discussed the various 
roles of office bearers, how to organise meetings, the importance of coming up with 
an agenda before each organised meeting, issues of representation, accountability and 
transparency, need to hold democratic elections, and good leadership qualities. 
 
4.5.4 Resource User Group Formation 
From the context studies the ACM team already had learnt that not all community 
members were interested in forest issues. The ACM team therefore decided to form 
groups of people who shared an interest in a particular resource. These resource user 
groups were to ensure that specific resources were managed sustainably. In Batanai 
and Gababe, three different resource user groups were formed, focusing on thatch 
grass, broom grass and honey. These were the main resources for which harvesting 
was permitted under the resource sharing agreement. The ACM team invited 
community members in the study sites to join the resource user groups and made 
explicit that this was on a voluntary basis. One could join-in or drop out when one 
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wished. Resource users were also free to join any other group and could thus belong 
to more than one group, especially if the group meetings were not taking place at the 
same time. Members of the resource user groups had opportunities to share their 
experiences and learn from each other in order to avoid making mistakes that others 
already made. The ACM team was responsible, during the early stages, to facilitate 
the process for resource users to address their problems. Initially, a variety of people 
came to the resource user group meetings and participated in the early stages of the 
PAR process, maybe out of curiosity. Many dropped-out as time went on and only 
few persons participated in all the stages of the research.  
 
The ACM team found it difficult to establish resource user groups in Ndarire because 
the area lacked resources which communities were allowed to harvest under the RSP, 
namely broom or thatch grass. The resource users in that area mainly harvested poles 
and timber in the forest, outside the resource sharing agreement, making the activity 
illegal. However, three months after the ACM team’s visit to Ndarire RMC area, a 
self-initiated ‘poles and timber’ group was formed. Ndarire community members 
made this decision after learning about the broom and thatch grass resource user 
groups formed by the ACM team in Batanai and Gababe. This did not, of course, 
render harvesting of timber and poles legal. The poles and timber group members 
approached the ACM team for help in negotiating for the inclusion of timber as one of 
the resources communities could harvest under the RSP. 
 
The formation of the resource user groups was not easy at the other sites. For 
instance, in Batanai, membership of the various resource user groups fluctuated, 
rendering such groups largely amorphous. This had implications for ownership of 
decisions, as well as commitment of members.  In most cases new members had no 
idea what others had done before and why. On each occasion, older members had to 
update newcomers on situation and progress before they could effectively participate. 
Then socio-economic changes in the country impinged on the resource user groups, 
resulting in high fluxes in membership and a slow down in the process. For instance, 
because of economic hardship and intensive drought, community members - including 
some ACM community partners - migrated to neighbouring countries in search of 
better employment. Some of the people who left were key members of resource user 
groups, with important roles in the implementation of the developed action plans.  
 
Later on, the user groups became smaller and easier to manage. Resource users who 
remained were excited, as this was the first time they had opportunities to work on 
their problems and jointly to come up with possible solutions. They also became 
aware, after the training sessions, that most problems they faced, such as degradation 
of resources, could not be solved by individuals, but needed joint action.  
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Part II: Participatory Action Research with resource user 
groups.  
The Participatory Action Research (PAR) process the Adaptive Collaborative 
Management (ACM) team implemented with the resource user groups, and the efforts 
to set up collaborative monitoring of the status of the forest resources, is now 
described. These two were considered crucial elements in the ACM. It will be shown 
how, through facilitated interaction, community members and the FC officer 
developed mutual understanding, and how this resulted in joint activities better to 
manage forest resources.  
 
4.6 The Participatory Action Research process 
The earlier top-down management approach to the forest, and unfulfilled promises in 
the RSP, disillusioned many local community members. This meant for the ACM 
team that they required to find an innovative way to stimulate people to take an active 
part in dealing with their problems. Following the T-for-T (see 4.5.1)  a next step was 
to use  scenarios and visioning tools to stimulate creative ways of thinking and help 
stakeholders break out of established patterns of assessing situations (Wollenberg et 
al., 2000).  
 
Resource users were asked to describe their vision of how things ideally would look 
in two years time, and were explicitly asked to include the status of forest resources, 
the number of people harvesting resources, harvesting methods, availability of 
markets, prices of the resources (both permits and selling prices), revenue from 
resources, and finally, the rules and regulations for governing use of resources. 
Several such meetings were organised for the different resource user groups in each 
RMC in the period of 2001 to early 2002. A list of some of the meetings held in the 
three ACM sites from 2001 to 2002 is presented in Annex 4.2. The majority of these 
meetings were facilitated by CIFOR field researchers and community partners on 
behalf of CIFOR. From this list, it is clear that community members during the 2001-
2002 period spent a lot of time in resource management meetings and workshops, and 
this raises a recurrent but unresolved question in participatory development – the 
opportunity cost of the time thus spent in “workshopping”, and how and when to try 
to reduce it to a minimum.  
 
In preparation for the visioning exercises, the ACM team carefully selected a small 
number of resource users and helped them develop a joint vision on resources, which 
they later presented to the rest of the user group.  Presentations by two women from 
Batanai had strong impact. These two women had so far been withdrawn in meetings 
and were reserved in expressing their opinion. The presentation of their vision was so 
passionate that the other community members were surprised and impressed. They 
listened to an eloquent presentation of views by two people who hitherto had never 
contributed during public meetings. Besides stimulating the rest of the resource users 
to come up with their own vision, the presentations boosted the confidence of the two 
women and they continued to participate actively in most of the meetings that 
followed.  
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After developing and presenting vision statements resource users were asked by the 
ACM team to describe the current situation with regard to their resources. This 
showed how different the current status was, compared to the desired outcomes 
(Tables 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7). Group members were thereafter asked to identify what 
they thought might hinder transition from the current situation to the envisioned 
situation. The resource user groups later came up with action plans to deal with 
possible hindrances they had identified. The groups later implemented these actions, 
and opportunities were created for them to reflect on lessons learned from the impact 
of these interventions. The lessons were later used in real decision-making processes. 
Detailed descriptions of four of the seven PAR processes are presented in the next 
sections: beekeepers in Batanai, broom grass users in Batanai, the timber group in 
Ndarire and beekeepers in Gababe.  
 
4.6.1 PAR with the Batanai Beekeepers 
With facilitation from ACM team, bee keepers in Batanai developed their vision for 
bee keeping (Table 4.4). The group was dominated by men. 
 
Identification of possible hindrances in achieving the desired future situation 
In a meeting in April 2001 where all members of the resource user group on bee 
keeping in Batanai were invited, the participants first described the current situation 
and their vision for their resource, The 43 bee keeping group members who attended 
the meeting then identified what they thought might hinder them from achieving their 
desired future. These included:  
• Lack of places to put bee hives 
• Too few modern hives with higher production  
• Continued increase in the price of timber/planks for making beehives and lack       
of capital to buy them. 
• Lack of knowledge on bee keeping and how to process honey 
• Continued reliance on distant markets 
• Small size of the local market 
 
During a discussion that followed, the bee keepers took a critical look at some of the 
points. When looking at reasons why there was a lack of knowledge on bee keeping, 
the keepers said that there was not necessarily a lack of knowledge. They reckoned 
there was a lack of communication among them; several people in their area had 
received training on bee keeping but had not been willing to share their knowledge, as 
they felt it threatened the profitability of their bee keeping ventures.  
 
Developing action plans   
After identifying the hindrances to attain their desired future, the next step was to 
develop strategies or action plans to deal with these identified hindrances. Items that 
the group members included in their action plans were: 
• Share experiences and learn from each other about bee keeping. Those with 
the knowledge on bee keeping should share with those who do not have.  
• Those interested in bee keeping should have bee hives as soon as possible. 
• Bee keepers group to have meetings once every month to plan on prices, 
markets and monitor progress on the development of the markets. 
• Bee keepers to work closely with the RMC to promote bee keeping projects in 
the community. 
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Table 4.4: Vision by the Batanai beekeepers resource user group. 
 
Indicator Current situation (year 2001) Vision of Bee  Keeping 
(after two years – year 
2003)      
Number of people 
involved in bee 
keeping 
Only a total of 30 households are 
harvesting honey and very few of 
them are women  
At least 187 households 
involved in bee keeping 
Knowledge and skills Resource users have little 
knowledge on bee keeping 
Resource users have 
considerable knowledge 
and skills for bee keeping 
Bee keeping methods Resource users are using all kinds of 
hives and some of these are not 
sustainable. The hives include 
Kenyan Top Bar (KTB) hives, 
wooden barrow, baskets, bees on 
trees 
 
Resource users harvest honey 
without protective clothing and 
some use smoke from burning tyres 
as a harvesting method, a  method 
which kills bees 
All resource users using 
the sustainable KTB 
hives and having 
protective clothing and 
using sustainable 
harvesting methods 
 
Rules and regulations None Clear rules and 
regulations put in place 
for bee keeping and 
enforced stringently.  
Processing At the moment, people process their 
honey into a number of grades. 
These are A, B and C. A is best but 
little honey achieves this grade. 
Resource users have 
skills to process and get 
the bulk of our honey as 
grade A 
Markets Markets are too far away: people 
travel to far places to sell their 
honey (more than 300 km). The 
local market is not developed. 
A well developed local 
market to exist at Gokwe 
and no resource users  
travelling to far places to 
sell honey 
Income Z$17 000.00/annum 
(USD308.1/annum) 
Z$40 000.00/annum 
(USD724.9/annum)52 
 
• Bee keepers to start showing others that they are getting good incomes from 
bee keeping, to attract more people into bee keeping. The bee keepers believed 
that if the production of honey increased this would result in them securing a 
better market for the product. 
• Increased cooperation in selling honey so as to be price-setters and not price-
takers. 
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 The June 2001  rate was 1USD=Zim$55.90 (Annex 2.3) 
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Implementation of action plans 
Following the action planning, the ACM team helped the bee keepers in 
implementation. For instance, with regard to enhancing the sharing of knowledge 
among bee keepers, ACM team members organised meetings for the group. At one 
such meeting, the ACM team invited the RMC chair who shared his knowledge with 
the rest of the bee keepers. He had been trained on effective honey harvesting 
methods at a workshop facilitated by the FC some years earlier. He started narrating 
some of the do's and don'ts of honey harvesting. These included: 
• Not to harvest honey when it is too cold for this kills the baby bees 
• During the hot season honey must be harvested when in the cooler part of the 
day, since if it is too hot bees become angry and sting. 
• A helper is needed when harvesting honey so that one person can hold the 
honey while the other is harvesting.  
• Not to burn tyres to chase away bees when harvesting because this kills them. 
Cattle dung smoke is harmless.  
• Not to make noise when harvesting honey. 
• Not to beat the beehive when harvesting because this makes the bees angry. 
• Not to harvest all the honey. Some has to be left for the bees. 
• Not to mix cow and donkey dung when preparing smoke for harvesting since 
this makes the bees angry. 
• If you make the bees angry, you must leave and come back later when they 
have settled down. 
• There is a time for harvesting honey. You must not harvest honey at a time 
when there are small baby bees around. The bees will sting. 
In the end, the man said that he had much more that he could tell them, but there was 
no time. So he offered to talk about it again some other time. During this meeting, 
when discussing the various methods of harvesting honey, another old man stood up 
and added to the discussion by saying: 
‘Now let me tell you the best way that I have used to harvest honey 
successfully, and you better listen attentively. For harvesting honey, you need to 
go there naked without wearing anything. You must not use perfumes, and you 
must take a bath before you go there. And, do not use perfumed soaps.’  
Most of the people who were present laughed, maybe in disbelief when he talked 
about going to harvest honey naked. In any case, for the ACM team, it was an 
indicator of a new willingness to share, and the good atmosphere generated during the 
meeting.  
 
There were, however, bee keepers who were not willing to share their knowledge. For 
instance, in the same meeting there was a man, Mr. M., who had about 110 beehives 
at his homestead. When the ACM team invited him to the bee keeping meeting, he 
sent message that if they did not come to pick him up, he would not come. When they 
heard the message, they sent their driver and vehicle. However, at the meeting Mr M. 
did not say a word. After the meeting ended, the ACM team dropped him at his 
homestead. 
 
In terms of the other action plans, the bee keeping group however did not manage to 
meet as frequently as they had planned. This was mainly because the group was not 
progressing due to the fact that a number of members had left for gold panning. In 
their absence it was difficult for the remaining members to pass binding resolutions. 
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In addition, some of the members lacked money to purchase planks from FC to make 
modern bee hives. Some bee keepers resorted to using traditional bee hives made 
from logs.  
 
Outcomes of the PAR processes 
Unfortunately, the ACM team could not carry out a study to see if the vision of the 
bee keepers group was realized or not in Batanai. Due to the increasing economic 
hardships in the country, most bee keepers in Batanai started to leave the area in 2002 
(and others left after the ACM project had ended) to search for a living.  Some went 
and panned illegally for gold while others went to neighbouring countries to look for 
employment. In August 2002, for instance, 24 men with ages ranging from 24 to 40 
were reported to have left the area for South Africa to search for work, while 32 men 
aged between 23 and 40 were reported to have left for gold panning (illegal gold 
panning was regarded as a dangerous activity, Box 4.6 below). Movement out of the 
country was mainly influenced by increased hunger due to drought. As was the case 
all around the forest, community members in Batanai faced serious food shortage 
problems, and relied on wild fruits from the forest for survival. The arrival of the 
honey season also saw an increase in large trees being felled by honey collectors as a 
quick (and unsustainable) way to harvest honey.  
 
Box 4.6: The dangers of illegal gold panning 
 
While ACM team members were waiting for a meeting with members of the Gwehava RMCs 
on the 18th of September 2002, several issues were discussed, including increasing hunger and 
illegal gold panning (korokoza). One man stated ‘ukawana munhu anenge ari kukorokoza, 
munhu iyeye anenge atopindwa nemweya wakaipa. Kukorokoza, munhu unoita basa rako 
wakabata banga nekuti anytime unogona kuuya kuzopondwa kana wawana dombo.’('People 
who participate in illegal gold panning inclined towards and susceptible to evil because they 
work holding weapons such as knives because the moment one finds the precious stone, 
he/she may be murdered by those who did not find anything’. He went on to say that seven 
copses had been brought to Gokwe mortuary of late from the gold mines. He went on to 
narrate a story of two young men who recently came back to their village with huge sums of 
money. One of them even burnt some of the money just to show off. However, a short while 
later they developed a strange disease similar to Parkinson's causing their bodies to shake 
[probably caused by mercury poisoning]. Upon enquiry, their father discovered that the two 
young men had stolen money from someone. The father then went to look for the person 
whose money had been stolen. When he found him, however, the man said that he was not 
responsible for causing the disease. It was then feared the young man would die as no cure 
had been found for their disease.   
 
From the year 2003, onwards it became difficult to organise a meeting with the bee 
keepers to follow up on the group’s progress. Sometimes only one member would 
show up for the meeting. 
 
4.6.2 PAR with Batanai broom grass resource users 
Another group engaged in action research was the broom grass group at Batanai. This 
group was dominated by female members. Collection of broom grass was the major 
activity at Batanai RMC. Table 4.5 summarizes the vision of the broom grass resource 
users and their assessment of the current situation. The vision was developed over a 
series of meetings organised in 2001.  
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Table 4.5 Current and future scenarios developed by the broom grass group 
at Batanai 
 
Indicator Current situation (2001) Vision of the broom grass 
resource (in – 2003)           
Number of 
people involved 
in broom grass 
A small number is involved. For instance in 
Mafa village, only 15 out of 194 
households are involved in harvesting 
broom grass.  
 
Those near the road are the ones involved.53 
 
Mostly women involved. 
 
Few men 
 
Children also involved. 
At least 50-80% of the total 
households in the RMC area. 
 
Men and women should all 
be equally involved. 
 
With more people involved, 
we can all help each other. 
Harvesting 
methods 
Most people cut using sickles  
 
There are some who dig, though fewer. 
Wish that all of us use the 
same harvesting method. 
 
All people harvesting by 
cutting. 
 
No one should be digging. 
Markets Sell at Gokwe, Bulawayo, Kadoma, 
Nemangwe, Sayi, Manoti, and Gweru and 
also to our neighbours. 
Get a huge market close by 
like at Gokwe Business 
Centre 
Rules and 
regulations 
Digging is not allowed 
 
We pay Z$30.00/ day (USD0.54/ day)54 for 
a permit. Permit prices go up every year, 
and it is difficult to cut all the broom you 
need in only one day.  
Hope that permit price will 
match the number of days the 
permit will be valid for. We 
would like it to be Z$80.00/4 
days (USD1.43/ 4days) 
 
All RMCs to have same rule 
on digging or cutting. 
Incomes Selling brooms is a reliable way of raising 
income. 
Currently get Z$15 000.00/ annum 
(USD268.34/ annum), from brooms. 
Hope to get as much as Z$30 
000.00/year (USD536.67/ 
annum). 
 
After the visioning exercise, the broom grass resource users identified the following 
possible hindrances to attaining their vision 
• Lack of cooperation among resource users in the use of the cutting method of 
harvesting 
• Lack of cooperation across the RMC  
• Failure to establish a local market for buyers of brooms from our area 
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 i.e. the road that goes from Gokwe to Nkai (see Fig 2.5, Chapter 2). 
54
 1USD: Zim$55.90 
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During this discussion, resource users narrated how they had conducted an experiment 
before, together with the FC, to find the most sustainable method of harvesting the 
broom grass (Box 4.7).  
 
Box 4.7: The Machije Experiment  
 
At the inception of the Resource-Sharing project in 1994, in an effort to enhance joint 
learning about sustainable methods of harvesting broom grass, community members in the 
Batanai RMC, on the initiative of the Forestry Commission, decided to conduct an experiment 
in Machije wetland (the area where Batanai RMC harvests broom grass). The experiment was 
conducted in two small plots staked out jointly by the broom grass resources users and the 
FC. In one of the plots, resource users harvested grass by digging. In the other plot they 
harvested the grass by cutting, using sickles. The stakeholders then monitored to see how the 
grass would grow in each of the plots. In the seasons that followed no new broom grass 
germinated in the plot where grass was harvested by digging. Instead, a new grass variety 
which could not be used for making brooms emerged. Stakeholders concluded that the best 
method for harvesting their grass without depleting it was cutting. For two years after the 
experiment, no one dug broom grass in Batanai RMC. However, after the two years, some 
people resumed digging despite the fact that they knew its adverse impact on the resource. 
 
The ACM team realized that after this experiment there had been no planned 
opportunities for the participants to come together and discuss the undesirable change 
in the harvesting practices by resource users. The team therefore organized several 
meetings to identify and plan for possible improvements. During these meetings with 
broom grass resource users the team learned that several factors had contributed to the 
sudden change in harvesting methods. One of these factors was the continued market 
demand for ‘dug brooms’, i.e. brooms made from dug/ uprooted grass. In most places 
where people were selling their brooms, the customers wanted ‘dug brooms’ and they 
therefore were selling faster than ‘cut brooms’. Customers alleged that uprooted 
brooms lasted longer than cut brooms because the grass did not loosen so easily. This 
resulted in many of the Batanai residents returning to the practice of digging the 
broom grass even though they knew the adverse effects of such practices. One woman 
from the Batanai RMC (who according to the wealth ranking exercise was considered 
very poor) explained her experiences at one of the meetings:  
 
“One day I went to Gokwe [Gokwe is about 15 km from Batanai] to sell my brooms - a 
scotch cart55 load.  When I arrived in Gokwe, all the customers rushed to see the 
brooms and all they were saying was, ‘une magaro here? Une magaro here?’ 56 which 
means ‘Are they dug brooms? Are they dug brooms?’  Not even a single broom was 
bought when the people realised that I had cut brooms. I had to go back home all the 
way from Gokwe with all my brooms untouched. I was really pained from all the time 
and effort I had wasted.” The woman just ended by shaking her head and saying, “Ah, 
zvinorwadza veduwe” meaning “Ah, it is very painful, I tell you.” 
 
Another woman had a similar experience which she also shared. 
 
“Last year, I also went to Gokwe with a scotch cart full of cut brooms and when I 
arrived, a group of customers asked me to bring my brooms since they wanted to buy 
them. I pushed my scotch cart to where the customers were standing and as they were 
                                                 
55
  A scotch cart is an animal drawn cart used for ferrying goods. 
56
  The literal translation for the phrase, ‘une magaro?’ is ‘does it have buttocks?’ 
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looking at the brooms and putting aside the ones they wanted to purchase, another 
seller came by and started shouting that she had dug brooms. All the customers who 
were about to buy my brooms threw them back into the scotch cart and rushed to the 
newly arrived seller. We actually had a big fight, me and the newly arrived seller, 
ending up at Gokwe police station. I presented my case to the police and told them that 
the other woman was selling illegal brooms, since they were dug and not cut, and this 
was not allowed in our RMC. The police dismissed the case and said that there was no 
such law written down. I finally left the police station angry and disappointed.” 
 
After hearing these experiences, broom-grass collectors decided to come up with 
strategies to ensure that their resource was used in a more sustainable manner. These 
included the following: 
• Everyone, including those who were not present at this meeting, should tell the 
RMC members whenever they see someone digging broom grass. The RMC 
members cannot do their duty single-handed, because they are sometimes too busy 
to monitor activities in the forest. Moreover, according to the community 
members, the RMC members are not paid, unlike the Forestry Commission Forest 
Protection Unit who could therefore devote most of their time to arresting people 
who transgressed. The RMC members had to work in their own fields as well, in 
order to survive.  
• Instead of giving a permit before harvesting grass, it was suggested that it would 
be better if people would pay after harvesting. This would enable the RMC 
members to inspect and check if the grass was harvested by cutting or digging. 
The Batanai resource users, however, thought that there would be a risk that 
people might harvest and disappear before paying for their permits.  
• In order to deal with the problem of the market preference for ‘dug brooms’, 
resource users suggested four options: (1) All broom grass harvesters (within and 
outside the Batanai RMC) to cooperate and only provide cut brooms. This would 
force consumers to buy cut brooms since these would be the only ones available 
on the market; (2) RMCs to negotiate with the Gokwe Rural District Council for a 
law to prohibit the sale of dug brooms. This would then force all broom grass 
collectors to cut instead of dig the grass; (3) Broom grass harvesters to come up 
with new bundling methods that could make the cut grass brooms more beautiful 
and last longer. This would make customers prefer buying the cut brooms.  (4) A 
suggestion was made for resource users to advertise their brooms so that 
customers would come to Batanai instead of the Batanai sellers taking the brooms 
elsewhere. This would give more opportunity for the RMC to inspect and check if 
all the sold brooms are cut brooms and not dug brooms. 
• To deal with the problem of other RMCs around Mafungautsi harvesting by 
digging instead of cutting, the participants suggested that a “look and learn” 
workshop would be organized in which they would share their experiences from 
the other RMCs to come and learn from the Machije experiment. They could visit 
the plots in the forest and see for themselves. One of the Batanai community 
members would explain how the experiment was conducted and what the findings 
were on the digging vs. the cutting of broom grass.  
 
In April 2002 the broom grass group organised a ‘learning’ workshop, together with 
the FC officer, with an aim to learn about new ways of bundling cut brooms. The 
local women who were knowledgeable on the alternative bundling method showed 
the others how they bundled their brooms and the resource users and the FC officer 
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agreed to jointly market the newly bundled brooms. The FC officer took the brooms 
to the annual Provincial Agricultural Show in August 2002. Eight out of the thirty-two 
decoratively bundled brooms were sold at a price of Zim$50/ broom (USD 
0.88/broom). This was Zim$42 (USD0.74) more per broom than undecorated brooms. 
The remaining twenty-four brooms were sold at the FC office for the same higher 
price. The production of the decorated brooms is much more time consuming, 
compared to the conventional bundling method: it takes 20-30 minutes more to make 
a decorated broom. People therefore felt that the decorated brooms were being sold at 
a fair price. Undecorated cut brooms (which were bundled using the conventional 
method) were selling at Zim$8/ broom (USD 0.14/ broom) at Gokwe Centre. 
 
In addition, the Batanai women started teaming-up to go and sell their brooms in 
faraway places. Some of these women would not have managed to do this alone as 
their husbands did not allow them to travel to such far places unaccompanied 
(probably afraid that venturing too far would tempt them to be promiscuous).   
 
Outcomes of the PAR processes 
Broom grass resource users developed a new decorative bundling method that helped 
to encourage the use of sustainable harvesting methods for the broom grass. Sale of 
the decorated brooms helped resource users to increase their incomes. For instance, an 
interview on 17/07/02 with Mrs Siwela, a broom grass resource user from Batanai 
area ACM research, discovered that she had decided to adopt the new bundling 
method being promoted in the area. Mrs Siwela said that the decorated brooms were 
selling fast and at a higher price [Zim$50 (0.88 USD) each) compared to undecorated 
brooms selling at lower prices (Zim$8 (0.14 USD).  Mrs Siwela also revealed that, 
together with her neighbour, she had begun to travel to faraway places (like Mbungu) 
to sell their brooms, and the income generated from the sale of the brooms had helped 
her to survive the drought in 2002. 
 
4.6.3 PAR with the Ndarire Timber Group 
With the facilitation of the ACM team members, the Ndarire timber group also 
developed a vision for their timber resources in the forest (Table 4.6). Participants 
listed some of the challenges anticipated in realisation of their visions:  
• Mukwa trees may get exhausted very fast if the level of harvesting is not 
monitored and regulated 
• If a lucrative market is found, more people will join the timber industry and 
this will create competition for the market and inputs, i.e. the timber 
• The FC may refuse to add timber to the list of permitted resources for 
communities to harvest under the resource sharing agreement. This will 
require a tremendous change in the RSP as currently timber logging is not part 
of this agreement. In the past however, when the timber was still abundant, the 
FC used to give logging concessions to big companies. 
• All the timber will be extracted if more concessions are awarded to external 
companies. 
 
As possible solutions they came up with the following suggestions: 
• For timber loggers to form a group to co-ordinate logging activities, 
• Initiate a dialogue between the FC and the current (illegal) timber loggers  
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• Regular facilitation by outside organisations such as CIFOR. Without such 
facilitation, it was not possible for them to progress further on their own. 
 
The members of the timber resource user group in Ndarire noted that a lot of timber 
was harvested by people from Nkayi - a neighbouring district outside the RSP area. 
They came up with activities to curb the poaching of the timber by these outsiders. 
One of these included asking FC officials to support them in reducing timber 
poaching as well as to help them with the development of sustainable harvesting 
methods. 
 
In response, the FC, with financial support from CIFOR, organised a look-and-learn 
tour in which various stakeholders (two FC officers, the Provincial Forest Extension 
Manager for Midlands Province, and representatives from 5 RMC areas around 
Mafungautsi Forest) visited a Nyagadza Project in Chipinge, Manicaland Province. 
This place is about 450 km away from Gokwe, in the south-eastern part of the 
country. The project involved communities managing an indigenous woodlot and 
sharing benefits from it. The trip aimed to expose the Mafungautsi community 
members to a number of value adding processes (e.g. through carpentry) implemented 
by communities in Chipinge, as well as to help them learn how other communities 
managed and used natural resources collectively.  This was an important learning 
experience for both the FC and communities from Mafungautsi concerning what 
kinds of systems might be implemented to ameliorate conflict over timber harvesting. 
In the carpentry project, the communities in Chipinge were manufacturing furniture 
from the timber they harvested from the indigenous woodlot, including beds, chairs 
and cupboards. The community also had a monitoring system to check how many 
trees were harvested to ensure sustainability. 
 
After this trip, the three FC officers administered a questionnaire to establish among 
other things the number of harvesters in the community, their qualifications, tools and 
skills, and the volume of timber they harvested per given season. A second survey 
followed to quantify the amount of timber in the forest and to find out about the 
feasibility of timber harvesting by communities in Mafungautsi, following the 
Nyagadza model. The discussions that followed these surveys were envisioned by the 
FC as a way to reshape forest policy for Mafungautsi and other state forests in 
Zimbabwe.
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Table 4.6: The timber status and vision developed by Ndarire timber group (meetings held on 21/04/02 and 24/04/02) 
 
Indicator Current status (year 2001) Vision for Timber ( 2003)      
Number of 
people involved 
in trading of 
hard wood 
products such 
as Mukwa 
(Pterocarpus 
angolensis). 
About 15% of the households in Ndarire use 
Mukwa for construction purposes, 10% use it 
for carpentry. Only 5 %  of carpenters (10% of 
the total Ndarire population) are experts in 
making Mukwa products e.g. chairs, doors 
An ideal situation would be a reasonable number of players in the timber industry. All 
stakeholders should be able to work together to ensure that Mukwa is not 
overexploited. However, participants foresaw the number of people dealing in Mukwa 
wood increasing in the near future due to increasing levels of unemployment in the 
country. The majority of the new players will be timber harvesters and plank makers. 
A small number will be 'experts'/carpenters because carpentry skills take time to be 
perfected.  
Rules • it is illegal to cut live trees especially 
Mukwa. 
• Farmers from surrounding communal areas 
are not allowed into the forest with dogs, 
axes and fire lighting accessories. 
These rules are however not reinforced as the 
FC hardly moves around the forest 
 
We need rules allow local community members from areas surrounding the forest to 
benefit from the forest resources – we also want to exclude those from outside of the 
RSP area  
 
Timber harvesters should be allowed to collect Mukwa from the forest. FC can set 
aside some days in the year when harvesters are allowed to collect Mukwa logs from 
the forest - for easy monitoring. For instance, harvesters can be allowed to harvest  an 
agreed number of poles or timber per given time. 
 
Harvesters should be allowed to harvest only dead Mukwa and mature live trees and 
leave the coppices to grow. 
 
There is need for a committee to monitor the harvesting methods and rates to ensure 
that the Mukwa tree is not overexploited.  
 
Other FC rules (e.g. no causing of veld fires), should be enforced to ensure that the 
forest is not destroyed by unscrupulous people. 
Methods of 
harvesting 
timber 
"Only ripe timber is harvested". In most cases 
the minimum width of timber that is harvested 
is 2 metres. People harvest both wet timber and 
dead wood. Axes and bow saws are used to 
Same as today. Use of heavy machines will deplete the tree resources at a fast rate. 
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harvest the timber. Once harvested the logs are 
transported to the homesteads using ox or 
donkey drawn carts. 
Processing 
methods 
Slicing planks from the logs using two men rip 
saws. Before the logs are sliced they are 
marked into small planks using a stained 
thread. On average a log can produce 7 to 12 
planks. Once sliced, the planks can be made 
into different items by carpenters. 
We hope to use electrified machines e.g. saws, which will reduce the amount of 
wasted wood as the tools we are currently using are crude and waste a lot of wood 
when we process the logs.  
Selling prices Timber can be sold as unprocessed logs, 
planks or as finished products e.g. chairs, 
doors etc. Prices differ from one producer to 
another, the differences being partly due to the 
level of desperation of the trader. An 
unprocessed log fetches between Zim$200 
(3.49 USD) and Zim$700 (12.21 USD). 
However one timber cutter claimed that if he is 
desperate for money he can sell a log for as 
little as Zim$50! Planks cost between Zim$50 
(0.87 USD) and Zim$150 (2.62 USD) each, 
depending on the width of the plank. 
Selling price of logs should be increased so that people reduce the number of trees 
they harvest to get reasonable incomes. On average, two years from now a log should 
sell at a minimum of Zim$500 (8.72 USD). Carpenters can improve on the quality of 
products they make and then charge high prices so that those who supply the planks 
and logs will also increase the selling price for the logs and planks respectively. 
"Some people in towns are selling a room divider for more than Zim$55 000 (959.36 
USD). A carpenter uses about 4 big planks to make such a room divider. If local 
carpenters can make such top quality products and get so much money, it means log 
suppliers can sell logs at more than Zim$1000 (17.44USD) each!" 
Markets • Timber is sold: 
• locally to carpenters who make 
different items such as coffins, doors 
and chairs: locals also use Mukwa 
wood to construct roofs for classrooms 
and their own houses.  
• to local schools that teach carpentry)  
• to  Kana Mission (about 5 km away), 
there is a thriving carpentry industry 
there 
Finished products can be sold in big towns where they fetch high prices. Unprocessed 
timber is too bulky and expensive to transport. 
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• to towns such as Bulawayo. However, 
very little timber goes there due to 
transport costs and the high risk of 
being caught by FC with the timber. 
Income levels 
from timber 
• Those who are still amateurs in the timber 
industry get low incomes from their 
products mainly because their products are 
of a poor quality. On average a log seller 
can harvest 40 logs per year. If the logs are 
selling at Zim$300 (5.23 USD) per log, 
this gives an annual income of Zim$12 
000 (209.31 USD). An amateur carpenter 
can earn an average of Zim$90 000 
(1.569.86 USD) per year while an 
experienced carpenter (who produces top 
quality products), can earn up to Zim$150 
000 (2.616.43 USD). These are gross 
incomes as some of the carpenters employ 
other people who assist them.  
"If markets improve, we can potentially earn millions of dollars. Those who harvest 
logs can earn up to Zim$120 000 (2.093.15 USD) per year while 'experts'/carpenters 
can earn more than half a million dollars each (8721.44 USD).  
Resource base Mukwa is now scarce. At the rate at which we 
are harvesting the timber, it is highly likely 
that a few years from now there will not be any 
trees left. As one man explained, to get Mukwa 
in the forest, one has to do thorough research. 
You may not even get Mukwa after searching 
for it the whole day". Informants reported that 
both young and old Mukwa is now scarce in 
the forest. The carpenters cut mature trees 
while other people cut the young trees for use 
as roofing poles  
To have as many Mukwa trees as possible so that we remain in business.  
 
It was suggested that all the people who use Mukwa should establish woodlots of 
Mukwa to replenish Mukwa which is being harvested. Some participants suggested 
that there should be a local committee that monitors and regulates the amount of 
timber that is harvested from the forest. Such a committee can liaise with the FC so 
that the locals can also benefit from the external timber loggers who get concessions 
from the FC. 
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4.6.4 PAR with Beekeepers in Gababe 
 
In meetings the ACM team organised with the Gababe bee keepers group, participants 
reflected on the situation and produced a vision for the bee keeping and honey production 
in their area (Table 4.7). In terms of obstacles, they identified the following: 
• If we fail to raise the required funds to purchase timber we cannot have any good 
hives.  
• If termites continue attacking our hives we will not have as many bees. 
• If we fail to have a market. 
• If we fail to gain more knowledge on harvesting and grading. 
The group then identified activities to cope with these obstacles  
• Organize look-and-learn visits to those who are experts in bee keeping. 
• Find and set up markets and a market place in Gababe where honey could be sold. 
• Look for a suitable place in Gababe where all bee keepers can put up their hives. 
• Come up with a strategy for acquiring more and better hives. 
 
Based on the activities they developed an action plan (Table 4.8). The group agreed that 
the first action to be undertaken was to try to revive the lapsed committee. The bee 
keepers unanimously agreed that it would not be wise to set up a new committee and plan 
what to do without first reflecting on the reasons why the old committee failed. Some 
members of the old committee were present during this meeting and they gave their 
views on why the committee had failed. 
 
During discussions that followed it became clear one reason the old committee had 
stopped functioning was because of the role of a local shop owner, the chair of the old 
RMC committee. Bee keepers in Gababe had become suspicious of him when he started 
buying honey from them, which he later sold in Bulawayo, in Matebeleland Province. 
The bee keepers felt that he was exploiting them by buying from them at low prices and 
later selling at higher prices in Bulawayo. Instead they expected him to link them directly 
with markets in Bulawayo, so they could also benefit from higher prices there. However 
when the shop owner was asked to speak, he left everyone dumbfounded by his immense 
knowledge on marketing and processing honey. He even lamented how the people of 
Gababe where losing opportunities to make money, by not venturing into bee keeping 
seriously. He told the bee keepers that the market for honey was not a problem, as there 
was a huge market for Mafungautsi honey in Bulawayo where he normally sold. He went 
on to say that most buyers preferred Mafungautsi Forest honey as it was thick, unlike the 
honey from gum trees which was watery. He then went on to advise that they needed neat 
packaging to attract buyers if they wanted to attain good prices. With this speech 
villagers' suspicion turned into a realization that perhaps he was needed to realise the 
group vision. 
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Table 4.7: The beekeeping vision at Gababe  
 
Indicator Current situation (2001) The bee keeping vision (in 
two years from now)  
Number of people 
involved in bee 
keeping 
About a quarter of the households are 
involved in bee keeping 
More households and 
people involved, so that we 
can have a market for our 
honey. Markets come when 
there are large quantities. 
Knowledge  and 
skills 
Those involved have very little 
knowledge 
More knowledge on 
trapping bees, bee keeping, 
harvesting and processing. 
Bee keeping 
methods 
Three types of hives; clay pots, tins, 
wooden barrows. Some people cut 
down hollow trees in order to make the 
wooden hives. 
Smoke the bees with cow dung, or 
grass. 
Others use cold water to strike and 
pacify the bees. 
Use of the Kenyan Top bar 
and basket hive.  
Still maintain the clay hive. 
Processing Only separate the wax from the honey. 
Mostly grades A and B honey are 
produced. 
Need more skills in processing. 
Use methods of processing 
that give good quality 
honey. 
Markets Selling at Raji, Venice mine, Gokwe, 
Harare, and to buyers from other 
places. 
Markets to be closer to us. 
Prices Sell for Zim$25 (0.44 USD) per bottle 
in the neighbourhood. 
Get higher and more 
rewarding prices. 
Rules and 
regulations 
None Effective rules to stop the 
cutting down of hollow 
trees for honey harvesting 
Incomes Zim$90 (1.57 USD) - 300 (5.23 USD) 
per annum raised from sales in the 
neighbourhood, and $1600 (27.91 
USD) per annum in Harare. 
After two years honey 
should be raising Zim$5000 
(87.21USD) per annum 
from selling at all markets. 
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Table 4.8 The action plan as developed by beekeepers at Gababe 
Activity  Tasks  Who is 
responsible 
Date Indicators  
Activity 1.  
Organizin
g look and 
learn visit 
Task 1. 
Gather information on 
possible sites that can be 
visited. 
 
Task 2. 
Raise funds or organize 
transport to visit the 
selected sites i.e. if the 
places to be visited are far 
away. 
 
Task 3. 
Selecting those who will 
go on the tour 
Task 1. 
Mr. L. 
Mabutho, and 
FC. 
 
Task 2. 
Treasurer of 
the group, Mr. 
Pilot Sibanda. 
 
Task 3. 
All members 
of the user 
group. 
Task 1 
By mid to 
end of 
May. 
 
Task 2 
By June 
 
Task 3 
By June 
All Tasks 
Change in behaviour,  
e.g. new and better 
ways of harvesting, 
processing and  
marketing of honey. 
  
Report back before 
end of May. 
 
Report back 
workshop after the 
tour. 
Activity 2.  
Finding a 
place to 
put up bee 
hives 
Task 1. 
Consulting and seeking 
land from kraal heads. 
 
Task 2. 
Fencing the area. 
Task 1. 
Mr. Albert 
Moyo 
Sithutha. 
 
Task 2. 
All user group 
members. 
Task 1. 
By the 5th 
of May 
2002. 
 
Task 2.  
As soon as 
land is 
found. 
Task 1. 
Report back meeting 
on 5th of May 2002. 
 
Task 2. 
Fenced area with bee 
hives. 
Activity 3. 
How to 
get 
beehives 
or 
material to 
make 
KTB type 
of bee 
hives. 
Task 1. 
Consulting the FC 
Task1. 
RMC chair. 
Task 1. 
29 April 
2002 meet 
FC. 
 
5 May 
2002 
report 
back to 
rest of 
group. 
Task 1. 
Minutes of report 
back meeting on 5th 
of May. 
 
Group members 
having KTB hives 
made from planks 
that are lying idle at 
the treasurer's place. 
Activity 4. 
Looking 
for more 
lucrative 
markets. 
Task 1 
Survey on buying prices 
being offered by different 
buyers. 
 
Task 2 
Buying calendar of 
potential buyers. 
 
Task 3 
Identify potential buyers 
and what they offer.  
Task 1. 
Jevas Sithutha 
(Production 
manager) 
Task 1 
By June 
Task 1. 
All honey is bought. 
 
Honey is purchased 
at higher price than 
the current price. 
 
Honey sells fast, e.g. 
20 buckets (20L) sold 
over 2 days. 
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Although the bee keeping group members came up with the vision for the resource and 
also an action plan to realise their vision, the ACM project ended before they had 
implemented the plan. One possible reason was lack of commitment by the group 
members, some of whom also left the area as the economic climate deteriorated in the 
country. One other possible reason they lacked commitment was that bee keeping was an 
individual venture and bee keepers were not willing to share information or risk increased 
competition from others. The bee keepers in Gababe therefore continued to work 
individually to understand and solve their problems. For the other resources, however, 
resource users collaborated to try to solve problems, as these were common resource 
found in the forest. After harvesting their grass, the broom grass group resource users, for 
example, organized a meeting to try to market their products in Bulawayo. However, they 
had a problem of transport, and came together to negotiate for cheaper rates with a local 
transport provider. The group even went a step further by asking the CIFOR community 
partner to negotiate the prices on their behalf. This was successful, and they managed to 
send their brooms to the Bulawayo market.  
 
4.7 Initiating and implementing collaborative monitoring 
processes 
The ACM team, like other researchers (Frost and Mandondo 1999), believed that 
adaptive management required a functioning monitoring and resource information system 
to enable resource managers to assess the condition of their environment, the status of 
key resources and the effect of their management processes. The team believed that such 
a monitoring system in multi-stakeholder situations had to be collaborative in nature for it 
to enhance joint learning processes. When several stakeholders participated in the 
monitoring process, it was termed collaborative monitoring (CM). CM therefore played a 
central role in the ACM approach, and helped stakeholders to generate information 
required to check whether they were moving towards attaining their goals (Guijt, 2007). 
In essence, CM involves stakeholders periodically and repeatedly observing appropriate 
parameters to determine the effects of certain management strategies and policies to the 
status of their resource and their well-being (Bosch et al, 1996). The information being 
collected should be systematically recorded to keep track of the progress made towards 
objectives on a regular basis. CM promotes self-reliance in decision-making and problem 
solving by stakeholders, by encouraging them to go beyond data collection to reflection 
and analysis. This enables them to take action and adapt management strategies. 
 
In order to understand the existing monitoring arrangements, so as to build on them, the 
ACM team conducted a qualitative survey, in August 2002, using semi-structured 
interviews, and focus group discussions, in Batanai and Gababe. Ndarire was left out of 
the survey as timber harvesting was still an illegal activity. The survey revealed that 
different stakeholders, i.e. the FC, RMC, individual resource users and traditional leaders, 
were monitoring different things according to their interests without necessarily sharing 
that information with other stakeholders. The challenge when initiating collaborative 
monitoring (CM) processes was to go beyond individual monitoring arrangements and 
come up with collaborative efforts that were conscious, deliberate and systematic at 
higher levels. In multi-stakeholder situations, this was assumed essential for collective 
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action. At the RMC level, the monitoring processes focused on (a) tracking the income 
generated through giving out permits to resource users to harvest forest products, (b) the 
incidence of fire outbreaks and lastly (c) the incidence of thefts. 
 
The RMCs were involved in monitoring resource harvesting because it was part of their 
terms of reference, set up by the FC. Individual resource users also monitored things in 
their own way, such as the quantities of resources (thatch grass, broom grass, honey) they 
harvested each season from the forest and the income generated thereby. The traditional 
leaders were also monitoring and controlling resource harvesting in their communities, 
and arresting people who indiscriminately cut down trees, using powers under the 
Traditional Leaders Act. There was, however, no systematic documentation of 
information by either the traditional leaders or the RMC. Nor had RMCs created 
opportunities for various stakeholders to share ideas and information from their 
monitoring activities such as meetings and workshops. Once every year, at the annual 
pre-grass cutting season workshop, the RMCs presented the results of their monitoring 
over the preceding year.  However, it was only the RMC members and the FC that 
attended these meetings. The forms on which the RMCs recorded their information were 
in English, and even though these forms were kept in the communities, they were not 
accessible because of the language barrier.  
 
Based on the findings from the survey the ACM team developed a concept note on how 
Collaborative Monitoring (CM) could be facilitated in order to build on the already 
existing monitoring processes. Issues addressed  included the definition of CM and the 
steps to be taken to initiate  CM. CM was defined as a process that involves resource 
managers and users in collaboratively and periodically recording and keeping track of 
both ecological and human well-being. In this CM system, platforms (opportunities that 
were created for people to interact) for sharing, reflecting upon, and learning from the 
monitoring results were crucial to inform decision-making processes. The ACM team 
proposed the newly formed monitoring subcommittees (MSC) to take a pivotal role in 
creating and operating these platforms. 
 
The ACM team discussed the concept note with the FC officer to get his views and 
comments. This discussion helped the team to understand the FC officer’s perception of 
the nature and purpose of monitoring. According to him, monitoring was associated with 
tracking the ecological condition of the forests through patrolling, a policing function 
similar to that of Forest Protection Unit (FPU), the policing arm of the FC. The FPU was 
mainly meant to arrest people who violated the Forest Act, and this had been one of the 
major causes of conflicts between local communities and the FC in the RSP. To avoid 
unnecessary conflicts, the ACM team negotiated a definition of CM that focused on 
generating information for key-decision making processes, and not only focused on 
policing. The FC officer accepted this version of CM. The fact that the ACM research 
project was a joint undertaking between the FC and the Centre for International Forestry 
Research (CIFOR) may have helped in making it easy for the FC officer to be flexible 
and accept the definition. The FC top management supported the implementation of 
ACM approach in Mafungautsi, mainly because this was also a pilot co-management 
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initiative for them and they were willing to try out new approaches to learn more about 
the usefulness of people-centred approaches in the management of state forests.  
 
CM was later discussed at meetings with RMC members, traditional leaders (who until 
then, had openly complained that they had been sidelined in the RSP), the MSCs and the 
various resource user groups in Batanai and Gababe. These discussions confirmed the 
ACM team’s fears that all the local stakeholders, except the members of the MSC, were 
against the idea of CM, as they took monitoring to mean policing and arresting. MSC 
members were for the idea, it seemed to the ACM team, because they associated the 
activity with gaining the power to arrest people and also to access the free permits 
members of RMCs were entitled to, to harvest thatch and broom grass resources. Once 
again the ACM team negotiated the meaning of CM, and finally agreed that monitoring 
should not only involve policing but should be beneficial to resource users as well. 
 
Discussions with the various stakeholders generated information on who should 
participate in the CM system, their roles, and what kinds of platforms could be put in 
place to enhance information sharing among stakeholders. Examples of platforms that 
were suggested included feedback meetings, general community meetings and 
workshops. The ACM team later presented the results of the various discussions to the 
community meetings (the FC officer was also present) to get their views and comments. 
During these meetings, stakeholders adopted both the proposed CM definition and 
proposed suggestion that the MSC could play a leading role in creating platforms for 
reflection and learning. 
 
At these meetings stakeholders also came up with a draft terms of reference for the MSC 
that clearly specified their roles and how they should relate to other stakeholders. It was 
also agreed that all stakeholders should continue monitoring activities and outcomes 
deemed relevant to them, for instance broom grass resource users could monitor things 
concerning the broom grass resource. The resource users were asked to notify the other 
stakeholders about what exactly they had chosen to monitor to avoid duplication. What 
the various stakeholders chose to monitor is presented in Box 4.8.   For each RMC area, a 
MSC was put in place and consisted of seven members, chair, vice chair, secretary, vice 
secretary, treasurer and two ordinary members.  In most areas, there were more young 
men in the MSC, as their role involved a lot of work in the forest. 
 
It was the responsibility of the MSCs to organize platforms for stakeholders to meet and 
share their monitoring findings. One of the limitations of this monitoring process was the 
fact that there were no indicators established. As a consequence it was also impossible to 
develop clear methods for monitoring the resources. The ACM team hoped that the local 
stakeholders would use their local knowledge to monitor resources, and that during the 
information sharing, stakeholders would describe the method they used to come up with 
their findings. This would be the basis to develop a monitoring method.  
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Box 4.8: What stakeholders from Batanai agreed to monitor in the 
Mafungautsi Forest (during a meeting held 28August 2002 
 
Resource users 
The resource user groups indicated that they were willing to play a role in the monitoring of the 
status of the particular resource they were interested in. They would particularly look at the 
impact of harvesting methods on the resource base. They also wanted to track their benefit from 
the forest resources and the way these benefits improved well-being.  
 
The MSC 
The roles of the MSCs in CM were clearly articulated in the TOR, developed in a participatory 
manner by all stakeholders (Box 4.9). The monitoring committee would coordinate monitoring 
activities of different user groups. There were also ideas about enhancing the interaction between 
RMCs. At Batanai RMC for example, the MSC had already established close contacts with an 
adjacent MSC of Sokwela RMC. Previously there had been allegations that broom grass 
collectors from Batanai were stealing the grass from Sokwela RMC. The people from Sokwela 
RMC alleged that the “poachers’ were using improper harvesting methods, resulting in their 
resource being depleted. The poachers, mostly women, would evade detection by Sokwela RMC 
members by harvesting the grass at unusual times. When apprehended with improperly harvested 
grass by members of the Batanai RMC, the women would argue that they bought it from Sokwela 
RMC. To deal with the problem of trans RMC “poachers” the monitoring committees for the two 
RMCs decided to work together, so that apprehended culprits would be sent to their respective 
RMC for prosecution.  
 
The Resource Management Committee  
In the CM process, the RMC would still retain its role of issuing permits to harvesters and 
monitoring the quantities harvested. It would also be responsible for handling the information 
from the MSC and presenting it to a proposed RMC board to oversee the operations of all the 
RMCs around Mafungautsi. A proposal was made for this information to be aggregated and 
presented at an annual meeting with the FC. The information would be discussed and reflected 
upon to come up with action plans for the future direction of the resource-sharing project in 
general. The RMC would also assume a policing role. The MSC would report to the RMC, if they 
found people who broke the rules. The RMC would then hand over such culprits to the traditional 
leaders, who had authority under the Traditional Leaders Act to fine them.  If the traditional 
leaders came across cases they thought were beyond their control, they would then hand them 
over to the FC. 
 
Traditional leaders   
In the CM process, traditional leaders would be responsible for encouraging their communities to 
use the forest resource in a sustainable manner. They would also support RMC activities, 
including the organisation of meetings.. The traditional leaders also would have a role in the 
policing component (see section on the RMC). The traditional leaders, through their aides, would 
also enforce traditional rules and cultural practices related to natural resources management. 
 
The Forestry Commission  
The Forest Protection Unit (FPU) of the FC had from the start had been involved in patrolling the 
forest and arresting people who broke the forest laws. This had been an important reason for the 
poor relations between local people and the FC. The FC officer for Mafungautsi explained that  
the Forest Act stipulates that there should be forest guards in any state forest, and they would, 
therefore, continue to patrol the forest. In the meeting where the TOR for the MSC were 
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discussed, some people commented that if the roles of the FPU and the monitoring committee 
were not be clearly defined, there was a potential for conflict and duplication of effort. The 
official agreed and suggested that the best way to solve this problem would be to make the FPU 
concentrate on areas outside those demarcated to individual RMCs. If the FPU wants to know 
something from the RMC areas, they would contact and discuss this with the MSC in that area. 
 
Researchers  
Researchers would be involved in carrying out research supposed to meet stakeholders’ needs and 
inform decision-making processes. These findings should be presented and reflected upon by the 
stakeholders in their various meetings. 
 
Towards the end of their project, the ACM team organised a workshop with 
representatives from all thirteen RMCs in Mafungautsi to finalise the terms of reference 
on the monitoring activities and to update members from RMCs that did not participate in 
the initial process. At that workshop, the ACM team asked members from Batanai and 
Gababe RMCs to present the process that they went through and the findings from the 
discussions with the various stakeholders on CM, including the definition of CM, the 
roles of the various stakeholders in the CM process and the draft terms of reference for 
the MSCs. The participants at this workshop agreed to adopt the proposed definition and 
roles of stakeholders in the CM for their areas as well. They went one step further and 
finalised the terms of reference for the MSC, as these had been drafted up by the ACM 
team based on earlier meetings (Box 4.9). In the discussion after the presentation of the 
Batanai and Gababe RMCs, members from the other RMCs said they were convinced 
that CM was important for the proper management of their resources and they promised 
to adopt (or adapt) it for their own RMCs.  
 
Setting up collaborative monitoring processes was time consuming because several 
stakeholders participated at each stage in their development.  
 
Implementing the Collaborative Monitoring System  
Although the ACM project came to an end in early 2003, before the collaborative 
monitoring system was implemented, the ACM researchers were able to observe some of 
what happened during the follow up research work. In most of the RMCs CM activities 
were implemented. The following two cases show how through the sharing of their 
findings from monitoring, stakeholders jointly learned and engaged in collective action 
more sustainably to manage their resources.  
 
Just after the CM system was put in place, at Batanai, the MSC generated important 
information on the amount and quality of available grass before the grass harvesting 
season started. The MSC gave reports on the amount and quality of grass available in the 
forest to resource users. They also indicated the area in which grass harvesting was to 
take place. When the grass was finished, they identified other areas and reported on the 
quality and availability of the grass to resource harvesters.  
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Box 4.9: Terms of reference for the MSC 
 
The MSC was tasked to work in the forest, in the community and also outside the community. 
These tasks included: 
In the forest 
To observe and look out for forest fires, and notify the RMC if there was a fire, people who cut 
wet trees (and poles) and report them to the RMC, poaching of wild animals, broom grass, 
domestic animals, snares, and theft of livestock. Some cattle rustlers were said to steal cattle and 
pen them in the forest while they looked out for markets. The committee would therefore patrol in 
the forest to check for such thieves, protecting the forest from fire by checking if the fire 
protection lines were maintained. It was said that if the committee discovered fire breaks that 
were not maintained, they could notify the RMC, who would then take the appropriate action.  
MSCs were also required to make sure that neighbouring RMCs did not harvest resources beyond 
their boundaries and; check if RMC members were not stealing resources or fraudulently giving 
out permits to people from outside their area before the set time for harvesting resources.  
 
In the community 
To investigate if people involved in any project are benefiting from it, to check if projects are 
doing what they planned to do and to check if the project sub-committee was working well 
towards the attainment of the group's vision. It was stated that there was need to monitor projects 
so that advice could be given if there were problems and also to learn lessons so that they could 
be shared with the larger community, to link up all the other subcommittees with the main RMC 
committee, to make sure that the money raised through payment of fines when someone is caught 
by the MSC goes into the RMC account; and to show those who do not know the various areas 
where resources could be harvested, and to advise the RMC and the other subcommittees on areas 
where resources could be found. 
 
Outside the community 
The committee should have a relationship with other similar committees in other RMC areas and 
visit them in order to find out about how they manage their resources and to check the quantities 
of specified resources they have. If there was a shortage of a certain resource in their area then 
RMCs could approach the FC to ask to expand their harvest to those areas with an abundance. If 
they find people from other RMCs not abiding by the agreed rules they should hand over such 
culprits to their respective RMCs. 
 
Reporting structure, frequency of feedback meetings & records 
The ACM team recommended community members to select literate people in the MSCs. These 
people would be able comprehensively to document results of the monitoring exercises, take a 
lead in organising opportunities for various stakeholders to share their monitoring results and to 
learn together. They argued that monitoring without written reports would not be adequate 
because people would want information on what things were happening in their area. It would 
also need to be spelled-out who needs the above data, and how often they had to be presented 
with it. It was also important to come up with an agreed recording format for the information to 
be collected. 
 
Reporting structure when people who break rules and are caught by the subcommittee 
Stakeholders suggested that the MSC should work under the RMC. According to them, the MSC 
should have no direct link with FC; all issues should be sent to the RMC which would hand over 
cases they cannot deal with to the traditional leadership authority. If the traditional leaders failed 
to deal with some cases, they would hand them over to the FC.  However, stakeholders said that 
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the FC should feel free to talk to the MSC any time. If the RMC was being implicated in a report, 
the MSC could directly report to the kraal heads. According to the stakeholders, the MSC should 
also arrest offenders from outside their RMC and refer the person to his/her RMC committee for 
prosecution. 
 
In implementing the CM system, several problems were faced in Batanai area in 
particular. First, the RMC did not get support from the village heads. For instance, if 
RMC members caught someone harvesting resources without a permit and took the 
culprit to the village heads, he/she was not punished. This encouraged more people not to 
pay their permit fees. Second, implementation of the CM system was difficult due to 
political problems. The RMC chair said that the ward councillor came to ask the RMC to 
donate money and sponsor some ward soccer matches. He said that the committee 
refused to do so since it said the money was not for the ward but for the development of 
their area. The next time the RMC went to harvest resources after refusing to hand over 
money to the councillor they discovered that the whole grass portion had been burnt. It 
was alleged that the MSC chair, who belonged to the same party as the councillor, went 
and burnt the grass portion after a party meeting with the councillor.  
 
At Gababe RMC area, a monitoring system had been put in place by the end of 2003. 
Roles of the MSC included checking if resource users were using good harvesting 
methods, getting resource user’s problems and taking them to the RMC, looking for 
poachers of small game, looking out for those who cut wet trees, looking out for forest 
fires (the biggest problem in 2003) and issuing permits for harvesting resources. It was 
said that the MSC carried out patrols in the forest throughout the year. There were 
problems each time the RMC had meetings in the village as some people took it as a 
chance to steal resources from the forest and start fires. The MSC, therefore, changed its 
strategy and each time an RMC meeting was organized in the village, they did not attend, 
but continued patrols in the forest.  
 
The Gababe area MSC also divided the grass harvesting area into several equal plots to 
monitor quantities harvested in each plot. This also helped to solve a major problem that 
broom grass resource users were facing, and had complained to the MSC about.  Users 
complained that RMC members allocated the areas with the best (tall) grass to 
themselves, friends and relatives, and gave poor (short) quality grass to other users. With 
the plot system in place a user would get some plots with poor/ shorter grass as well as 
those with good/ longer grass.  
 
Also in Gababe, following several reports and complaints by communities on the 
embezzlement of funds by some RMC members, the FC and the communities decided to 
monitor RMC activities. Communities demanded the RMC regularly report to their 
constituents rather than just reporting upwards to the FC. The FC provided basic 
stationery to selected RMCs (including other RMCs that were not part of the research) so 
that they could write and submit monthly reports on what they had done. This resulted in 
the RMC transforming itself into a more transparent and downwardly accountable 
institution. 
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Follow-up on implementation of the CM system in Chemwiro Masawi, a neighbouring 
RMC to Gababe, revealed that the system was fully implemented by the end of 2003. The 
MSC was responsible for: (1) patrolling the forest and checking for forest fires, especially 
during peak fire season,  (2) checking if the grasses were growing well in the different 
blocks of the grass harvesting area (the area was divided into blocks for monitoring 
purposes), (3) looking out for people who cut down wet trees in the forest and poachers 
of game. The system, according to the RMC members, was working well. However, one 
village head who was present during the meeting said that community members 
complained that there was too much control by RMC members when they harvested 
resources. Community members said that RMC members followed them everywhere 
when they were harvesting resources and they did not like it. 
 
Several other platforms for sharing the monitoring results were created. These were 
principally locally organised community meetings and workshops organised and 
facilitated by the FC. An example was the pre-grass-cutting workshop, which has now 
become an annual activity on the FC calendar. It was organised before the start of the 
grass-cutting season and was meant to give an opportunity to RMC members to reflect on 
their work and share experiences in order to learn together. A range of issues were 
discussed during these workshops, like the incentives for the RMC, financial report 
backs, and reports on sustainable harvesting practices used, possible projects that could 
be funded using RMC funds, and problems and challenges faced by the various RMCs. 
During the 2004 pre-grass cutting workshop one RMC member shared with the rest of the 
workshop participants the monitoring results of his RMC on thatch grass. He told 
participants that he had realized that if you cut the grass and you leave it for a few days 
all the seeds drop off and germinate into new grass, and this boosts the next year’s grass 
yield. Most RMCs present said they would try out the new way of harvesting thatch grass 
in the next season. 
 
Outcomes of collaborative monitoring 
Discussions with the MSC chair for Batanai area in September 2002 revealed that the 
subcommittee had already started monitoring conditions in the forest, even though their 
TOR had not yet been finalised. The chair, and another member of the MSC said that 
they recently made several patrols around the resource area under the "jurisdiction" of 
Batanai RMC. The two reported that from their trips around the forest they saw and learnt 
that there are fewer problems in the forest when compared to previous years. They said 
that there were no major fire outbreaks, cutting down of trees was reduced, and fewer 
snares were set in the forest. There have been pockets of fire outbreaks, possibly caused 
by honey collectors, but these were put out before spreading further. 
 
 
Reflection 
From the above discussion of the CM system and how it was implemented, it is clear that 
the developed CM system was too complicated, and different RMCs adopted some but 
not all the elements proposed in the TOR of the MSC. Although MSC helped to generate 
useful information for resource users, their roles were still largely to do with patrolling 
and policing, a reason why the resource users in Chemwiro Masawi, a neighbouring 
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RMC to Gababe complained. Instead of putting more effort to push their ideas of CM, the 
ACM team, with benefit of hindsight, might have been more flexible, perhaps focusing 
more on the role of raising awareness of the importance of CM for learning. They should, 
however, have asked the various RMC areas to come up with their own ideas for CM. 
This might have generated a more innovative and simpler CM system. 
  
Implementing ACM 
 
 
143 
Part III:  Post ACM project developments 
 
Introduction 
The ACM team members took the lead in facilitating the ACM approach in Mafungautsi 
from the year 2000 to 2003. The FC officers (both the first officer, Mrs Gutura, who was 
later transferred to another area - Chegutu - in 2001, and the officer who took over, Mr 
Mutasa) participated in most of the organised meetings and workshops, and the CIFOR 
researchers shared with the officers highlights and insights from the meetings he did not 
attend. This helped the officers to learn by observing the ACM team facilitating the 
various processes. When the project ended in 2003, the CIFOR researchers handed over 
the overall facilitation of the process to the second Mafungautsi Resource Sharing Project 
(RSP) Coordinator. 
 
The team did not pull out of the area drastically, but gradually, offering considerable 
back-up support initially and gradually reducing it as time went by, and as the FC officer 
became more confident in organising and facilitating the learning processes on his own. 
As part of the exit strategy from Mafungautsi the ACM team organised five training 
workshops in which the Mafungautsi RSP Coordinator (and several personnel at different 
levels, including the FC top management and personnel from the Forestry College of 
Zimbabwe) attended (Table 4.9). The workshops aimed at equipping FC officers with 
facilitation skills and good knowledge of the ACM approach, and CIFOR researchers 
acted as resource persons during the workshops. The FC officer remained actively 
involved in the processes after the ACM team had pulled out of the area to become - 
eventually - observers of the process (Mutimukuru and Kozanayi, 2005b). 
 
The FC officer continued to receive financial back up from CIFOR (part of the funding 
came from the ACM up-scaling grant received from CIDA) because, due to the declining 
economic conditions in the country, he had no access to other financial resources. In 
September 2003, for instance, the officer faced problems of transport and fuel, and these 
made it difficult for him to visit communities frequently. The FC officer had further 
problems when his vehicle was involved in an accident, and he could no longer visit 
communities. When ACM researchers asked him to join their trip to Gababe, he refused, 
saying that communities will not take him seriously because the last time he had failed to 
meet his promise to come back to the village and sort out some issues they agreed upon. 
The FC officer died in October 2005, and the new officer had little knowledge of the 
ACM approach (he only attended a half day ACM training workshop in June 2006) The 
new incumbent had a different focus, on forest management, and concentrated his efforts 
on eviction of new forest settlers. Unfortunately, the new officer also died in (October 
2007) before having an opportunity to interact with resource users in the study sites.  
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Table 4.9: ACM training workshops organised for FC officers at various levels  
 
Workshop When Who participated 
Kwekwe June 2003 (2 ½ 
days) 
9 Forestry Extension Officers (FEOs) including 
the Mafungautsi Project coordinator 
 
2 Provincial Forestry Extension Managers 
(PFEMs) 
Kadoma 12-15 October 
2003 
2 PFEMS 
 
9FEOs including the Mafungautsi Project 
Coordinator 
 
Principal, Forestry College of Zimbabwe 
 
Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, FC head 
office 
Masvingo 28-29 June 2004 8FEOs including the Mafungautsi Project 
coordinator 
 
5 PFEMS 
 
Principal, Forestry College of Zimbabwe 
Harare-Gokwe 6-15 December 
2004 
2 Lecturers from the Forestry College of 
Zimbabwe 
 
8 FEOs (including the Mafungautsi Project 
Coordinator) 
Harare 13 June 2006 – 
Half day 
General manager FC 
 
Deputy General Manager Extension 
 
Deputy General Manager Research Division 
 
Operations manager 
 
Accountant CONEX Division 
 
2 (PFEMS) 
 
2 FEOs (Mudzi and Kwekwe) 
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4.8 Participatory Action Research processes after the CIFOR 
Project 
 
4.8.1 PAR after facilitation by CIFOR researchers (late 2003-2007) 
Joint learning processes at the resource user group level stopped after the ACM project 
ended in all sites, partly because the community partners, who used to receive an 
allowance from CIFOR, stopped facilitating them. Because of continued economic 
decline and increasing hunger and poverty in the country some community partners left 
for neighbouring countries in search of work. For instance in September 2003 the 
community partner for Batanai left the area to search for employment in Botswana. The 
FC officer had limited resources and chose to focus on the learning processes at a much 
higher level. These included look and learn tours, pre-grass cutting workshops and 
discussion meetings. These are described below.  
 
Look-and-learn tours  
The FC officer organised several look-and-learn tours for both the FC officers and the 
local communities (members of RMCs and traditional leaders) to learn from resource 
management experiences from other areas. Examples of such tours include look-and-
learn tours to Kana area CAMPFIRE project and the Chemwiro Masawi RMC area. The 
Kana CAMPFIRE tour was organised by the FC officer in April 2004. The FC officer 
took stakeholders in Mafungautsi to a CAMPFIRE Project in Kana, a communal area 
neighbouring Mafungautsi State Forest. Participants in this tour included representatives 
from five RMC areas, including the research sites, and the two FC officers. During the 
tour the Mafungautsi stakeholders learned about the CAMPFIRE program and the way 
the communities managed natural resources in this project.  The host communities were 
also interested in learning about bee keeping and this resulted in an intense discussion. 
The second tour was organised by the FC officer in August 2004. Members of four 
RMCs, namely, Gwehava, Gababe, Sokwela and Batanai, travelled with the FC to 
Chemwiro Masawi, to familiarise themselves with their constitution and terms of 
reference, since all of them were newly elected to office. They were elected by 
communities and were supposed to be in office for two years, after which they were 
supposed to organise new elections according to the RMC constitution developed by the 
FC. The RMC members also had an opportunity during this trip to get to know each other 
and exchange experiences.  
 
Pre-grass cutting workshops and discussion meetings 
After the ACM team left the RSP coordinator continued to organise the yearly pre-grass 
cutting workshops for members of RMCs, to reflect on the previous season, share 
experiences and engage in joint learning. The FC also invited representatives from other 
projects such as CAMPFIRE, to the pre-grass cutting workshops to share their 
experiences in dealing with some of the challenges faced. Other pertinent issues 
discussed in the pre-grass-cutting workshops were related to the socio-economic and 
political developments in the country, and how these affected resource management 
activities in Mafungautsi.  
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The FC officer also organised meetings for the RMC members to discuss the problems 
encountered in the RSP, possible solutions and the way forward in the project. All these 
meetings were useful for sharing of experiences among the district and local level 
stakeholders.  
 
4.8.2 PAR after the death of the FC officer  
After the FC officer had passed away all organized joint learning processes stopped at all 
levels In. 2007 community members in both Batanai and Gababe said that there were 
now several problems and conflicts in the RCM area related to resource management 
activities, and these were not being dealt with by anyone. However, in Gababe, 
discussions with local community members revealed that they had managed to initiate 
processes to solve other problems faced in their community. For instance, since 2005, 
several organisations were working in the area. When I asked how these organizations 
came into their area, community members said that in the meetings and workshops that 
were organized by the ACM team they had met with several key stakeholders, including 
their member of parliament (MP) who they did not know before. He had never been to 
their area before. Because they now knew him, they had approached him and their Chief. 
They had asked them if it would be possible for them to get a resident agricultural 
extension officer, as the one who serviced their area was too far away at Nyaje RMC 
area. They also asked if he could help them source funds and facilitate the building up of 
a clinic in their area, as the nearest one was too far. They also mentioned that they would 
welcome the services of the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) as they had serious 
problems with delinquent youth, as well as numerous thefts. They also solicited for 
development projects, as they did not have any.  
 
The MP, who belonged to the ruling ZANU-PF political party, was happy to link up with 
the Gababe people, and he organised for them to get an agricultural extension officer, 
who lodged at the primary school. The MP also approached two non-governmental 
organisations, AFRICARE and CONCERN, already working in Gokwe, and asked them 
to also include Gababe as one of their beneficiary areas. The two organisations agreed to 
work in Gababe.57 Through the facilitation of the MP, the people from Gababe RMC 
were now getting the services of a mobile clinic once every month. They also received a 
resident policeman stationed in the area from late 2005 to August 2007. The policeman 
was later removed by the MP, after the 2005 parliamentary elections. The people from 
Gababe voted for the opposition party and this did not please the ZANU-PF MP. He was 
angry, and although he won as the MP for the area, he organised a meeting with the 
Gababe people and told them that ‘maida kundibvisa pachigaro manje ndakubvisa 
mapurisa angu. Ndoda kuona kuti MDC yamakavotera ichakuitirira chii, asi ndinoziva 
kuti hapana nekuti haisi mugovernment iri kutonga’ - ‘you wanted to remove me from 
power, now I will remove my police from your area. I want to see if the MDC you voted 
                                                 
57
  CONCERN started working in Gababe in 2005 and gives people maize grain, cooking oil, beans 
and porridge. About 90% of people in the RMC benefit from this project, yearly. AFRICARE works with 
people who were left out of the Concern project. The organization gives people seed, peanut butter pressing 
machines, oil pressing machine, and cooking oil. They also teach people how to process soya beans and 
prepare it into various foods (milk, bread). This group is led by Mr Lamerk Mabuto, a former member of 
the beekeeping resource user group. 
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for will now help you. I am however sure the MDC will not help you as it is not part of 
the ruling government’.  
 
4.8.3 New settlements in the forest after the introduction of the Fast 
Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) 
 
Soon after the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) was introduced in the year 
2000, some local people (calling themselves war veterans) pioneered the settlement at 
Zanda Plateau within the Mafungautsi forest, saying they were reclaiming land taken 
when the forest was converted to a state forest in 1954, under British colonial rule. Soon 
after they went into the forest there were several reports of poaching of wildlife, as well 
as rampant tree cutting by settlers, as they cleared land to make way for homesteads, 
fields and gardens. The new settlers cleared the designated resource collection area of 
Kupfuma Ishungu RMC area, (Map, Fig. 2.6, Chapter 2). Community members estimated 
that in 2002 about 75 families had settled in the forest. Other community members were 
angry about this development, complaining they had taken care of the forest ever since, 
and their management efforts were about to be wasted. The Kupfuma Ishungu RMC 
completely stopped functioning as the new settlers arrived and settled in the forest areas 
where they used to harvest resources. It is important to mention that when the RMC 
stopped functioning, no alternative resource management systems were put in place.  
 
By 2004, there were about 200 households at Zanda Plateau, occupying a forest area that 
stretched for 16km.58 The settlers had cleared trees for a road that connected the new area 
with an existing main road. They encountered a problem when the road reached the FC 
Camp (Figure 2.5, Chapter 2) and the FC officer rejected the settlers’ request to let their 
road pass through the camp. According to the FC officer, the number of people who 
resided in the forest changed with time – increasing towards the agricultural season, but 
decreasing thereafter. Some of the residents were there only temporary and went back to 
their original homes in the communities for security reasons since the settlements were 
not yet legalised. Mr G., the former chair of the MSC in the Batanai area, was also a 
temporary settler in the forest.  When asked about the area of land cleared by settlers for 
agricultural purposes, he said ‘vanhu vanongotema kusvika panoperera simba ravo’ - 
‘there are no rules being followed when clearing the land for agricultural purposes; 
people just clear areas as big as they have energy to do so’. Mr G. later indicated that he 
himself had so far cleared 30 acres and that many people had cleared similar pieces of 
land. 
 
The forest settlements were a major issue in the pre-grass cutting workshop in April 
2004. This annual event was organized by the FC and members from all the RMCs 
around Mafungautsi area met there to discuss the various issues and to set prices for the 
harvesting permits and the various forest products. Part of the minutes of this meeting 
taken by the ACM team members are presented in Box 4.10. 
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  Entry in the area for exact measurements were too risky in 2004 and thereafter.  
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Box 4.10: From the minutes of the pre-grass cutting workshop held on 6-7April 
2004 at Lutope Camp 
A group consisting of members from Rugare Tasungunuka and Chemusonde RMC areas was 
asked about the issue of the forest settlers and how they thought this situation should be resolved. 
Their main recommendations were that the settlers should be removed immediately. They felt that 
the new settlers were now monopolising the forest resources, and were making harvesting of 
resources difficult for those living in the communities. The forest settlers were even asking 
villagers from communities surrounding the forest to pay them for harvesting resources; they 
claimed that the resources were now in their private agricultural fields and therefore belonged to 
them. The members of the two RMC considered that the forest residents should be barred from 
using any of the forest resources, as these are a common property belonging to all the villagers in 
Chemusonde and Kupfuma Ishungu RMC area. 
 
In the discussions that followed, the FC officer highlighted that the first recommendation was not 
easy to implement. He also said that a land committee being chaired by Mr. John Nkomo59 had 
been set up and was looking into this issue. The officer however, went on to say that at a recent 
ruling party meeting  it was highlighted that these settlers would be removed and resettled 
elsewhere, as the government would not de-gazette any forest areas. One RMC member from 
Sokwela, who was also a village head, later told participants at the workshop that so far he had 
had a lot of pressure from his RMC area, as they also wanted to go and settle in the forest. He 
said that he had told them that those who ‘invaded’ the forest were not there to stay and were 
going to be removed soon. In his opinion, the whole forest could disappear if these settlers were 
not removed in the coming two years, because those outside the forest were watching and waiting 
for an opportunity to move in as well. The workshop participants later agreed that the Council 
Chair and the District Administrator, who were also participants of the workshop, should take this 
as a priority and remind the governor of their province about the potential threat that the new 
settlers posed to the existence of the forest. 
 
An issue of forest clearings by villagers from the Rugare Tasungunuka RMC area was also 
discussed in the same workshop. Villagers of this RMC were said to have cleared a large area in 
the forest for agricultural fields. It was agreed that this would be dealt with separately as there 
were no settlers in the forest but only fields. Suggestions were that the responsible authorities (the 
FC and other departments) should meet with the communities and try to map out a way forward. 
The events in Rugare Tasungunuka had sparked debates in other communities and RMC 
members had started negotiating with the FC to get agricultural fields in the forest as well. The 
chair of Chemwiro Masawi’s RMC (a RMC neighbouring Rugare Tasungunuka – see Figure 2.5, 
Chapter 2) said that their RMC area was aware of the events happening in Rugare Tasungunuka 
but that they did not agree with this unlawful acquisition of land for agricultural purposes. Their 
RMC was trying by all means to prevent this from happening in their area, but they wanted to 
acquire land legally in the forest to set up an agricultural project to create employment for the 
youth, so that they could grow crops and sell them at a market, since their RMC was close to the 
road.  
 
Mr Makore an officer of the FC’s Forestry Protection Unit reported in October 2007 that 
about 600 families now lived in the forest. The number of settlers had continued to 
increase and in addition to the Zanda Plateau, there were new settlers in the 
Bhandakamwe, Ngondoma and Mbumbuzi areas. The new settlements at Ndondoma and 
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  He was the chair of the land committee  set up by the Zimbabwean Government to preside over 
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Mbumbuzi disturbed grass harvesting in the nearby Gababe area, and also in the 
Chemwiro Masawi RMC and Batanai areas. As more people continued to move into new 
areas, in September 2006, the FC Provincial Forest Extension Manager (PFEM) for 
Midlands Province and officers from various other district level organizations organized 
a meeting with the new settlers at Bhandakamwe, Mbumbuzi and Ngondoma areas, and 
told them to move out. Those who did not move were arrested and taken to the police. 
 
Chief Nj., however, called the police and told them that the arrested people had not 
committed any crime as they had settled in his area. The people were later released. It 
was alleged that Chief Nj. also had his own field in the forest that forest residents worked 
on without pay60. It was said that the Chief only brought seed and then came back to 
collect the harvest at the end of the season. The forest settlers were said to be getting 
good harvests and were practicing shifting cultivation. It was estimated that each settler 
had on average cleared a total of 50 acres. When asked why the new settlers had such 
huge fields and were practicing shifting cultivation in the forest one of the forest residents 
explained that it was because the soils were very poor and without fertilizers they had to 
move to new plots to get reasonable yields.  
 
New settlers in the forest were a mixed group of people from different backgrounds and 
political affiliations. They included the early settlers, the later settlers and also people 
from outside the Mafungautsi RSP area. One settler in the forest, an immigrant who 
settled in the Gokwe area after independence, discussed with CIFOR researchers about 
his stay in the forest, and said that before moving into the forest he resided in Ndhlalambi 
Ward 2 area around Mafungautsi Forest. He moved into the forest because he had only a 
small field and could not grow enough food for his family. However, when the Fast 
Track Land Reform Programme started, he went to Mvuma in Midlands Province, where 
he had been told there were farms for occupation. He stayed on three different farms only 
to be chased away from each farm by the powerful people in the area. He realized that he 
was not making any progress, and when the squatters invaded Mafungautsi he decided to 
come back home. He went on to say that, ‘ndakati regai ndibatane nevaridzi venzvimbo 
ino veChishangwe. Vaiti varikudzokera kumatongo avo.’ – ‘I then decided to join the 
original settlers of in Mafungautsi, the Shangwe people, who moved in the forest to 
reclaim their ancestral land’. He went on to say that although he was not highly educated, 
he was a very good farmer and all he wanted in life was just to farm. This is the main 
reason why he moved into the forest area, to obtain land for agricultural purposes. But he 
also said that if the government found land somewhere for him to settle, he was willing to 
leave the forest area. He also commented on his political affiliation and confessed that he 
was not interested in politics. He went on to say, ‘ini ndinongotevera hurumende iri 
kutonga, chero Smith akadzoka akati ndini ndava kutonga handinei nazvo ini 
chandinongoda chete kurima nekuzvishandira’- ‘I respect the government of the day. 
Even if Smith [The head of the former white settler regime] was to come back and tell me 
that the he is now the new president, I will respect him. All I want is to farm and work for 
my family’. 
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 The District Administrator for Gokwe South District was also said to have a field in the forest and 
normally hired workers to work on it and was only seen in forest during harvest time, presumably to collect 
the harvest. 
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In a separate discussion with other settlers in the Forest, Mrs. Mpofu, she told the ACM 
researchers that she was a war veteran who originally came from Jahana area of Gokwe 
District. The ACM research team gave her a lift from Lutope Forest Camp to Gokwe 
Business Centre. On the journey she shared with the ACM team the micro politics and 
power dynamics of the squatter movement in the forest (see Box 4.11). The main reason 
why she left Jahana was that her arable land was not enough for her family. Before she 
settled at Zanda, she was staying at Gokwe centre, where she bought three residential 
stands, which she was currently developing. In 2003, she came to know about the 
‘scramble for land’ at Zanda Plateau through some forest settlers who supplied her with 
groundnuts that she processed into peanut butter. 
 
From 2002 onwards  the settlements continued to increase, and in some cases affected 
resource management activities in the forest, initially for RMC areas outside of the ACM 
project, (like Kupfuma Ishungu), and later on the ACM research sites as well. The new 
settlers invaded areas where the RMCs were supposed to manage the forest. When 
carrying out their patrols in the forest the RMC would surely feel threatened. One 
member of the Gababe RMC, a member of the MSC responsible for spearheading 
monitoring activities and carrying out patrols in the forest, said that after his encounter 
with the new settlers in the forest, he became very scared of going back to do patrols. He 
said:  
 
One day when I was patrolling the forest, I came across a group of the new settlers and I 
thought they were poachers. I told them that I was an RMC member and that poaching was 
not allowed in this forest. Upon hearing this, the settlers were angry and each person 
picked up all kinds of weapons (axes, hoes, etc) and they told me that if I wanted to live I 
should leave immediately. I was so scared, and I dropped to my knees and started clapping 
my hands, as I did not know what to do. The war veterans then told me to stand up and go 
home and never to come back to their area again.  
 
A member of the Batanai RMC revealed that some people were not happy about the 
events in the forest. There were no rules and regulations governing use of resources and 
people were just cutting down trees in a greedy way. In his opinion, the FC and the DA 
should support the move by local community members who had settled in the forest and 
work with the local councilor to bring back order into the forest. He said that there was a 
reason why people moved into those areas: these people used to live in the forest and 
were asked to move out of the forest during the war and now they were claiming their 
land back. According to the RMC member, the way forward now was for the FC to come 
up with strict rules in terms of what these settlers should or should not do, as well as 
come up with a limit on how much land a person could clear. He went on to say that most 
people cleared vast pieces of land and most of these were underutilized.  
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Box 4.11: From an interview with Mrs. Mpofu from Zanda (18 July 2004) 
 
“The settlers from Zanda told me there was abundant land in the forest and anyone who wanted 
land was welcome. They said the government had blessed the occupation of the forest by the 
people who were evicted from there during the dissident era. They said that since some of the 
people who had been evicted had either passed away or moved to other areas, other people like 
me could also settle in the forest since there was a lot of land. Therefore, in October 2003, I came 
to the forest and cleared a field. I built a makeshift house, because most the time I was at Gokwe 
centre where I am busy constructing my three houses. This year I am expecting three tonnes of 
maize and several bags of groundnuts from my plot in the forest. My only intention is to grow 
crops and raise enough money to finish my houses at Gokwe. 
 
The impression I got from those who were already in the forest when I settled there was that the 
government was aware that peasants had occupied part of the forest. I was also told that the 
government had ceded the invaded area to the peasants who were living in the forest. Recently, I 
started facing problems with the leadership in the forest. There are three types of leaders in the 
forest - namely kraalheads, the ward coordinator and the ruling party officers. The kraalheads 
used to allocate the land, but now the ward coordinator is playing a very active role. New settlers 
are asked to pay Zim$100 000 (18.82 USD) to the ward coordinator so that the land seeker’s 
‘application’ can be processed. I have heard that yesterday two people paid Zim$100 000 (18.82 
USD) each to the ward coordinator to get permission to settle in the forest. The money is shared 
with the kraalheads. I was also irked by weekly contributions of Zim$5000 (0.94 USD) per 
farmer, which the ward coordinator says ‘ndeyekuronga kuti mugare muno’ (it is for us to arrange 
for you to stay in the forest). They say the money will be given to Chief Ne. so that the chief 
fights for the invaders when the government tries to evict them from the forest. Everyone is 
expected to pay all the money the leadership asks for. If you refuse or fail to pay, you are labelled 
a traitor. We hold endless meetings in the forest where people are asked to pay more and more 
money, but no one knows where the money goes. We are also expected to attend several meetings 
they hold at Nyaradza Business Centre, which is far away from the forest. I once told them that I 
could not attend all the meetings at Nyaradza because I have problems with my legs and they said 
each day I fail to attend a meeting, I should pay a fine of Zim$2000 (0.38 USD) ‘to pay those 
who would have gone to listen on your behalf’. Recently FPUs from the FC came and addressed 
us. They said they wanted to know if more people had settled in the forest, in addition to the ones 
who were counted at the height of the farm invasions. From the FPUs’ talk, I picked that the 
government is planning to evict us from the forest. At one of the routine meetings I asked that 
since we were going to be evicted by the government there was no need for us to keep on paying 
‘protection levies’. I also suggested that since we were inevitably going to be evicted we were 
supposed to stop chopping down trees. The local leadership did not like what I said. In particular, 
the ward coordinator said that I was influencing other settlers to revolt against him. He does not 
want to hear anyone who says that the settlers will be evicted. However, some kraalheads 
supported me, especially on the issue of weekly contribution. I was summoned to a tribunal 
where I was strongly reprimanded, but I refused to withdraw my statements. I vowed that I was 
never going to pay any money because I had just realized that all the settlers in the forest were 
illegal. They also said I was selling them out to the FC because I sometimes visit the FC camp at 
Lutope where my sister works. However, I told them that being a settler in the forest does not 
stop me from visiting my sister at the FC. I am now fed up with the politics in the forest and I 
have decided to move out. I only told a few friends about this. If the leadership knows about it 
now, they might harass me or even burn my produce. The other problem is that the people in the 
forest do not want to develop their families. All they want is to gamble and drink beer. Every 
weekend there is a beer party where animals are slaughtered. If you are a settler, you are expected 
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to also brew beer. If you do not, they ask you to pay something so that they can ‘quench their 
thirst’. ‘Manje zvinangwa zvakasiyana. Ini ndirikufunga zvekupedza kuvaka dzimba dzangu 
paGokwe umwe arikuti deno ndawana mari ndimwe doro, hapana chatingaronga kana 
takasiyana seizvi’ (meaning “we have different objectives, mine is to finish building my houses at 
Gokwe and yet some want to raise money for drinking beer – with these different objectives it is 
difficult to work together”). I am leaving the forest as soon as I finish transporting all my produce 
to Gokwe. I have realised that the government is very clear on the land issue; they are saying if 
there are any people who are occupying a piece of land they were not given, such people should 
move out. Soon the government will come and chase them away. I do not want to be chased away 
like a thief. Those settlers want to fight with the government, but they will not win. The 
government is very powerful. Whether one fought in the war or not, if the government wants to 
evict them it will do it easily. 
 
 
4.8.4 Developments in the Forestry Policy Arena 
One of the objectives of the ACM project in Zimbabwe was to influence forestry policy 
formulation at the national level. To influence national level policy formulation, the 
ACM team implemented a number of interventions including writing and presenting 
policy briefs to policy makers including the FC, organising look and learn tours for 
policy makers to field sites, and organising international conferences to enhance their 
learning on which policies work. For example, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of 
Environment and Tourism attended a workshop in Indonesia where she met with other 
policy makers and had the opportunity to share experiences. The ACM researchers also 
organized policy round table discussions for policy makers on emerging findings from 
the field, and invited them to participate in ACM training workshops. For example, the 
FC top management was invited to a half day training workshop in June 2006.  The ACM 
team also organised regular update meetings with the FC top management where they 
briefed them about the ACM activities and findings. It is also important to note that the 
first ACM team leader, joined CIFOR on secondment from the FC. This was also to 
ensure that the FC researchers took an active part in the research process. The strategy 
was to use results from the field to influence the national forestry policy formulation 
process. It however took quite a while before these positive outcomes were seen in 
Mafungautsi, and little had been done to influence national policies when the project 
ended. However, some funds were secured later on for an up-scaling phase of the ACM 
approach, and part of the money was used to continue working on influencing policies.  
 
With time, small positive outcomes began to surface with regard to the national forestry 
policy making process. The FC management decided to up-scale the research to seven 
other provinces in the country with one district participating as an ACM Learning Centre 
– officers from these districts also participated in the various ACM training workshops. 
This was made possible by funding from the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA.) This up-scaling phase gave birth to the ACMZim News newsletter that 
acted as a platform for the various officers in the different districts to learn from shared 
experiences. With up-scaling, the FC wanted to test the ACM approach further, on the 
contents under which positive outcomes could be realised. Experiences from the ACM 
centres were, however, supposed to generate concrete lessons to influence forestry policy 
in Zimbabwe.  
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4.9  Discussion and Conclusions  
The ACM team found a range of conflicts in the Mafungautsi forest during and after the 
implementation of the project. Whilst efforts were made to deal with some of these 
conflicts, others were not recognized, or were ignored, in one case (increasing poverty) 
because this was an externality beyond the team’s scope. In Table 4.10 an attempt is 
made to analyze the different conflicts according to their type and outcome.  This then 
indicates where the ACM approach was more and where it was less successful. 
 
At the initial stages of the ACM project, the ACM team tried to identify existing 
conflicts. This was because the team considered that PAR, a key element of the ACM 
approach, required participation of all stakeholders. The empowerment training and 
conflict resolution helped to clear misconceptions, and address other simple conflicts, 
such as tensions over definitions of roles and boundaries, that can be considered as 
consequences of lack of communication between stakeholders. A good example is the 
misunderstandings around the initiation of forest fires (see Table 4.10; 4.5.2). By making 
the FC and community members each present and discuss their view on the situation, the 
ACM team supported the stakeholders to come up with a joint plan around fire 
management. In time the increased interaction and communication among stakeholders 
resulted in improved relations and genuine collaboration in the PAR process.  
Participation by local communities in the management of the forest also improved. The 
ACM interventions also seemed successful in reducing tensions that found their origin in 
lack of knowledge. However, although most of these communication-related conflicts 
were resolved during the ACM project, they later re-emerged after the death of the FC 
officer who took over facilitation when the ACM project ended.  
 
Although local communities had developed interest in the management of the forest 
resources during the ACM project, they were aware that, legal ownership of the forest 
rested with the government through the FC. However, the FC officer, through the ACM 
project, became interested in the idea of involving the local people in forest conservation. 
His effort genuinely to involve communities in resource management (e.g. by 
encouraging them to generate their own solutions to problems) created some hope for a 
change in the legal framework to enable better access to resources as the officer 
represented the institution responsible for forestry policy formulation in Zimbabwe. 
However, when the ACM team pulled out and the FC officer died, the framework for 
local resource use and management efforts disappeared, and no facilitating legal 
framework was ever put in place. Community members lost hope and lacked the zeal to 
manage the forest that did not belong to them. The forest again became an open access 
resource in which individual interests (e.g. personal gain) overtook collective 
management objectives once again.  
 
There were also unresolved contradictions in the project itself. These included, logically, 
those in which the ACM team was powerless to address, e.g. those related to increasing 
poverty, and lack of means of enforcement for agreed rules. They also included complex 
and deep rooted problems relating to forest land and resource ownership reflecting varied 
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historical backgrounds and politicized power structures; not addressed by the ACM 
approach. The lack of legal framework provided, in a period of strong political dynamics, 
an unregulated playing field in which conflicts – earlier regulated by the presence of the 
ACM team and the FC commissioner - re-emerged. This confirms the obvious but 
important point that some types of local level constraints require involvement of higher 
level stakeholders to create enabling environments (e.g. Giller, et al., 2008). Social 
learning alone cannot suffice. 
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Table 4.10: Conflicts that arose in Mafungautsi and how they were addressed 
 
Nature of 
conflict/ tension 
Example How was it dealt with? Was the conflict or tension 
resolved? 
Between the FC and local communities 
Different perceptions on the value of the forest - communities saw it as 
land for settlement and the FC saw it as a water catchment area to be 
preserved. When the national political situation was favourable, some 
community members moved in and settled (4.4.2; 4.8.3). 
The ACM team helped build capacities of community 
members who supported the conservation objective in 
doing PAR process so that they could tackle the issue on 
their own. 
No.  Ownership and 
rights of use of 
forest land and 
resource  
Communities were not allowed to use timber. Although they were jointly 
managing the forest together with the FC (4.5.2). 
The ACM team facilitated discussions between Ndarire 
poles and timber group and the FC to negotiate the 
inclusion of timber in the RSP agreement. 
No.  
Lack of legal 
framework 
Although local communities were participating in the RSP, the existing 
Forest Act did not support their participation (4.8.4) 
The ACM team initiated interventions to create awareness 
with policy makers. 
No. with the ACM project, 
community members gained 
support from the FC officer 
and ACM team. 
Stakeholders accused each other of starting forest fires (4.5.2). ACM team facilitated conflict resolution processes that 
improved communication among stakeholders 
Yes. 
After forceful evictions from the forest, communities now viewed the 
forest as owned by the government/ FC, yet they were being asked to 
manage it under the RSP (4.5.2). 
The ACM team organised a conflict resolution process. 
The FC officer explained that if the forest belonged to the 
government, then it belonged to them as well.  
Yes. 
Lack of 
communication 
/Misconceptions 
Some local community members ran away when they saw the FC vehicle 
and did not want to work with the ACM researchers they worked with the 
FC (4.2.2; 4.2.3). 
The ACM team organised workshops to build FC capacity 
to use the ACM approach and to engage in conflict 
resolution processes.  
Yes. 
Among community members 
RMC members not reporting to the community members. Community 
members became suspicions that RMC members were embezzling 
community funds (see section 4.5.2). 
ACM team organised capacity building workshops for 
RMC and local community members on the importance of 
accountability and transparency. Communities put 
pressure on the RMCs to be accountable. 
Yes, especially in Gababe. 
However, this deteriorated 
after the FC officer died 
Lack of 
communication  
 
Local community members were not informed about their roles in the 
project leading to conflict (4.4.1). 
ACM team involved stakeholders in discussions to clarify 
roles. 
Yes. 
Lack of 
knowledge  
Some members of the Batanai beekeeping group did not have knowledge 
on beekeeping, honey harvesting and processing (4.6.1); Some Batanai 
broom grass resource users did not know the new bundling method to 
promote sustainable harvesting (4.6.2) 
The ACM team, FC officer and local communities 
organised opportunities for sharing experiences, 
knowledge and to learn from each other. 
Yes. However, it was 
difficult to make the 
innovators share their 
knowledge with others.  
Increasing 
poverty 
Resource user group members moved out of the area in search of a living, 
making it difficult to implement their action plans (4.6.1);  
Nothing. 
 
No. 
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Community partners crucial in facilitating learning processes migrated out 
of the area to earn a living after the ACM project (4.8.1) 
Nothing. No, the ACM project had 
ended. 
Community members stealing resources from the forest and using 
unsustainable harvesting practices. For instance cutting hollow trees and 
using fire to harvest honey (4.2.1) 
Collaborative monitoring implemented Yes. But the problems re-
emerged after the FC officer 
died. 
The elite trying to get personal benefits from the ACM project. e.g. The 
case of wife of a Batanai village head campaigning for her daughter to be 
elected as a community partner. 
The ACM team targeted and encouraged members from 
marginalised groups to actively participate (4.5.1; 4.6). 
Yes. 
Greed/ Personal 
gain 
Gababe RMC members favouring relatives and friends in allocating grass 
harvesting portions (4.7) 
Conflict resolution facilitated by the RMC. They came up 
with a plot system to reduce favouritism. 
Yes. 
 
Lack of 
communication/M
isconceptions 
Community members were afraid to attend meetings not authorised by 
local political leaders fearing these would be mistaken for political 
meetings(4.2.1; 4.2.3); ACM team had difficulty to conduct meetings in 
Batanai during early stages of the project as local politicians were 
suspicious of their work (4.5.1). 
The ACM team (after some mistakes) organised the 
introductory meetings through local politicians and 
continued to pay them courtesy calls during field visits.  
Yes. 
Local politicians in Batanai wanted to use the RMC money to fund a 
ruling political party function (see section 4.7) 
Nothing. No. 
Women did not actively participate in resource management due to 
cultural reasons (4.2.2) 
The ACM team encouraged marginalised  groups to 
participate in empowerment training workshop to build 
their confidence and challenge existing norms and values. 
Yes. 
Community members not interested and disillusioned by resource 
management issues (4.5.1). 
ACM team used visioning as a tool to stimulate interest. Yes. 
Community members lacked confidence in themselves and looked to 
outsiders to solve their problems (4.5.1). 
The ACM team organised empowerment training 
workshops for community members.  
Yes. 
Differentiated 
interests/capacitie
s  
 
 
ACM team had difficulty to work with community members with interests 
in different resources . 
The ACM team facilitated the formation of resource user 
groups to focus on resources of interest. 
Yes.  
Between ACM-RMCs and other RMCs 
Lack of legal 
framework  
The Batanai woman who reported a seller of unsustainably harvested 
brooms to the police was not helped as there was no law on broom grass 
harvesting methods (4.6.2). 
Nothing. No. 
Lack of 
communication 
Unclear boundaries of resource harvesting areas (4.5.2). Discussions and negotiations during the ACM facilitated 
conflict resolution process. 
Yes. 
Within the Forestry Commission 
Lack of resources The FC officer lacked basic resources to do his work after the ACM 
project. 
The ACM team provided the FC officer with financial 
support the first two years after the project ended. 
Partly. The support was 
inadequate and ended. 
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Resource users from Batanai area 
during a discussion and learning 
session 
Broom grass resource users from 
Batanai area holding their newly 
decorated brooms 
A Gababe beekeeper with his beehives 
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Chapter 5: Tracking the Resource Management 
Committees 
5.1 Introduction 
In addition to participatory action research (PAR) activities facilitated in Mafungautsi 
Forest (Chapter 4), the Adaptive Collaborative Management (ACM) team aimed to 
improve the local governance institutions in Mafungautsi. As already mentioned in 
Chapter 1, no single definition exists for the term institution. Some researchers define 
institutions as regulatory systems of formal rules, regulations, informal agreements 
and norms of behaviour and organisations (Harriss, 1982; North, 1990; Bromley, 
1989; Cleaver, 2000). Others define institutions as organisations, and others yet again 
take institutions as synonymous with organisations (Uphoff, 1986; Mukamuri, 2000). 
Institutions and governance structures have been argued as crucial in defining the 
context within resource management takes place (North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990, 
Murphree, 1993).  
 
The ACM team focused on the key resource management institutions, the Resource 
Management Committees (RMC). The RMCs were created by the FC to act on behalf 
of the communities, help with controlling of resource harvesting and provide a link 
between the communities and the FC. Their main tasks were to administer permits for 
local community members to harvest non-timber forest products, given that 
communities were now allowed to extract resources from the forest under the 
Resource Sharing Project (RSP), to monitor the harvesting process, to open and keep 
community bank accounts where the money raised through the permit system was to 
be kept, and to advise the community on how the funds could be utilised. 
 
The RMCs in Mafungautsi comprised seven members, namely chair, vice chair, 
secretary, vice-secretary, treasurer and two committee members. Instead of creating 
new organisations for managing resource in the RSP, or focusing on local traditional 
institutions, the ACM team decided to focus on the Resource Management 
Committees created by the Forestry Commission (FC) at the inception of the RSP. 
The ACM team aimed to transform the new RMCs into representative and 
downwardly accounting structures. 
 
Several studies have shown that enhancing local organisational development in 
resource management situations leads to widespread improvements in the lives of 
rural communities through better mobilisation and management of their resources 
(Krishna et al., 1997; Ribot, 1999; 2001). Ribot (1999; 2001) showed that local level 
organisations which are downwardly accountable make a strong contribution towards 
positive social, ecological and environmental outcomes. On the other hand, 
organisations that are only upwardly accountable have been found to fail in the task of 
building trust among stakeholders in joint management initiatives, and as a result are 
often unable to resolve conflicts between, for example, forestry departments 
(representing the state) and local communities (Berkes, 2002).  
 
To try and initiate change in the characteristics and functioning of RMCs, the ACM 
team ensured that RMC members participated in the empowerment training, capacity 
building processes, conflict resolution processes, and training in leadership skills, and 
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understood the importance of transparency and accountability (Section 4.5, Chapter 4, 
for more details). 
 
This chapter traces the operations and performance of the RMCs in Gababe and 
Batanai areas from the pre-ACM project period to the time the project ended, and 
onwards up to 2007. It critically analyses the performance of the RMCs over time and 
discusses factors influencing changes in their performance. The chapter begins with a 
general summary of RMC operations in Mafungautsi, including the period before the 
ACM project was introduced, since this early period is well documented in the 
literature (Mapedza and Mandondo, 2002; Mapedza, 2002).   This is followed by the 
separate presentation on the operations of two RMCs in Gababe and Batanai areas 
from 2002 - 2007. The RMC at Ndarire area was left out as it was not yet operational 
when fieldwork for this study ended in 2007. This is followed by a discussion on the 
changes in RMC operations, and the challenges faced by the RMCs in the various 
areas.  
 
5.2 RMC operations around Mafungautsi before the ACM 
project 
The creation of the RMCs was the Forestry Commission’s way of operationalising the 
concepts of ownership and participation. However, the communities around 
Mafungautsi were never consulted on this arrangement and it was not clear how the 
new committees would fit into the already complex local institutional landscape 
(Mapedza and Mandondo, 2002). The first RMCs put in place in most areas consisted 
of committees of powerful people in the community. In Batanai area for instance, the 
first RMC was put in place in 1996 and comprised the Chief’s secretary as chair, the 
Chief’s assessor as vice chair, the councillor for the area as secretary, an ordinary 
community member as vice secretary, a headman as treasurer, and finally the VIDCO 
chair and the VIDCO secretary served as ordinary committee members (Mapedza and 
Mandondo, 2002). This RMC was dissolved after an audit by the FC officer who saw 
that the RMC was not performing well. 
 
A new RMC was put in place in 1997. The FC officer now asked three village heads 
in Batanai to nominate seven people to act as members of the RMC. Local community 
members were later asked to vote on who would take up which positions (Mapedza 
and Mandondo, 2002). The new RMC was all male, apart from one powerful woman, 
a wife of a village head in the area. Most members were members of the Ndebele 
ethnic group. The new RMC chair was a member of a School Development 
Committee and a member of the ruling Mafa Clan; the ordinary two committee 
members belonged to the ruling clan and the vice chair was a headman. This RMC 
was in still in place, with fewer active members, when the ACM project started in 
1999. 
 
In Gababe, the first RMC (from 1997) comprised seven members. However, upon the 
advice of the FC officer, 12 other people were co-opted to assist with the work. Most 
new members were women, and some of them were added to the committee without 
their knowledge. All the new members later dropped out of the committee as they 
were not clear on their terms of reference and there were no incentives for them to 
work. When the ACM project started, the RMC in Gababe was all male.  
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The way the RMCs were formed led to many problems. Selection procedure for 
members was one difficulty.  In one case the FC officer (a woman later transferred to 
Chegutu in 2001), who often excused herself from joining field activities organised by 
the ACM team (Section 4.1, Chapter 4), sent word that seven people from a specific 
community should come and see her, and those who came were selected as the RMC 
committee (Mapedza and Mandondo, 2002). People who went to see the officer were 
those who could afford the bus fares to travel from their areas to Gokwe Business 
Centre, where the FC office was located. In other cases, the officer asked the 
traditional leadership authority to make nominates. The FC officer also advocated for 
those who were literate to be selected.  This discriminated against the original settlers, 
who had less schooling (Section 2.3.3, Chapter 2).  
 
Because of the way the RMCs were put together communities were unclear about 
their roles, and saw the committees as an extended arm of the FC. This generated a lot 
of tension. The RMCs themselves were accountable only to the FC, and they paid 
scant to the existing traditional leadership authority structures, for instance. This, in 
turn, resulted in un-addressed conflicts between traditional authorities and RMC 
members. For instance, some village heads and their community members failed to 
attend meetings organised by the Batanai RMC as they regarded the committee as 
having no authority to make such arrangements.  
 
Upon election RMCs were handed the RMC constitution, developed by the FC in 
collaboration with the Ministry of Youth, Gender and Employment Creation. 
Regardless of the low literacy rate in Gokwe area, the RMC constitution was in 
English, and still had not been translated into vernacular languages up to the time the 
ACM project was initiated. The average literacy rate for Gokwe was low, with only 
39% of the people having received formal education in 1992 (Central Statistics 
Office, 1992). 
 
The constitution gave the RMCs authority to exercise all powers necessary to achieve 
community objectives. It also gave the RMCs powers to make decisions, but these 
decisions were subject to approval by the FC officer, who had power to reject them. 
For instance, RMCs were asked by the FC to open bank accounts in order to deposit 
money raised through issuing permits to resource harvesters. The FC officer however, 
was a signatory to the account and the communities could not withdraw the money 
without approval from him/ her. Although the money was said to belong to 
communities, and that they could use it for their own needs, the FC only approved use 
of the funds on forestry related projects and activities.  
 
When the ACM project was initiated, several conflicts were identified among 
stakeholders (Chapter 4, Part I), and these quarrels hindered collaboration over joint 
management of the forest. Degradation of the resource was inevitable. To try and 
transform the RMCs into transparent and downwardly accountable institutions, the 
ACM team came up with interventions (mentioned above)  to help shape the 
organisations  directly (through training) and indirectly (though building the 
capacities of community members to demand accountability). 
 
From 1999 to early 2002 ACM researchers concentrated efforts on introducing the 
ACM project to communities and facilitating interventions to deal with key with 
issues arising from the context studies. Little attention was paid to documenting the 
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functioning of the RMC during this period. It was only in April 2002 that the team 
began to document the performance of the RMCs in the study sites. The ACM project, 
however ended in early in 2003, and the FC officer played an important part in 
supporting the RMCs during this period. He assisted them to resolve conflicts, and to 
produce reports on their work, encouraging them to continue being accountable and 
transparent to their constituencies.  Unfortunately, the FC officer died in October 
2005. A new officer, with little knowledge of the ACM approach, was appointed in 
January 2006. He focused on evicting squatters from the forest, and had yet to begin 
interacting with RMCs in the study sites, when he also unfortunately passed away in 
October 2007. The next section presents the characteristics of the RMCs and their 
performance over time, starting with the RMC in Gababe area. 
 
5.3 Operations of the Resource Management Committees 
from 1999-2007 
5.3.1 The Gababe Resource Management Committee 
 
In 2002 
 
As at April 2002, there was no woman on the Gababe RMC committee. The RMC 
was led by an acting chair (the elected chair had died several years back) and only 
four other members out of seven were actively participating. The other members 
refused to work for free. At a general community meeting organised by the ACM 
team on the 19th of April 2002, community members highlighted many problems 
faced in their area and said nothing was being done to solve them. These problems 
included:  
• Community members having to travel long distances to harvest grasses because 
they lived far from the forest. The RMC refused to let them stay in the forest 
because they found it difficult to monitor the harvesting 24 hours a day.  
• Lack of transparency in the way RMC members allocated areas to community 
members for harvesting of grass. Some women claimed that the RMC members 
gave the best portions to friends and relatives and everyone else got poor portions.  
• The RMC did not organise meetings with local communities to update them on 
progress made in terms of resource management. According to one woman, the 
RMC only convened meetings when they wanted to get money from resource 
users. 
• Lack of transport for grass from the forest to the market.  
• Absence of any established market for broom grass. 
 
After becoming aware of these numerous problems, as encountered by Gababe and 
other RMCs in Mafungautsi, the ACM team, together with the FC, organised a 
Leadership Training and Management of Finances workshop in April 2002 at the FC 
Camp in the forest. All RMC members (including the sub-committee and traditional 
leadership authority representatives) attended from areas around the forest. 
 
One issue that was raised there was the lack of incentives. RMC members complained 
that they were not paid for their work. This generated a heated discussion with the 
RMC members explaining that without any payment there was no incentive to be part 
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of the RMC. The FC officer responded by saying that it was not the duty of the FC to 
pay the RMCs and it was up to the communities to pay as a way of thanking them for 
their effort. Some RMC members reported that community members in their areas did 
not want to pay. 
 
Three months later, in July, the community members reported that the RMC secretary 
had left the area to go to the Venice Mine to pan (illegally) for gold.  This was about 
95 kilometres away from Gokwe and he had left none of the RMC financial records. It 
was alleged that he had embezzled money raised from permits issued over the 
previous year. The village heads who came to the meeting where this was reported, 
had not been informed about the situation previously.  Community members were 
bitter and wanted the whole RMC to be dissolved. 
 
During this same meeting, the FC officer suggested the creation of sub-committees 
for different products, i.e. thatch grass, broom grass and honey, and for monitoring the 
status of the forest resources. This would reduce the workload of the RMC and help it 
work more effectively. The community members agreed with this suggestion. In 
selecting the sub-committees, community members were clear that they did not want 
anyone from the old RMC to be a part of the sub-committees as they would 
‘contaminate’ the new committees. Like the RMC, the sub-committees had seven 
members (chair, vice-chair, secretary, vice-secretary, treasurer and two committee 
members) and were tasked with ensuring forest resources were managed sustainably. 
The monitoring sub-committee (MSC) was responsible for monitoring forest 
resources and arranging meetings for the various stakeholders involved in monitoring, 
so they could share their results and learn from each other (Section 4.7, Chapter 4). 
 
Another general community meeting was organised by the ACM team at Gababe 
RMC area on the 19th of September 2002, after the formation of the various sub-
committees, at which community members again expressed bitterness about the RMC. 
They asserted that the RMC committee was not transparent and was stealing resources 
and money raised through permits. One community member reported that more than 
200 bundles of thatch grass belonging to the RMC61 had been stolen from the forest. 
Other community members claimed that the RMC members were responsible for 
stealing the grass. The issue of the RMC secretary who left for gold panning and was 
alleged to have embezzled funds came up again. The other RMC committee members 
had not come to the meeting, possibly because they feared facing allegations of 
corruption. The RMC chair attended, but remained silent when these issues were 
raised. 
 
The community members brought up these allegations but there were no 
consequences. The RMC became increasingly bogged down by organisational 
problems. Committee members were sceptical about the role of the sub-committees, 
suspecting that the latter were meant to usurp them. There were allegations from 
community members that some grass fires during the season were caused by 
disgruntled members of the RMC, retaliating for the “tactful thinning” of their 
responsibilities by the FC through the creation of the sub-committees. Community 
members claimed that the RMC chair was too soft and lacked authority and that 
                                                 
61
  Resource users could pay in either cash or in kind (e.g. with harvested bundles of grass) or 
harvesting permits. Once the grass was sold, the money should have been deposited in the community 
bank account by the RMC members 
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people were spending more time wrestling for power than pursuing tangible 
developmental goals. The alleged embezzlement by the RMC secretary was still a 
bone of contention. The chair had still not organised a meeting to ask the secretary to 
account for the money raised from the permits issued in the previous grass cutting 
season and community members remained angry about this.  
 
Later on, the Forestry Commission officer responsible for the area organised a 
stakeholder workshop at FC Camp, and it became clear that the Gababe RMC 
continued to face serious organisational problems. There was no communication 
among the RMC committee members. No financial report was presented by the 
Gababe RMC representatives because the secretary had left and the chair and 
treasurer were unaware of how much money there was in the RMC account. Given 
the number of training workshops that the RMC members had attended to learn about 
the importance of accountability and transparency, it is difficult to understand why the 
Gababe RMC members failed to present their financial reports. In fact, this might lead 
the analyst to the conclusion that training alone is not the answer to dishonesty.  
Definite checks and balances and sanctions are also needed.  This is a point to which I 
return in Chapter 6.  
 
By September 2002, hunger was widespread in Gokwe area because of the 2002 
drought period. Discussions between the ACM researchers and the FC officer ended 
in the conclusion that that in fact people were starving. Many people were heavily 
dependent on wild forest fruits, such as Chakata (Parinari curatelifolia) and Matohwe 
(Azanza garckeana). According to the FC officer, there was a scramble going on for 
these fruits in the forest, involving both people and animals (wild and domestic). He 
also had noted that in some cases, people cooked and ate unripe fruit, because they 
had nothing else to eat. Gababe RMC area was reported to have experienced the 
highest incidences of forest fires at this time. ACM researchers found out from 
resources users that the villagers suspected the fires were caused by vindictive 
members of the RMC committee.  There is no way to be certain that this was true, but 
the very fact that ordinary villagers were capable of suspecting  leading members of 
the community of committing vindictive acts at such a difficult time is in itself a 
reflection on intra-community tensions and divisions.  
 
2003-2005 
Towards the end of 2003 the relations between the sub-committees and the main 
RMC improved, due to conflict resolution processes employed by the RMC, and the 
resulting improved communication. They were now carrying out joint patrols to check 
if people were stealing resources. Women also participated in the patrols, but since 
they were afraid to move in the forest on their own, RMC members made sure that 
men accompanied them, or asked them to patrol areas close to where people were 
harvesting resources. Community members also agreed to pay the RMC members in 
kind – each RMC member was allocated an area from which they could freely harvest 
grass.  
 
Yet, in a discussion with the Gababe resource users and the RMC in September 2003, 
it was obvious that the RMC still faced a number of problems:  
• Community members continued to mistrust RMC members. They alleged that 
some RMC members harvested resources before the stipulated time, while 
others took larger portions than they had been allocated. One RMC member 
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described his experience in the following terms: Ko ndakazoita zvekukara 
ndikazvipa zinzvimbo zihombe rekucheka uswa. RMC yakamboda kundidzinga 
asi pavakaita meeting nevanhu vanochecka uswa musango, vanhu vakati 
ndisadzingwa asi kuti ndidimbure nzvimbo yangu yekucheka mutsvairo iite 
diki’ - ‘I took a bigger portion greedily and the RMC members wanted to 
expel me for that. However, they organised a meeting with the broom grass 
resource users in the forest to find out what they thought about their decision. 
The resource users did not want me to be expelled but said I should reduce my 
grass cutting area instead’. 
• RMC members reported that they needed help from the FC to create fire 
breaks and to identify nearby markets for resource users to avoid the need for 
people to travel to distant towns such as Bulawayo in order to sell their 
produce. 
• The MSC members complained that since they were doing the same work as 
the main RMC, they should also be allocated similar portions for harvesting. 
The RMC organised a meeting with forest resource users and it was agreed 
that the MSC members should get similar incentives for their work. 
• The RMC members ran out of permit books for poles and planks and wanted 
the FC to provide them. 
• Because of the rise in permit prices, some local community members were 
now opting to harvest grasses from the neighbouring small-scale commercial 
(SSCF) farms rather than from their own areas in the forest. This resulted in 
loss of revenue for the RMC.  
• Community members blamed the RMC chair for not organising community 
meetings where issues affecting the management of forest resources could be 
discussed and clarified. They suggested replacing the existing RMC 
committee with a more vibrant one.  
At the end of the meeting the FC officer gave some advice to the RMC members on 
how they could solve some of their problems.  
 
In March 2004, discussions with a member of the Gababe RMC revealed that there 
were serious conflicts between the main RMC and the sub-committees. He also 
reported that people were cutting fresh trees at an alarming rate because they were 
aware of the RMC problems. The RMC member said that if the FC officer did not 
come to help them solve the current problems, more trees would continue to be felled.   
 
When the ACM team revisited the area in July 2004 (the ACM project had already 
ended, but the team was still offering backstopping support to the FC offer) they 
found that a new RMC had been elected in April, just before the yearly pre-grass-
cutting season workshop.62 According to the RMC constitution, when a new 
committee is elected, two members from the old committee should remain for 
continuity. However, in this case the community members removed all the old 
committee members as they were afraid that these would corrupt the new committee. 
The FC officer had been present during the elections and he respected this decision.  
 
                                                 
62
  Such workshops became a common feature of the FC calendar (see Section 4.8.1, Chapter 4).     
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After the new committee was elected there was increased illegal cutting of live trees63, 
especially for timber. The new RMC was not able to stop people from cutting down 
these trees and asked four members from the old committee to help them. In addition, 
the ACM team learned from the community partner that a conflict had developed 
between some former RMC members and the new committee over grass harvesting. 
Some of the new RMC members had reserved good grass portions for themselves. 
When members of the old RMC discovered this, they went to harvest grass from the 
area with good grass that had been reserved by the new RMC members, with axes 
slung on their hips, to threaten any member of the new committee who wanted to 
resist. To resolve this conflict, the new RMC members sought help from the Forestry 
Commission’s Forest Protection Unit (FPU).64 Some traditional leaders also took the 
case to the chief, but it had already been amicably solved by the FPU and individuals 
concerned. 
 
After discussion, community members said they were happy about the way the new 
committee handled the RMC finances in 2004. However they were less happy that the 
RMC had opened the grass cutting season later than usual (on the 10th of June), as 
most people had been busy in the fields with (unusually good) crop harvests. 
 
The tracing study in 2005, two years later after the ACM project ended, showed 
several positive developments around the functioning of the RMC. Community 
participation had improved (RMC members were now asking for input from resource 
users before making decisions) in decision-making processes and the RMC was 
generating more money from allocating permits. The key issues discussed during the 
general meeting in May 2005 are presented in Box 5.1 below (these are notes taken by 
an ACM team member, the author): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63
  An explanation for the increased cutting of trees was that in 2004 people in Gababe had 
bumper harvests of maize which gave rise to a demand for new grain storage bins (Ngarani). Several 
new and renovated grain bins were seen by the ACM team in the community.  
64
  This is the FC’s armed unit, mainly involved in patrolling the forest and arresting poachers 
and other offenders. The FPU members are permanently based in the forest and stay at the Lutope 
Camp in Mafungautsi Forest. They report to and take their orders from the Mafungautsi Project 
Coordinator.  
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Box 5.1: Notes on the general meeting held at Gababe area in May 2005 
 
RMC report on their performance in 200465 
When reviewing their performance in 2004, the vice chair of the RMC mentioned that they 
could not come up with a comprehensive report because all the financial records had been 
sent to the FC office for auditing, and had not yet been returned. The FC officer apologised 
and said that he had audited the books a long time ago but forgot to return them. 
 
The RMC reported that they had worked well in 2004. In total the RMC issued 350 permits 
for broom grass at Zim$500.00 (USD 0.10) each. They also issued about 100 permits for 
thatch grass. The RMC issued relatively few permits for thatch grass because they had started 
to harvest the grass in July instead of June. By this time, a lot of grass had been poached by 
other people and cattle had also trampled on the grass rendering it unmarketable. The RMC 
managed to generate about Zim$1million (USD 192.32), from permits issued for the 
harvesting of broom and thatch grass. This was the largest amount of money recorded so far 
for Gababe and was more than the neighbouring RMC Chemwiro Masawi had collected - 
which used to be the RMC that generated the most income). About Zim$200,000 (USD 
38.46) was used to purchase receipt books and to pay the bus fare of the people who went to 
Gokwe to submit financial reports to the FC. Cash in hand was therefore about Zim$800,000 
(USD 153.85). The RMC performed better than it had in previous years and better than the 
other RMCs before. The FC officer commended the RMC for submitting a comprehensive 
financial report. He advised the RMC to always report to the community and all leaders in the 
area to give them an update of their performance. He also advised them not to wait for big 
community meetings organised by the traditional leaders but to also organise meetings 
themselves to update local stakeholders on their work and finances to avoid suspicions of 
embezzlement.  
 
Unfortunately the money raised by the RMC was not deposited in the RMC’s savings 
account. The reason given by the RMC was that the RMC was afraid that if the money was 
deposited in a savings account for a protracted period, it was going to incur service charges 
from the bank. The FC officer and other local participants at the meeting advised the RMC to 
keep it in the bank as it was safer than keeping the money at someone’s home where there 
was risk of the money being utilised for other reasons when the person was confronted by 
financial problems. 
 
Problems mentioned in the meeting: 
1. The area allocated by the FC to the RMC for harvesting broom grass was said to be small. 
Community members claimed that they could harvest all the broom grass in their area in less 
than five days.  
2. Theft of thatch grass before the official opening of the harvesting season. 
3. Theft of cattle in the forest, allegedly by cattle rustlers from Nkai district. 
 
Proposed project:  
The RMC proposed that the money raised in 2004 be used towards the construction of a local 
clinic.  
 
Communication with stakeholders 
The RMC chair reported that the RMC had failed to meet with the general community 
members save for the pre-grass harvesting meeting. However the committee had met on its 
own several times to deliberate on its progress. The RMC rarely met with traditional leaders. 
It was agreed that the RMC should meet more often with community members throughout the 
year and not just before the grass harvesting season which seemed to be the only time when it 
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  In May 2004, 1USD = 5199.76 Zim$ (Annex 2.3) 
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appeared to be active. It was suggested that the committee should be actively involved in the 
management of forest resources throughout the year and that the RMC should also monitor 
other resources like timber and grazing for cattle. 
 
After the presentation by the RMC chair, there was a discussion on what the community 
members were going to do to stop people from outside the RSP area from accessing resources 
in the forest. For instance, people from Nkai, a neighbouring community were said to be 
grazing their animals in the forest, yet they were not part of the RSP. The issue of incentives 
or rewards for RMC members was also discussed and community members continued to 
complain that the RMC members were allocating themselves portions with the best grass. At 
the end of this discussion the FC officer, advised the RMC members that before they 
rewarded themselves they must seek permission and approval from the other community 
members. He also explained the community that it was important for them to reward the 
RMC members as they were making a lot of sacrifices during their work.  
 
After the meeting, community members and key informants commented that despite some 
problems the current RMC was performing well. Some of the reasons for positive changes 
mentioned were:  
1. There was now cooperation among members of the RMC. 
2. Unlike the old committee, the new one did not practice favouritism when allocating 
portions. 
3. The new committee had a strong and committed MSC. 
4. The committee had a good leader who was well educated and understood all the financial 
transactions.  
5. New committee members were transparent and knew what was going on. 
6. The new committee worked well with the traditional leaders. Some of the leaders who had 
previously not participated in the project, because of their location in areas furthest from the 
forest, were now participating in resource management meetings. Traditional leaders had also 
approached the RMC members to ask if the RMC funds could be used for the clinic project. 
After the presentation of this proposal by the RMC vice chair at the general meeting, 
community members agreed that this could be a good use of their money. This was the first 
serious attempt by the RMC members in Gababe to utilise their money to the benefit of the 
community.  
   
When an ACM team member (the author) returned to the Mafungautsi Forest in 
December 2005, she learned that the FC officer had died in October 2005 and had not 
yet been replaced. Despite this loss, the RMC of the Gababe area continued with its 
work and organised meetings with the local community members and the village 
heads to decide how to use RMC money. The village heads, however, abandoned the 
idea of building a clinic as this required a larger sum of money than was available. 
Instead, they agreed on building a house for one of the teachers at Gababe Primary 
School. The RMC purchased 15 bags of cement used to build a two-roomed flat. 
Local community members were asked to come and mould bricks at the school and 
the builder was paid from the RMC money. All the community members commended 
the RMC for working well on this project. 
 
After 2005 
A year later, in December 2006, the community members commented that after the 
death of the FC officer, no other FC officer had visited their area and community 
members did not know that a new officer had been appointed to take over the role of 
the Mafungautsi Project Coordinator. In 2006, the RMC members stopped organising 
meetings with community as well as their own meetings. Some community members 
blamed the FC for lack of follow–up; the RMC no longer had anyone to monitor their 
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work or to audit their books. The only time RMC members had met with local 
communities was in May 2006 when they wanted to announce the harvesting prices, 
just before the harvesting period. In 2006, the FC had not organise the annual pre-
grass cutting workshop that once gave the RMCs around the forest an opportunity to 
meet, share experiences and set the grass harvesting prices. The Gababe RMC 
therefore had set its own prices and, according to the former ACM community 
partner, the RMC was now making decisions on permit prices without collaborating 
with resource users and other RMCs. 
 
After the 2006 grass cutting season the RMC failed to give feedback to local people 
on their work and finances. Community members tried to organise the meeting for the 
RMC members to present their finances, but each time they did so, the RMC members 
failed to show up. When RMC members attended a meeting organised in the area by 
their Chief for another purpose, community members asked them to make a report of 
their financial status, but they came up with various excuses. Community members 
then began to suspect that the RMC members were embezzling community funds. 
They also complained that RMC members had not been polite during the grass 
harvesting period, and that again RMC members gave themselves bigger portions 
with the best grass while other resource users had to be content with smaller portions 
with poor grass. They now wanted the RMC to be dissolved. Additional to this, in a 
meeting with the ACM team member, the community members highlighted a series of 
problems they faced in 2006, pointing to increased pressure on resources and invasion 
by outsiders: 
• Increased cutting down of trees, 
• Increased poaching of game, especially zebras. The poachers only took the 
skins and left the meat. When faced with this evidence, the RMC members 
approached the FC Forest Protection Unit (FPU). The FPU advised them not 
to interfere with these poachers as they were ill equipped to do so. The FPU 
also said that the FC no longer had transport to patrol the forest, 
• An increase in forest fires, mainly because of increase in poaching of game, 
and the failure to open up fire breaks.66 The FC used to take the lead in the 
making fire breaks, but after the death of Mr Mutasa, the FC stopped 
performing this role, 
• The RMC lost one of its grass cutting areas, Ngondoma, to new settlers 
(Figure 2.6). They now only harvested from their other grass harvesting area, 
Wadze (Figure, 2.6). The number of settlers at Ngondoma continued to 
increase.  Squatters also invaded the grass cutting area for Chemwiro Masawi, 
the neighbouring RMC.  
• The MSC was no longer functional. 
 
In the following year (2007) the RMC opened the grass harvesting period in June 
instead of May. One RMC member said that many people were angry about this 
decision. He also said that he had decided to go and harvest thatch grass without a 
permit because they opened the grass cutting season late. Unfortunately, he was 
caught by another RMC member, and he was asked to pay a fine of Z$ 2 million 
(USD 7.8467).  He had to sell his pigeons to pay the fine. 
                                                 
66
  Fire breaks are lines that are opened up in the forest by clearing trees for purpose of stopping 
fires from spreading. The fire breaks can be used as roads/ paths by people 
67
  In June 2007, the exchange rate was 1USD = Zim$255.000.23 (Annex 2.3) 
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The first RMC meeting was in June 2007, just before the grass cutting season. It 
turned out to be the only meeting in 2007. During this meeting, the RMC set the 
permit prices, but community members refused to pay the permits saying that RMC 
members had embezzled community funds in 2006 and they did not want to give them 
their money again. Without consulting the other RMC members, Mr Piyangane, one 
of the RMC members, and another community member, went to report the conflict 
and seek help from the FPU. The FPU came later and took over the issuing of permits. 
However, to issue the harvesting permits, the FPU staff had to walk several 
kilometres from the FC Camp (also known as Lutope Lodge) in the forest to the 
Wadze wetland (Figure 2.6, Chapter 2) and as a result of that they did not come every 
day. In their absence, the RMC members issued the harvesting permits and handed 
over the money to the FPU staff when they did manage to come.  Again community 
members were not happy and accused the RMC members of embezzling community 
funds. One former RMC member, Mai Carrington, said that one day she paid 
Z$600,000 (USD 2.35) for permission to harvest broom grass for 6 days with her son. 
She only got a receipt for Z$50,000 (USD 0.20) from the RMC member in charge. 
When she asked why he did not write the full amount, the RMC member told her that 
they had shortages of the permit books and instead of giving her twelve receipts for 
Z$50, 000 (USD 0.20) each, he decided to save paper. Mai Carrington said that she 
did not argue with him but was sure that he stole that money. 
 
By the end of 2007 most of the problems encountered by the RMC in 2006 were still 
unresolved. Community members continued to complain that RMC members treated 
them badly, favouring themselves with the largest portions of good grass harvesting 
areas, and that there was no accountability for use of money from the permits.   
 
5.3.2 The Batanai Resource Management Committee  
 
In 2002 
 
As in the Gababe case study, the ACM team members only started to document the 
functioning of the Batanai RMC from in April 2002 onwards. The political situation 
made working in Batanai RMC area difficult, both for the RMC and the ACM team 
members. Except for the few positive developments during the early stages of the 
ACM project, there was little change in the functioning of the Batanai RMC during 
and after the ACM project. Its performance was poor during the ACM project period, 
and worsened when a ZANU-PF supporting RMC was put in place later. The details 
of the performance of the Batanai RMC are presented below.  
 
The Batanai RMC installed in 1997 was still in power in early 2002. The committee 
consisted of six men and one woman. Discussions with community members revealed 
that the RMC made decisions without any input from the rank-and-file. For example, 
the RMC was given some modern (Kenyan-Top-Beehives – KTB) beehives by the FC 
officer to promote bee-keeping projects in their area. The RMC was asked by the FC 
to give the beehives as a loan to community members who would pay the RMC with a 
portion of the honey harvested, in order to generate funds for the RMC. Community 
members said that the RMC took the beehives for themselves, friends and relatives. 
One community member said that he went to one of the RMC members to request for 
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a beehive, but discovered the RMC member was already using all the remaining 
hives.  
 
When visited by the ACM team in April 2002, the RMC chair explained that the 
committee was having difficulties because it was understaffed. The lady member had 
resigned, another member had died, the vice chair refused to come for work and the 
secretary had left for Gokwe Business Centre to pursue building studies.  As a result 
the chair said he had recruited temporary staff to help with the issuing of permits and 
monitoring the harvesting process during the peak grass harvesting period. He also 
explained that the RMC was not getting support from the village heads, who refused 
to attend meetings organised by the RMC. The traditional leaders had said that the 
RMC was below them in the hierarchy and did not have authority to call them to 
meetings. The village heads said they needed a formal invitation from the FC for them 
to attend forestry related meetings. When the ACM team asked Mr. Maf, the village 
head of Mafa Village, why he did not attend meetings organised by RMC members he 
claimed that most of them were members of the opposition political party and he did 
not want to be associated with the opposition. The RMC members denied this 
allegation. RMC members said that they also found it difficult to organise meetings 
with resource users after the passing of the Public Oder Security Act.  Permission was 
needed from the police to hold meetings (Section 2.2.3, Chapter 2). As a result no 
meetings were held during this period. 
 
In August 2002, the situation in Batanai had not improved. Community members told 
the ACM team that earlier promises made by the RMC members to resolve the 
group’s problems had not yet been fulfilled. Many local residents, mostly young men 
between 19 and 40, had left the area due to economic difficulties and drought.  
Twelve community members were said to have left for South Africa to look for 
employment, and another 32 had left to pan gold at the Venice Mine.  
 
However, by the end of 2002, the RMC had organised seven meetings. Five were with 
resource users and focused on grass-cutting methods. Two meetings were organised in 
collaboration with the FC, one of which was a report-back meeting for feedback on 
what happened with the brooms that were taken to the Provincial Agricultural Show. 
At a meeting with RMC members and resource users in Batanai, the ACM team heard 
they were facing the following problems: 
• The RMC lacked support from traditional leaders. 
• The broom grass users were stealing grass from their neighbouring RMC in 
Sokwela, creating ill will and reducing the opportunity for RMCs to generate 
income through giving out permits.  
• Some resource users were refusing to pay for permits taken on credit.  
• The arrival of the honey production season saw an increase in large hollow 
trees being felled by honey collectors who used them to make traditional 
beehives.  
At this meeting, local community members asked the RMC members to improve their 
record keeping and iron out their problems with traditional leaders, as these leaders 
could help them to be effective.  
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2003 to 2005 
 
In further meetings in September 2003 the ACM team discovered that the woman 
who had resigned from the RMC was a strong supporter of the ruling party and she 
had informed participants at a ZANU-PF fund raising meeting that the RMC had 
some money lying idle. After the meeting, the ZANU-PF chair and ward councillor 
went to see the RMC treasurer and had asked him to hand over the RMC funds to the 
ZANU-PF party to sponsor some party activity. The treasurer told him that the money 
was in a bank account and he would not release it until the RMC had arranged a 
meeting with the community to ask if the money could be used for this purpose.68 The 
ZANU-PF chair interpreted this as a refusal to hand over the money. The following 
week members of the RMC went to the forest and discovered that their grass area had 
been burnt. It was alleged that the chair of the MSC, and a strong ZANU-PF 
supporter, had taken the lead in burning the grass area as a way of punishing the RMC 
members (see Section 4.7, Chapter 4).  
 
Discussions with Batanai RMC members showed that most of the problems raised in 
the previous meeting still persisted in September 2003: 
• The village heads were still not supportive of RMC work and they refused to 
help resolve cases that the RMC brought to them. 
• Some committee members did not report for duty because there were no 
incentives.  Only three RMC members were active, and this made it difficult 
to monitor harvesting activities effectively.  
• Some resource users were not paying for harvesting permits and took 
advantage of an understaffed RMC. 
• The RMC had difficulty in securing the harvested grass given as payment in 
kind  due to lack of transport. 
• There were problems with poaching of broom grass, and some people 
harvested the grass before the stipulated harvesting dates. One member of the 
RMC accused the ruling Sibanda family in Mafa village of being the major 
culprits, disobeying agreed rules and harvesting grass before it was ripe 
 
In March 2004, an ACM team member visited Batanai to find that the RMC had not 
organised any meetings in the previous months. RMC members, as well as other 
community members, had been busy with their crops and attending to livestock. The 
MSC was no longer functional and the bee-keeping group was almost defunct. Many 
bee keepers had left for gold panning while the few who remained were busy in their 
crop fields. There were still only three active members of the RMC: chair, treasurer 
and vice secretary. Most RMC and sub-committee members came to harvest free 
grass but took no interest in controlling harvesting. 
 
Also in March 2004, another joint meeting between Batanai and Sokwela RMCs, was 
organised by local politicians, and the treasurer for Batanai RMC69 had an opportunity 
                                                 
68
  At this time, the first FC officer (a woman) left the project and a new officer, Mr Mutasa, 
took over. The new officer allowed local communities to make their own decisions on the use of 
community funds. Communities could use the money for things like paying school fees for orphans and 
supporting social functions in their communities. 
69
  The treasurer was a pensioner who spent much of his time in Bulawayo where he worked as a 
policeman. In community workshops, he proved to be someone who consistently wanted the truth to be 
told.  
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to report on the work of his RMC. He started by narrating the story of the attempt by 
the ward councillor and ZANU-PF party to wrestle RMC money from him. He 
explained that he had refused to hand over the money, as the RMC needed to consult 
with the local community members first. The councillor, present at this meeting, was 
annoyed by this bold stance and interjected by saying: “Old man do you know that 
you are an immigrant to this area? You do not even deserve to be in that committee. 
How did you get that post? I strongly suspect you bribed someone”. He continued to 
threaten all the members of the RMC who were present, saying, “you have to work 
well and cooperate with us, otherwise we will start to investigate your political 
background to see if you support the correct party”. 
 
The councillor went on to suggest that a new committee should be set up. Most local 
community members from Batanai were present and the FC officer agreed with this 
proposal Elections for the new RMC were organised by the FC officer on the 20th of 
March 2004. Candidates included local community members, local politicians and 
traditional leaders. When the ACM team asked how the elections were conducted, 
most community members said that there had been heavy political influence on the 
outcome – local politicians had vigorously campaigned for ruling party cadres to be 
elected. Community members were happy that the treasurer, Mr Ndlovu, had been 
retained as they saw him as an honest and transparent man. They said that the rest of 
the new RMC committee now consisted of politically motivated people. The new 
chair was much older than the previous chair, and - a war veteran - he was a strong 
supporter of the ruling party.  
 
In May 2005, ACM team members discovered that the former community partner for 
Batanai area was alleged to have participated in the 2005 parliamentary elections as a 
polling agent for the opposition political party. The allegations were raised by a wife 
of a village head and an active member of the ruling party. Because of these 
allegations, the ACM team found it difficult to work with the community partner.  
 
After 2005 
When returning to the area in 2006 for a monitoring visit, the present author 
discovered that all members of the current RMC were involved in the work, in stark 
contrast to the past. Community members explained that it was because committee 
members were allowed to harvest the grass for free. The permit prices were now 
substantially higher and most people could not afford to pay for them. 
 
After the 2006 grass cutting season the RMC did not organise a general meeting to 
give feedback on their work and finances. The RMC worked closely with some 
village heads in their area, especially in a school building project that communities 
had decided to focus on with the RMC money. RMC members met frequently with 
the village heads to decide on how many inputs to purchase, and they agreed to start 
by constructing toilets for the school. Towards the end of 2006 they managed to 
purchase cement and built the foundations for 10 toilets. Community members from 
all the villages in Batanai were asked to volunteer their labour to help with this, 
although they had not had an opportunity to participate in the decision making. The 
RMC members did not update community members on their work. 
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Communication was also poor among the RMC members themselves. For instance, 
the RMC secretary did not know how much the cement cost. There were rumours that 
some members of the RMC were embezzling funds. Community members and the 
RMC treasurer identified the problems they faced: 
 
• Poor communication among RMC members and lack of transparency and 
accountability concerning their work and finances towards local community 
members as well as among themselves. This made community members 
suspicious that RMC members were misusing funds 
• The RMC was ineffective, as it only worked during the grass harvesting 
period. During this period all RMC members worked, but only a few members 
monitored the harvesting of firewood at other times of the year According to 
the community members the RMC chair had little interest in resource 
management activities. He had several jobs, (as member of the neighbourhood 
watch police, as a builder and as an active member in the ZANU PF party) and 
did not have time for the RMC work  
• More generally, for all RMC members, it was sometimes difficult to meet as 
everybody was busy struggling to survive. 
• High transaction costs – RMC members who had travelled to purchase 
building materials for the school project had spent a large amount of money on 
transportation and food 
• Lack of learning opportunities for community members who had previously 
participated in several learning workshops during the ACM project  
• Lack of support from the FC. For instance, Mr Ndlovu, the RMC treasurer, 
complained that he was doing too much work on his own and this was 
straining him as he was now old. He said that when he faced problems in the 
RMC, he normally sought help from the FC. Unfortunately, as mentioned in 
Chapter 4, each time he saw the FC vehicle and tried to stop it, the driver did 
not stop the vehicle (because the new officer did not know him). He was now 
worried that the forest would decline. Too many forest fires broke out, mainly 
because the fire breaks were not  maintained after the death of the FC officer 
• Increased cutting down of live trees, with nothing done about it by the RMC. 
 
There were also disturbances in resource management activities when new settlers 
from other areas moved into the grass harvesting area. After realizing that nothing 
was being done about the new settlers in the forest (who continued to increase in 
number) some members of the Batanai RMC decided to open up new fields in the 
forest at the Mbumbuzi, even though no one moved in to stay there, while others also 
opened fields at Zanda Plateau, affecting the grass harvesting areas for Kupfuma 
Ishungu RMC area (Figure 2.5, Chapter 2). 
 
At Mbumbuzi, one of the grass areas for Batanai RMC, Batanai RMC members 
started by clearing about 3 acres each. This happened when the new FC officer, had 
just taken up his post. He decided to start working on this issue.  Specifically he was 
trying to prevent the cutting down of trees to clear land for agriculture. In September 
2006 he organised a meeting with community members in Batanai area. The FC 
general manager and the Zimbabwe Republic Police were also present during the 
meeting to discuss the issue. At the meeting officials identified the man allegedly 
responsible for organising these illegal clearances. He was arrested, and nearly injured 
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himself jumping out of a moving police truck. After this arrest no new areas were 
cleared for agricultural fields at Mbumbuzi. 
 
The Batanai RMC met just once with community members in 2007, just before the 
grass cutting season. After the 2007 grass harvesting period, the RMC decided to give 
32 bundles of thatch grass to the headman Ndlalambi as a gift (this was the tradition 
when the RSP project started in 1997 and RMC members decided to revive it). They 
also donated 80 bundles of thatch grass to be used for the construction of a shelter to 
be used as a classroom at the nearby local school. However, the problems of the 
previous year remained unresolved.   
 
5.4 Discussion and Reflection 
In addition to existing natural resource governance structures in local communities 
(namely local government and traditional authority structures, Section 2.2.1, Chapter 
2), the FC decided to form another institution, the RMCs. The reason why the FC 
decided to do this was because traditional leadership authority had been 
disempowered when the country gained independence in 1980, due to their role in 
promoting the colonial government (see Chapter 2). New local government structures, 
the Village Development Committees and the Ward Development Committees were 
put in place in communal areas of Zimbabwe. The role of these institutions (including 
management of natural resources) was not fully clarified, however, and this brought 
about conflict between the new and traditional institutions. 
 
When the ACM project was initiated in 1999 the traditional authority had just been re-
empowered through the Traditional Leaders Act of 1998 (see Chapter 2). Although 
the ACM team members also invited representatives of the traditional leadership 
authority to also participate in the capacity building activity and the subsequent 
Participatory Action Research (PAR) processes, the team continued to focus more on 
the RMCs as the legitimate institutions for managing resources in the forest. This is 
evident in the continuous interaction with RMC members documented above.  Each 
time they visited the study sites the ACM team members visited members of the RMC 
to find out about their work, and their problems, and also to advise them on solutions. 
 
The RMCs derived their resource management powers and authority from the FC, a 
custodian of state forests according to the existing Forestry Act. The ACM team, 
however, paid courtesy calls on traditional leaders each time they went to the field. 
This shows that the ACM team, in trying to achieve its objectives, was careful not to 
bring any radical changes to the situation at hand. The team did this in the spirit of 
building on to what already existed to promote the RSP. Those seeking to work with 
traditional authority structures, however, have also to been advised to be careful as 
there is danger of them not being as equitable or as legitimate in local eyes as they are 
often portrayed (Knudsen, 1995). In fact, many traditional institutions in Africa, 
including the traditional authority structures in Zimbabwe (see Section 2.2.1, Chapter 
2), have lost local legitimacy as a result of collaboration with colonial and post-
colonial regimes (Richards, 1985, 1992).  
 
Since it is not obvious that resource management could have been immediately placed 
in the hands of a weakened if recently revived traditional system of governance it is 
an important analytical task  to track how the newer institution, the RMCs, performed 
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over time, and how this performance influenced resource management outcomes. The 
first part of this section discusses the functioning of the RMCs before the introduction 
of the ACM project, followed by a discussion on how the RMCs functioned after the 
introduction of the ACM project, and the extent to which they were transformed by 
this experience. 
 
The Functioning of the RMCs before 1999 
Inaugural RMCs, as the empirical evidence above shows, were hi-jacked by male-
dominated elites. Women and marginalised groups rarely if ever participated in 
RMCs.  This exclusion was, in part, deliberate.  For example, the FC officer 
advocated that only educated people should be selected as members. Early settlers, 
with poor educational backgrounds, had no chance to participate, even though they 
may have had an especial closeness and need of the natural resources to be preserved. 
Elite RMC members lacked solidarity with these social classes, and used their power 
to benefit themselves and their kind. Batanai RMC was a clear example.  Given 
improved bee hives committee members used these hives themselves, rather than 
supervising their distribution among community rank-and-file. 
 
The RMCs during this time were mainly accountable to the FC officer and not to their 
constituencies, and were therefore seen as an arm of the FC. The FC remained a 
powerful actor, and community members continued to lack real power. The FC officer 
had powers to approve or not approve decisions made by local communities and even 
though money generated through the permit system was said to belong to the 
communities, the FC officer was signatory to the account, and had to approve any 
withdrawals. This shows the paternalistic nature of the FC at that time.  Even though 
on paper the FC and local communities were jointly managing the forest, only RMC 
members participated, while other local community members experienced “business 
as usual”. 
 
Old conflicts among stakeholders continued unabated.  Evidence of these tensions 
between communities and the FC became apparent in commentary by community 
members when the team introduced the ACM research in the sites (Chapter 4, Part I).  
There were also struggles between the RMCs and traditional leadership authorities, 
and between RMCs and local community members. Because of these conflicts, 
stakeholders failed to fully collaborate in managing forest natural resources that in 
effect became an open access facility, prone to the ‘tragedy of the commons’. Forest 
degradation continued unabated.  
 
The functioning of RMCs after the introduction of the ACM project up to 2007 
The two case studies presented above show contrasting fortunes in the experience of 
two different RMCs. The Gababe RMC, performed badly during the initial stages of 
the ACM project, but over time transformed into a downwardly accountable 
institution. For instance, in 2004 and 2005, the RMC performed well and local 
community members were satisfied with its performance. The RMC continued to do 
well, even after the untimely death of the local FC Officer. However, this success was 
short-lived and major shortcomings of accountability became apparent both to the 
communities and to the FC. In Batanai, the performance of the RMC remained 
generally poor (with some minor improvements during the early stages of the ACM 
project), because here the RMC was constrained by strong political influences in the 
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area. These political factors undermined much of the training and capacity building of 
the RMC.  
 
The following key issues will be discussed separately to assess the performance of the 
RMCs over time: accountability and transparency of the RMCs, conflict resolution 
problem solving, decision making by RMCs and community members in their areas. 
 
Accountability and transparency of Resource Management Committees 
During the early part of the ACM project, the performance of RMCs continued as it 
was in the period before the project. However over time, some changes began to be 
observed. For instance, the Gababe RMC transformed into a downwardly accountable 
institution. This RMC had never before reported to the community and was accused 
of embezzling community funds. Financial records disappeared. The reorganised 
RMC was more transparent, and began to report about its work and finances. 
Community members were happy with this changed approach.   
 
 
Participation by local community members and RMCs in decision making processes 
During the ACM project period, the situation with decision making remained similar 
to the situation before the introduction of the ACM project. However, improvements 
were observed later. For example RMC members in Gababe, who previously made 
decisions without involving community members, asked resource users their opinion 
about an RMC member who gave himself a bigger portion of grass than agreed upon 
(section 5.2.1). Also, RMC members began to make autonomous decisions on how to 
use their money, favouring local community activities. In Gababe, community 
members in electing their next RMC, made the decision not to retain two members 
from the old committee, as spelt out in the RMC constitution, because they wanted a 
fresh start.  
 
However, throughout the ACM project period, the FC still continued to make the 
bigger decisions on what resources were to be included and excluded from the 
Resource Sharing Project (RSP). In short, the policy framework never changed. Land, 
in particular, remained outside any resource sharing agreement, and nothing was (or 
perhaps could be) done during the ACM project period to change this. 
 
Gains were short-term.  For instance, participation of community members in decision 
making in the transformed Gababe RMC deteriorated from 2006, after the death of the 
FC officer. RMC members turned a deaf ear to community wishes and resisted 
attempts to account for their work or report on funds. In Batanai participation of local 
community members in electing their RMC members was limited, and local 
politicians influenced outcomes.  
 
Conflict resolution and problem solving 
Batanai RMC continued to be conflict ridden during and after the ACM project. 
Nevertheless, a few improvements could be seen. For instance, unlike in previous 
years when the RMC failed to organise meetings with resource users, in 2002 the 
RMC organised 5 such meetings. In Gababe RMC however, over time RMC members 
managed to resolve conflicts and solve some of the problems they encountered, 
sometimes on their own, and at other times with assistance from the FC (including the 
Forest Protection Unit). For example, the conflict between the RMC and its 
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subcommittees was successfully resolved in 2004 with assistance from the FC. When 
the FC died, however, the RMCs ignored new conflicts in the study sites, even though 
they were aware of the importance of resolving conflicts in resource management.  
 
Performance of RMCs and resource management outcomes 
Empirical evidence above shows that when RMC committees were not performing 
well there was increased cutting down of trees, poaching of game and forest fires. 
This is supported by events before and after the ACM project. For example, when 
there were conflicts between the new and RMC members in 2003, Gababe RMC 
experienced its highest incidences of forest fires.  Also when there were conflicts 
between the Gababe RMC and its sub-committees in 2004, fresh trees in the forest 
were cut down at an alarming rate. This was also experienced in the Batanai area as 
well.  
 
Factors that influenced performance of RMCs 
A number of factors can be distilled from the empirical evidence presented above as 
influences over the performance of RMC. These include: 
 
The presence of a supportive partner, the FC 
With support from the FC officer, the Gababe RMC’s performance improved, even 
after the ACM project had ended. However, when the FC officer died, an important 
process driver disappeared.  In the absence of support from the FC, frustration and 
conflict all too readily returned. Transparency and accountability became empty 
words, and community members failed to make their RMCs accountable and 
transparent.  
 
Incentives for RMC work 
Incentives for RMC members to work continued to be a topical issue at all times. 
Even though RMC members were allowed to harvest resources for free, as payment of 
their work, the issue continued to come up over and over again showing that the free 
grass was inadequate. This partly explains, if it does not justify, the embezzling of 
community funds by RMCs, and this embezzlement resulted in heightened conflict. 
 
Rules and means of enforcement 
Although the RMC constitution clearly stipulated that RMC members were supposed 
to organise regular meetings with their communities and give them reports of their 
work and finances, RMCs did not meet this requirement, especially in Gababe after 
the FC officer died. Even though rules were in place as part of the RMC constitution, 
there was no means to enforce them.  
 
Power and its distribution 
Power struggles between stakeholders in Mafungautsi were detrimental to resource 
management activities. For instance, traditional leaders in Batanai questioned the 
legitimacy of the new institution when it tried to call meetings, and hence some 
village heads and their community members did not come to meetings organised by 
the RMC in their areas. Also the fact that the FC remained the most powerful actor, 
and local community members remained at all times conscious of their relative 
powerlessness, resulted in some deployment by community members whose needs 
were not met by the RSP of Scott’s (1985) ‘weapons of the weak’. 
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Capacity building for RMC members and their community members 
The performance of the RMCs improved after the advent of the ACM project, and this 
can partly be attributed to the capacity building interventions of the ACM project. 
Community members in Gababe, for instance, began to put pressure for their RMCs 
to be accountable to them after participating in the various ACM interventions. 
5.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has traced the operations of the RMCs in the two study sites. Several 
factors influenced the performance of RMC, including presence of a supportive 
partner at all times, a need for incentives as a means to get RMC members to carry out 
their duties, the drafting of suitable rules, and availability of a means of enforcing 
them.  Except for some initial minor changes, performance of the Batanai RMC 
remained generally poor, even after interventions by the ACM team, because of 
interference from politically powerful people in the area. The Gababe RMC, however, 
transformed into a downwardly accountable institution after a new RMC was put in 
place. The training of members in administration and accounting apparently bore 
fruit, and helped RMC take its functions seriously. The new committee showed 
commitment and transparency. When RMCs were not functioning well, the problems 
and conflicts experienced resulted in degradation of the forest resources, as seen, for 
example, in increased cutting down of trees and a greater number of fire incidents. 
When RMCs functioned well, fewer conflicts were observed, and sustainable resource 
use and management practices were applied. Follow up work showed, however, that 
no amount of investment in training and capacity building could withstand the 
pressures generated by severe drought and economic collapse. Building robust 
collective natural resource management institutions in the midst of an economic storm 
proved too great a challenge for the ACM approach. 
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Chapter 6: General Discussion and Conclusions. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis has presented and critically analysed the implementation and outcomes of 
the ACM approach in Mafungautsi State Forest, Zimbabwe. The thesis began with a 
detailed account of how the ACM team – of which I was part – worked under 
deteriorating socio-economic and political conditions in Zimbabwe, to facilitate 
processes intended to improve resource management, and livelihoods of forest-
dependent communities. The thesis offered a critical account of the intervention, 
based on participant experience but also incorporated findings from a follow-up study 
undertaken to track developments in Mafungautsi over a period of four years after the 
ACM project ended. This follow up study drew ideas from the fields of “new 
institutionalism” and political ecology.  
 
A key finding was that improvements on how people interacted and dealt with the use 
of forest resources induced by the ACM project were not sustained. In concluding the 
thesis I will now ask to what extent these negative outcomes were endemic to the 
ACM approach, as distinct from being consequences of a general rapid decline in 
socio-economic conditions in the country. This decline doubtless contributed to the 
failure to sustain the initial promising outcomes. But the project also created 
difficulties for itself through misconceptions and misapplication. I now pinpoint some 
of these problems in project design and approach implicated in the lack of 
sustainability. I conclude that participatory approaches to forest conservation in 
Africa are still worth trying, but only if a new approach gives more weight to issues of 
political dynamics and power relations.  
 
6.2 Outcomes of the ACM project 
The ACM project intervention (1999 - 2003) in Mafungautsi forest was meant to 
support an ongoing project, the Resource Sharing Project (RSP) – begun 1994 - which 
had so far not been very successful. The ACM project indeed resulted in some 
improvements in the RSP (Chapters 4 and 5). First, community members benefited 
from capacity building (e.g. the Training for Transformation workshop). Otherwise 
marginalised community members, especially women, gained confidence to engage in 
participatory action research processes to deal with some of the problems faced in the 
project.  Some of these positive changes can be summarized as follows: 
  
• Community members discussed and resolved hidden conflicts. For instance, 
even though there was joint management of the forest on paper, this did not 
work out in practice. The FC continued with its command and control 
management. At the outset the tension was so great that the team could not go 
to the communities in a Forestry Commission vehicle. After some intervention 
this changed and relations between the communities improved; they began to 
work together to try and solve some of their problems (Chapter 4, Part II). 
• This resulted in the emergence of genuine partnerships, and stakeholders 
began to respect the contribution of the other partners in resolving resource 
management problems. For instance, villagers were encouraged by the 
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Forestry Commission officer to develop local solutions to problems they faced 
in managing forest resources (e.g. a new bundling method for the brooms). 
• Before ACM, only the Resource Management Committee (RMC) members 
participated in management of resources, but now, ordinary community 
members, participated in resource user groups, and helped to impose 
management sanctions.  An instance of this was when one Gababe RMC 
member allocated himself a bigger portion of free grass than agreed, and the 
RMC wanted to expel him, but the ordinary members decided it would be 
better to reduce his share, but not expel him. 
• Community members also succeeded to put pressure on their RMCs to be 
downwardly accountable (Chapter 5). This was particularly noticeable in 
Gababe. In Batanai, however, powerful people aligned with the ruling political 
party increasingly obstructed the functioning of the RMC.  
• Community members also implemented collaborative action to solve 
problems. In Batanai area, for instance, broom grass resource users developed 
a new bundling method, and took steps to promote this sustainable harvesting 
technique (Chapter 4).  
 
Second, this greater involvement of ordinary villagers in the management process 
then had impact on incomes through value addition and identification of alternative 
markets for products. For example, in Batanai the newly bundled and decorated 
brooms sold at higher prices – even though making them took more time. Women 
broom grass resource users in Batanai began to team up to expand their market by 
selling brooms in faraway places with no broom grass. Teaming up specifically 
helped those women who were not allowed by their husbands to travel to such far 
places on their own.  Third, stakeholders adopted and promoted use of sustainable 
practices. Beekeepers, for example, began seriously to consider trying to prevent 
cutting down of hollow trees and forest fires.  Although there was no study to quantify 
the impact of these activities, it appears that stakeholders improved their knowledge 
of forest resources through their own monitoring activities. Resource users in Batanai, 
for instance, benefited from knowledge shared by the monitoring sub-committee on 
the areas, amounts, location and quality of grass resources. These positive changes are 
evidence that capacity building and participatory action research did generate learning 
and supported collective action, as intended in the ACM approach, even if a drawback 
was the high transaction costs associated with time spent in meetings, discussions, 
reflection sessions and workshops.  
 
However, a follow up study four years after the project had ended showed that these 
improvements were not sustained. The following negative changes were observed 
during this second study. First, the status of the forest had deteriorated due to the 
increase in the number of new settlers in the forest. The new settlers had cleared forest 
areas both for settlement and for agricultural fields (Chapter 4). Resource 
management activities, e.g. the monitoring of resource harvesting processes, poaching 
and incidence of fire, stopped in areas where the new settlers had settled, and no 
alternative resource management activities were initiated in the forest. The new 
settlers privatised resources in the areas where they settled by staking-out and 
fencing-off their plots, and members from communities outside of the forest area 
could no longer access forest resources freely. The new settlers set fees for extraction 
of resources like broom grass from the staked-out fields.  In the forest area that the 
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ACM research sites were managing, there was increased cutting down of live trees 
and poaching of wild game. 
 
This happened after the death of the FC officer responsible for the project, since 
RMCs no longer received support. The FC Forest Protection Unit, the first point of 
contact for assistance, lacked transport or resources to pursue any issues. The 
succeeding officer focused on trying to evict the new settlers in the foest, but also died 
two years later. RMC efforts to engage with him in resource management, in Batanai 
area, for instance, proved to no avail, as the officer did not know the RMC members 
and therefore he did not stop when they tried to hail his vehicle. Resource users in 
Gababe were not even aware that a new officer had been appointed, even up to the 
time when he passed away. 
 
Second, the Participatory Action Research (PAR) process initiated by the ACM 
project for resource user groups, stopped immediately after the ACM project ended. 
PAR was implemented as a way for tackling complex resource management problems 
where there were no ready-made answers available. The PAR processes halted, at 
least in part, because the ACM community partners organising the resource user 
meetings stopped facilitation due to lack of incentives. During the ACM project, the 
ACM community partners received monthly allowances for their work and after the 
project ended in 2003 some community partners became involved in cross-border 
trading to earn a living. 
 
The FC officer, crucial in PAR activities by resource user groups, took over 
facilitation of the joint leaning processes when the CIFOR project ended, but lacked 
the basic resources to operate at the level of the resource user groups and facilitate 
learning processes. He did, however, manage to continue facilitating experience 
sharing and joint learning processes across RMCs for two years after the ACM project 
stopped with financial support from CIFOR (Chapter 4). These learning processes 
ended when he died, since his successor had a new focus and only received brief 
training on the ACM approach (a half day ACM training workshop in June 2006) 
even though he had not been exposed to similar approaches before. 
 
Third, the functioning of RMCs deteriorated over time as a result of lack of input 
from the FC officer (Chapter 5). In Gababe area RMC performance initially continued 
to improve after the ACM project ended, but RMC members stopped being 
accountable to communities on their activities after the death of the FC officer. This 
resulted in communities becoming suspicious that RMC members were embezzling 
community funds. Several conflicts among the stakeholders broke out, and these were 
left unaddressed when the resource management activities and joint learning 
processes stopped (Chapter 5). 
 
Clearly, then, the positive outcomes of the ACM project proved unsustainable. So 
what went wrong, and could these problems have been foreseen? This question is the 
focus of the next section.  
 
6.3 Why positive outcomes were not sustained  
There are several reasons why the improvements achieved in the ACM project period 
were not sustained. First, it is now clear that in the conceptualisation phase, both in 
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Bogor (Indonesia) and in Zimbabwe, there was overestimation of what an ACM team 
might achieve in practice as far as implementing the ACM approach was concerned. 
As seen in Chapter 4, Part I, a considerable amount of time and effort was spent 
setting the stage (through various interventions on capacity building and conflict 
resolution, for instance), for the PAR processes to take off, but the actual running in 
phase was too short. In effect, the project ended when resource users were just 
beginning to implement their action plans and before the crucial collaborative 
monitoring system was implemented. 
 
The CIFOR researchers based their ACM approach on the belief that stakeholders 
could over time learn from their experiences how to best manage and use resources 
jointly.  Indeed, some learning did happen, but the time frame was too limited. 
Learning processes for multiple stakeholders require longer time frames. In effect, 
what is learnt needs to become embedded within local thinking, and even become part 
of local “tradition”.  But additionally, solutions were needed to the myriad tensions 
and divisions affecting communities as preconditions for genuine joint learning to 
take place, and resolving these problems took up a huge part of the three-year ACM 
project time frame.  Even after the three year project, some bigger conflicts still 
remained unresolved (even unaddressed – notably, what to do about the new settlers 
in the forest).  The project, thus, badly underestimated time needed to resolve tensions 
and build a platform of trust among partners. When the project ended, the road ahead 
was still unclear. 
 
Second, although contextual studies and initial project experience indicated the 
complexity of issues of power and politics associated with in the research sites, the 
ACM team did little to respond to this understanding, apart from engaging in some 
capacity building with marginalised groups to address issues of power and its unequal 
distribution. People not interested in the forest resources were deliberately left out. 
The ACM team chose not to focus on issues of power within rural society more 
generally, as they saw this as something beyond its scope. The team assumed that 
building the capacity of interested stakeholders, marginalised groups and women 
through Training for Transformation would break the apparent passiveness of the 
marginalised and prepare them to step up and ‘participate’ in resource management 
activities effectively. In its interventions, the team did not explicitly aim to locate and 
engage with existing sources of power in rural communities (e.g. traditional chiefs 
and ritual experts), but work around them. As a result, the team never evolved a clear 
strategy of engagement with the wider rural society and its influential power brokers 
(Chapter 3).  
 
The situation with regard to state power was equally unsatisfactory, but for a different 
reason.  Even at the outset, the team was quite aware of the highly unequal 
distribution of power between the two major stakeholders in the resource management 
process - local communities and the Forestry Commission. The problem was more a 
failure to think through the implications of this inequality.  The FC held all the cards.  
Its legal authority to manage a state forest derived from the existing Forest Act.  As 
seen in Chapter 1, this act was inherited from a colonial regime highly influenced by 
Western ideas on conservation largely ignoring the needs of local communities. 
Despite several changes made to legislation related to land acquisition by the new 
Zimbabwe government after independence, very little was done to try and change 
legislation related to forestry (Chapter 2). Local communities thus had no legal 
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authority to manage the forest reserve.  Early settlers had lost their homes and sources 
of livelihood to a law that denied access to resources they had once accessed in the 
forest. The project went ahead to implement a participatory resource management 
scheme without proper thought to the “elephant in the room” (i.e. a law that made 
local community members criminals in their own back gardens). The colonial 
Forestry Act had resulted in several conflicts between the local communities and the 
Forestry Commission as communities continued to access forest resources illegally.  
 
When faced with these problems, the FC initiated the Resource Sharing Project (RSP) 
to allow communities to benefit from minor non-timber forest products. Yet the ACM 
project was implemented in Mafungautsi against the background of an old colonial 
forestry law, and little was done to change it, even though the project aimed to 
address the needs of local community members. Initiating the process for reform of 
the Forest Act ought perhaps to have been a precondition for the implementation of 
the project. This would have helped to create a wider enabling environment for 
communities to participate in the management of state forests, as well as give them 
legal power to do so. As Mapedza and Mandondo (2002) rightly point out, without 
meaningful legal power over the resources they were supposed to manage, local 
communities felt cheated, since at any time it suited, the FC could revert to its old 
management system under a new name.  
 
Nor did the project pay proper attention to evidence of communal strife in the area.  
Even though contextual studies revealed historical struggles over land between local 
communities and the FC, the team did not see much scope to address this issue. The 
prevailing assumption of ACM team members was these structural conflicts could be 
placed in abeyance.  Their hope was that through implementing the Participatory 
Action Research (PAR) process and learning together to solve their problems local 
stakeholders in Mafungautsi would eventually gain the confidence to tackle the bigger 
land issue in the area.  This is to assume (or imply) that “participation” is such a 
powerful good that it can serve as a counter-balance on sovereign power. To say the 
least, there is no real evidence, anywhere, that it enjoys such potent features. 
 
In consequence, of this unwarranted faith in the power of participation the ACM team 
placed too much emphasis on facilitating the passage of stakeholders through the PAR 
process, in the hope that reform of attitudes alone would reshape actions. This is a 
reflection of a basic assumption underlying the ACM approach that joint learning 
from the PAR processes by stakeholders was a key ingredient to make resource 
management problems resolvable. 
 
But it is also relevant to mention the overall political context, and the highly charged 
atmosphere over land reform.  Perhaps this helps account for the decision that 
researchers took to work only with community members with a direct interest in 
helping to conserve forest resources. Members of the wider community – whether 
they were villagers or local politicians – were left out of the project, even though they 
sought to claim forest land. In effect, by opting to work only with those directly ‘for’ 
conservation, the ACM team was exempted from becoming involved in issues of 
power around land ownership, a position that might have placed project staff in the 
political firing line. 
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Belief in the power of participation to resolve the land issue seems in retrospect only 
wishful thinking. Several researchers (Logan and Moseley, 2002; Chauveau and 
Richards 2008; Kaimowitz and Shell, 2007) have suggested that resource 
management initiatives will not succeed even in their most limited conservation aims 
if they shy away from analysis and resolution of fundamental societal conflicts. 
 
In Mafungautsi, various stakeholders (including local politicians and some early 
settlers)  make claims to forest land based on their historical backgrounds and rights. 
Although these claims are not legally recognised under the existing Forest Act, they 
cannot be held at bay on a legal pretext (Mohamed-Katerere, undated).  Talking to all 
parties involved in local land issues was therefore a crucial aspect of project activity. 
Whether local agreements could have then been accommodated by the FC within the 
existing Forest Act is perhaps doubtful, but that would then indicate that the project 
should either have withdrawn or begun to initiate action for reform at a higher level. 
 
When faced with similar circumstances, the ACM team in Cameroon facilitated 
platforms for stakeholders to discuss the underlying causes of land problems. Local 
people lost their land when the Ottotomo forest reserve was established in 1930. Over 
time, there was increasing shortage of land due to increase in population, and this 
resulted in conflicts between the local communities and reserve managers, as people 
encroached in the forest to farm. After discussions facilitated by the ACM team, 
involving the forestry department, the stakeholders finally agreed to come up with a 
new land use plan for the area. This included the creation of a buffer zone within the 
forest to provide additional farm land to local communities (Jum, 2003; Jum et al., 
2009). Agro-forestry activities were also allowed within the zone and the forestry 
department provided the new agro-forestry management skills required. Institutional 
structures were also put in place to support the implementation of agreements, and 
those who did not abide by the rules were reported and arrested (Jum et al., 2009). 
 
This might provide a model for similar action in Zimbabwe.  It is thus frustrating to 
learn that in Cameroon the ACM project closed down in about the same time as the 
project in Zimbabwe, and that follow up studies are yet to be carried out. However, it 
is pertinent to add that the productive capacities of the forests in question are quite 
different. The Mafungautsi forest is characterised by infertile sandy soils prone to 
rapid erosion (Zingore et al., 2005). The soils in Ottotomo forest are fertile and 
suitable for agricultural production.  
 
Within the local communities themselves, it was clear from the early stages of the 
ACM project that there was unequal distribution of power among stakeholders in the 
local communities and the ACM team also did little to challenge the existing power 
relations. For instance, RMCs that were put in place in a mostly top-down way by the 
FC and were still in existence when the project was initiated.  Membership comprised 
representatives of the local elite, mostly male. In Batanai, for instance, except for one 
powerful woman (a wife of a village head) all positions on the RMC were held by 
men (Chapter 5).  Again, the RMC was filled with powerful people: the chair, vice 
chair and secretary were the chief’s secretary, the chiefs’ assessor and the councillor 
respectively. The treasurer of the RMC was the headmen and ordinary members of the 
RMC were members of the VIDCO.  
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Also the FC advocated for people who could read and write to be elected to RMC 
positions.  Thus, no illiterates took part. This excluded the early settlers who mainly 
belonged to this group without education (Chapter 2). Instead of challenging the 
unequal distribution of power among stakeholders, the ACM team did very little apart 
of capacity building processes to empower marginalised groups to participate in 
resource management. It was assumed that with capacity building marginalised 
groups would feel empowered to become members of the RMCs.  There was no 
emphasis on structural constraints – e.g. insisting on committee quotas for early 
settlers, or organizing adult education to overcome the illiteracy constraint.  
 
In Batanai however, participation by women improved. For instance, one poor woman 
managed to be elected to a number of committees not related to resource management 
(Chapter 5). But when opportunity for RMC members arose to elect new members, 
and perhaps change the balance of power by including the poor people in the 
important resource management institution, political factors influenced the selection 
process. Politically powerful people were elected to take over as new members of the 
RMC, with the chair being a powerful member of the ruling ZANU-PF political party. 
 
The ACM team, therefore, did not do much to challenge existing power relations and 
the unequal distribution of power in these communities. This resulted in conflicts that 
threatened resource management activities. The poor employed what Scott (1985) 
terms ‘weapons of the weak’ to meet their objectives. Some continued harvesting 
resources outside the Resource Sharing Project agreement, while others quietly 
moved into the forest to reclaim ancestral lands. 
 
This blind spot in the ACM approach is disturbing given the fact that the failure to 
engage with issues of power and politics has been one of the strongest criticisms of 
participatory approaches (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). In effect, the ACM team took 
participation to be a technical method of organising project work rather than a  
methodology to empower poor and marginalised groups (Carmen, 1996; Cleaver, 
1999; Rahman, 1995). In an assessment intended to answer some the above criticisms 
of participatory development Hickey and Mohan (2005) found that successful 
participatory development initiatives were those that explicitly aimed to focus on 
issues of power and politics and challenge existing power relations, rather than simply 
work around them for service delivery. 
 
Thus it is now easy to see that steps ought to have been taken to facilitate negotiations 
between the more powerful stakeholder, the FC, and local communities, to open up a 
space for these communities to participate legally in the management of their forest. 
Such negotiations might have resulted in, for instance, stakeholders reshaping the 
RSP to ensure win-win distribution of benefits across a wider set of groups. To 
challenge existing power relations, the ACM team could have done more to lobby for 
RMC positions to be reserved for under-represented groups, including women and 
illiterate early settlers. 
 
Third, and related to the above point about the failure to perceive that an unreformed  
Forest Act was a constraint on project aims, insufficient attention was paid by the 
ACM team to the conflicting and different needs of local community members. 
Poverty, need (and perhaps also some greed), and the ever-present problem of land 
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shortage undermined whatever scope individual actors might otherwise have had to 
cooperate, or show generosity to other groups.  
 
Like the Resource Sharing Project (RSP), the ACM project continued to focus on low 
quality resources like broom and thatch grasses. Even with value added, resources like 
broom grass sold at low prices, thereby not generating meaningful income for the 
resource users. A different approach should have been considered.  Bearing in mind 
the low value of thatching grass, it might have made sense to improve thatching skills 
among resource uses, to encourage some, at least, to not only sell grass but to work as 
skilled thatchers. A similar approach might have been taken with the beekeepers – e.g. 
training them to generate more income through making products such as candles and 
body oil.  
 
Other skills (like for instance, marketing skills) might have been equally important. 
The ACM team initiated processes in Ndarire (where grasses are not found in the part 
of the forest they were managing) to lobby for high value timber to be included to the 
resource sharing agreement. The ACM project however, ended before much was 
done. The inclusion of high value resources such as timber in the RSP agreement 
could have significantly contributed to poverty alleviation by giving local 
communities a better stake in the timber trade. 
 
The intrinsic value of the forest as watershed might also have been brought into the 
equation (Chapter 2). The forest represents a public good as a watershed and 
negotiations might have been pursued with relevant government departments for 
communities to be compensated for their work in preserving it. Mafungautsi Forest is 
a source of major rivers that drain into the Zambezi River, where the Kariba Dam is 
important for generating hydro-electricity for the country. Local communities helping 
to take care of the forest had electricity neither in their homes nor any form of 
compensation for their work in ensuring a good supply of electricity elsewhere. 
Compensation would give them a direct stake in the wider economy and its success, 
while also helping local land users to  understand the need to preserve the 
environmental services provided by the forest. 
 
A RSP proposal sent to the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to 
promote eco-tourism in the area (Chapter 2) might also have been pursued. Facilities 
(such as the FC camp) might have been upgraded for eco-tourism purposes (Chapter 
2). 
 
The ACM project had little interest in any such options.  In effect, it was focused on 
“improving” participation at the expense of thinking about poverty alleviation more 
broadly, despite a basic aim to improve the lives of local communities in areas 
surrounding the forest. Increasing levels of poverty and hunger saw local community 
members (some of whom were crucial in resource management activities) migrating 
and participating in dangerous and illegal gold panning activities, as well as going to 
neighbouring countries in search of employment. Addressing local needs has been 
identified as crucial in conservation work.  Kaimowitz and Sheil (2007) clearly point 
out: ‘…conservation can and should address broader, more diversified and more 
democratically defined goals, and should recognise and address the needs and 
aspirations of local people: especially the poor and vulnerable (p. 572).’ The ACM 
team fell short of these ideals. 
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Fourth, the ACM team, when dealing with the issue of institutions, concentrated effort 
on influencing the RMCs to become transparent and downwardly accountable 
institutions. Instead of initiating a new organisation, or working with the traditional 
authority structures, the ACM team decided to build on the RMCs put in place by the 
FC at the start of the RSP. With conflict resolution and capacity building, these 
reformed organisations, especially in Gababe, became more downwardly accountable 
(Chapter 5). The changes were not sustained, however, and the RMCs deteriorated 
rapidly after the death of the FC officer. Even though a constitution clearly stipulated 
how RMCs were supposed to function, including accountability to their 
constituencies, no means to enforce constitutional rules was in place. Furthermore, the 
constitution was not translated into vernacular languages, restricting knowledge of it 
to those capable of reading a document in English. 
 
The ACM team neglected best practice guidelines in this area.  The issue of rules and 
regulations has been clearly identified by a growing body of body of literature 
(Ostrom, 1990; Bromley and Cernea, 1989; Cleaver, 2000; Kayambazintu et al., 
2003) as important in determining the success or failure of participatory initiatives. 
  
Although resource users were clear that it was important for effective rules to be in 
place for managing various resources, not much was done to enable them to come up 
with clear rules or to enforce them. The ACM researchers focused their efforts on 
trying to influence norms, values, attitudes and beliefs through the Participatory 
Action Research (PAR) and joint learning processes. The aim here was to stimulate 
people to cooperate and undertake joint actions.  By going through the PAR process, 
the ACM team focused on changing local beliefs about the use and management of 
the forest resources. For instance, when the ACM team facilitated a meeting for 
resource users in the Batanai area to reflect on the Machije experiment on the broom 
grass digging, their main hope was that resource users would remind each other of 
lessons learned. The main aim was behaviour change, e.g. to start using sustainable 
methods for harvesting broom grass. 
 
It might have been better to focus on creating a set of effective rules and to work 
towards their enforcement. A woman from Batanai demonstrated that the rules they 
had agreed on were not known by outside support agencies – e.g. the police.  The 
project might at this point have focused not so much on internalizing behaviour 
change but on getting locally agreed management rules turned into local government 
by-laws. This would have implied some intensive work with e.g. The Rural District 
Council, as the entity to suggest such by-laws and to pass them on for higher 
approval. With by-laws in place, communities could then have used the police and 
other law enforcement agents to sanction those not following such agreed bye-laws. 
 
The ACM team, however, simply left the issue of by-laws untouched and assumed 
that the FC officer would take over the process later on. With no effective regulatory 
systems in place, the forest became in effect an open access resource. In the absence 
of any sanctions on outside offenders the degradation of the forest was, thus, a 
foregone conclusion, given the increasing levels of poverty and need in Mafungautsi, 
and the country at large.  
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Finally, the ACM team left future work in the hands of the FC, thinking that the way 
ahead was clear and straightforward. This placed too much burden on the role of the 
FC officer to maintain an enforcement structure to ensure that the RMCs continued to 
be downwardly accountable to their communities, while at the same time the same 
officer was also the crucial factor in up-scaling the ACM approach to the other RMC 
areas around the forest. This was an overestimation of what the FC officer could 
possibly achieve on his own resources once the project ended. The team failed 
properly to assess how an understaffed and underfunded organisation with personnel 
earning meagre salaries, hardly sufficient for survival, would manage alone. 
 
To expect the FC officer to be able to scale-up the use of the ACM approach to the 
remaining 11 sites around the forest was a particularly gross miscalculation, given 
that the multi-disciplinary ACM team already knew how much it had had to invest in 
establishing activities in only 2-3 places in three years. Even though the FC officer 
was keen to apply the approach in the other RMC areas, he would not have been able 
to do so without commensurate human support and funding assistance. These were 
simply not forthcoming. The ACM team used a substantial budget during the project 
period to kick start the PAR processes. An even larger budget would therefore have 
been required to engage the remaining forest-edge communities in similar processes. 
  
Although on first assessment it might seem that wider events in the country finished 
off a beautiful initiative in its infancy, the five points above are sufficient to suggest 
that the positive ACM outcomes would have been unsustainable, even in the absence 
of the subsequent crisis in Zimbabwe. If learning-based participatory forestry 
management is to have a future in very poor countries it is clear that it has to 
incorporate strong doses of political realism, based on a more thorough understanding 
of the political economy of resource alienation.  It also needs to address an 
institutional issue.  Specifically, it needs to take regulation seriously and find effective 
rules and means of enforcing these rules, rather than rely on vague notions of human 
goodness and behaviour modification.  Furthermore, participatory resource 
management needs to be supported by adequate longer-term financial provision and 
human resources. The following section elaborates on what might need to be taken 
into account if learning-based participatory approaches are to be reorganized to bring 
about positive lasting changes to the status of resources and lives of local 
communities involved in managing those resources.  
 
6.4 Strategic considerations to ensure positive results in 
participatory resource management initiatives   
The ACM approach was developed as a response to criticism of participatory resource 
management initiatives from conservationists who blamed participation of local 
communities for exacerbating resource degradation. After reading this thesis, the 
reader might be tempted to think the conservationist critics were right, and quickly 
dismiss the learning-based approach. This is a normal reaction to any failure. There is, 
however, a risk of throwing the baby out together with the bath water. For me, the 
learning-based approaches are still being developed, and have potential to help us 
avoid the square-wheel paradigm, i.e. reinventing an old approach that was as big a 
failure as the present one (Wilshusen et al. 2002). To improve the learning-based 
paradigm some conceptual enlargement is now needed. The following issues seem to 
be salient. 
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To start with, learning-based participatory resource management projects must be 
given sufficiently long time frames, especially when outside facilitating agents are 
involved. Long time frames will enable facilitators to set up a solid base with more 
chance of enduring success when they finally pull out. There is also need for adequate 
long-term financing (covering both pilot and continuation phases). This should also be 
coupled with appropriate investments in human resources. The learning-based 
approach to participation is both labour and skill-intensive. Teams that facilitate the 
participatory resource management processes need to be multi-disciplinary and 
include expertise from the fields of political ecology and new institutionalism. Teams 
should consist of members with both analytical and facilitation skills, as both aspects 
are crucial.  
 
Following the entry process into the community, in-depth contextual studies (as 
presented in Chapter 2, for instance), should be conducted to generate understanding 
of the local situation, uncover underlying causes of resource management problems, 
and (crucially) generate understanding of the political power dynamics that are at play 
in the relevant communities. Participatory resource management initiatives must also 
be ready to challenge existing power relations where these are clearly reproducing 
poverty and marginalising important stakeholders.  Facilitators of learning based-
approaches for instance, in developing countries should be aware that resource 
management problems are deeply rooted in colonial policies that remained 
unreformed when countries like Zimbabwe became independent. Conservation aims 
cannot be sustainably attained through perpetuating injustices. Facilitators in learning-
based approaches will, thus, at times need to work with, or even challenge, 
governments in lobbying for essential legal reforms and the realization of basic 
human rights. Without these changes, resource management efforts will continue to 
perpetuate past command-and-control management, resulting in continued conflict 
among stakeholders and deterioration of resources. 
 
Facilitators also need to be aware that issues of politics and power are inherent in 
local communities. When there is unequal distribution of power, schemes for 
participatory management of resources are likely to be captured by local elites, while 
marginalised groups will continue to be sidelined. Interventions to challenge existing 
power relationship at the local community level may be needed, therefore, as part of 
the participatory approach.  
 
Learning-based resource management will also have to pay more attention to wider 
strategies of poverty alleviation.  Conservation requires a win-win situation among 
local stakeholders.  This may require lobbying for high value resources to be included 
in resource sharing agreements, or paying attention to skill levels and value-added 
resource transformation processes. The approach may need to be varied where high 
value resources are not present but a natural resource provides important public goods 
or environmental services.  In such cases, the learning-based approach must also 
include learning how to lobby effectively for communities to be compensated for their 
custodial role. Only when all this has been done, is it appropriate for resource users to 
go through the PAR processes, to learn about the co-management of an enlarged “pot” 
of benefits. 
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All the above could have been included in a scenario for the Mafungautsi forest - 
namely,  change in policies to support participation of local communities in resource 
management, change in structures that keep marginalised groups in unfavourable 
situations and continued poverty. In situations where policies already support 
participation by local communities in the management of resources, there is need to 
ensure that authority and decision making powers are truly transferred to the grass 
roots. In the case of the Zimbabwe Communal Area Management Programme for 
Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), policies that support the participation of local 
communities have been put in place, but management authority and decision making 
powers have not been effectively devolved. The devolution of powers ends at the 
Rural District Council (RDC) level and this has led to the failure of resource 
management efforts.  
 
Facilitators of learning-based resource management initiatives however need to be 
aware that going through the above mentioned steps is bound to take a long time, 
especially when it involves attempts to address marginality resulting from existing 
power relations. It is naïve to think that a three or five year learning-based project can 
generate sustainable changes. When evaluating similar participatory resource 
management initiatives in Africa, other researchers (Kiss, 1990; Hannah, 1992; Wells 
et al., 1992) also came to a similar conclusion that a 3-5year project was too short to 
bring meaningful changes. This has implications for the way project time frames are 
set up, and donors need to be flexible especially when dealing with learning-based 
participatory resource management projects. Unfortunately, there are no obvious short 
cuts, if alternatives to the idea of parks and protected land are to be found. The lesson 
of this thesis is that skipping the initial steps, and rushing to initiate PAR research 
interventions, as in the ACM project, results only in superficial and not long-lasting 
positive change.  
 
Wrapping up 
The ACM team pulled out after having used a substantial budget to facilitate PAR 
activities in three of the fourteen Resource Management Committee (RMC) areas in 
Mafungautsi forest. Subsequent developments show that the most difficult part was 
still to be tackled when the team left. The ACM team was, in fact, learning fast, 
realising the complexity of its task, and if the process had been continued, some 
useful reforms might have been achieved. But for this to happen, the rather inward 
looking belief that stakeholders would cooperate solely via the stimulus of mutual 
learning would have had to be abandoned in favour of some more realistic 
appreciation of the messy, conflicted nature of local political processes. Part of the 
required standpoint would be a realisation that the Mafungautsi Forest and the people 
living in and around it did not constitute a world apart, but were merely small cogs in 
the wheels of a larger historical and regional system of colonial and neo-colonial land 
acquisition and resource extraction. This larger and a much contested picture is the 
inescapable starting point for understanding forest land dynamics in Zimbabwe. The 
notion that somehow the forest is or can be a quiet corner in a largely traditional 
world of African cooperation has to be abandoned in favour of a picture in which 
strong competing regional cross-currents are given full analytical due. In short, it is in 
a combination of perspectives from participation, new institutionalism and political 
ecology that the way forward will be found.  
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6.5 Concluding remarks: a personal reflection 
As a participant in a learning-based resource management project what did I learn 
from this experience? One thing I am now conscious of is the danger of generalizing 
from a sample of one. Unfortunately, I have only the Mafungautsi forest case study to 
shed light on possibilities of moving towards sustainability in forest management. 
What the team was trying to do was not easy (dealing with so many issues and 
concepts at the same time), as my account has demonstrated. During the project 
period we all shared a strong belief that we were indeed on the right path, as can be 
seen from the multiple publications we generated concerning activities around the 
Mafungautsi forest (Chapter 3). These publications, to our knowledge, were well 
received at the time, and the approach was applauded. But looking at adverse 
developments four years after the project ended, I now wonder if it was at all worth 
the effort. A question that the reader can ask after reading this thesis is, ‘can 
sustainable management be learnt?’ We know from other studies that parks and 
protected areas do not lead to successful conservation of natural resources (Hayes, 
2006; Wilshusen et al., 2002; Borrini-Feyerabend, 2002). If we want to avoid falling 
back on an ineffective paradigm of enforced protection we have to recognise that 
politics and power are inherently part of the interaction between humans and nature, 
as Robbins (1994) claims. ‘Participation’ and ‘learning’-based approaches have their 
place in preparing people to play their part, but implementing such approaches should 
not prevent us from looking at contextual realities. One could argue that the 
Zimbabwe situation is an extreme case demonstrating how politics and poverty can 
totally disrupt conservation efforts. However, the issues of poverty, power and politics 
described in this thesis are not unique to Zimbabwe, but present in all developing 
countries. What we definitely can learn from the Zimbabwe case is how 
systematically to reflect on learning-based conservation initiatives, in a wider 
comparative framework of experiences.  This means that work is now needed to 
“locate” the case here described in its broader field. This thesis has tried to locate the 
participatory learning-based approach in a wider intellectual landscape, including 
perspectives from new institutionalism and political ecology. It would now be useful 
to follow up on similar initiatives in the other countries where the ACM approach was 
implemented. This would also help to check the outcomes of the learning approach in 
stable socio-economic and political environment and whether these outcomes were 
sustained or not, to throw further, comparative light on why the outcomes of the 
learning based approach were not sustained in the rapidly  deteriorating socio-
economic and political environment in Zimbabwe. I have here outlined reasons for 
thinking that there were internal, conceptual problems with the learning-based 
approach, but equally I have argued that giving more analytical scope to power, 
politics and institutions does not invalidate a learning-based orientation in 
conservation, but will strengthen it and make it more effective. This way, advocates of 
participation in development will avoid making the same mistakes repeatedly. 
 
Chapter 6 
 194 
 
 
 
 
References 
195 
 
References 
 
Aamodt A. M., 1991. Ethnography and epistemology: Generating nursing knowledge. In, J. 
M. Morse (ed.). Qualitative Nursing Research: A contemporary dialogue p40-53. 
Newbury Park, CA, Sage. 
Acheson J. M., 1989. Management of common property resources. In Platter S., (ed.). 
Economic Anthropology. Stanford University Press. Stanford. 
Adams, W., & Hulme D., 2001. Conservation and Community. Changing Narratives, Policies 
& Practices In African Conservation. In Hulme, D & Murphree, M (eds.), African 
Wildlife And Livelihoods. The Promise And Performance Of Community 
Conservation. Oxford: James Currey. 
Addison T., 1996. Zimbabwe: the impact of economic reform on poverty and income 
distribution. Paper prepared for the Southern Africa Development of the World Bank. 
Agrawal A., 1995. Dismantling the divide between indigenous and scientific knowledge. 
Development and Change 26: 413-439.  
Agrawal, A. & Gibson, C. C., 1999. Enchantment and disenchantment: the role of 
‘community’ in natural resource conservation. World Development 27: 629-649.  
Ahern K. A., 1999. Ten tips for reflective bracketing. Qualitative heath research 9: 407-411. 
Alexander J. & McGregor J., 1997. Modernity and ethnicity in a frontier society: 
understanding difference in north-western Zimbabwe. Journal of Southern African 
Studies 23: 187-201. 
Alexander J., 1994. State, Peasantry and Resettlement in Zimbabwe. Review of African 
Political Economy 21: 325-345. 
Alexander J., McGregor J. A., & Ranger T., 2000. Violence and memory: One hundred years 
in the ‘Dark Forests’ of Matebeleland. Oxford, James Currey. 
Allen R., 1980. How to save the world: strategy for the world conservation. London: Kogan 
Page. 
Alpert P., 1996. Integrated conservation and development projects. Bio-Science 46: 845-855. 
Anderson D., & Grove R., 1987. The scramble for Eden: past, present and future in African 
conservation. In Anderson D., & Grove R., (eds.). Conservation in Africa. People, 
policies and practice. Cambridge University Press. 
Andersson J., 2002. Going places, staying home. Rural-urban connections and the 
significance of land in Buhera district, Zimbabwe. PhD thesis. Wageningen 
University and Research Centre, the Netherlands. 
Andrews M., Lyne P., & Riley E., 1996.Validityin qualitative health care research: An 
exploration of the impact of individual researcher perspectives within collaborative 
enquiry. Journal of Advanced Nursing 23: 441-447. 
Argyris C., & Schon D. A., 1978.  Organisational learning: a theory of action perspective. 
Addison-Wesley, Reading, UK. 
Argyris C., & Schon D. A., 1996. Organisational learning II. Theory, method and practice. 
Upper Saddle River, NJ, Prentice Hall. 
Baland J. M. & Platteau J. P., 1996. Population pressure and management natural resources. 
FAO Economic and social development paper No. 139, FAO, Rome. 
Bandura A., 1977. Social Learning Theory. Englewood Cliffs, N.J, Prentice Hall. 
Barrett C. B., & Arcese P., 1995. Are integrated conservation and development programmes 
sustainable? On the conservation of large mammals in sub-Saharan Africa? World 
Development 23: 1073-1085. 
Bates R. H., 1995. Social dilemmas and rational individuals: An assessment of the new 
institutionalism. In Harriss J., Hunter J., & Lewis C. M., (eds.). The new institutional 
economics and third world development. Routledge. London, p27-48. 
Bates R. H., 1999. Ethnicity, capital formation and conflict. Social Capital Initiative Working 
Paper No. 12, World Bank, Washington DC. 
References 
 196 
Bebbington A., 2002a. Social capital/ social development/ SDV. Note prepared for the 
workshop: Social capital: The value of the concept and strategic directions for World 
Bank Lending, IFC, Washington DC. 
Beinart W., 1984. Soil erosion, conservation and ideas about development: A Southern 
African exploration, 1900-1960. Southern African Studies 11: 52-83. 
Berkes F., 2002. Cross scale institutional linkages: Perspectives from the bottom up. In Deitz 
N., Ostrom E., & Stern P. C., (eds.). The drama of the commons. National Research 
Council, Washington p293-321. 
Blaikie P., & Brookfield H., 1987. Land Degradation and Society. London, Methuen. 
Bond P., & Manyanya M., 2003. Zimbabwe’s Plunge: Exhausted Nationalism, Neoliberalism 
and the Search for Social Justice. University of Natal Press, South Africa, Weaver 
Press, Harare, Zimbabwe and the Merlin Press, London, UK. 
Bonger T., 1999. The CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe: Institutional Innovation and 
Implications for environmental governance. In, Okoth-Ogendo H. W. O., & 
Tumushabe G. W., (eds.). Governing the Environment. Political Change and Natural 
Resources Management in Eastern and Southern Africa. ACTS Press, Kenya, 
Nairobi. 
Borrini-Feyerabend G., 1996. Collaborative management of protected Areas. Tailoring the 
approach to the context. Gland, Switzerland, IUCN. 
Borrini-Feyerabend G., 2002. Indigenous and local communities and protected areas: 
rethinking the relationship. Parks 2: 5-15. 
Bosch O.J.H., Allen W.J., & Gibson R.S., 1996. Monitoring as an integral part of 
management and policymaking. Proceedings of symposium ‘Resource management: 
issues, visions and practice’. Lincoln University. New Zealand. 5-8 July 1996, p12-
21. 
Bourdieu P., 1985. The forms of Capital. In, Richardson John (ed.). Handbooks of Theory and 
Research for the sociology of education. New York: Greenwood, p241-258. 
Bourdieu P., 1992. Invitation to a reflexive sociology. University of Chicago Press. 
Bowles S., 1999. Social capital and community governance. Focus: Newsletter of the Institute 
for Research on Poverty Vol. 20: 6-10. 
Bradley P.N., & McNamara K., (eds.), 1993. Living with trees: Policies for forestry 
management in Zimbabwe. World Bank Technical Paper 210. Washington DC, 
World Bank. 
Brechin S. R., Wilsushen P. R., Fortwangler C. L., & West P. C., 2002. Beyond the Square 
Wheel: Toward a more comprehensive understanding of biodiversity conservation as 
social and political process. Society and Natural Resources 15: 41-64. 
Bromley D. W., & Cernea M. M., 1989. The management of common property natural 
resources: some conceptual and operational fallacies: World Bank Discussion Papers, 
Discussion paper No. 57. 
Bromley D. W., 1989. Property relations and economic development: the other land reform. 
World development 17: 866-867. 
Bromley D. W., 1999. Economic dimensions of community-based conservation. In, Bromley 
D. W., (ed.). Sustainable Development: Environmental Resources in Developing 
Countries p163-179. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Bromley W. D., (ed.), 1992. Making the commons work: Theory practice and policy. ICS 
Press. San Fransisco. 
Brown K., 2003. 'Trees, forests and communities': some historiographical approaches to 
environmental history on Africa. Area 35: 343-356. 
Bryant R., & Bailey S., 1997. Third world political ecology. London, Routledge. 
Burr V., 1995. An introduction to social constructionism. London, Routledge. 
Campbell B. M., de Jong W., Lucket M., Mandondo A., Matose F., Nemarundwe N., & 
Sithole B., 2001. Challenges to proponents of common property systems: despairing 
voices from the social forests of Zimbabwe. World Development 29: 589-600. 
References 
197 
 
Campbell B. M., Frost P., & Byron N., 1996. Miombo woodlands and their use: overview and 
key issues. In, Campbell B., (ed.). The Miombo in transition: woodlands and welfare 
in Africa, p11-57, Cifor, Bogor, Indonesia. 
Campbell B. M., Mukamuri B. B. & Sithole B., 1998. Managing sacred woodlands in 
Zimbabwe. World bank/ WBI’s CBNRM initiative. 
Campbell J.Y., 1992. Joint forest management in India. Social Change 22: 36-54. 
Carmen R., 1996. Autonomous development. London: Zed Books. 
Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and Legal Resources Foundation, 1999. Breaking 
the silence. Building true peace. A report on the in Matebeleland and the Midlands: 
1980-1988. Summary Report. CCJPZ and LRF, Harare, Zimbabwe. 
Central Statistics Office, 1992. Zimbabwe national census report. Harare: Government 
Printers. 
Centre for Housing Rights and the Evictions, 2001. Land, Housing and Property Rights in 
Zimbabwe (Geneva: COHRE, September, 2001), available at www.cohre.org, 
accessed 10 November 2007. 
Cernea M. M., (ed.), 1995. Putting people first: Sociological variables in rural development. 
A World Bank Publication, Washington DC., USA. 
Chambers R., 1974. Managing rural development. Ideas and experiences from East Africa. 
Uppsala. The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. 
Chauveau J. P., & Richards P., 2008. West African insurgencies in agrarian perspectives: 
Cote d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone Compared. Wageningen University and Research 
Center Publications. 
Chigwenya A., & Manatsa D., 2007. The History of Natural Resource Management in 
Zimbabwe: A chronicle of how sustainable resource management has remained an 
elusive concept. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 9: 102-115. 
Childs S. L., & Walker B.H. 1987. Ecology and dynamics of woody vegetation on the 
Kalahari sands in Hwange National Park, Zimbabwe. Vegetatio 72: p111-128. 
Chitiyo T. K., 2000. Land Violence and compensation: Reconceptualising Zimbabwe’s land 
and War Veterans’ Debate. Track Two Occasional Paper, Vol. 9. 
CIFOR, 2000. The ACM Researcher’s Handbook. A work in progress. Draft 2, 5 October. 
Cleaver F., 1999. Paradoxes of participation: Questioning participatory approaches to 
development, Journal of International Development 11: 597-612. 
Cleaver F., 2000. Moral Ecological Rationality. Institutions and the management of common 
property resources. Development and Change 31: 361-383. 
Cliffe L. 1988b. Zimbabwe’s Agricultural success and food security in Southern Africa. 
Review of African Political Economy 43: 4-25. 
Cliffe L., 1988a. The conservation issue in Zimbabwe. Review of the African Political 
Economy 42: 48-58.  
Coleman J. S.,  1990. Foundations of society theory. The Balknap Press of Harvard 
University Press: Cambrigde, MA. 
Coleman J. S., 1988. Social Capital in the creation of human capital. American Journal of 
Sociology 94 (supplement):  S95-S120. 
Colfer, C. J. P., (ed.), 2005a. The Equitable forest. Diversity, community and resource 
management. Resources for the Future, Washington DC, USA. 
Colfer, C. J. P., 2005b. The complex forest. Communities, uncertainty and adaptive 
collaborative management. Resource for the Future, Washington DC, USA. 
Collier P., 1998. Social Capital and poverty. Social Capital Initiative Working Paper No. 4, 
World Bank, Washington DC. 
Cooke W., & Kothari U., (eds.), 2001. Participation: The new tyranny? London, Zed Books. 
Côté J. & Levine C., 2002. Identity Formation, Agency and Culture. A Social Psychological 
Synthesis, Mahwah/New Jersey/London, Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Curtin P., 1964. The image of Africa. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Cutcliffe J. R., 2003. Reconsidering reflexivity: Introducing the case for intellectual 
entrepreneurship. Qualitative Health Research 13: 136-148. 
References 
 198 
Darling F. F., 1960. Wildlife in an African territory. Lusaka: Game and Tsetse Control 
Department, Government of Northern Rhodesia. 
Dasgupta P., & Serageldin I., 2000. Social capital: A Multifaceted Perspective. World Bank, 
Washington D.C., USA. 
Daubon R. E., & Saunders H. H., 2002. Operationalising social capital: A strategy to enhance 
communities’ “capacity to concert”. International Studies Perspective 3: 176-191. 
Davis R., & Rattso J., 1996. Growth, distribution and environment: macroeconomic issues in 
Zimbabwe. World Development 24: 395-405. 
DeFilippis J., 2001. The Myth of social capital in community development. Housing Policy 
Debate 12: 781-806. 
Dekker, M., 2004. Risk, resettlement and relations: Social security in rural Zimbabwe. 
Tinbergen Institute Research Series No. 331. Amsterdam, the Tinbergen Institute and 
the Free University of Amsterdam. 
Department of Geography, Lancaster University, 2005. What’s happening in political ecology 
in the ‘third world’? Human Geography poster 6, http://geography.lancs.ac.uk.  
Diaw M. C., Aseh T. & Prabhu R., (eds.) 2009. In search of Common Ground. Adaptive 
Collaborative Management In, Cameroon. Center for International Forestry Research, 
Bogor, Indonesia. 
Diaw M. C., Aseh T. & Prabhu R., (eds.) 2009. In search of Common Ground. Adaptive 
Collaborative Management in Cameroon. Center for International Forestry Research, 
Bogor, Indonesia. 
Dore D. (not dated). Transforming traditional institutions for sustainable natural resource 
management. History, narratives and evidence from Zimbabwe’s Communal areas. 
African Studies Quarterly 5, no. 3, [online] URL: 
http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v5/v5i3a1.htm. 
Douglas M., 1986. How institutions think. Syracuse NY, Syracuse University Press. 
Dudley R. G., 2004. The dynamic structure of social capital: How interpersonal connections 
create communitywide benefits. Paper prepared for presentation at the 22nd 
International Conference of the System Dynamics Society, July 25-29. 
Duffy R., 2000. Killing for conservation. Wildlife Policy in Zimbabwe. London, James 
Currey. 
Durlauf S., 1999. The case against social capital. Focus: Newsletter of the Institute for 
Research and Poverty 20: 1-5. 
Dzingirai V. and Breen C. (eds.), 2005. Confronting the crisis in community conservation. 
Case studies from Southern Africa. Center for Environment, Agriculture and 
Development, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. 
Eckholm K., 1980. On the limitations of civilisation: The structure and dynamics of global 
systems. Dialectic Anthropology 5: 155-166. 
Edwards Bob, & Foley Michael, 1997. Social capital and the political economy of our 
discontent. American Behavioural Scientist 40: 669-78. 
Eicher C. K., Tawonezvi P., & Mandivamba R., 2006. Synthesis. In Rukuni M., Tawonezvi 
P., Eicher C., with Munyuki-Hungwe M., & Matondi P., (eds.) 2006. Zimbabwe’s 
Agricultural Revolution Revisited. University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare. 
Zimbabwe. 
Emerton L., 2001. The nature of benefits and the benefits of nature. Why wildlife 
conservation has not economically benefited communities in Africa. In Hulme D., & 
Murphree M., (eds.). African wildlife and livelihoods: the promise and performance 
of community conservation p208-226, Oxford, James Currey. 
Ferraro P., & Kiss A., 2002. Direct payment to conserve biodiversity. Science 298: 1718-
1719. 
Fine B., 1999. The developmental State is dead. Long live social capital? Development and 
Change 30: 1-19. 
Fine B., 2001. Social capital versus social theory: Political economy and social science at the 
turn of the millennium. London, Routledge. 
References 
199 
 
Fine B., 2002. They F**k you up those social capitalists. Editorial Board of Antipode. 
Blackwell publishing, Oxford, UK and Malden MA, USA. 
Fine B., 1998. From Bourdieu to Becker: Economics confronts the social sciences. 
International Papers in Political Economy 5: 1-43. 
Fisher R. J. & Jackson W.J., 1998. Action research for collaborative management of protected 
areas. Workshop on Collaborative Management of Protected Areas in the Asian 
Region. Sauraha, Nepal, 25-28 May. 
Foley M., & Edwards B., 1997. Escape from politics? Social theory and the social capital 
Debate. American Behavioural Scientist 40: 550-61. 
Foley M., & Edwards B., 1998. Beyond tocqueville: Civil society and social capital in 
comparative perspective. American Behavioural Scientist 42: 5-20. 
Folke C., Carpenter S., Elmqvist T., Gunderson L., Holling C. S., & Walker B., 2002. 
Resilience and sustainable development: Building adaptive capacity in a world of 
transformations. Ambio 31: 437-440, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. 
Forestry Commission 2004. Annual Report. Harare, Zimbabwe. 
Forestry Commission, 1997. Resource sharing seminar: Kadoma Ranch Motel, 9-11 April 
1997, Forest Commission, Harare. 
Forestry Commission, 1998. Mission statement. Harare, Zimbabwe. 
Franks P., & Worah S., 2003. New directions for integrated conservation and development – a 
CARE/WWF perspective. Gland: WWF International Improving Conservation and 
Development in Eco-regions Programme: Issues in Natural Resource Management 1: 
2-3. 
Freire P., 1970. Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York. Herder and Herder. 
Frost P. G. H. & Bond I., 2006. CAMPFIRE and payments for environmental services. 
CIFOR publication, Bogor, Indonesia 
Frost P. G. H., 1996. The ecology of miombo woodlands. In Campbell B., (ed.). The Miombo 
in transition: woodlands and welfare in Africa. Cifor, Bogor, Indonesia. 
Frost P.G.H., & Mandondo A., 1999. Improving rural livelihoods in semi arid regions through 
management of micro catchments. IES working paper, No. 12. 
Galston W., 1996. Won’t you be my neighbour? American Prospect, May-June. 
Gibson C. C., & Marks S. A., 1995. Transforming rural hunters into conservationists: An 
assessment of community-based wildlife management programmed in Africa. World 
Development 23: 941-957. 
Gibson C., 1999. Politicians and Poachers: The political economy of wildlife policy in Africa. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Giddens, 1990.  The consequences of modernity. Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Giller K. E., Leeuwis C., Andersson J. A., Andriesse W., Brouwer A., Frost P., Hebink P., 
Heitkonig, van Ittersum M. K., Koning N., Ruben R., Slingerland M., Udo H., 
Veldkamp T., van de Vijver C., van Wijk M. T., & Windmeijer P., 2008. Competing 
claims on natural resources: What role for science? Ecology and Society 13: 34. 
[online] URL: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss2/art34/. 
Government of Zimbabwe, 1996. Forest Act. Chapter 19:05. Revised edition. Government 
printer, Harare. 
Graham A. D. 1973. The gardeners of Eden. London, George Allen and Unwin. 
Greenberg J. B. and Park T. K., 1994. Political ecology. Journal of Political ecology 1:1-12. 
Grootaert C., 1998. Social Capital: The missing link? Social Capital Initiative Working Paper 
No. 3, World Bank, Washington DC 
Grove R., 1987a. Early themes in African conservation: The cape in the nineteenth century. 
In, Anderson D., and Grove R., (eds.), 1987. Conservation in Africa. People, policies 
and practice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
Grove R., 1987b. Conservation and colonialism: the development of environmental attitudes 
and conservation policies in the British Imperial Context, with special reference to 
India, Mauritius and the Cape Colony, p1814-1914. Unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of Cambridge 
References 
 200 
Guijt I., (2007), Negotiated Learning: Collaborative monitoring in resource management. 
Resources for the Future (RFF), Washington DC, USA. 
Guillemin M., and Gillam L.,2004. Ethics, reflexivity and ethically important moments in 
research. Qualitative Inquiry 10: 261-280. 
Hanifan L., 1916. The Rural school community Centre. Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 67: 130-38. 
Hannah L., 1992. African People, African Parks: An evaluation of development initiatives as 
a means of improving protected area conservation in Africa. Washington (DC): 
Biodiversity Support Program. 
Hardin G. 1968. The tragedy of the commons. Science 162: 1243-1248. 
Harriss J., (ed.), 1982. Rural development: Theories of peasant economy and agrarian change. 
Hutchson University Library for Africa, London. 
Harriss J., 2001. Depoliticising development: the World Bank and Social Capital. London, 
Anthem Press. 
Harrisson P., 1984. Inside the third world: the anatomy of poverty. London, Penguin. 
Hartanto H., Lorenzo M. C, Valmores C., Arda-Minas, Burton E. M. & Prabhu R., 2003. 
Learning together: Responding to change and complexity to improve community 
forests in the Philippines. CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia. 
Harvey C., (ed.), 1996. Constraints on the success of structural adjustment in Africa. 
McMillan, London. 
Hasler R., 1996. Agriculture Foraging and Wildlife Resources Resource use in Africa: 
Cultural and Political Dynamic in the Zambezi Valley. New York: Kegan Paul 
International 
Hayes T. M., 2006. Parks, people and forest protection: An institutional Assessment of the 
effectiveness of protected areas. World Development 34: 2064-2075, Elsevier Ltd. 
Hertz R., 1997. Introduction: Reflexivity and voice. In, Hertz (ed.), Reflexivity and voice, p 
vi-xviii, Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage. 
Hesseling G., 1996. Legal and institutional Incentives for local environmental management. 
In: Marcussen H. S., 1996. Improved Natural Resource Management – the role of 
formal organisations and informal Networks and institutions. Occasional paper 
No.17. International Development Studies, Roskilde University, p98-134. 
Hickey S., & Mohan G., 2005. Relocating participation within a radical politics of 
development. Development and Change 36: 237-262. 
Hill P., 1986. Development economics on trial: the anthropological case for a prosecution. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Holman M., 2000. A shaky grip on Zimbabwe’s moral ground, Financial Times, 13 April. 
Holmberg J., (ed.), 1992. Policies for a small planet. London: Earthscan Publications Limited 
Hope, A. and Timmel, S. 1995 Training for transformation: A handbook for community 
workers (rev. ed.), Books I–III. Mambo Press, Gweru, Zimbabwe. 
Huberman A. M., & Miles M. B., 1994. Data management and analysis methods. In, Denzin 
N. K. and Lincoln (eds.). Handbook of qualitative research, p428-424, Thousand 
Oaks CA, Sage. 
Human Rights Watch, 2003. Under the shadow: Civil and political rights in Zimbabwe. 
Accessed at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/zimbabwe060603.htm on 30/05/ 
2007. 
Human Rights Watch. 2002. Fast rack Land Reform in Zimbabwe. March 2002, Vol. 14, A. 
Husain I., & Faruqee R., 1996. Adjustment in Africa: lessons from country case studies. The 
World Bank, Aldershot, England and Brookfield VT, USA. 
International Crisis Group, 2005. Zimbabwe’s Operation Murambatsvina. The Tipping Point? 
August 2005 Report. Downloaded at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/southern_africa/097_zim
babwe_s_operation_murambatsvina_the_tipping_point.pdf on 19 Jan 2010. 
References 
201 
 
International Crisis Group, 2006. Zimbabwe’s continuing self destruction. Update briefing. 
Update briefing No 38. Pretoria/ Brussels, 6 June 2006.  Accessed at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3618&l=1, 07/06/2007. 
International Crisis Group, 2007. Zimbabwe: an end to the Stalemate? Africa report No. 122 – 
5March 2007. Accessed at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3618&l=1 
on 07/06/2007. 
ITDG, 1997. Chivi food security project: A process approach. ITDG publication, Harare, 
Zimbabwe. 
IUCN, 1980.World Conservation Strategy. Gland, Switzerland: International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. 
Jiggins J. & Roling N., 2000. Adaptive Management: Potential and limitations for ecological 
governance.  International Journal of Agricultural Resources, Governance and 
Ecology 1: 28-42.  
Jum C. 2003. New thinking: Local actors in a buffer zone management enterprise in 
Cameroon. ACM news Vol. 4, No.1, Cifor, Bogor, Indonesia. 
Jum C., Abega M., & Bengono F., 2009. Action Research as a strategy for collaborative 
management in Ottotomo. In, Diaw M. C., Aseh T. & Prabhu R., (eds.), 2009. In 
search of Common Ground. Adaptive Collaborative Management in Cameroon. 
Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia. 
Kadenge P. G., Ndoro H., & Zwizwai B. M., 1992. Zimbabwe structural adjustment 
programme: the first year experience. SAPES Books, Monograph Series No.2, 
SAPES Books, Harare, Zimbabwe. 
Kaimowitz D., & Shell D., 2007. Conserving what and for whom? Why conservation should 
help meet basic human needs in the tropics. Biotropica 39: 567-574.  
Katerere Y., 1999. Overview of community based natural resource management in the region. 
A paper presented at a workshop on Exchange Visit of Directors. 
Katerere Y., Moyo S., & Mujakachi L., 1993. The national context: Land, agriculture and 
structural adjustment, and the Forestry Commission. In Living with Trees: Policies 
for Forest Management in Zimbabwe edited by P. N. Bradley & K. McNamara, 
World Bank Technical Paper No. 210, Washington DC, The World Bank. 
Kayambazintu D., Matose F., Kajembe G., & Nemarundwe N., 2003. Institutional 
arrangements governing natural resource management of the Miombo Woodland, In, 
Kowero G., Campbell B. M., & Rashid Sumaila U. Policies and governance 
structures in woodlands of Southern Africa. CIFOR Publication, Bogor, Indonesia. 
Khumalo M. A., (Compiler), 2003. CAMPFIRE Monitoring and evaluation Data 2001. 
WWF-SARPO and the CAMPFIRE Association, Harare, Zimbabwe. 
Kinsey B. H., 2004. Zimbabwe’s Land Reform Programme: Underinvestment in post-conflict 
transformation. World Development 32: 1669-1696. 
Kiss A., 1990. Living with wildlife: Wildlife resource management with local participation in 
Africa. Washington DC: World Bank. Technical Paper No. 130. 
Knudsen A. J.,  1995. Living with the commons: Local institutions for natural resource 
management. Report, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway. 
Kozananyi W., 2005. From glory to shambles: The rise and fall of the Romwe initiative. In 
Mutimukuru T., & Kozanayi W., (eds.), 2005.  ACM News Zimbabwe. Keeping the 
momentum: Sustaining projects/processes when outside support has been withdrawn. 
Vol. 2: No. 2. A newsletter published by Mirror Publications for CIFOR Zimbabwe. 
Kramer R.A., & van Schaik C.P., 1997. Preservation paradigms and tropical rain forests. In, 
Kramer R.A., van Schaik C.P., & Johnson J. (eds.). The last stand. Protected areas 
and the defence of tropical biodiversity. New York, Oxford University Press, p3-14. 
Krishna A., & Uphoff N., 1999. Mapping and measuring social capital: A conceptual and 
empirical study of collective action for conserving and developing watersheds in 
Rasthan, India. Social Capital Working Paper No. 13, Washington DC. 
Krishna A., Uphoff N., & Esman M. J., (eds.), 1997. Reasons for hope: Instructive 
experiences in rural development. W. Hartford, CT, Kumarian Press. 
References 
 202 
Kusumanto T., Yuliarni L. E., Macoun Y., & Adnan H., 2005. Learning to adapt: Managing 
forests together in Indonesia. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, 
Indonesia. 
Leach M., 2002. Plural perspectives and institutional dynamics: Challenges for community 
forestry. In, Oglethorpe J. A. E., (ed.). Adaptive Management. From theory to 
practice. UUCN, Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, UK.  
Leeuwis C. & Pyburn R., 2002b. Social learning for rural resource management, In Leeuwis 
C., and Pyburn R., (eds.), 2002. Wheelbarrows Full of Frogs: Social learning in rural 
resources management. Assen, The Netherlands: Koninklijke van Gorcum, p11-21. 
Leeuwis C., 2000. Reconceputizing participation for sustainable rural development: Towards 
a negotiative approach.  Development and Change 31: 931-959.  
Lemann N., 1996. Kicking in groups. Atlantic Monthly, April, p22-26. 
Lensink R., 1996. Structural adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa. Longman, London. 
Lerbert T., undated. An introduction to land and agrarian reform in Zimbabwe. Downloaded 
at http://www.landaction.org/gallery/Zim%20Bckgrndr-
bested%20completed.pdf  on 11 January 2010. 
Lincoln Y. S., & Guba E. G., 1985. Naturalistic inquiry. Beverley Hills, CA, Sage. 
Logan B. I., & Moseley W. G., 2002. The political ecology of poverty alleviation in 
Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources 
(CAMPFIRE). Geoforum 33: 1-14, Pergamon. 
Loury G., 1977. A dynamic theory of radical income differences. In, Wallace Phyllis & 
LaMond Annette, 1977. Women, Minorities and Employment discrimination. 
Lexington, MA: Heath, p153-88. 
Lowe P. D., 1980. Ecology as ideology. In, Buttel F., Gavazzani F., & Newby H., (eds.). 
Rural sociology of advanced societies.  London, Croom Helm. 
Maarleveld M, & Dangbegnon C., 1998. Managing natural resources in face of evolving 
conditions. A social learning perspective. Paper presented at crossing boundaries, the 
seventh conference of the international Association for the study of common 
property, June 10-14, Vancouver, Canada.  
Maarleveld M. & Dangbégnon C., 1999 Managing natural resources: a social learning 
perspective. Agriculture and Human Values 16: 267–280. 
MacDougall S., Ojha H., Banjade M.N., Pandit H. B., Bhattarai T., Maharjan M., & Rana S., 
2008. Forests of Learning. Experiences from research on an Adaptive Collaborative 
Approach to community forestry in Nepal. A synthesis of lessons from the Adaptive 
Collaborative Management Research Project in Nepal, 1999 – 2002 and 2004-2007. 
Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia. 
Mair L., 1984. Anthropology and development. London, Macmillan. 
Makoshori S., 2007. Price increases stoke inflationary pressures. In the Zimbabwe Situation. 
Accessed at http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/jun8a_2007.html#Z15 on 
08/06/2007. 
Makumbe J. Mw., 1998. Democracy and development in Zimbabwe: constraints of 
decentralisation. SAPES Trust, Harare. 
Mandondo A. 1997. Trees and spaces as emotion and norm laden components of local 
ecosystems in Nyamaropa Communal Lands, Nyanga District, Zimbabwe. 
Agricultural and Human Values 14: 352-372. 
Mandondo A. 2000a. Forging democratic resource governance systems from the Relic of 
Zimbabwe’s colonial past. Berkeley, CA, Institute of International Studies. 
Mandondo A., 2000.  Situating Zimbabwe’s Natural Resource Governance Systems in 
History. CIFOR Occasional Paper No. 32. 
Mandondo A., 2001. Allocation of governmental authority and responsibility in tiered 
governance regimes: the case of Chivi Rural District Council land use planning and 
conservation by-laws. African studies Quarterly 
http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v5/v5i3a3.htm 
References 
203 
 
Mandondo A., Prabhu R., & Matose F., (eds.) 2008. Copying amidst chaos. Studies on 
Adaptive Collaborative Management from Zimbabwe. Center for International 
Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia. 
Mandondo, Alois (undated). "Allocation of governmental Authority and Responsibility in 
Tiered Governance Regimes: The Case of the Chivi Rural District Council Landuse 
Planning and Conservation By-Laws.” African Studies Quarterly 5, no.3: [online] 
URL: http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v5/v5i3a3.htm. 
Manyena S. B., 2006. Rural District Authorities and disaster resilience in Zimbabwe. Disaster 
Prevention and Management 15: No. 5, Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
Mapedza E., 2002. Compromised co-management, compromised outcomes: Experiences from 
a Zimbabwean forest. Paper presented at the IASCP conference in Victoria Falls, 
Zimbabwe. 
Mapedza E., 2007. Forestry policy in colonial and postcolonial Zimbabwe: Continuity and 
Change. Journal of Historical Geography 33: 833-851. 
Mapedza, E. and Mandondo A. (2002) ‘Co-management in the Mafungautsi State Forest Area 
of Zimbabwe – What Stake for Local Communities?’ Working Paper no. 5, Working 
Paper Series on Environmental Governance in Africa, Washington D.C, World 
Resources Institute. 
Marnham P., 1980. Fantastic invasion: Dispatches from contemporary Africa. London, 
Jonathan Cape. 
Marquette C. M., 1997. Current Poverty, Structural Adjustment and Drought in Zimbabwe. 
World Development 25: 1141-1149. 
Martin R. B., 1986. Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources 
(CAMPFIRE), Branch of Terrestrial Ecology, Department of National Parks and 
Wildlife Management, Harare. 
Marx L., 1964. The Machine in the garden: technology and the pastoral ideal in America. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Masiiwa M., & Chigejo O., 2003. The Agrarian reform in Zimbabwe. Sustainability and 
Empowerment of Rural Communities. IDS, UZ. 
Mason J., 1996. Qualitative researching. London, Sage. 
Matondi P. B. & Munyuki-Hungwe M. N., 2006. The evolution of agricultural policy: 1990-
2004. In, Rukuni M., Tawonezvi P., Eicher C., with Munyuki-Hungwe M., & 
Matondi P., (eds.), 2006. Zimbabwe’s Agricultural Revolution Revisited. University 
of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare. Zimbabwe. 
Matondi P. B., 2001. The struggle for access to land and water resources in Zimbabwe: The 
case of Shamva District. Agraria 297, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, 
Uppsala. 
Matose F. M. 2002. Local people and reserved forests in Zimbabwe. What prospects for co-
management? Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Development 
Studies. University of Sussex. 
Matose, F., 1997. Conflicts around forest reserves in Zimbabwe. What prospects for 
community management? IDS Bulletin 28: No. 4. 
Maturure P. N., Mazambani, D., Mujakachi, L. R., Phiri C. & Sibanda S., 1994. Community-
based natural resource management project: Pilot forest grazing and wildlife 
management program in Mafungautsi forest – Preliminary results of the feasibility 
study. Harare: Forestry Extension Services, Forestry Commission internal document.  
Mazrui A., 1980. The African Condition: a political diagnosis. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
McCay B. J., and Acheson J. M. (eds.) 1987. The Question of the commons: The culture and 
ecology of communal resources. University of Arizona Press, Tucson. 
McGreal C., 2002. The Trail from the Lancaster House, Guardian, 16 January. 
McGregor T., 1991. Ecology, policy and ideology: An historical study of woodland use and 
change in Zimbabwe’s communal areas. PhD thesis, Loughborough University of 
Technology. 
References 
 204 
McNamara K., 1993. Key policy issues. In, Bradley P.N & McNamara K. (eds.), 1993. Living 
with trees: Policies for forestry management in Zimbabwe. World Bank Technical 
Paper 210. Washington DC, World Bank. 
Mehretu A, 1994. Social poverty profile of communal areas.  In Rukuni M. and Eicher C. 
(eds.), Zimbabwe agricultural revolution. Harare: University of Zimbabwe 
Publications. 
Meinzen-Dick R., DiGregorio M. & McCarthy N., 2004. Methods for studying collective 
action in rural development. Agricultural Systems 82: 197-214. 
Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, 2001a. Land Reform and 
Resettlement Programme (Revised Phase II). Government of Zimbabwe, April 2001, 
Paragraph 2.4. 
Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, 2001b. People First: Land Reform 
and Resettlement Programme. Harare, Zimbabwe. 
Mohamed-Katerere J., undated. Participatory natural resource management in the communal 
lands of Zimbabwe: What role for customary law? African Quarterly 5, No 3 [online] 
URL:http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v5/v5i3a7.htm. 
Mohammed-Katerere J., 2001. Participatory natural resource management in the communal 
lands of Zimbabwe. What role for customary law. African Studies Quarterly. The 
online journal for African Studies. Downloaded at 
http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v5/v5i3a7.htm  on 21 March 2008. 
Moore D. S., 1996. A river runs through it: Environmental history and the politics of 
community in Zimbabwe’s Eastern Highlands. CASS Occasional paper and Institute 
of Environmental Studies, Harare. 
Mosley P. & Weeks J. 1993. Has recovery begun? Africa’s adjustment in the 1980s revisited. 
World Development 21: 1585-1606. 
Mosley, P., Subasat T., Weeks J., 1996. Assessing adjustment in Africa. World Development 
23: 1459-1473. 
Moyo M., 2000. CAMPFIRE: Policy changes and legislative amendments – programme 
Impact in the New Millennium. CASS Occasional Paper – NRM Series, CPN 
104/2000. Harare, Zimbabwe. 
Moyo S., & Skalness T., 1990. Land reform and development strategies in Zimbabwe. State 
autonomy, class and the agrarian lobby. Afrika Focus 6, p3-4.  
Moyo S., 2000. The Interaction of market and compulsory land acquisition process with 
social action in Zimbabwe’s land Reform. Paper presented at the SARIPS of the 
SAPES Trust Annual colloquium on Regional Integration: Past, present and future, 
Harare, Sheraton Hotel and Towers, 24-27 September 2000. 
Moyo S., 2001. The land occupations movement and democratization: The contradictions of 
the neoliberal Agenda in Zimbabwe (Unpublished paper) 
Mudavanhu H., Undated. Report of the ecological survey for Mafungautsi State Forest, 
Zimbabwe. 
Mudekwe J., 2003. Adaptive co-management project: Mafungautsi Forest Reserve. Baseline 
study of the forest resources and collaborative monitoring mechanisms guidelines. 
Unpublished 
Mukamuri B. B., 2000. Local institutions and management of indigenous woodland resources 
in Zimbabwe. Silva Carelica 34: 15-33. 
Mukamuri B. B., Matose F & Campbell B. M., 2000. Rural institutions: Contexualising 
community based management of natural resources in Zimbabwe. IES, University of 
Zimbabwe. 
Muphree M. W., 2000. Community based conservation: Old ways, new myths and enduring 
challenges. Paper presented at the conference on African Wildlife management in the 
New Millennium. Mweka College, Tanzania. 
Murombedzi J. C., 1992. The Communal areas Management Programme for Indigenous 
Resources (CAMPFIRE): A Zimbabwean initiative for natural resource conservation. 
CASS, University of Zimbabwe. 
References 
205 
 
Murombedzi, J. C., 1994. The dynamics of conflict in environmental management policy in 
the context of the communal areas management programme for indigenous resources 
(CAMPFIRE). . PhD thesis, Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of 
Zimbabwe. 
Murphree M. W., 1990. Decentralising the proprietorship of wildlife resources in Zimbabwe 
Communal Lands. CASS, University of Zimbabwe, Harare. 
Murphree M. W., 1993. Communities as resource management institutions. IIED Gatekeeper 
series No. 36. IIED, London. 
Murphree M., 1988. Decentralising the proprietorship of wildlife resources in Zimbabwe’s 
communal lands. Harare: Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of 
Zimbabwe. 
Murphree M., 1997. Congruent objectives, competing interests and strategic compromise. 
Paper presented at the conference on representing communities: Histories and politics 
of community based Resource Management, Helen, Georgia, USA, June. 
Murphree, 1991. Communities as institutions for resource management. Centre for Applied 
Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe. Harare. 
Mutimukuru T., & Kozanayi W., (eds.), 2005b. ACM News Zimbabwe. Keeping the 
momentum: Sustaining projects/processes when outside support has been withdrawn. 
August 2005, Vol. 2, No. 2. A newsletter published by Mirror Publications for 
CIFOR Zimbabwe. 
Mutizwa-Mangiza N. D., 1985. Community development in pre-independence Zimbabwe: A 
study of policy with special reference to rural land. Supplement to Zambezia. 
Mutizwa-Mangiza N. D., 1991. Decentralisation in Zimbabwe: problems of planning at the 
district level. In, Mutizwa-Mangiza N. D., and Wekwete A. H. J., (eds.), 1991. Rural 
development and planning in Zimbabwe, 418-443. Gower publishing company, 
Aldershot. 
Nabane N. 1997. A gender sensitive analysis of a community-based wildlife utilisation 
initiative in Zimbabwe’s Zambezi Valley. Unpublished MPhil Thesis. CASS, 
University of Zimbabwe. 
Narayan D. & Pritchett L., 1997. Cents and sociability: Household income and social capital 
in rural Tanzania. Policy Research Working Paper 1796. World Bank, Washington 
D.C. 
Nemarundwe N. 2005. The performance of CBNRM in the face of socio-political dynamism: 
A case study of CAMPFIRE in Masoka, Zimbabwe. In: Dzingirai D. & Breen C. 
(eds.), 2005. Confronting the crisis in community conservation. Case studies from 
Southern Africa. Center for Environment, Agriculture and Development, University 
of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. 
Nemarundwe N., 2003. Negotiating resource access: Institutional arrangements for 
woodlands and water use in Southern Zimbabwe. PhD thesis, Swedish University of 
Agricultural Sciences, Agraria 408, Uppsala. 
Neumann R., 2005. Making political ecology. London, Hodder Arnold. 
Newmark D. W., & Hough J. L., 2000. Conserving wildlife in Africa: Integrated conservation 
and development projects and beyond. BioScience 50: No. 7. 
Nhira C., and Matose F., 1996. Joint forest management and resource sharing: Lessons from 
India. London: International Institute for Environment and Development, Forest 
Participation Series 5. 
Nhira, C., Baker S., Gondo P., Mangono J. J., & Marunda C., 1998. Contesting inequality in 
access to forests. Zimbabwe country study, Policy that works for forests and people 
series, no. 5. CASS, Harare, Forestry Commission, Zimbabwe and IIED, UK. 
North D. C., 1990. Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Nyambara P. S., 2001a. The closing frontier: agrarian change, immigrants and the squatter 
menace in Gokwe, 1980-1990s. Journal of Agrarian Change 1: 534-549. 
References 
 206 
Nyambara P. S., 2001b. The politics of land acquisition and struggles over land in the 
communal areas of Zimbabwe: the Gokwe Region in the 1980s and 1990s. Africa: 
The International African Institute 71: 253-285, Markets in a new Era.  
Nyambara P. S., 2002. Madheruka and Shangwe: ethnic identities and the culture of 
modernity in Gokwe, north-western Zimbabwe 1963-79. African History 43: 287-
306. 
Nyangani E., 1971. A comparison of the farming practices of the indigenous Shangwe tribe 
and the more recent immigrants in the Kana TTL of Gokwe District. BA thesis, 
University of Rhodesia, Department of Geography. 
Oates J. F., 1995. The dangers of conservation by rural development. A case study from the 
forests of Nigeria. Oryx 29: p115-122. 
Oates J. F., 1999. Myth and reality in the rain forest: How conservation strategies are failing 
in West Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Olwig K. F., & Olwig K., 1980. Conflicting perceptions of nature in an ‘American Paradise’: 
the problems of American-style National Parks in the third world. Unpublished 
typescript, Department of Geography, University of Copenhagen. 
Ostrom E., 1986. An agenda for the study of institutions. Public Choice 48: 3-25.  
Ostrom E., 1990. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Ostrom E., 1994. Constituting social capital and collective action. Theoretical Politics 6: 527-
562. 
Ostrom E., 2000. Collective action and the evolution of social norms. Economic Perspectives 
14: 137-158. 
Ostrom E., Jansen A., & Anderies J. M., 2007. Going beyond panaceas. PNAS, 104: 15181-
15187. 
Ostrom E., Schroeder L., & Wynne S., 1993. Institutional Incentives and Sustainable 
Development: Infrastructure policies in perspective. Boulder, CO, Eastview Press. 
Pantoja E., 999. Exploring the concept of social capital and its relevance for community-
based development: The case of coal mining areas in Orissa, India. Social Capital 
Initiative Working Paper No.18,Washington DC. 
Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2002. Forest Act [Chapter19:05]. Downloaded at 
http://www.parlzim.gov.zw, on 20 December 2009 
Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2006. Bill Origination. Downloaded at 
http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/inside.aspx?mpgid=13&spid=48 on 20 December 
2009. 
Parl-Wostl C., & Hare M., 2004. Process of social learning in integrated resource 
management. Community and Applied Social Psychology 14: 193-206. 
Parson E. A. & Clark W. C., 1995. Sustainable development as social learning. Theoretical 
perspectives and practical challenges for the design of a research program, In, 
Gunderson L. H., Holling C. S., & Light S. S. (eds.), 1995. Barriers and bridges to the 
renewal of ecosystems and institutions. New York: Columbia University Press, p428-
460. 
Paulson S., Gezon L. L., & Watts M., 2003. Locating the political in political ecology. An 
introduction. Human Organisation 63: No. 3. 
Peet R., & Watts M., 1996. Liberating ecologies: Environment, development and social 
movements. New York: Routledge Press. 
Peterson G., 2000. The Human actor in ecological-economics models. Political ecology and 
ecological resilience: an integration of human and ecological dynamics. Ecological 
Economics 35: 323–336 
Piearce G. D., & Gumbo D., (eds.), 1993. Ecology and the management of indigenous forests: 
Proceedings of an International Symposium held in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, July, 
1993. Harare: Forestry Commission and SAREC. 
Pimpert M., & Pretty J., 1995. Parks, people and professionals: putting ‘participation’ into 
protected area management. UNRISD Discussion paper No. 57. 
References 
207 
 
Pitt D.C., 1976. Development from below. Anthropologist and development situations. The 
Hague, Mouton Publishers. 
Pollitt K., 1996. For whom the ball rolls. Nation: April 15. 
Portes A. l., 1998. Social Capital: Its origins and applications in modern sociology. Annual 
Review of sociology 24: 1-24. 
Portes A., & Landolt P., 1996. The downside of social capital. American Prospect, 94: 18-21. 
Prabhu R. & Matose F., 2008. Adversity and the adaptive possibility of local communities: 
Setting the scene. In Mandondo A., Prabhu R., and Matose F. (eds.). Copying Amidst 
Chaos. Studies on adaptive collaborative management from Zimbabwe. Resources for 
the Future (RFF), Washington DC, USA. 
Prabhu R., 2003. Developing collaborative monitoring for adaptive co-management of 
tropical African forests. Final Technical Report for the Period: January 1, 2000- 
December 31, 2002. 
Prabhu, R., McDougall, C., & Fisher, R., 2007. Adaptive collaborative management: a 
conceptual model. In: Fisher, R., Prabhu, R., McDougall, C. Adaptive collaborative 
management of community forests in Asia: experiences from Nepal, Indonesia and 
the Philippines.  Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Bogor, 
Indonesia, p16-49. 
Pretty J. & Buck L.E., 2002. Social capital and social learning in the process of natural 
resource management.  In, Barrett C.B., Place F. & Aboud A.A. (eds.) Natural 
Resources Management in African Agriculture. Nairobi: ICRAF and CABI 
Publishing. 
Pretty J. & Ward H., 2001. Social capital and environment. World Development 29: 209-227. 
Pretty J. N., 1995. Participatory learning for sustainable agriculture. World Development 23: 
1247-1263. 
Pretty J., 2003. Social capital and the collective management of resources. Science 32: 1912-
1914 
Putnam R. D., 1993a. Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University press. 
Putnam R. D., 1993b. The prosperous community: social capital and public life. American 
Prospect, Spring: p35-42. 
Putnam R. D., 1995. Bowling Alone: America’s declining social capital. Journal of 
Democracy 6: 65-78 
Putnam R. D., 1996. The strange disappearance of civic America. American prospect, winter: 
34-48. 
Putnam R. D., 2000. Bowling Alone: The collapse and revival of American community. 
Touchstone Books, New York, NY. 
Putnam R. D., Leonardi R., & Nannetti R. Y., 1993. Making democracy work. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton. 
Rahman M. D. A., 1995. Participatory development: Towards liberation and co-option? In 
Graig G., & Mayo M., (eds.). Community empowerment: A Reader in Participation 
and Development, p24-32, London, Zed Books. 
Ranger, T., 1985. Peasant consciousness and guerrilla war in Zimbabwe: a comparative study, 
London, James Currey. 
Redclift M., 1984 Development and the environmental crisis: red or green alternatives? 
London, Methuen. 
Ribot J. C., 1995. From exclusion to participation: Turning Senegal’s forestry policy around? 
World Development 23: 1587 – 1599. 
Ribot J. C., 1999. Decentralisation, participation and accountability in Sahelian forestry: legal 
instruments of political administrative control. Africa 69: 23-65. 
Ribot J. C., 2001. Actors, powers and accountability: Implementation and the effects of 
decentralised environmental management in Africa. World Bank, Washington. 
Richards P., 1983. Ecological change and the politics of African land-use. African Studies 
Review 26: 1-72. 
Richards P., 1985. Indigenous agricultural revolution. London, Hutchinson. 
References 
 208 
Richards P., 1992. Saving the rainforest? Contested futures in conservation. In Wallman S., 
(ed.), 1992. Contemporary futures: Perspectives from social anthropology. Routledge, 
London and New York. 
Richards P., 1996. Forest indigenous peoples: Concept, critique and cases. In, Royal Society 
of Edinburgh, 1996. Essays on the ecology of the Guinea-Congo Rain Forest. 
Proceedings Section B (Biological Sciences), Vol. 104. Published by the Royal 
Society of Edinburgh, Edinburgh. 
Riddell R., 1992. Zimbabwe to 1996: At the heart of a growing region, Economist 
Intelligence Unit Economic Prospects Series, Special Report No. 1. M205, EIU, 
London. 
Robbins P., 1994. Political ecology. Blackwell publishing. MA, USA, Oxford, UK and 
Victoria, Australia. 
Rukuni M., 2006. The evolution of agricultural policy: 1890-1990. In, Rukuni M., Tawonezvi 
P., Eicher C., with Munyuki-Hungwe M., & Matondi P., (Eds.) 2006. Zimbabwe’s 
Agricultural Revolution Revisited. University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare. 
Zimbabwe. 
Sadomba W. Z., 2007. Post-colonial challenges of  liberation movements in Southern Africa: 
Democracy, social movements and local politics in Zimbabwe. Paper presented at the 
Summer Institute on Democracy, Social Movements and Governance in the South, 
for Africa/Asia/Latin America Scholarly Collaborative Programme, Held in 
Malaysia, 2007. 
Sadomba W. Z., 2008. War Veterans in Zimbabwe’s land occupations: Complexities of a 
liberation movement in an African post-colonial settler society. PhD thesis, 
Wageningen University and Research Centre, the Netherlands. 
Saki O., & Chiware T., 2007. The law in Zimbabwe. House Global Law School Program, 
New York University School of Law, New York. 
Schneider J., 1977. Was there a pre-capitalist world system? Peasant Studies 6: 20-7. 
Schudson M., 1996. What if civic life didn’t die? American Prospect, March-April, p17-20. 
Scoones I., & Wilson K., (eds.), 1989. Households, lineage groups and ecological dynamics: 
Issues for livestock development in Zimbabwe’s communal lands. In People, Land 
and Livestock: Proceedings of a workshop on the socio-economic dimensions of 
livestock production in Zimbabwe’s communal land (ed.) Ben Cousins, p17-122. 
Harare: University of Zimbabwe. 
Scott J. C. 1986. Everyday forms of peasant resistance. In Scott J. C. & Kerkvliet B. J. T., 
(eds.) Everyday forms of peasant resistance in south east Asia, Frank CASS & Comp 
Ltd. London. 
Scott J. C., 1985. Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
Selener D., (1997).  Participatory action research and social change.  The Cornell 
Participatory Action Research Network.  Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 
U.S.A. 
Senge P. M., 1990. The fifth discipline, Doubleday, New York. 
Serageldin I., 1998. Foreword. In Grootaert C., 1998. Social Capital: The missing link? Social 
Capital Initiative Working Paper No. 3, World Bank, Washington DC. 
Sharma R. C., 1998. What ails joint forest management? A paper presented at the 
international seminar on Decentralisation and Devolution of Forest Management in 
Asia and Pacific on 30 November – 4December 1998. The Seminar was organised by 
the Philippians Department of Environment and Natural Resource Management/ 
Forest Management Bureau (DERN/FMB) and Food and Agricultural Organisation 
(FAO) and Regional Community Forest Training Centre (RECOFTC). 
Sharpe B., 1998. First the forest: Conservation, community and participation in south western 
Cameroon. Journal of the International African Institute 68: 25-45, Edinburgh 
University Press. 
Skocpol T., 1996. Unravelling from above. Prospect, March-April: 20-25 
References 
209 
 
Skott J. C., 1985. Weapons of the weak. Everyday forms of peasant resistance. Yale 
University Press, New Havenlience. Journal of Peasant Studies 2: 3-35. 
Smith A., 1980. How Western culture dominates the world. New York, Oxford University 
Press. 
Steins N., 1999. All hands on deck. An interactive perspective on complex common pool 
resource management based on case studies in the coastal waters of the Isle of Wight 
(UK), Connemara (Ireland) and the Dutch Wadden Sea. PhD thesis Wageningen 
Agricultural University, The Netherlands. 
Taylor, undated. Buffer zones: resolving the conflict between human and wildlife interests in 
the Sebungwe Region.  
Technical Committee of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Resettlement and Rural 
Development and the National Economic Consultative Forum Land Reform Task 
force, 1998.  Inception Phase Framework Plan: 1999 to 2000, an implementation plan 
of the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme – Phase 2. Harare, Government of 
Zimbabwe. 
Terborgh J., 1999. The requiem for nature. Washington DC,  Island Press. 
Thomas S. J., 1993. Indigenous woodlands and CAMPFIRE: Complementarities from 
collaboration. In Piearce G. D. & Gumbo D., (eds.) 1993. Ecology and the 
Management of Indigenous Forests: Proceedings of an International Symposium held 
in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, July, 1993. Harare: Forestry Commission and SAREC. 
Timberlake L., 1985. Africa in crisis: the causes, the lures of environmental bankruptcy. 
London, Earthscan. 
Torsvik G., 2000. Social capital and economic development: A plea for the mechanisms. 
Rationality and Society 12: 451-476. 
United Nations Devolvement Programme, 2002. Zimbabwe. Land reform and resettlement: 
assessment and suggested framework for the future – Interim Mission Report, New 
York, UNDP. 
United Nations, 2005. Report on the fact finding mission to Zimbabwe to assess the scope and 
impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlement 
Issue in Zimbabwe, Mrs Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka. 
Uphoff N., & Mijayaratna C.M., 2000. Demonstrated benefits of social capital. The 
productivity of farmer’s organizations in Gal Oya, Srilanka. World Development 28: 
1875-1840. 
Uphoff N., 1986. Local institutional development: An analytical source book with cases. 
Kumarian Press, Hartford. 
Uphoff N., 2000. Understanding social capital: Learning from the analysis and experience of 
participation. In Dasgupta P., & Serageldin I (eds.) 2000. Social capital: A 
multifaceted perspective. World bank, Washington DC. 
van der Hoven R., Marinakis A., Baily C., & Van Ginneken M., 1993. Structural change and 
adjustment in Zimbabwe, International Development Project on Structural 
Adjustment Occasional Paper. No. 16, ILO, Geneva. 
Vanclay, J., Prabhu, R. & Sinclair, F. 2006 Realising community futures: A practical guide to 
harnessing natural resources. Earthscan, London. 
Vayda P., A. & Walters B. B., 1999. Against political ecology. Human Ecology 27: 167-179. 
Venema B., & van den Breemer H., 1999. Natural resource management in Africa: 
Approaches, constraints and opportunities. In, Venema B., & van den Breemer H., 
(eds.), 1999. Towards negotiated co-management of Natural Resources in Africa. 
Transaction publishers, Rutgers University. 
Vermeulen S. J., Campbell B. M., & Matzke G. E., 1996. The consumption of wood by rural 
households in Gokwe Communal Area, Zimbabwe. Human Ecology 24: No.4 
Vermeulen S.J., 1997. Sharing of state-owned resources with local residents: the case wood in 
Mafungabusi state forest and Gokwe communal area. IES Working Paper Number 4. 
Published by the Institute of Environmental Studies, University of Zimbabwe, Harare. 
References 
 210 
Vermeulen, S.J., 1994. Consumption, harvesting and abundance of wood along the boundary 
between Mafungautsi and Gokwe Communal Area, Zimbabwe. MSc. thesis, 
University of Zimbabwe, Harare. 
Vermulen S. J., 2000. Setting the context of the Mafungautsi (Zimbabwe) Project in a criteria 
and indicators framework. Harare, CIFOR ACM Programme, Typesrcipt 53pp. 
Vincent V., & Thomas R. G., 1962. An agricultural survey of Southern Rhodesia. Part I 
Agro-ecological survey. Government Printers, Harare. 
Wallerstein I., 1974. The modern world-system I. New York, Academic Press. 
Wallerstein I., 1979a. The modern world-system II. New York, Academic Press. 
Wals E. J. A., (ed.), 2007. Social learning towards a sustainable world. Wageningen 
Academic Publishers, The Netherlands. 
Watts M., 1983a. Silent violence. Berkeley, University of California Press. 
Wells M. Brandon K., & Hannah L., 1992.  People and parks: Linking protected area 
management with local communities. Washington DC, World Bank. 
Wenger E., 1998. Communities of practice; learning, meaning and identity. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Whitlow R., 1987. Land degradation in Zimbabwe: A geographical study. Harare, 
Department of Natural Resources 
Wickramasinghe A., 1994. Deforestation, women and forestry: The case of Sri Lanka. 
Utrecht, the Netherlands, International Books. 
Wilshusen P. R., Brechin S. R., Fortwrangler C. L., & West P. C., 2002. Reinventing the 
square wheel: Critique of a resurgent ‘protection paradigm’ in international 
biodiversity conservation. Society and Natural Resources 15-17-40. 
Wolf E., 1982. Europe and the people without history. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Wollenberg, E., Edmunds, D. and Anderson, J. 2000 Anticipating change: Scenarios as a tool 
for adaptive forest management: A guide. Centre for International Forestry Research, 
Bogor.  
Woodhill, J. & Röling N., 1998. The second wing of the eagle: The human dimension in 
learning our way to more sustainable futures. In, Röling N. & Wagemakers E. (eds.) 
1998. Facilitating sustainable agriculture: participatory learning and adaptive 
management in times of environmental uncertainty. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge 
University Press, p46-77. 
Woolcock M., 2001. The place of social capital in understanding social and economic 
outcomes. Isuma: Canadian Journal of Policy Research 2: 11-17. 
Worby E., 1992. Remaking labour, reshaping identity: cotton, commoditisation and the 
culture of modernity in north-western Zimbabwe. PhD dissertation, McGill 
University. 
Worby E., 1994. Maps, names and ethnic games: the epistemology and iconography of 
colonial power in north-western Zimbabwe. Journal of Southern African Studies 20: 
371-392, Special Issue: Ethnicity and Identity in Southern Africa  
World Bank, 1995. Zimbabwe: achieving shared growth. Country Economic Memorandum. 
Volumes I and II. The World Bank, Washington DC. 
Worster D., 1985. Nature’s economy: a history of ecological ideas. Studies in environment 
and history. [New ed.] Cambridge [UK]; New York, Cambridge University Press. 
Worthington E. B., 1958. Science in the development of Africa. Paris: Commission for the 
Technical Cooperation in Africa South of Sahara. 
Zingore S., Manyame C., Nyamugafata P., & Giller K. E., 2005. Long term changes 
in organic matter of woodland soils cleared for arable cropping in Zimbabwe. 
European Journal of Soil Science 56: 727-236. 
References 
211 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annexes 
Annexes 
 212 
Annex 2.1. The Forestry Commission Organogram (Source: Forestry Commission, 2004) 
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Annex 2.2: The stages that a bill goes through in parliament before it becomes a law 
(Source: Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2006) 
 
• After being gazetted, the bill is referred to a Portfolio Committee that shadows the 
responsible ministry. The committee then consults the public to get their input on the bill. 
The Committee then prepares a report. 
• First reading: After giving a written notice on his/her intention to present a bill, the 
Minister introduces the bill to the House of Assembly by reading its title. The bill is then 
referred to the Parliament Legal Committee (PLC) to determine if the Bill, when enacted 
will contravene the Declarations of rights or section of the Constitution (constitutional 
bills are not referred to the PLC). 
• Second reading: After reports by the PLC and recommendations have been taken into 
consideration, the bill is set for second reading. At this stage, the Minister presents the 
principles of the bill and these are debated upon. Amendments are then suggested and 
these are placed at the Order Paper. 
• Committee Stage. At this stage the parliament resolves itself into a Committee and 
presents the bill to the Senate – the Chair of the committee takes over and the Speaker 
steps down. The Bill is considered clause by clause and any amendments made are 
debated. 
• Report stage. The Speaker resumes his/her role as Chair and the chair of the Committee 
reports the bill with or without amendments. If reported with amendments, the bill is 
referred to the PLC for consideration to formally adopt the recommendations. If the 
report is given without amendments, it is set for a third reading. 
• Third reading. For an ordinary bill (and not a constitutional bill), a simple majority of 
members present is sufficient to pass the bill. After this, the bill is transmitted to the other 
House of Parliament. 
• Transmission to and passage in the Other house. Once the bill has been passed in the 
house where it originated, it is transmitted to the other house and set for a second reading. 
The bill goes through the same stages as mention above. If the other house adopts the 
amendments to the Bill, it is referred back to the house of origin for concurrence. 
• Presidential Assent. Once a bill has been duly passed by the Parliament in terms of the 
Constitution and Standing Orders and is authenticated by the Clerk of Parliament, it is 
presented to the Head of State for assent. The President then returns the copy of the Act 
with his signature and Public Seal. 
• Enrolment of the Act. After the President’s assent, the Clerk of Parliament makes the 
authenticated copy of the Act to be enrolled on the record in the office of the registrar of 
high Court. 
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Annex 2.370: Zimbabwe Dollars (ZWD) equivalent to 1 United State Dollar (USD) from 
2001 to 2007 (Source: http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory) 
 
 
 
Month Year 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
January 55.19 57.37 57.09 819.02 5,516.73 91,621.13 259,000.13 
February 55.14 57.36 56.84 1,023.23 5,500.40 98,920.45 259,000.24 
March 55.14 57.38 56.86 4,077.18 5,500.40 99,322.75 259,000.09 
April 55.18 57.33 208.62 4,470.30 5,780.40 99,258.17 258,000.72 
May 55.17 57.28 813.92 5,199.76 6,561.72 101,270.19 257,000.85 
June 55.90 57.23 814.47 5,327.84 9,092.96 101,227.16 255,000.23 
July 55.97 57.08 814.44 5,314.58 11,145.30 101,292.00 255,000.12 
August 56.04 57.13 820.37 5,440.04 18,701.26 10,037.10 255,000.00 
September 56.25 57.14 816.04 5,498.97 24,293.37 259,000.57 19,518,000.95 
October  57.32 57.08 817.71 5,421.86 27,264.17 259,000.43 30,685,000.23 
November 57.26 57.07 814.22 5,616.19 62,161.39 259,000.13 30,653,000.08 
December 57.33 57.05 815.26 5,665.85 76,856.13 259,000.17 30,697,000.59 
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 The Zimbabwe reserve bank governor knocked off three zeros from the currency to help consumers deal with 
transactions rendered incomprehensible through hyperinflation. This was effected from the 1st of August 2006. The 
true numbers were used when constructing the graph. 
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Annex 3.1: The Social Learning Concept note 
 
Title: Demystifying the concept of social learning by T. Mutimukuru, Jan 2001 
 
Introduction 
Adaptive Collaborative Management comprises three broad processes namely, stakeholder 
interactions and relations, communication and learning among stakeholders, and joint or 
collective action that result in changes or adjustments to management of forest resources. The 
new management strategies impact on benefits derived from the forests and also the quality of 
the forest resource. This paper will only focus on one of the three processes, learning among 
stakeholders (social learning), and tries to answer the following question: What is social learning 
and how can it be traced in practice? It is divided into five different sections. The next section 
presents a definition of social learning. This is followed by a discussion on what facilitating 
social learning entails. Section 4 later on discusses how social learning can be traced in real life. 
The fifth section discusses a very crucial question on how the social learning process can be 
sustained.  
 
Defining Social Learning 
Several types of learning can be identified in literature and these include:  
 
Experiential learning - implies learning from experience  
 
Action Learning – represents an advance of experiential learning. According to King (2000), 
“social learning aims to provide effective means of obtaining real solutions to real problems in 
real life situations” (pp). It involves a process of experiential learning and is the underlying 
principle for action research. It allows learners to use what they learn to tackle the most priority 
problems under actual work conditions. This type of learning has multitude benefits. Learners do 
not only gain self-understanding and skills, but also uncover the real reasons underlying the 
existing problem.  
 
Participatory/Collaborative/ Social Learning. Several definitions of social learning have been 
identified in literature. Some researchers define social learning as an approach and philosophy, 
which focuses on participation processes of social change. It involves: critical self-reflection, 
development of multi-layered democratic processes, reflective capabilities of individuals and 
societies and the capacity for social movements to change political and economic frameworks for 
the better (Woodhill and Roling 1998). Others define social learning as: a conscientisation 
process (Friere, 1974), a process of experiential learning (Kolb, 1984), a dynamic process which 
involves continuous sense making of the world through the perspectives or frames of references 
based on concrete, experience-modified knowledge, beliefs, values (Dangbegnon, 1998), and 
finally, a dynamic process of adaptation and action by the stakeholders through the experiences 
encountered by involvement with other people and the physical environment. According to 
Morren and Wilson, 1990, social learning is much more than memorising facts and acquiring 
intellectual understanding and is an adaptive process, which includes the ability to act as well as 
understand and attribute meanings. Social learning depends on all sorts of preconditions, which 
have to be created and strategically negotiated in advance, and involves gaining understanding 
about other stakeholders’ perceptions, goals and interests. It is also based upon consensus 
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building through cooperation by group members (Panitz, 1996). Interaction among stakeholders 
is very important because it shows alternative ways of getting things done and is most fruitful 
when people are able to be non-judgmental, entering into dialogue and not dismissing views 
from other people because they are different, but they should try to identify the assumptions 
made and learn from them.   
          
Social learning involves a number of steps and these are (Maarleveld, et al., 1997): 
 
• Shared problem definition 
• Shared sense of mutual interdependency 
• Shared social construction of the hard system in question 
• Shared perception of the causes of the problem including agreed ways of looking at 
intractable social impasses 
• Reflective learning about how others see oneself 
• Shared perspective on the nature of the solution, both in terms of hard and soft changes 
• Collective resource mobilization 
• Establishing leadership and organization for action  
 
Defining Social Learning in the Mafungautsi context 
The various definitions for social learning have been the basis for defining social learning in the 
context of Mafungautsi, where social learning is defined as: a dynamic process of adaptation and 
action by a group of stakeholders, who are continuously interacting, communicating, and 
reflecting upon their experiences and coming up with lessons to influence future decision making 
processes. The social learning process starts with many problems being identified by 
stakeholders sharing a common resource. Through facilitation, stakeholders critically analyses 
the various problems and finally come up with a shared problem definition. This is followed by 
identification of each stakeholder’s interest in being involved in the process. With the multiple 
interests, a sense of interdependency has to be cultivated among these stakeholders in order for 
them to realize that each stakeholder cannot solve the problem single handedly and requires input 
from the other stakeholders. Stakeholders then seek the various ways of solving the problem at 
hand. Through discussions on their experiences and negotiations, stakeholders come up with a 
solution(s) that ensures that they all benefit. Leadership structures are then put in place to 
spearhead implementation of the desired solution. Stakeholders later on reflect on the solution 
and discuss if it managed to solve their problem or not. All these steps are similar to those of the 
learning cycle presented in Figure 1. 
 
But what do stakeholders learn about?  
Decision-making process in Natural Resource management is a learning process. Stakeholders 
learn about the consequences (rewards or punishments) of their actions. It is more rewarding for 
stakeholders to find their own solutions than for someone to impose solutions on them. 
Stakeholders also learn from the experiences, goals and interests of others through sharing and 
communicating with each other.  
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Facilitating Social Learning: What does it entail? 
Social learning involves learning by doing and this type of learning has a number of 
characteristics: 
 
• It cannot be wholly planned and prescribed in advance because the scope of what people 
will actually learn is not known. However, facilitators can have some guidelines on 
possible things which participants could learn 
• it does not happen once and for all and people will continue to learn and build upon what 
they have learnt previously. There are a number of steps that are involved in this type of 
learning. Participants might start with some experiences they already have or they can 
have an activity. After the activity, participants can then discuss, review and reflect upon 
it and later draw up some conclusions. The conclusion is useful in future for decision-
making processes. All these steps form a learning cycle which is represented in Figure 1, 
below 
 
Figure 171: The Learning cycle 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facilitating social learning involves (Roling and Jiggins 1998) 
Stimulating group learning processes through fostering discussion, engaging in exercises and 
creating learning experiences. It is important to realize that, in resource management situations, 
learning can take place without any assistance from outside. However, facilitators can help by 
stimulating and complementing the learning process. They can do this through: 
• Use of visualisation techniques to fasten the results so that stakeholders can see them 
quickly. 
• Fostering discovery learning by not answering farmers’ questions on the bases of one’s 
experiences, but using the questions as opportunities for discovery learning through 
experimentation 
• Replacing reliance on farmer’s own capacity to anticipate and enhance desirable natural 
processes. 
It is important for facilitators to realise that, Facilitating social learning is very complex, requires 
a lot of skills in a variety of areas and understanding of the learners’ previous experiences and 
expectations, acknowledging that humans are intentional beings and their involvement in 
learning, reactions and what they learn cannot always be predicted or anticipated (King 2000).  
 
In order to facilitate conflict resolution, negotiation and learning processes, facilitators require 
the following competencies; (i) they must have a mandate to do so, (ii) should have knowledge 
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Experiences 
Observing and 
reflecting 
Experimenting 
Conceptualization 
Annexes 
 218 
on how to facilitate, (iii) should have facilitation skills, (iv) should have authority, (v) should be 
willing to facilitate and lastly, (vi) should be trustworthy. 
 
Methodology for Tracing Social Learning 
Having defined what social learning is and how it can be facilitated, it is crucial to look at how 
this learning can be evaluated. The important questions therefore are: How do we know that 
social learning has taken place? Can social learning be measured? 
 
Two broad methodologies namely, quantitative and qualitative, have been identified in literature 
for measuring social learning.  
 
Qualitative Methods 
This focuses on stakeholder’s perceptions on the social learning process. Stakeholder’s who have 
been jointly involved in collective management of resources can be asked after a period of time 
to critically reflect on the whole process and assess the level of social learning. A qualitative in-
depth study can be carried out with groups of stakeholders, in for instance, a focus group 
discussion. A checklist can be used to guide such a discussion with the various stakeholders. An 
example of such a checklist is given below 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other qualitative techniques that can be used include: 
Participant observation - the researcher observes the changes taking place throughout the whole 
learning process including: livelihood strategies, agricultural practices and how they change over 
time. Through this technique, the researcher can also measure how much knowledge 
stakeholders use in practice. 
 
Personal evaluation forms – stakeholders can be asked to complete self-evaluation forms (the 
questions to be asked could be similar to those in the above checklist). Stakeholders can be asked 
to give their perceptions on whether they think they learned new facts, skills, arguments, new 
insights and perspectives by participating in a social learning exercise. They can also explain 
what these lessons are and how this changed their behaviour.  
 
Quantitative Methods 
This involves quantifying the changes taking place over time due to the social learning process. 
An oral/ practical test can be administered to a group of stakeholders to determine the level of 
understanding of a certain principle. The oral test that involves a stakeholder explaining how 
A checklist to Measure Social learning: Questions that could be discussed 
• Who learned?  
• What was learned?  
• What counts as learning?  
• What specific things did they learn? 
• How did they learn them?  
• Did the learning make them change their agricultural practices, forest resource 
management techniques or the way they perceive certain issues?  
• What factors hindered or enhanced the social learning process? 
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something can be made. For instance, in the case of bee keeping, a stakeholder who claims to 
have learnt about how to make a beehive can be asked to explain such a process. In the practical 
test, the stakeholder can be given all the materials needed to make a hive, and he/she can be 
asked to make the beehive in the presents of the evaluator. 
 
A quantitative survey can also be used to find out people’ practices before and after a social 
learning process and these two can be compared to see if any changes took place. Changes that 
could take place could be reductions/ additions to amount of resource harvested, and amount of 
resources allocated for each enterprise. 
 
There are not many techniques used in literature to measure social learning quantitatively, and 
the ACM project may also contribute to that. 
 
Benefits and challenges for participating in social learning 
Our hypotheses for the benefits and challenges of social learning are given below. 
 
Benefits 
• We hypothesis that stakeholders will benefit as follows: 
• The social learning systems will create a platform for communication and enhancement 
of understanding of social and biophysical systems which integrates different knowledge 
systems or ways of knowing. 
• The collaborative nature of learning enhances an in-depth understanding of the forest and 
social systems which enables greater reflective and anticipatory understanding of changes 
to the system and thus greater potential for rapid adaptation. 
• It also enhances better understanding of problems faced by the community, and help 
stakeholders to understand how each one of them view the problem, and why that is so. 
With such understanding, stakeholders together jointly re-define the problem in order to 
incorporate each other’s views. With a re-defined problem, stakeholders can jointly come 
up with better solutions that are sustainable. Knowing each other’s perception of the 
problem and interests is therefore an important element gained through social learning. 
An example to illustrate this point is as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If a problem is encountered in managing a natural resource, it is important that each 
stakeholder explains how he/she perceives this problem. For instance FC might 
mention the excessive cutting down of trees, while forest users mention prohibition of 
cutting down of trees as their biggest problem. Without these two stakeholders 
negotiating, the FC’s solution to the problem would be to increase the number of 
people in the Forest Protection Unit (FPU) so that they can arrest more people who cut 
trees illegally. At the same time, forest users might decide to go and cut trees during 
the night so that they are not caught by the FPU. In this case, solutions that are taken 
by both stakeholders are not sustainable since each stakeholder is operating 
individually. However, with social learning, both parties learn about each other’s 
definition of the problem and interests and through discussions might agree to define 
their problem and try to deal with it. Through negotiations, stakeholders then agree on 
quantities to be harvested by the forest users and how those who default will be 
punished. In this case, forest users also get involved in controlling and managing 
quantities they harvest thereby ensuring sustainable management. 
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• Social learning also helps stakeholders to benefit from other’s experiences so that they do 
not re-invent the wheel. As stakeholders go through their activities, they benefit through 
the experience of those who have undergone similar activities 
 
Challenges 
• Unwillingness of people to share their ideas/ innovations with others. Some stakeholders/ 
individuals are still not very much willing to share their activities with everyone else – 
i.e. they want to keep their innovations/ or ideas to themselves. Some stakeholders/ 
individuals could be shy to air out their own opinions, perceptions and views because 
they think others will not listen or take them into consideration 
• Different learning styles for stakeholders. Individuals have different learning styles and 
this can complicate the learning process 
• Power relations. Sometimes people tend to follow suggestion from people who they think 
are powerful and might disregard suggestions or ideas from the marginalized/ poor 
people. 
• Lack of understanding of what social learning entails. Stakeholders might fail to learn 
because of lack of understanding of what social learning entails. This might result in 
stakeholders having no motivation to be involved in the social learning exercise. 
• Unclear learning objectives. With unclear learning objectives it is very difficult for 
stakeholders to learn together. 
• Lack of motivation for involvement in social learning. Some stakeholders are very 
innovative and are always ahead in whatever they do. They might fail to see the benefits 
in being involved in the social learning processes. 
• Different education levels. Some stakeholders, because they are highly educated learn 
very fast, while others take a long time to understand what is happening.  
 
How can the social learning process be sustained? 
According to a study carried out in Australia by King (2000), three factors are important for 
sustaining social learning processes and these are: funding, facilitation and keeping learning 
going. According to the interviews conducted, funding enabled additional and enhanced learning 
opportunities to occur both within the group and the wider community. This is made possible 
through exchange visits, organized trips, competitions, only to mention a few. Concerning 
facilitation, the interviewees expressed the need to have a facilitator in the social learning 
processes. In most cases, stakeholders are not willing to take up that leading role and lack of 
facilitation was said to hinder learning. On the issue of learning, group members expressed their 
motivation to stay in a group, “to learn”.  
 
Stakeholders therefore need to be empowered with such facilitating and monitoring and 
evaluation skills, if the social learning process is to be made sustainable. One way of making 
stakeholders to have more control on sourcing funds for organizing such things as exchange 
visits, they need to be empowered through training such as the Training for Transformation. 
 
Tracing social learning in Mafungautsi 
The most crucial question now is, how are we going to trace social learning in Mafungautsi?  To 
kick off, we will start by discussing the sources of information for the stakeholders on various 
subjects they consider important in their lives. It would be important to come up with a general 
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inventory of lesson learnt so far from the information obtained.  Afterwards, the stakeholders can 
identify their information gaps, and may later come up with strategies of getting this information 
and from who. Table 1 can be used to generate such information. 
 
Table 1: Information gaps and how this information will be obtained 
 
Important subject Sources of 
information in 
order of their 
importance 
General 
lessons learnt 
so far from 
the 
information 
obtained 
Information 
gaps – 
(information 
they think 
they are 
lacking) 
From who do 
they intent to 
get this 
information 
Agriculture   
Crops 
Livestock... 
1 
2 
3… 
   
Forest  
Management 
strategies 
Growing trees… 
1 
2 
3… 
   
Business 
Entrepreneurial skills 
– setting up a viable 
business 
Budgeting… 
1 
2 
   
Leadership skills 
How to be a good 
leader 
1 
2 
3 
   
 
Strategies for filling the information gaps 
• “Look and learn” visits. Together with the ACM researchers, stakeholders can organize 
such a visit, which will be followed up to find out the lessons learnt and how this has 
affected stakeholder’s behaviour.  
• Experiments can be carried out by groups or individual farmers. Results of such 
experiments can be shared among groups of stakeholders and such lessons can also be 
traced. For example, in an effort to encourage farmers to grow trees in the forest, 
different groups of farmers could be involved in experiments to propagate different 
indigenous tree species, with the aim of finding out under what conditions (soil type, 
amount of water etc) can maximum germination of each species be achieved. After the 
experiments, the different groups of stakeholders could share their results. 
• Collaborative monitoring and evaluation can also generate very important information.  
• Training workshops – Capacity-building workshops can be organized. Examples of such 
workshops include those focusing on: training for transformation and entrepreneurial 
skills.  
• Sharing experiences among stakeholders. Sharing can be facilitated through organized 
group meetings, field days and the look and learn tours described above. Organized group 
meetings help certain issues to be discussed in a more systematic way, unlike in informal 
meetings were some aspects are not explored.  
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• A community newsletter. This could provide a platform for stakeholders to share their 
experiences and learn from each other. A small editorial team needs to be set up in this 
case, which will be responsible for editing articles that people submit. The newsletter, for 
instance could be for all people in the community who are interested in getting updates of 
what is happening in the community. These can be translated versions into vernacular 
languages for those who do not understand English.  
 
Community partners will therefore play a very important role in documenting in detail, all the 
processes taking place in the community after such interventions.  
 
Both qualitative measures and quantitative measures (as discussed in section 1.4) will be used to 
measure social learning.  
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Annex 4.1: The Community partner contract form and Terms of Reference 
 
An agreement between 
 
CIFOR ACM Zimbabwe Project, Batanai/ Gababe/ Ndarire area and Mr/Ms/Mrs…………. 
 
 
1. Mr/Ms/Mrs……………….. has been recruited by the Batanai/ Gababe/ Ndarire community and 
CIFOR ACM Zimbabwe Project as their Community Partner for their area for a contract period 
of 3 months, commencing on the 1st of October 2000, and thus ending on 31st December 2000. 
 
2. The gross monthly salary of the employee, payable monthly by the CIFOR ACM project is 
Z$3000.00. Mr/ Ms/Mrs…… undertakes to perform to the best of his/her abilities all duties that 
are required of him/her, as specified in (task description),  
 
 
Name: 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Signed: 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Date: 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Signed: 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  ACM Team Leader 
 
Date: 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Signed: 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  On behalf of Batanai/ Gababe/ Ndarire RMC 
Date: 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Terms of Refference for Community partners 
 
Research on adaptive collaborative management around Mafungautsi forest will be undertaken using the 
Participatory Action Research (PAR) approach. In this approach, communities or forest users with the 
facilitation of local Community partners will undertake the research, and the research team using PAR 
cycles of Reflection, Planning, Action, Observation, Feedback and Learning. Through the tasks below the 
Community partner will play a central role in enabling communities or forest users undertake the 
research. The community partner is primarily accountable to the community or forest users and not to the 
CIFOR ACM Zimbabwe Project. 
 
Tasks: 
 
1. Facilitate the undertaking of participatory research (PAR) by local communities and/or forest user 
groups.  
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2. Undertake regular and detailed recording of the processes and outcomes of actions being 
undertaken by communities as they carry out their participatory research. The recording will be 
undertaken in a prescribed manner that is understandable to the communities and conforms to 
their culture and skills. Reports to be submitted fortnightly. 
3. Facilitate PAR in your villages through discussions, planning, analysis, reflection, and learning 
by communities. 
4. Represent both CIFOR’s ACM team and the community at the local level and possibly above the 
local level. 
5. Liaise with level stakeholders including those from elsewhere on matters relating to PAR in your 
area. 
6. Contribute to timely preparation of reports on behalf of the community to the ACM team. 
7. Be involved in monitoring, and facilitate monitoring of research progress by communities. 
8. Carry out other duties as might be required by the CIFOR ACM team.  
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Annex 4.2: Some of the meetings organised in the research sites between 2001-2002 
 
Date of 
Meeting 
Who 
organised 
meeting 
With who? Agenda 
• Training for Transformation workshop 28/05 – 
2/06 01 
CIFOR 
researchers 
Community members from 
Batanai, Gababe and 
Ndarire 
 
FC 
• Conflict resolution workshop 
26/6/01 FC Training workshop on bee 
keeping; honey production, 
processing and marketing 
• Ndarire Community members 
16/07/01 CIFOR 
researchers 
Batanai Thatch group • Visioning and action planning 
30/07/01 CIFOR 
researchers 
Resource users from 
Gababe, Ndarire, Batanai 
and the FC 
• Criteria and Indicators workshop 
23/8/01 Development 
Levy Finance 
Committee 
Gababe community 
members 
• Levy payment and collection 
• Prioritising areas of need to be 
developed by levies generated 
29/8/01 ZANU (PF) 
Party 
Chairman 
Gababe Community 
members 
• Selection of ward co-ordinator and 
acting ward councillor 
• Informing the community about money 
set aside by government for project 
development in rural areas 
2/09/01 Community 
Partner 
Resource users in Ndarire • Report back on broom grass modelling 
seminar held in Harare 
2/9/01 RMC Batanai resource users • Sharing beehives among villages in the 
RMC 
• Selling price of old stock grass 
4/9/01 RMC Batanai resource users • Follow up of the above: deliberate on 
how beehives could be shared 
11/9/01 Community 
partner 
Batanai resource users • Dead wood and firewood collection 
CIFOR 
researchers 
Gababe Beekeeping group • Context study on bee keeping in the 
area 
16/9/01 
CIFOR 
researchers 
Batanai broom grass 
resource users 
• action planning meeting 
17/9/01 CIFOR 
researchers 
Gababe broom grass 
collectors 
• Visioning with broom grass collectors 
18/9/01 CIFOR 
researchers 
Batanai Broom grass 
resource users 
• Scenario building with broom grass 
collectors 
 CIFOR 
researchers 
Batanai Thatch grass 
resource users 
• Visioning and action planning 
20/9/01 Village heads Ndarire community 
members 
• Allocation of a single bee hive (donated 
to the community by FC) 
30/9/01 Community 
partner 
Gababe beekeeping group • History of the bee keeping project ' 
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Kancane kancane's version) 
2/10/01 Community 
partner 
Batanai resource Users • Continuation of the scenario building 
process-identifying possible constraints 
5/10/01 Community 
partner 
Batanai resource users • How to enhance high honey production 
in the community 
8/10/01 RMC 
chairperson 
Batanai Community 
members 
• Nesto's resignation and its implication 
on how the community can withdraw 
money from its bank account (Nesto 
was one of the three signatories for the 
account) 
• Outstanding fees for permits 
• Remuneration for the RMC for their 
contribution for the year 
10/10/01 Community 
Partner 
Gababe broom grass 
collectors 
• Action planning 
21/10/01 Community 
Partner 
Gababe community 
members 
• Election of new and 'effective' RMC to 
replace the existing one 
4/11/01 Mr. Mabhiza-a 
war veteran 
Batanai Community 
members 
• Settlement in Mafungautsi state forest 
by some of the farmers living adjacent 
to the forest 
15/11/01 Community 
partner 
Batanai Resource users • Illegal harvesting of resources from the 
forest 
16/12/01 RMC 
chairperson 
Batanai Resource users • Outstanding fees for permits to harvest 
thatch and broom grass 
• Selection of new committee 
Village heads Ndarire community 
members 
• Reminder on the need to protect fruit 
and other traditionally important trees 
in the community 
3/02/02 
RMC Gababe community 
members 
• Report back workshop by the RMC 
after the pre grass cutting workshop at 
Lutope camp :mainly on the increase of 
permits to harvest thatch and broom 
grass 
5/5/02 Local partner Gababe local community 
members 
• Land offered to the group to keep bee 
hives by kraalheads to Sithutha 
14/5/02 RMC Gababe resource users • New and equitable Resource allocation 
mechanism 
17/04/02 FC (CIFOR 
team were 
invited to 
attend) 
Settlers in the forest • Discuss the Forest activities and 
encourage the new settlers to take good 
care of the forest 
21/04/02 CIFOR 
researchers 
Ndarire timber group • To introduce the research to the area 
and do a visioning exercise with the 
group 
CIFOR 
researchers 
Members of the Batanai 
RMC 
• To find out about the history of the 
RMC and progress to date 
23/04/02 
CIFOR 
researchers 
Batanai Broom grass 
resource users 
• Harvesting and marketing of broom 
grass 
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• Monitoring system 
25/04/02 CIFOR 
researchers 
Batanai Broom grass 
collectors 
• Action planning with members of the 
broom grass collectors 
 
28/04/02 CIFOR 
researchers 
Ndarire Timber group • To finish the visioning exercise and do 
action planning 
19/04/02 CIFOR 
researchers 
Broom grass collectors 
Gababe 
• Continue with the visioning exercise 
that was started in September 2001 
25/0402 CIFOR 
researchers 
Gababe Beekeeping group • Come up with action plans and 
indicators for monitoring progress 
2/05/02 Community 
partner, and 
RMC 
Batanai area • Election of new committee 
• Feed back by the RMC on issues raised 
at the pre grass cutting meeting at 
Lutope: increase in license fees for 
broom and thatch grass 
15/5/02 CIFOR 
researchers 
Batanai Beekeeping group • Action planning with bee keeping 
group 
23/5/02 Community 
partner 
Batanai Broom grass 
resource users 
• Report back by Mabhena on FC 
commission response to the group's 
request to be invited for agricultural 
shows 
• Social learning on how to decorate 
brooms (value adding) 
2/06/02 Beekeeping 
sub-committee 
Gababe beekeepers • Report meeting by members of the Bee 
keeping group, subsequent to an earlier 
Action planning meeting 
CIFOR 
researchers 
Batanai Resource users  
 
• Field visit by African ACM team 
• Shared learning on methods of weaving 
brooms 
6/6/02 
CIFOR 
researchers 
Gababe Resource Users • Field visit by African ACM team 
16/6/02 RMC Batanai resource users • Extension of areas the RMC is 
harvesting broom and thatch grass 
17/6/02 Agritex Batanai Community 
members 
• Gum tree planting 
• Soil conservation 
• Master Farmer training course 
25/6/02 Agritex Batanai Community 
members 
• Training on citrus production 
 Agritex Batanai Community 
members 
• Training in crop husbandry practices, 
notably crop rotation 
Batanai beekeepers • To find out if the developed action plan 
was being implemented 
12/07/02 CIFOR 
researchers 
Ndarire Timber harvesters • Action planning 
13/07/02 FC – CIFOR 
researchers 
also attend 
Gababe resource users • To select the RMC sub-committees 
15/07/02 FC – CIFOR 
researchers 
Batanai resource users • To select the RMC sub-committees 
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were invited to 
attend 
19/07/02 CIFOR 
researchers 
Batanai resource users • Reorganise RMC 
• Make sub-committees for the 
following: Thatch, broom, projects 
(outside the forest), monitoring and 
beekeeping. 
• Present the FC program for the coming 
months 
• Present CIFOR's program in the 
coming months 
 
21/07/02 CIFOR 
researchers 
Ndarire timber harvesters • Follow up on the action plan 
23/7/02 FC – CIFOR 
researchers 
were invited to 
attend 
All RMC members from 
Mafungautsi Forest 
• Short course on income generating 
projects-by FC and the Min. Of Gender, 
Youth and Employment Creation 
22/08/02 CIFOR 
researchers 
FC officer • Discussion with the FC officer on the 
CM concept note 
22/08/02 CIFOR 
researchers 
Batanai MSC, the RMC, 
members of thatch and 
other ordinary community 
members 
• To discuss their views on monitoring 
CIFOR 
researchers 
Batanai broom and thatch 
grass resource users 
• To get their perceptions of CM 25/08/02 
CIFOR 
researchers 
Meeting with the chair 
person of Sokwela RMC 
• Key informant interview to find out 
about his views on monitoring 
26/08/02 CIFOR 
researchers 
 FC officer • To present findings from resource users 
and RMCS and key informant 
interviews on CM 
28/08/02 CIFOR 
researchers 
Batanai all stakeholder  • To present the proposed CM system 
and ask participants to come up with 
TOR for the MSC 
19/09/02 CIFOR 
researchers 
Gababe all stakeholder 
meeting 
• Come up with TOR for MSC 
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Completed Training and Supervision Plan: Tendayi Mutimukuru-
Maravanyika 
Description Department/ Institute Dates Credits 
I. Orientation    
CERES introductory course CERES, Utrecht March – April 2003 5 
CERES presentation tutorials CERES, Utrecht March – April 2003 5 
Writing Grant Proposals WGS, Wageningen 
University 
November 2009 2 
Literature review and proposal writing Wageningen University Jan. 2003 – July 
2003 
6 
 
   
II. Research Methods and Techniques    
Facilitating Change in Up-Scaling of 
participatory approaches: Building Personal 
Mastery and Organisational Capacities 
PAU, Wageningen 
University, Boxmeer 
10-18 Oct. 2002 3 
Learning in PAU: Linking Participation with 
personal development – competence 
development in Participatory Approaches and 
up-scaling 
PAU, Wageningen 
University, Baarlo 
1-4 Nov. 2003 3 
Sharing experiences on/of PhD research on 
participatory approaches  and up-scaling 
PAU, Wageningen 
University, Malindi, 
Kenya 
13-18 June 2004 2 
Learning in PAU: Support to analysis and write-
up of PhD research 
PAU, Wageningen 
University, Jinja, Uganda 
24-28 Jan. 2006 2 
III Seminars and workshop Presentations    
 ‘Enhancing Social learning in Joint forest 
management situations: Experiences from 
Mafungautsi State Forest, North-Western 
Zimbabwe’ 
‘Understanding the contribution of the Adaptive 
Collaborative Management (ACM) extension 
approach in joint forest management situations. 
The Mafungautsi State Forest case, Zimbabwe’ 
‘Can We Learn Our Way to Sustainable 
Management? Adaptive Collaborative 
Management in Mafungautsi State Forest, 
Zimbabwe 
TAD Advanced 
Seminars, Wageningen 
University 
2007- 2010 
 
4 
 ‘Enhancing local organisational capacity in 
resource co-management situations. Experiences 
from Mafungautsi State Forest, Zimbabwe’ 
CERES, Utrecht 
University 
26th of June 2007 6 
 ‘Participatory Action Research Experiences in 
Zimbabwe’ 
IDRC, Nigeria 6 May 2008 2 
 ‘Participatory Action Research. Sharing 
experiences from Zimbabwe’ 
 Melkassa Agricultural 
Research Centre, 
Ethiopia 
29June – 3July 2009 2 
 ‘Experiences and challenges of doing 
Participatory Action Research in Mafunagusi 
State Forest, Zimbabwe’ 
Adama, Ethiopia 15 – 20 Nov. 2009 2 
Total   44 
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